John, List: JFS: But in order to understand the issues, it's essential to relate what Peirce wrote to his sources and to his successors.
It is also essential, as you have emphasized before, to read carefully and interpret faithfully what Peirce *actually wrote*--and not attribute positions to him that he never said, meant, implied, or intended. JFS: For a discussion of Schelling's influence on Peirce's objective idealism, I recommend two articles by David Dilworth: Thank you for those links. What Dilworth says about T. L. Short in the first paper is exactly what I have been saying about Edwina. DD: Short of course is free to develop a positive alternative to Peirce’s system. It would be in the spirit of Peirce’s philosophy to welcome and cherish his endeavor. Be that as it may. But as a bottom line, Short’s article plays fast and loose with Peirce’s own text. It does not adequately represents [*sic*] Peirce’s “completely developed system” of “Schelling-fashioned objective idealism” ... (p. 70) This should put to rest once and for all the complaint that it is somehow illegitimate to deem someone else's "reading" or "interpretation" of Peirce as inaccurate, and therefore invalid. It happens all the time in the secondary literature. JFS: The similarities of Logos, Tao, and Dharma is recognized by many philosophers and theologians. I have not disputed this. Again, equating any two (or three) of the terms within a particular context and for a particular purpose is a very different proposition from equating all of them without qualification. The latter assertion is neither vague nor certain. JFS: The word 'primordial' is another vague term. Google's online dictionary suggests two potentially relevant definitions--"existing at or from the beginning of time" and "(especially of a state or quality) basic and fundamental." Peirce's summary of objective idealism--"that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws"--clearly asserts that mind is "basic and fundamental," such that matter is derived from it; and that habits (psychical laws) existed "from the beginning of time," while physical laws evolved later. In other words, in both senses of the word "primordial," Peirce's view was that "the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] primordial, which is *idealism*" (CP 6.24; 1891). JFS: Since Peirce claimed that matter is effete mind, that implies that matter is a kind of mind. It does not come after mind. That would support Edwina's point. The implication that "matter is a kind of mind" entails that mind is more "basic and fundamental" than matter; i.e., that mind is *logically *primordial (second definition) relative to matter. The description of "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" implies that physical laws come about after habits; i.e., that psychical laws are *temporally *primordial (first definition) relative to physical laws. That *refutes *Edwina's point. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Aug 5, 2019 at 1:56 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, Jon, and Edwina, > > GR > > It should be obvious from my own previous messages in this thread > > on the topic that I fully concur with Jon's conclusion in general > > and in the particulars he outlined. Indeed, we have both been making > > the same points based on many of the same quotations > > Yes, that's obvious. It's always the same quotations. But in order > to understand the issues, it's essential to relate what Peirce wrote > to his sources and to his successors. > > > JFS: Many philosophers and theologians of various persuasions > > agree with that equation at a "sufficiently vague" level. > > > > JAS: but your claim was that it is vague enough to be certain, > > which I continue to deny. > > The starting equation is Theos = Logos. The criterion for certainty > is Peirce's: "It is easy to be certain. One has only to be > sufficiently vague." > > For the definitions of the terms, we can use the ones that Peirce wrote > for _The Century Dictionary_. See the attached idealism.jpg, which > contains his definitions for 'idealism', 'objective idealism', etc. > > CSP, Century Dictionary > > idealism 1. The metaphysical doctrine that the real is of the nature > > of thought; the doctrine that all reality is in its nature psychical. > > ... > > Objective idealism. the doctrine of F. W. J. von Schelling (1775-1854) > > that the relation between the subject and object of thought is one of > > absolute identity. It supposes that all things exist in the absolute > > reason, that matter is extinct mind, and that the laws of physics are > > the same as those of mental representations. > > For more detail, see idealism.jpg. It also includes Peirce's > definitions of other varieties of idealism, including Kant's > transcendental idealism. An interesting example is ideal-realism, > which C. S. Peirce attributes to B. Peirce. That was probably > a version that he discussed with his father while they were both > studying Kant. > > For a discussion of Schelling's influence on Peirce's objective > idealism, I recommend two articles by David Dilworth: > > https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/db5f/2d660a8ee2f64eeef4d85033922ca38f6cc8.pdf > > http://www.commens.org/sites/default/files/biblio_attachments/peirces_schelling-fashioned_critique_of_hegel.pdf > > For more background, I recommend _On the History of Modern Philosophy_ > by Schelling (152 pages) with a 40-page intro by the translator. > Schelling begins with Descartes's dualism and Spinoza's monism. > > Spinoza had a huge influence on German idealism, which led many > religious and political leaders to denounce pantheism as a version > of atheism. Any philosopher in Germany who was accused of atheism > could be ousted from any university. Even Kant felt the danger. > > Schelling's history is based on lectures he presented in 1833 and > 1834, which were attended by many leading philosophers of the day. > He was very careful to develop a version of monism that supported > the development of science while avoiding an accusation of atheism. > Peirce would find that quite congenial. > > The similarities of Logos, Tao, and Dharma is recognized by many > philosophers and theologians. I mentioned that 'Tao' is the > translation of 'Logos' in Chinese versions of the New Testament. > In any case, Peirce's definition of 'idealism' is sufficiently > broad (or vague) to include them. > > If anyone needs more evidence, consider the writings of the Catholic > monk, Thomas Merton. He wrote extensively about varieties of mystical > experience, East and West. And he observed that the descriptions of > their mystical experiences were very similar. Merton also wrote his > own translation of Lao Zi's book of the Tao. > > Peirce also had a mystical experience at the church of St. Thomas > in New York. That could have affected his feelings, as expressed > in various writings, especially the Neglected Argument. Merton's > analyses would support a similarity of Peirce's experience with > others around the world. > > For an equation of Peirce's Objective Idealism with Whitehead's > process philosophy, Hartshorne's process theology is good evidence. > Gary R said that the details of the writings by Peirce, Whitehead, > and Hartshorne are very different. I agree. But at the level of > the definitions in idealism.jpg, the equation stands. > > For more evidence on that point, I recommend the article "From Kant > to Schelling to process metaphysics" by Arran Gare: > > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282232558_From_Kant_to_Schelling_to_Process_Metaphysics_On_the_Way_to_Ecological_Civilization > > Gare calls both Peirce and Whitehead "process metaphysicians", and > he discusses their similarities to Schelling. > > ET > > My reading of Peirce is that 'objective idealism' means that Mind is not > > primordial but emerges with Matter as Matter emerges after the first > > chaos. Mind emerges as evolving habits within 'the material Object' . > > The word 'primordial' is another vague term. If it is taken in the > sense of "prior in time", it cannot be defined in the absence of > matter, since the laws of physics define time in terms of the > motions of matter. If it is defined in terms of logical dependence, > it is based on the laws or Logos. > > Since Peirce claimed that matter is effete mind, that implies > that matter is a kind of mind. It does not come after mind. > That would support Edwina's point. > > In any case, all the terminology is "sufficiently vague" to comply > with Peirce's criterion for certainty. Therefore, I repeat: > > Theos = Logos = Tao = Dharma = Natura = God of Spinoza, Einstein... > > John >
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