Gary F, list:
I agree with your outline of both anticipation and what I call the
'umbrella' form of the semiosic triad.
First - the concept of 'anticipation' is not confined to the realm
of biosemiotics, though it is absolutely vital in that area. As I've
often referred to on this list, the concept of anticipation has been
researched in physics, AI, biology and social infrastructures for
some years now. I've referred to on this list the excellent
conferences on Computing Anticipatory Systems, arranged by Daniel
Dubois in Liege, Belgium - which have been going on for years, with
publication of papers in AIP. The disciplines in these outstanding
meetings are - just about everything, with mathematics, physics,
biology, economics, societal systems, linguistics etc.
The point about anticipation is that it can be found in all systems
that are not mechanical. That is, it moves a system out of being
locked into the specifics of present time and the direct local
interactions of Secondness - and we DO need such certainty in our
lives, ie, that we can directly interact with our environment ---
into the realm of the 'imaginary' where we can analyze and choose our
actions without risk to our material reality.
As I wrote on this list on June 13:
" And note -the system has the capacity for not one mode of thought
but for diverse modes of thought [Thirdness]. That is, there are three
modes of Thirdness. The genuine Thirdness enables the system to
anticipate/imagine the future without risk-taking; it's pure
'thought' without the risks of actualization.
Thirdness in a mode of Secondness [3-2] enables the system to
connect to multiple indexical sites of actual existent information,
so that the system can gather current data, evaluate it - and make
a choice about its next actions. Thirdness in a mode of Firstness
[3-1] enables the system to make a choice that will be common
[iconic] to others.[Induction] ..and thus increase the power of that
set of individuals. I think the power of three modes of thought
cannot be underestimated."
By the way- Thirdness in a mode of Firstness could have similarities
to the 'mind-fusion' that John Sowa discussed, with his very
interesting referenced article today.
As for the what I call umbrella image of the triad, that -
Jon, Gary, list,
For my purposes in Turning Signs (other than quoting Peirce), the
term “retroduction” works better than “abduction” because its
prefix is more metaphorical, so that it integrates better with the
central diagram of biosemiosis which I call the meaning cycle [1].
It’s the part of the cycle complementary to the “prediction”
practiced by anticipatory systems.
This past week i've been revisiting some variants of that diagram
found in my sources, starting with Robert Rosen's “modeling
relation” diagram which was the original inspiration for mine.
There's a note in the “Comminding” section [2] which shows how
Rosen's diagram of the modeling process in scientific inquiry also
communicates the biosemiotic idea of anticipatory systems. I've added
to that a diagram (with explanation) by Floyd Merrell which clarifies,
among other things, the Peircean idea that an interpreter is also an
interpretant sign – an idea discussed on the list this past week.
Merrell's is also the only cyclic process diagram i know of that
includes the “tripod” diagram of the O-S-I relation. I thought
some list members might be interested in that, hence the link above.
(There are also some links within the text itself that might be
helpful in exploring the ideas.)
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Jun-20 20:07
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea
Gary R., Gary F., List:
Upon reflection, I was indeed too hasty and dismissive in my initial
responses, for which I sincerely apologize. As I only belatedly
acknowledged, "abduction" may be more suitable in certain contexts
than "retroduction," which Peirce himself evidently recognized. In
particular, I agree that his preference for the latter applies
primarily to the logical notion of "reasoning from consequent to
antecedent" (CP 6.469, EP 2:441, 1908) in order to explain
something, especially in scientific contexts where "the well-prepared
mind has wonderfully soon guessed each secret of nature" (CP 6.476, EP
2:444; presumably this is the quote that Gary R. had in mind).
What this has in common with "moments of 'pure inspiration'" in the
arts and humanities is that the basis of assurance is instinct,
rather than experience or form. Such signs belong to the class that
Peirce calls "abducent" in one of the taxonomies that he wrote in his
Logic Notebook (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31), and as far as I know,
he never proposes "retroducent" as an alternative. From that
standpoint, "abduction" does seem to be potentially broader in
meaning than "retroduction," as you both have been suggesting. I was
wrong to assert otherwise.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4]
On Sat, Jun 20, 2020 at 5:49 PM Gary Richmond <
[email protected] [5]> wrote:
Jon, Gary F., List,
As a supplement to my last post, I've cut and pasted excerpts from
some of the definitions of 'retroduction' which can be found in the
Commens Dictionary.
I'm putting the last dated definition from the dIctionary first
because it tends to make an important point I've been trying to get
at, and it does it most simply and plainly, that point being that, as
I see it, 'Retroduction' is best thought of as a kind of reasoning,
that it works to form "an explanatory hypothesis." And while in the
early history of our movement from superstition to science it may
have amounted to little more than guessing (but guessing out of
experience), that as science advances, it is a "prepared mind" (I
looking for a quotation related to that idea of the prepared
scientific mind) steeped in the science in which it is making perhaps
bold conjectures, say, in quantum theory, that retroductively arrives
at a hypothesis. Retroduction is not in and of itself a hypothesis
but rather the consequence of retroduction. Or to state it otherwise,
retroduction is the type of inference which results in a hypothesis
being formed, the actual hypothesis being the product of
retroductive inference, an intellectual process. And that is why
retroduction is given as one of the three stages of a complete
inquiry according to Peirce.
nd | Logic: Fragments [R] | MS [R] S64
There are three stages of inquiry, demanding as many different kinds
of reasoning governed by different principles. They are,
1, Retroduction, forming an explanatory hypothesis[;]
2, Deduction, tracing out the consequences that would ensue upon the
truth or falsity of that hypothesis; and
3, Induction, the experimental testing of the hypothesis by
inquiring whether its consequences are born out by fact, or not.
Retroduction
The recommendations of an explanatory hypothesis are
1st, verifiability; 2nd, simplicity; 3rd, economy.
1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The
First Rule of Logic | RLT 170; CP 5.581
As for retroduction, it is itself an experiment. A retroductive
research is an experimental research; and when we look upon Induction
and Deduction from the point of view of Experiment and Observation, we
are merely tracing in those types of reasoning their affinity to
Retroduction. [—] To return to Retroduction, then, it begins with
Colligation. Something corresponding to Iteration may or may not take
place. And then comes an Observation. Not, however, an External
observation of the objects as in Induction, nor yet an observation
made upon the parts of a Diagram, as in Deduction; but for all that
just as truly an observation.
1906 [c.] | Reasoning [R] | MS [R] 753:3
Retroductive reasoning is the only one of the three which produces
any new idea. It originates a theory.
1906 [c.] | Suggestions for a Course of Entretiens leading up
through Philosophy to the Questions of Spiritualism, Ghosts, and
finally to that of Religion | MS [R] 876:2-3
Retroduction is the passage of the mind from something observed or
attentively considered to the representation of a state of things
that may explain it. Its conclusion is usually regarded as a more or
less likely conjecture; but it may be a mere suggestion of a question
or, on the other hand, it may be the most confident of convictions.
The essential point is that the consideration of what is observed or
known produces some representation of something not so known.
1907 | Pragmatism | MS 318:21-3
…Retroduction, or that process whereby from a surprising array of
facts we are led to a conjectural theory to account for them. Many
logicians refuse to call this last ‘inference’, because its
conclusion is so extremely problematical as to amount to little more
than an interrogation. I am sure they are wrong, however: they have
not possessed themselves of the true scientific definition of
‘inference’. The logical justification of a retroduction, of
which the proper conclusion is that the conjectured state of things
is “likely,” in the vague sense of tending to resemble the real
state of things, consists in the two-fold truth that in case the
conjectured state of things should closely resemble the real state of
things, then the acceptance of the vague proper conclusion will prove
of some considerable advantage in the conduct of further inquiry,
even if not also (as usually will be the case,) in some future
practical conduct; while, on the other hand, should the conjectured
state of things be markedly in contrast to the real state of things,
the acceptance of the same proper conclusion would bring
comparatively little disadvantage.1907 | Pragmatism | MS 318:21-3
…Retroduction, or that process whereby from a surprising array of
facts we are led to a conjectural theory to account for them. Many
logicians refuse to call this last ‘inference’, because its
conclusion is so extremely problematical as to amount to little more
than an interrogation. I am sure they are wrong, however: they have
not possessed themselves of the true scientific definition of
‘inference’. The logical justification of a retroduction, of
which the proper conclusion is that the conjectured state of things
is “likely,” in the vague sense of tending to resemble the real
state of things, consists in the two-fold truth that in case the
conjectured state of things should closely resemble the real state of
things, then the acceptance of the vague proper conclusion will prove
of some considerable advantage in the conduct of further inquiry,
even if not also (as usually will be the case,) in some future
practical conduct; while, on the other hand, should the conjectured
state of things be markedly in contrast to the real state of things,
the acceptance of the same proper conclusion would bring
comparatively little disadvantage.
1908 [c.] | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (G) | MS [R]
842: 29-30
… Another question to be noted for later consideration is whether
this first step in inquiry can conclude, if it can be called
“concluding,” otherwise than in the interrogative mood, if
grammarians will acknowledge such a mood. Certain it is that if a
series of experience does no more than suggest an idea
interrogatively, the mere occurrence of the suggestion, warrants us
in regarding the movement of thought as having the essential
character of this first stage of inquiry. I call this mode of
inference, or, if you please, this step toward inference, in which an
explanatory hypothesis is first suggested, by the name of
retroduction, since it regresses from a consequent to a hypothetical
antecedent. But while this explains why I have selected the vocable
‘retroduction’ to express my meaning, I claim the right, as
inventor of the term, to make its definition to be, the passage of
thought from experiencing something, E, to predicating a concept of
the mind’s creating; the subject of the predication being a
specified class to which E belongs, or an indefinite part of such
class.
The second stage of inquiry consists in deducing the consequences of
the retroductive hypothesis. The word “retroductive,” however, is
surplusage; for every hypothesis, however arbitrary, is suggested by
something observed, whether externally or internally and such
suggestion is, from a purely logical point of view, retroduction.
NOTE: In the following Peirce does connect retroduction to
'guessing', at least in the initial stages of inquiry by humankind,
from "primitive notions into modern science." [CSP: . . ."every step
in the development of primitive notions into modern science was in
the first instance mere guess-work, or at least mere conjecture. But
the stimulus to guessing, the hint of the conjecture, was derived
from experience.]
1908 [c.] | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (G) | CP
2.755
Retroduction and Induction face opposite ways. The function of
retroduction is not unlike those fortuitous variations in
reproduction which played so important a rôle in Darwin’s original
theory. In point of fact, according to him every step in the long
history of the development of the moner into the man was first taken
in that arbitrary and lawless mode. Whatever truth or error there may
be in that, it is quite indubitable, as it appears to me, that every
step in the development of primitive notions into modern science was
in the first instance mere guess-work, or at least mere conjecture.
But the stimulus to guessing, the hint of the conjecture, was derived
from experience. The order of the march of suggestion in retroduction
is from experience to hypothesis.
1910 [c.] | Letters to Paul Carus | CP 8.227-231. . .The general
body of logicians had also at all times come very near recognizing
the trichotomy. They only failed to do so by having so narrow and
formalistic a conception of inference ( as necessarily having
formulated judgments for its premises) that they did not recognize
Hypothesis (or, as I now term it, retroduction) as an inference …
.
When one contemplates a surprising or otherwise perplexing state of
things (often so perplexing that he cannot definitely state what the
perplexing character is) he may formulate it into a judgment or many
apparently connected judgments; he will often finally strike out a
hypothesis, or problematical judgment, as a mere possibility, from
which he either fully perceives or more or less suspects that the
perplexing phenomenon would be a necessary or quite probable
consequence.
That is a retroduction. Now three lines of reasoning are open to
him. [—]
Or, second, he may proceed still further to study the phenomenon in
order to find other features that the hypothesis will explain (i.e. in
the English sense of explain, to deduce the facts from the hypothesis
as its necessary or probable consequences). That will be to continue
reasoning retroductively, i.e., by hypothesis.
1910 [c.] | On the Three Kinds of Reasoning [R] | MS [R] 755:14
That kind of reasoning by which we are more or less inclined to
believe in a theory because it explains facts that without the theory
would be very surprising is what I call Retroduction, or reasoning
from consequent to antecedent. To understand the legitimacy of this
kind of reasoning (often and often as it deceives us,) is to
understand the legitimacy, the truth-leading power of all reasoning.
1911 | Letter to J. H. Kehler | NEM 3:177-178
. . .A scientific inquiry must usually, if not always, begin with
retroduction. An Induction can hardly be sound or at least is to be
suspected usually, unless it has been preceded by a Retroductive
reasoning to the same general effect.
1911 | Letter to J. H. Kehler | NEM 3:206
. . .So Retroduction comes first and is the least certain and least
complex kind of Reasoning.
nd | Lecture I | MS [R] 857: 4-5
. . . But since this, after all, is only conjectural, I have on
reflexion decided to give this kind of reasoning the name of
retroduction to imply that it turns back and leads from the
consequent of an admitted consequence, to its antecedent.
Links:
------
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#meancyc
[2] http://gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x05
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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