Edwina, List: I just discovered that I sent this to Edwina only earlier today; I meant to send it to the List.
ET: I object to your view that my analysis of Peirce is not "an interpretation of Peirce's words". Your objection is noted. My point is that any careful and fair-minded comparison of your words with Peirce's reveals that what you are expressing is inconsistent with what he expressed, as I demonstrate (again) below. ET: My method is an integral part of my identity! So- you can't split up one's 'method' from one's identity! Freely choosing to tie your identity to your method is up to you, but again, I intended no *moral *judgment--just a *methodological *judgment, which is well within the bounds of scholarly discourse. Your assertions simply do not match up with Peirce's texts. ET: And - I don't 'assign views to Peirce that 'directly contradict him' - I've pointed out the texts - and your response is only that I am 'misreading' them. I disagree. You claim that Peirce's objective idealism *is not* a form of idealism. The relevant texts themselves plainly indicate that according to Peirce himself, his objective idealism *is* a form of idealism. Therefore, you assign views to Peirce that directly contradict his own words, presumably because you are misreading them. ET: You now suggest that I've never heard of 'subjective idealism'? I've been a professor for 30+ years, dealing in cognitive processes and societal organization - and I assure you - I've heard of it. Then why was it only *after *I introduced that term into the conversation that you began claiming that it is what Peirce meant by "idealism" (with no adjective) in CP 6.24? Note that I brought it up in response to your demand for a reason why Peirce called his position "objective idealism" in CP 6.25, rather than just "idealism." I have also pointed out that he *did* call it simply "idealism" in R 936:3, and "a Schelling-fashioned idealism" in CP 6.102. ET: You, however, still haven't explained 'objective idealism as you interpret it - instead you are using Peirce's definition of 'idealism' - which is NOT, in my view, the same as 'objective idealism'. This is more evidence of poor reading comprehension, since I have explained Peirce's objective idealism multiple times now. Let me spell it out for you in full. - In CP 6.24, Peirce identified four broad alternatives for a basic metaphysical doctrine--dualism, neutralism, materialism, and idealism. - Each of these candidates stipulates a different relationship between physical and psychical laws; i.e., between matter and mind. - The doctrine that matter and mind are "two radically different kinds of substance" is dualism, which Peirce explicitly rejected. - The doctrine that physical and psychical laws are "independent" and "on a par," and thus "both primordial," is neutralism; and Peirce invoked Ockham's Razor to dismiss it. - According to R 936:3, synechism also rules out both dualism and neutralism, because the acknowledged "disparateness" of matter and mind "is a mere matter of degree." - Put another way, "the synechist will not admit that physical and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct--whether as belonging to different categories of substance [dualism], or as entirely separate sides of one shield [neutralism],--but will insist that all phenomena are of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and regular" (CP 7.570). - The doctrine that "the psychical law [is] derived and special, the physical law alone [is] primordial"--i.e., that "*mind *is a peculiar kind of *matter*"--is materialism. - The doctrine that "the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] primordial"--i.e., that "*matter* is a peculiar kind of *mind*"--is idealism. - Peirce explicitly rejected materialism in CP 6.24 and associated it with nominalism in R 936:3, which in both cases left idealism as the only remaining option. - According to CP 6.25, "The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." - According to R 936:3, "if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of *idealism* ." - These two statements are directly parallel, confirming that *objective *idealism is a form of idealism; but it is distinguished from *subjective *idealism, which denies the reality of matter altogether. - Peirce elsewhere described his metaphysics as "a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312). In summary, in 1891-1892, Peirce labeled his own basic metaphysical doctrine as *idealism*--specifically, a *Schelling-fashioned* idealism; *objective *idealism, as opposed to *subjective *idealism. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 3:04 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, list > > I object to your view that my analysis of Peirce is not "an interpretation > of Peirce's words". I have pointed out how I derive this analysis - from > his texts. All you have the right to say - is that you disagree and that > YOUR interpretation is different. You have no authoritative right to > declare that your interpretation - and that's what it is - an > interpretation - is the RIGHT one. > > To say that one sticks to one's views by 'tenacity' rather than by using > 'the scientific method' is of course a description of my character - and is > a character flaw - and it is a trivial sidestep to say - oh, no, I'm not > speaking about YOU personally, only about your method'. My method is an > integral part of my identity! So- you can't split up one's 'method' from > one's identity! > > And - I don't 'assign views to Peirce that 'directly contradict him' - > I've pointed out the texts - and your response is only that I am > 'misreading' them. I disagree. > > Yes, I consider it unacceptable that you rewrote John Sowa's words, and > inserted my name, to make it seem as if he was referring to me. I think I > do have the right to comment on this - and need not wait for John Sowa to > comment. If you considered that his words referred to any and all - then, > you should have left them unchanged and not inserted my name or changed the > pronouns. > > You now suggest that I've never heard of 'subjective idealism'? I've been > a professor for 30+ years, dealing in cognitive processes and societal > organization - and I assure you - I've heard of it. You, however, still > haven't explained 'objective idealism as you interpret it - instead you > are using Peirce's definition of 'idealism' - which is NOT, in my view, the > same as 'objective idealism'. > > As I said - you and I interpret Peirce very differently. I don't think > that you have the right to say more than this - i.e., I don't think that > you have the right to declare that I am misreading, that my views have 'no > basis in the actual text'; and so on. All I can say about your analysis - > is that I disagree and provide the texts which I feel support my > interpretation. And all you can do - is exactly the same. But I don't think > that either of us has the right to be a 'final judge' of the 'truth' of > each interpretation. > > Edwina > > On Sun 04/08/19 3:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words ... > > > The problem is that your position is not an "interpretation of Peirce's > words," because it has no basis in his actual text. > > ET: The difference between us is 'hubris' ... > > > No, it is (apparently) basic reading comprehension. > > ET: ... you declare that mine is false and maintained only by a character > flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use of reason - which you maintain > that you hold]. > > > I said nothing whatsoever about your character, only about your method. > I am criticizing your specific claims, not attacking you as a person. > > ET: What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? > > > Like anyone else on the List, I have the authority/right to express my > opinion here, as long as it is related to Peirce. What gives you the > authority/right to assign views to him that directly contradict his own > statements? > > ET: I reject your moving into ad hominem. > > > I reject your accusation of ad hominem. Again, I have never resorted to > attacking anyone personally; instead, I have consistently stuck to the > substance, refuting unsupported assertions with verbatim quotations from > Peirce, as I do again below. > > ET: And I object to your misuse of the words of John Sowa - which were > directed against you - and rewriting them to make it seem as if he wrote > them against me. > > > John Sowa can speak for himself if he honestly thinks that I misused his > words. For one thing, why would you suggest that they were "directed > against" me or any other individual? On the contrary, I understood them to > be expressing general principles by which he believes that all of us > should abide. Otherwise, he would be advocating a double standard; why > would the "ground rules" be different for me than for anyone else? Some > additional comments of his from a few weeks back seems relevant here, as > well. > > JFS: Open debate in any and every community is always important ... There > is no authority. Any evaluation must be based on evidence and reasoning > about the evidence ... And the methodeutic requires a dialog. There should > always be a "devil's advocate" for challenging any claim. > > > No one should take it personally when someone challenges a specific > claim--especially when that challenge is accompanied by "evidence and > reasoning about the evidence," as mine has been in this case. The method > of science requires subjecting our fallible hypotheses to the scrutiny and > well-founded criticism of others. > > ET: Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is one > that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and matter as > derived from mind. > > > Based on how this exchange has gone, it appears to me that you had never > even heard of "subjective idealism" until I introduced it in my explanation > of why Peirce presumably wanted to distinguish his version of idealism from > that one. Moreover, you have persistently ignored the other relevant > passage that I have quoted several times now, which is unmistakably clear. > > CSP: The paradox here has always been that mind and matter are of > disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this disparateness > is a mere matter of degree. Either mind is a peculiar kind of matter, or > else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is it? If mind is nothing > but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is > much to be said,--we are landed in materialism, and nominalism is not > much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but > effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act > with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of > learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. > (R 936:3; no date) > > > The last sentence is directly parallel to how Peirce described "the one > intelligible theory of the universe" in CP 6.25--"that matter is effete > mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." According to Peirce's own > words, this view is "the more elevating theory of idealism"; > specifically, objective idealism that affirms the reality of matter as "a > peculiar sort of mind," rather than subjective idealism that denies the > reality of matter altogether. Both kinds of idealism affirm "the > physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" > (CP 6.24). > > ET: But his objective idealism is very different and defines neither as > primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and the indeterminacy > [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never separate or 'individual' > ... My meaning is that Matter only exists when it is organized into laws by > Mind; and Mind only exists when it is organizing Matter into laws. > > > This is not Peirce's objective idealism, it is your own construct, which > for some reason you wish to ascribe to him. Again, CP 6.24-25 says nothing > whatsoever about a fifth alternative to dualism, neutralism, materialism, > and idealism that involves matter and mind "co-evolving." According to > that text, if neither is primordial, then they are either "two radically > different kinds of substance" (dualism) or "independent" and "on a par" > (neutralism); and Peirce explicitly rejected both of these options. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 7:37 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words - I note that you stand by >> your interpretation. The difference between us is 'hubris'; you declare >> that your interpretation is true - while you declare that mine is false and >> maintained only by a character flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use >> of reason - which you maintain that you hold]. >> >> . What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? Both of >> us are interpreting Peirce - and neither of us has been able to convince >> the other of the validity of our views. That's as far as it can go. I >> reject your moving into ad hominem. And I object to your misuse of the >> words of John Sowa - which were directed against you - and rewriting them >> to make it seem as if he wrote them against me. >> >> Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is one >> that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and matter as >> derived from mind. But his objective idealism is very different and defines >> neither as primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and the >> indeterminacy [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never separate or >> 'individual'. >> >> This is not the same as Mind=Matter, and when I say that Mind becomes >> Matter/Matter becomes Mind - this simple phrase, perhaps too simple -- is >> not an equation of similarity or merging of identity. My meaning is that >> Matter only exists when it is organized into laws by Mind; and Mind only >> exists when it is organizing Matter into laws. >> >> This does not mean, as you suggest, that I mean that Matter exists >> outside of Mind; I didn't write that; I said that it exists outside of >> what YOU OR I think of them - but it doesn't exist outside of Mind. >> >> I repeat - both of us are equal interpreters of Peirce. We haven't been >> able to convince each other of the validity of our different >> interpretations of Peirce. That's as far as any debate should go. I don't >> see that an argument based on a self-assertion that one's interpretation is >> the Truth, while the other person's interpretation is due to their >> 'misreading' and 'tenacity' - is a valid argument. >> >> Edwina >> >
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