Jon, Edwina, list, JAS wrote: "In summary, in 1891-1892, Peirce labeled his own basic metaphysical doctrine as *idealism*--specifically, a *Schelling-fashioned* idealism; *objective *idealism, as opposed to *subjective *idealism."
It should be obvious from my own previous messages in this thread on the topic that I fully concur with Jon's conclusion in general and in the particulars he outlined. Indeed, we have both been making the same points based on many of the same quotations (JAS adding a few which I did not reproduce), making exactly the same argument, and arriving at exactly the same conclusion. I might add that I do not know of any others in the secondary literature who argue any differently. If I'm mistaken about this, please provide sources and quotations which contradict what Jon and I have been arguing. As I've repeatedly said in this thread, one may disagree with Peirce on this matter of 'objective idealism', but it is clear from the source material, that what Jon and I have been arguing amounts to little more than a paraphrase of Peirce's position in the matter. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, Aug 5, 2019 at 12:11 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > I just discovered that I sent this to Edwina only earlier today; I meant > to send it to the List. > > ET: I object to your view that my analysis of Peirce is not "an > interpretation of Peirce's words". > > > Your objection is noted. My point is that any careful and fair-minded > comparison of your words with Peirce's reveals that what you are expressing > is inconsistent with what he expressed, as I demonstrate (again) below. > > ET: My method is an integral part of my identity! So- you can't split up > one's 'method' from one's identity! > > > Freely choosing to tie your identity to your method is up to you, but > again, I intended no *moral *judgment--just a *methodological *judgment, > which is well within the bounds of scholarly discourse. Your assertions > simply do not match up with Peirce's texts. > > ET: And - I don't 'assign views to Peirce that 'directly contradict him' > - I've pointed out the texts - and your response is only that I am > 'misreading' them. I disagree. > > > You claim that Peirce's objective idealism *is not* a form of idealism. > The relevant texts themselves plainly indicate that according to Peirce > himself, his objective idealism *is* a form of idealism. Therefore, you > assign views to Peirce that directly contradict his own words, presumably > because you are misreading them. > > ET: You now suggest that I've never heard of 'subjective idealism'? I've > been a professor for 30+ years, dealing in cognitive processes and societal > organization - and I assure you - I've heard of it. > > > Then why was it only *after *I introduced that term into the conversation > that you began claiming that it is what Peirce meant by "idealism" (with no > adjective) in CP 6.24? Note that I brought it up in response to your > demand for a reason why Peirce called his position "objective idealism" in > CP 6.25, rather than just "idealism." I have also pointed out that he > *did* call it simply "idealism" in R 936:3, and "a Schelling-fashioned > idealism" in CP 6.102. > > ET: You, however, still haven't explained 'objective idealism as you > interpret it - instead you are using Peirce's definition of 'idealism' - > which is NOT, in my view, the same as 'objective idealism'. > > > This is more evidence of poor reading comprehension, since I have > explained Peirce's objective idealism multiple times now. Let me spell it > out for you in full. > > - In CP 6.24, Peirce identified four broad alternatives for a basic > metaphysical doctrine--dualism, neutralism, materialism, and idealism. > - Each of these candidates stipulates a different relationship between > physical and psychical laws; i.e., between matter and mind. > - The doctrine that matter and mind are "two radically different kinds > of substance" is dualism, which Peirce explicitly rejected. > - The doctrine that physical and psychical laws are "independent" and > "on a par," and thus "both primordial," is neutralism; and Peirce invoked > Ockham's Razor to dismiss it. > - According to R 936:3, synechism also rules out both dualism and > neutralism, because the acknowledged "disparateness" of matter and mind "is > a mere matter of degree." > - Put another way, "the synechist will not admit that physical and > psychical phenomena are entirely distinct--whether as belonging to > different categories of substance [dualism], or as entirely separate sides > of one shield [neutralism],--but will insist that all phenomena are of one > character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more > material and regular" (CP 7.570). > - The doctrine that "the psychical law [is] derived and special, the > physical law alone [is] primordial"--i.e., that "*mind *is a peculiar > kind of *matter*"--is materialism. > - The doctrine that "the physical law [is] derived and special, the > psychical law alone [is] primordial"--i.e., that "*matter* is a > peculiar kind of *mind*"--is idealism. > - Peirce explicitly rejected materialism in CP 6.24 and associated it > with nominalism in R 936:3, which in both cases left idealism as the only > remaining option. > - According to CP 6.25, "The one intelligible theory of the universe > is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate > habits becoming physical laws." > - According to R 936:3, "if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but > effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act > with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of > learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of > *idealism*." > - These two statements are directly parallel, confirming that > *objective *idealism is a form of idealism; but it is distinguished > from *subjective *idealism, which denies the reality of matter > altogether. > - Peirce elsewhere described his metaphysics as "a Schelling-fashioned > idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened > mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312). > > In summary, in 1891-1892, Peirce labeled his own basic metaphysical > doctrine as *idealism*--specifically, a *Schelling-fashioned* idealism; > *objective *idealism, as opposed to *subjective *idealism. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 3:04 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> I object to your view that my analysis of Peirce is not "an >> interpretation of Peirce's words". I have pointed out how I derive this >> analysis - from his texts. All you have the right to say - is that you >> disagree and that YOUR interpretation is different. You have no >> authoritative right to declare that your interpretation - and that's what >> it is - an interpretation - is the RIGHT one. >> >> To say that one sticks to one's views by 'tenacity' rather than by using >> 'the scientific method' is of course a description of my character - and is >> a character flaw - and it is a trivial sidestep to say - oh, no, I'm not >> speaking about YOU personally, only about your method'. My method is an >> integral part of my identity! So- you can't split up one's 'method' from >> one's identity! >> >> And - I don't 'assign views to Peirce that 'directly contradict him' - >> I've pointed out the texts - and your response is only that I am >> 'misreading' them. I disagree. >> >> Yes, I consider it unacceptable that you rewrote John Sowa's words, and >> inserted my name, to make it seem as if he was referring to me. I think I >> do have the right to comment on this - and need not wait for John Sowa to >> comment. If you considered that his words referred to any and all - then, >> you should have left them unchanged and not inserted my name or changed the >> pronouns. >> >> You now suggest that I've never heard of 'subjective idealism'? I've been >> a professor for 30+ years, dealing in cognitive processes and societal >> organization - and I assure you - I've heard of it. You, however, still >> haven't explained 'objective idealism as you interpret it - instead you >> are using Peirce's definition of 'idealism' - which is NOT, in my view, the >> same as 'objective idealism'. >> >> As I said - you and I interpret Peirce very differently. I don't think >> that you have the right to say more than this - i.e., I don't think that >> you have the right to declare that I am misreading, that my views have 'no >> basis in the actual text'; and so on. All I can say about your analysis - >> is that I disagree and provide the texts which I feel support my >> interpretation. And all you can do - is exactly the same. But I don't think >> that either of us has the right to be a 'final judge' of the 'truth' of >> each interpretation. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Sun 04/08/19 3:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words ... >> >> >> The problem is that your position is not an "interpretation of Peirce's >> words," because it has no basis in his actual text. >> >> ET: The difference between us is 'hubris' ... >> >> >> No, it is (apparently) basic reading comprehension. >> >> ET: ... you declare that mine is false and maintained only by a >> character flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use of reason - which you >> maintain that you hold]. >> >> >> I said nothing whatsoever about your character, only about your method. >> I am criticizing your specific claims, not attacking you as a person. >> >> ET: What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? >> >> >> Like anyone else on the List, I have the authority/right to express my >> opinion here, as long as it is related to Peirce. What gives you the >> authority/right to assign views to him that directly contradict his own >> statements? >> >> ET: I reject your moving into ad hominem. >> >> >> I reject your accusation of ad hominem. Again, I have never resorted to >> attacking anyone personally; instead, I have consistently stuck to the >> substance, refuting unsupported assertions with verbatim quotations from >> Peirce, as I do again below. >> >> ET: And I object to your misuse of the words of John Sowa - which were >> directed against you - and rewriting them to make it seem as if he wrote >> them against me. >> >> >> John Sowa can speak for himself if he honestly thinks that I misused his >> words. For one thing, why would you suggest that they were "directed >> against" me or any other individual? On the contrary, I understood them to >> be expressing general principles by which he believes that all of us >> should abide. Otherwise, he would be advocating a double standard; why >> would the "ground rules" be different for me than for anyone else? Some >> additional comments of his from a few weeks back seems relevant here, as >> well. >> >> JFS: Open debate in any and every community is always important ... >> There is no authority. Any evaluation must be based on evidence and >> reasoning about the evidence ... And the methodeutic requires a dialog. >> There should always be a "devil's advocate" for challenging any claim. >> >> >> No one should take it personally when someone challenges a specific >> claim--especially when that challenge is accompanied by "evidence and >> reasoning about the evidence," as mine has been in this case. The method >> of science requires subjecting our fallible hypotheses to the scrutiny and >> well-founded criticism of others. >> >> ET: Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is >> one that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and >> matter as derived from mind. >> >> >> Based on how this exchange has gone, it appears to me that you had never >> even heard of "subjective idealism" until I introduced it in my explanation >> of why Peirce presumably wanted to distinguish his version of idealism from >> that one. Moreover, you have persistently ignored the other relevant >> passage that I have quoted several times now, which is unmistakably clear. >> >> CSP: The paradox here has always been that mind and matter are of >> disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this disparateness >> is a mere matter of degree. Either mind is a peculiar kind of matter, >> or else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is it? If mind is >> nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory >> there is much to be said,--we are landed in materialism, and nominalism >> is not much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is >> nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit >> as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of >> forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory >> of idealism. (R 936:3; no date) >> >> >> The last sentence is directly parallel to how Peirce described "the one >> intelligible theory of the universe" in CP 6.25--"that matter is effete >> mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." According to Peirce's own >> words, this view is "the more elevating theory of idealism"; >> specifically, objective idealism that affirms the reality of matter as >> "a peculiar sort of mind," rather than subjective idealism that denies the >> reality of matter altogether. Both kinds of idealism affirm "the >> physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" >> (CP 6.24). >> >> ET: But his objective idealism is very different and defines neither as >> primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and the indeterminacy >> [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never separate or 'individual' >> ... My meaning is that Matter only exists when it is organized into laws by >> Mind; and Mind only exists when it is organizing Matter into laws. >> >> >> This is not Peirce's objective idealism, it is your own construct, which >> for some reason you wish to ascribe to him. Again, CP 6.24-25 says nothing >> whatsoever about a fifth alternative to dualism, neutralism, materialism, >> and idealism that involves matter and mind "co-evolving." According to >> that text, if neither is primordial, then they are either "two radically >> different kinds of substance" (dualism) or "independent" and "on a par" >> (neutralism); and Peirce explicitly rejected both of these options. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 7:37 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> JAS, list >>> >>> I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words - I note that you stand >>> by your interpretation. The difference between us is 'hubris'; you declare >>> that your interpretation is true - while you declare that mine is false and >>> maintained only by a character flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use >>> of reason - which you maintain that you hold]. >>> >>> . What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? Both of >>> us are interpreting Peirce - and neither of us has been able to convince >>> the other of the validity of our views. That's as far as it can go. I >>> reject your moving into ad hominem. And I object to your misuse of the >>> words of John Sowa - which were directed against you - and rewriting them >>> to make it seem as if he wrote them against me. >>> >>> Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is one >>> that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and matter as >>> derived from mind. But his objective idealism is very different and defines >>> neither as primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and the >>> indeterminacy [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never separate or >>> 'individual'. >>> >>> This is not the same as Mind=Matter, and when I say that Mind becomes >>> Matter/Matter becomes Mind - this simple phrase, perhaps too simple -- is >>> not an equation of similarity or merging of identity. My meaning is that >>> Matter only exists when it is organized into laws by Mind; and Mind only >>> exists when it is organizing Matter into laws. >>> >>> This does not mean, as you suggest, that I mean that Matter exists >>> outside of Mind; I didn't write that; I said that it exists outside of >>> what YOU OR I think of them - but it doesn't exist outside of Mind. >>> >>> I repeat - both of us are equal interpreters of Peirce. We haven't been >>> able to convince each other of the validity of our different >>> interpretations of Peirce. That's as far as any debate should go. I don't >>> see that an argument based on a self-assertion that one's interpretation is >>> the Truth, while the other person's interpretation is due to their >>> 'misreading' and 'tenacity' - is a valid argument. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>
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