Edwina, List: ET: You are merging 'idealism' and 'objective idealism' and the two are not synonyms of each other.
Of course they are not synonyms; as I already explained, *objective *idealism is one *variety *of idealism, and *subjective *idealism is another. Peirce was distinguishing his "Schelling-fashioned" idealism, which *affirms *the reality of matter, from other versions of idealism that *deny *it. ET: You are rejecting his synechism [see 7.570] which "will not admit that the physical and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct...etc.. Nonsense, I have consistently acknowledged that physical and psychical phenomena are not *entirely *distinct. As Peirce himself affirmed, that is precisely because the physical is *derived from* the psychical--"matter is effete mind" and "mere specialized and partially deadened mind"--such that "the psychical law alone [is] primordial, which is idealism." This is all perfectly consistent with his synechism. Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 1:45 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, list > > Again, I disagree with your interpretation. You are merging 'idealism' and > 'objective idealism' and the two are not synonyms of each other. > > I disagree that Peirce sees 'Mind as more fundamental than Matter'. You > are rejecting his synechism [see 7.570] which "will not admit that the > physical and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct...etc.. > > Furthermore, your pure idealism cannot function as a complex adaptive > system - and Peirce's semiosis is exactly that. > > And I'm still waiting for your clarification of vol 2;322 - I can't find > that section, and certainly can't find where Peirce inserted the categories > in brackets . > > As I've said before - you and I interpret Peirce quite differently and I > don't see that these continued back and forth statements are going to > convince either of us to change these interpretations. > > Edwina > > On Sat 03/08/19 1:03 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special, the > psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he did NOT > say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as primordial; and the > physical as derived. > > > On the contrary, he plainly stated that he DID accept this. According to > the text, once dualism is dismissed in favor of monism, there are three > remaining options--neutralism, materialism, and idealism. Three paragraphs > follow; the first rejects materialism, the second rejects neutralism, and > the third endorses (objective) idealism. Just previously (CP 6.23), > Peirce had equated the mental law or law of mind with the law of habit, and > had contrasted it with the absolute and exact nature of physical law. > Therefore, "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" is just another way > of characterizing "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical > law alone as primordial, which is idealism." > > ET: Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism' [and > I'm not sure what that means] - please explain the difference between > 'idealism' and 'objective idealism'. > > > The adjective "objective" distinguishes Peirce's "Schelling-fashioned > idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened > mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892) from the subjective idealism of > Berkeley and others, which holds that there is only mind; i.e., there is > no such thing as matter at all. In other words, Peirce affirmed the reality > of matter; however, his statements that "matter is effete mind" and that > matter is "mere specialized and partially deadened mind" both entail that > mind is more fundamental than matter; i.e., "the physical law as derived > and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism." > > Rejecting this requires embracing one of the other three > alternatives--dualism, with matter and mind as "two radically different > kinds of substance"; neutralism, with matter and mind "both primordial"; or > materialism, with "the psychical law as derived and special, the physical > law alone as primordial." Deacon's subtitle suggests that unlike Peirce, > he adheres to the last of these. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:49 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism' [and I'm >> not sure what that means] - please explain the difference between >> 'idealism' and 'objective idealism'. I don't object to the term of >> 'idealism' in the phrase of 'objective idealism' - but I DO object to any >> notion that this term means that either Mind or Matter is primordial. >> >> Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special, the >> psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he did NOT >> say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as primordial; and the >> physical as derived. >> >> Instead, he wrote" the one intelligible theory of the universe is that >> of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate bits becoming >> physical laws". This is absolutely not the same as idealism; there is no >> mention of primordial and no mention of mind as privileged. >> >> And - you haven't referenced 2.322 as I asked. I can't find that section >> and certainly, Peirce didn't insert the categories in brackets. >> >> As for whether or not my views are 'absurd' - I don't think I need such >> terms applied to me. My interpretation of Peirce is different from yours. >> Period. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Sat 03/08/19 11:38 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: I feel that your view of Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than >> 'objective idealism' is in line with your own personal theism. >> >> >> I feel that your view of Peirce, with its absurd claim that objective >> idealism is somehow not a species of idealism, is in line with your own >> personal atheism. >> >> ET: Now - whether these views are also similar to those of Peirce - is a >> matter for debate. >> >> >> No, again, Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text of CP >> 6.24-25--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism; >> specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as >> primordial" and "that matter is effete mind." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:27 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> JAS, list >>> >>> I cannot find that section in 2.322 where Peirce inserts, in brackets >>> that, eg, 'consciousness' is [1ns]...etc - and I disagree with such an >>> insertion. Firstness is feeling, without consciousness - which requires a >>> separation of the experience such that one can be conscious of it. A >>> paramecium 'feels', i.e., is in a state of 1ns, but is not conscious of it. >>> >>> I also disagree that 'pure mind' is 3ns. Thirdness is a specific aspect >>> of time and space and habit-formation. It is not a pre-existent [prior to >>> space and time, ie, material embodiment] set of laws or mind. >>> >>> The more I read your comments and your inserts - I feel that your view >>> of Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than 'objective idealism' is in line >>> with your own personal theism. Now - whether these views are also similar >>> to those of Peirce - is a matter for debate. You, of course, consider them >>> similar. I consider them very dissimilar. So- that's where it's at. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Sat 03/08/19 11:00 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>> sent: >>> >>> Helmut, List: >>> >>> On the contrary, according to Peirce, the necessary being of pure mind >>> (3ns) does not require time, space, or matter. >>> >>> CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was >>> in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction >>> [2ns] and no quality [1ns], no matter [2ns], no consciousness [1ns], no >>> space and no time, but just nothing at all. Not determinately nothing. For >>> that which is determinately not A supposes the being of A in some mode. >>> Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, >>> Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol [3ns]. >>> That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. >>> (EP 2:322; 1904) >>> >>> >>> CSP: Thus, He [God] is so much like a mind [3ns], and so little like a >>> singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing >>> subject to brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents [2ns],) >>> and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility [1ns], that we may >>> loosely say that He is a Spirit, or Mind [3ns]. (R 843:27[5]; 1908) >>> >>> >>> CSP: A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens >>> necessarium would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be >>> given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since >>> all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every >>> previous time. (CP 6.490; 1908) >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 5:32 PM Helmut Raulien < [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> List, >>>> >>>> I think, Edwina is right, because anything that happens, like an action >>>> of a mind, requires time, and time needs a scale, and a scale needs >>>> boundary conditions. These may be a standstill on one side, and light >>>> velocity, or something else, maybe infinity, on the other. So i guess, >>>> there cannot be a mind at work (at some certain, or any, speed) without the >>>> concept of standstill or effeteness, which would be matter. Also, a mind >>>> does not only require time, but space too, and space and matter are two >>>> things that, according to Einstein, are prerequisites for each other, as >>>> you, I forgot who, already have mentioned. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>>
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