Edwina, List: ET: I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words ...
The problem is that your position is *not *an "interpretation of Peirce's words," because it has *no basis* in his actual text. ET: The difference between us is 'hubris' ... No, it is (apparently) basic reading comprehension. ET: ... you declare that mine is false and maintained only by a character flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use of reason - which you maintain that you hold]. I said nothing whatsoever about your *character*, only about your *method*. I am criticizing your specific *claims*, not attacking *you *as a person. ET: What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? Like anyone else on the List, I have the authority/right to express my opinion here, as long as it is related to Peirce. What gives you the authority/right to assign views to him that directly contradict his own statements? ET: I reject your moving into ad hominem. I reject your accusation of *ad hominem*. Again, I have *never *resorted to attacking anyone personally; instead, I have *consistently *stuck to the substance, refuting unsupported assertions with verbatim quotations from Peirce, as I do again below. ET: And I object to your misuse of the words of John Sowa - which were directed against you - and rewriting them to make it seem as if he wrote them against me. John Sowa can speak for himself if he honestly thinks that I misused his words. For one thing, why would you suggest that they were "directed against" me or any other individual? On the contrary, I understood them to be expressing *general *principles by which he believes that *all of us* should abide. Otherwise, he would be advocating a double standard; why would the "ground rules" be different for me than for anyone else? Some additional comments of his from a few weeks back seems relevant here, as well. JFS: Open debate in any and every community is always important ... There is no authority. Any evaluation must be based on evidence and reasoning about the evidence ... And the methodeutic requires a dialog. There should always be a "devil's advocate" for challenging any claim. No one should take it personally when someone challenges a specific claim--especially when that challenge is accompanied by "evidence and reasoning about the evidence," as mine has been in this case. The method of science requires subjecting our fallible hypotheses to the scrutiny and well-founded criticism of others. ET: Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is one that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and matter as derived from mind. Based on how this exchange has gone, it appears to me that you had never even heard of "subjective idealism" until I introduced it in my explanation of why Peirce presumably wanted to distinguish his version of idealism from that one. Moreover, you have persistently ignored the *other *relevant passage that I have quoted several times now, which is unmistakably clear. CSP: The paradox here has always been that *mind* and *matter* are of disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this disparateness is a mere matter of degree. Either *mind* is a peculiar kind of *matter*, or else *matter* is a peculiar sort of *mind*. Which is it? If mind is nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are landed in *materialism*, and nominalism is not much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of *idealism*. (R 936:3; no date) The last sentence is directly parallel to how Peirce described "the one intelligible theory of the universe" in CP 6.25--"that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." According to Peirce's own words, this view is "the more elevating theory of *idealism*"; specifically, *objective *idealism that *affirms *the reality of matter as "a peculiar sort of *mind*," rather than *subjective *idealism that *denies *the reality of matter altogether. *Both *kinds of idealism affirm "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24). ET: But his objective idealism is very different and defines neither as primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and the indeterminacy [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never separate or 'individual' ... My meaning is that Matter only exists when it is organized into laws by Mind; and Mind only exists when it is organizing Matter into laws. This is not *Peirce's *objective idealism, it is *your own* construct, which for some reason you wish to ascribe to him. Again, CP 6.24-25 says nothing whatsoever about a fifth alternative to dualism, neutralism, materialism, and idealism that involves matter and mind "co-evolving." According to that text, if neither is primordial, then they are either "two radically different kinds of substance" (dualism) or "independent" and "on a par" (neutralism); and Peirce explicitly rejected both of these options. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 7:37 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > JAS, list > > I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words - I note that you stand by > your interpretation. The difference between us is 'hubris'; you declare > that your interpretation is true - while you declare that mine is false and > maintained only by a character flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use > of reason - which you maintain that you hold]. > > . What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? Both of us > are interpreting Peirce - and neither of us has been able to convince the > other of the validity of our views. That's as far as it can go. I reject > your moving into ad hominem. And I object to your misuse of the words of > John Sowa - which were directed against you - and rewriting them to make it > seem as if he wrote them against me. > > Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is one that > applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and matter as > derived from mind. But his objective idealism is very different and defines > neither as primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and the > indeterminacy [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never separate or > 'individual'. > > This is not the same as Mind=Matter, and when I say that Mind becomes > Matter/Matter becomes Mind - this simple phrase, perhaps too simple -- is > not an equation of similarity or merging of identity. My meaning is that > Matter only exists when it is organized into laws by Mind; and Mind only > exists when it is organizing Matter into laws. > > This does not mean, as you suggest, that I mean that Matter exists outside > of Mind; I didn't write that; I said that it exists outside of what YOU OR > I think of them - but it doesn't exist outside of Mind. > > I repeat - both of us are equal interpreters of Peirce. We haven't been > able to convince each other of the validity of our different > interpretations of Peirce. That's as far as any debate should go. I don't > see that an argument based on a self-assertion that one's interpretation is > the Truth, while the other person's interpretation is due to their > 'misreading' and 'tenacity' - is a valid argument. > > Edwina >
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