Jon, Gary F, List, Gary F wrote:
I think [GR's comments represented a] . . . context-sensitive way of communicating the idea abduction/retroduction. To a logician, I guess it would make “abduction” a “looser” or more vague term than “retroduction”. Or we might say that abduction is more *preconscious* than retroduction. This approach seems to be supported by Peirce’s remark that “I perform an abduction when I so much as express in a sentence anything I see. . ." This notion that abduction may be considered looser and vaguer and even "more preconscious than retroduction" seems to me to be well supported by Peirce's remark above and several other comments he made (see below) despite JAS's opinion to the contrary. JAS at first responded that GF's remark above (with the Peirce snippet) reminded him of Peirce's third cotary proposition (1903 Lectures on Pragmatism): CSP: . . . "that abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or in other words our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences." How interesting that "perceptual judgments" may be seen "as an extreme case of abductive inference;" and so far GF, JAS, and I would appear to be in agreement. But then JAS added: "I honestly think that we could substitute "retroduction" for "abduction" and "retroductive" for "abductive" in all these quotes without changing their meaning at all." Not at all? Let's try out this substitution with the third cotary: CSP (modified): ". . . that [retroductive] inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or in other words our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of [retroductive] inferences." Given that 'retroduction' has the etymology that it has, viz., moving from effect to cause (see below), it would appear that, in contrast to 'abduction', that it is a *less vague* and *more conscious* matter than retroduction (and this, whether or not it is true, as JAS contends, that *for Peirce *the terms are strictly equivalent). That Peirce was inconsistent in his use of these two terms suggests to me that, while -- perhaps -- in Peirce's work, which centers as it does on *scientific inquiry*, they *may* be equivalent (even if Peirce may have introduced retroduction as a possibly 'better' term than abduction for the function of hypothesis in scientific inquiry), that GF's analysis above regarding the specific connotations brought up by the very etymology of 'retroduction', suggests that whether or not Peirce thought of them as equivalent, that there may be good reason for us (in the 21st century) not to be so hasty in assuming that they are strictly so. Moreover, there is reason enough for us to employ them as if they are *not *strictly equivalent. But JAS, frankly rather prematurely and dismissively, seems to reject that line of thinking altogether: "Frankly, I am not aware of any more warrant in Peirce's writings for drawing this distinction than for the one proposed by Chiasson, which we both [i.e., JAS and GR] find unpersuasive" rather misses the thrust both of GF's argument above and, perhaps more so, mine. For the point that I was making was that in the latter half of the 20th century and now in the 21st century, that there are many Peirceans in the arts and humanities, and that they may have gravitated towards 'abduction' *because* of its looser, vaguer connotations. Indeed, Peirce sometimes refers to abduction as if it mere "guessing," sometimes *even* in discussing scientific abduction. Yet, I don't at the moment recall his employing 'retroduction' as a term more or less equivalent to 'guessing', although it is clear that in 1908 that he is employing it as equivalent to 'hypothesis' in being the first step in a 'complete inquiry'. GF also wrote: Thanks [to JAS] as always for tracing out the full history of Peirce’s own usage of the two terms. I too have treated them as synonymous in *Turning Signs*, and I don’t think Gary R was suggesting otherwise — just that the different terms are somewhat different in their suitability for communicating the one idea in different contexts, or communicating it to different audiences. JAS replied: JAS: That is a valid point, consistent with my hypothesis that despite preferring "retroduction," Peirce uses "abduction" in 1901-1906 because his audiences were likely to be at least somewhat familiar with that term as the usual and traditional English translation of Aristotle's *ἀπαγωγή*. So, JAS's hypothesis is that Peirce did indeed 'prefer' 'retroduction' (but, again, *why* is that?) And despite the fact that the etymology of 'retroduction' is quite clear and simply stated (GF did it in less than a sentence), yet Peirce declined to use it for his audiences between 1901 and 1906. While I have stated above that I do not see the two terms as *exactly* synonymous -- not even necessarily for Peirce for exactly the etymological reasons already stated by GF, "that the different terms are somewhat different in their suitability for communicating the one idea in different contexts, or communicating it to different audiences" is precisely my point in consideration of the *contemporary *employment of the term 'abduction' in the arts, humanities, and even some of the 'soft' sciences, especially those which have been informed by Peirce's philosophy. Gary F had earlier given a tentative hypothesis as to why Peirce experimented with substituting 'retroduction' for 'abduction' -- that it is a better term in suggesting how science "works *back* from the observed effect to the hypothesized cause." But this -- *hypothesis formation*, an idea which JAS seemingly rejects such that for him a hypothesis would seemingly just 'magically' appear (I suppose, like a 'guess') without the long preparation of a disciplined scientific mind capable of thinking from effect to cause -- is not necessarily the way of the arts or the humanities generally. In these there are often moments of 'pure inspiration'. Those working in the arts are rarely, if ever, looking for the 'cause' of something, and that whatever their own forms of 'experimentation' may take, perhaps especially in the actual creation of a work of art. It seems to me that for many artists there is much 'guessing' involved, little, if any, 'working from effect to cause'. GF: I think one of Peirce’s major contributions to the logic of inquiry as the idea of *abduction*. But sometime late in the 1890s, Peirce decided that a better term for the concept was *retroduction* (RLT 141, CP 1.65, NEM 4.331), and that was the term he used in his 1908 “Neglected Argument” (and several unpublished late works). My tentative hypothesis is that *retroduction* is the better name because the *retro-* prefix suggests a backward or *returning* movement of thought. This seems to me related to Peirce’s analogy between causality and reasoning: just as we think of *cause* > *effect* as a forward motion in time, we think of deductive reasoning as a forward movement from premisses to conclusion. *Retroduction*, though, [. . .] works *back* from the observed effect to the hypothesized cause. That such circular causality "seems to be characteristic of life itself" makes retroduction the optimal first step in scientific inquiry, most obviously so in the biological sciences, but not at all limited to those. For me the question is not merely *how Peirce looked at these matters* in choosing the terminology that he did -- and as already noted, I think there may be *reasons* why Peirce himself was "consistently inconsistent" in moving back and forth between 'abduction' and 'retroduction' -- but over a hundred years after his death, it is clear that some in the arts and humanities find Peirce's term 'abduction' of value in creating, reflecting on, and analyzing work in those fields. And I would further suggest that there is good reason to believe that it is the *looseness* and *vagueness *(and even *preconsciousness*) of that term which makes it suitable for use in the humanities whereas 'retroduction' is not. Best, Gary R "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 8:35 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., Gary R., List: > > GF: This approach seems to be supported by Peirce’s remark that “I > perform an abduction when I so much as express in a sentence anything I > see,” that “Not the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the > stage of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step.” > > > Those comments by Peirce remind me of his "third cotary proposition" from > the 1903 Harvard Lectures, which is "that abductive inference shades into > perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or > in other words our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be > regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they differ > in being absolutely beyond criticism" (CP 5.181, EP 2:227). However, I > honestly think that we could substitute "retroduction" for "abduction" and > "retroductive" for "abductive" in all these quotes without changing their > meaning at all. > > GR: So, as I see it, in sum: *abduction* is a general term for a certain > kind of 'guessing' in the arts and (possibly) the sciences, while > *retroduction > *specifically and exclusively applies to that familiar kind of scientific > thinking which works backwards, from effect to cause, and which, I believe, > ought best be thought of as 'hypothesis *formation*." > > > Frankly, I am not aware of any more warrant in Peirce's writings for > drawing this distinction than for the one proposed by Chiasson, which we > both find unpersuasive. Are there specific places where he discusses the > *artistic > *reasoning process that you associate with "abduction"? If so, I have > not found them so far. On the other hand, it turns out that he *does* use > both terms within the same passage at least twice, potentially shedding > light on why he employs "abduction" for a while despite having a definite > preference for "retroduction." > > CSP: There are in science three fundamentally different kinds of > reasoning, Deduction (called by Aristotle συναγωγή or ἀναγωγή), Induction > (Aristotle's and Plato's ἐπαγωγή), and Retroduction (Aristotle's ἀπαγωγή, > but misunderstood because of corrupt text, and as misunderstood usually > translated *abduction*). (CP 1.65, c. 1896) > > > CSP: This kind of reasoning is very often called *adopting a hypothesis > for the sake of its explanation of known facts* ... > This probable reasoning in the second figure is, I apprehend, what > Aristotle meant by ἀπαγωγή. There are strong reasons for believing that in > the chapter on the subject in the Prior Analytics, there occurred one of > those many obliterations in Aristotle's MS due to its century long exposure > to damp in a cellar, which the blundering Apellicon, the first editor, > filled up with the wrong word. Let me change but one word of the text, and > the meaning of the whole chapter is metamorphosed in such a way that it no > longer breaks the continuity of the train of Aristotle's thought, as in our > present text it does but so as to bring it into parallelism with another > passage, and to cause the two examples, like the generality of Aristotle's > examples, to represent reasonings current at his time, instead of being, as > our text makes them, the one utterly silly and other nearly as bad. > Supposing this view to be correct, ἀπαγωγή should be translated not by the > word *abduction*, as the custom of the translators is, but rather by > reduction or *retroduction*. In these lectures I shall generally call > this type of reasoning *retroductlon*. (NEM 4:183, RLT 140-141, 1898) > > > I find it to be quite clear here, as well as when comparing the many texts > where he uses only one word or the other, that Peirce considers the two > terms to be synonymous. "Abduction" is the usual and traditional > translation of Aristotle's *ἀπαγωγή*, which likewise also means > "kidnapping" in Greek, so Peirce might have felt obliged to maintain it > while seeking to capitalize on the widespread interest in pragmatism during > the several years after William James first popularized it (and credited > him with founding it) in 1898. However, he strongly suspected corruption > of the original text and believed that "retroduction" better captures what > Aristotle really intended. > > The excerpts in the online Commens Dictionary support this (ahem) > retroduction, suggesting that Peirce mainly uses "hypothesis > <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/hypothesis-%5Bas-a-form-of-reasoning%5D>" > until the mid-1890s, then "retroduction > <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/retroduction>" for the rest of > that decade, and then "abduction > <http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/abduction>" from roughly 1901 to > 1906. I suspect that the inclusion of so many texts that he wrote during > those six years accounts for the fact that CP has some 149 instances of > "abduction(s)/abductive(ly)" but only 58 of > "retroduction(s)/retroductive(ly)," while in EP 2 the tally is even more > lopsided at roughly 134 to 25. Nevertheless, even within that time period > he plainly expresses dissatisfaction with "abduction." > > CSP: In what then does the soundness of argument consist? > In order to answer that question it is necessary to recognize three > radically different kinds of arguments which I signalized in 1867 and which > had been recognized by the logicians of the eighteenth century, although > those logicians quite pardonably failed to recognize the inferential > character of one of them. Indeed, I suppose that the three were given by > Aristotle in the Prior Analytics, although the unfortunate illegibility of > a single word in his manuscript and its replacement by a wrong word by his > first editor, the stupid [Apellicon]* has completely altered the sense of > the chapter on Abduction. At any rate, even if my conjecture is wrong, and > the text must stand as it is, still Aristotle, in that chapter on > Abduction, was even in that case evidently groping for that mode of > inference which I call by the otherwise quite useless name of Abduction,--a > word which is only employed in logic to translate the [ἀπαγωγή] of that > chapter. (CP 5.143-144, EP 2:205, 1903) > > > The asterisk is where EP 2 has a reference to note 11 on page 537, which > tells the full story of the illegible word by quoting CP 7.250-251 (1901). > Peirce eventually seems to stick with "retroduction," from about 1907 until > the end of his life, presumably because it better captures the *logical* > notion of reasoning backwards "from consequent to antecedent" (CP 6.469, EP > 2:441, 1908). Maybe he also finally decided that, like "pragmaticism," > this name would be safe from kidnappers. :-) > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 6:20 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary R, >> >> I think yours is a very astute and context-sensitive way of communicating >> the idea abduction/retroduction. To a logician, I guess it would make >> “abduction” a “looser” or more vague term than “retroduction”. Or we might >> say that abduction is more *preconscious* than retroduction. This >> approach seems to be supported by Peirce’s remark that “I perform an >> abduction when I so much as express in a sentence anything I see,” that >> “Not the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the stage of >> vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step.” The context and >> source of that remark is here <http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#abdct> >> in my book (which I’ve just slightly revised to reflect what I’m learning >> from this conversation). Anyway, I think the core idea is the same >> regardless of whether we call it abduction or retroduction. >> >> Gary f. >> >> } Entering is the source, and the source means from beginning to end. >> [Dogen] { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the transition >> >> >> >> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* 14-Jun-20 17:41 >> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea >> >> >> >> Jon, Gary F, List, >> Gary F wrote: >> >> My tentative hypothesis is that *retroduction* is the better name >> because the *retro**-* prefix suggests a backward or *returning* movement >> of thought. This seems to me related to Peirce’s analogy between causality >> and reasoning: just as we think of *cause* > *effect* as a forward >> motion in time, we think of deductive reasoning as a forward movement from >> premisses to conclusion. *Retroduction*, though, is works *back* from >> the observed effect to the hypothesized cause. >> >> And Jon wrote in response: >> >> In Peirce's late writings, he is consistently inconsistent about whether >> to use "abduction" or "retroduction" when referring to the kind of >> reasoning that he usually calls "hypothesis" in his early writings. As you >> [Gary F] note, he goes with "retroduction" in the Cambridge Lectures of >> 1898 and "A Neglected Argument" in 1908. However, he reverts to >> "abduction" in the Harvard and Lowell Lectures of 1903, even including it >> in the title of the final presentation of each series. Personally, I >> prefer "retroduction," both for the reasons that you give below and >> because "abduction" is much more familiar to most English-speakers as a >> synonym for kidnapping. >> >> This is an interesting terminological case in which, as Jon wrote, Peirce >> "is consistently inconsistent about whether to use "abduction" or " >> retroduction" when referring to the kind of reasoning that he usually >> calls "hypothesis" in his early writings." >> But in his "early writings" 'hypothesis' is *always* used within the >> context of scientific inquiry. Yet it seems to me that there is also in >> Peirce the suggestion that 'abduction' can *also *refer to certain other >> kinds of 'guesses' including those which artists in various artistic >> disciplines are always making, especially -- but hardly exclusively -- as >> they begin a work. Such 'guesses' might include in planning a new work (a >> novel, or a building, or a sculpture, etc.), say, for a painting: the >> subject matter being considered, the size of the canvas appropriate to that >> subject matter, the choice of materials (watercolor or oil; on canvas or >> wood, etc.), the colors to be employed in order to bring about the intended >> effect, etc. In any case, that is how I know some folk in the arts and >> humanities, sometimes these days actually informed by Peirce's use of the >> term, are thinking about 'abduction' (and, btw, I think 'abduction' is >> often enough used in this way as *not* easily to be confused with its >> more familiar use as "a synonym for kidnapping," as Jon suggested in the >> quotation above). >> >> So my tentative conclusion regarding the terminological question is, I >> believe, rather similar to Gary F's (with a slight addition). As I think of >> it, *abduction* is a term which can be employed both in science *or *in >> the arts, etc., to mean 'a kind of 'guess' which might lead to (a) a sort >> of 'truth' in an artwork or (b) a *possible* tentative 'explanation' as >> science inquires into some phenomenon within nature (it will, of course, >> need to be tested). In science I believe it ought best be referred to, as >> it ordinarily is, as a hypothesis. >> >> >> >> On the other hand, *retroduction* ought, in my opinion, be limited to a >> more formal act of scientific 'guessing' as it "works *back* from the >> observed effect to the hypothesized cause" as Gary F succinctly put it. >> However, in reading that snippet just now, "hypothesized" sounded to me to >> be, perhaps, redundant, which is to say, that in Peirce's understanding, I >> believe, scientific hypothesis formation *is* retroductive. But on >> second thought, I think that Gary F is correct: that *retroduction >> (hypothesis formation) leads to actual hypotheses being formed*, some of >> which might eventually be tested. >> >> >> >> Jon also wrote: >> >> As you may know, Phyllis Chiasson takes a different tack, claiming >> <http://www.commens.org/encyclopedia/article/chiasson-phyllis-abduction-aspect-retroduction> >> that >> abduction "refers to a distinct form of logical inference," >> while retroduction is "the form of a deliberate and overarching logical >> method which incorporates abduction, deduction, and induction for its full >> performance." This solution is admittedly clever, but I find it utterly >> unpersuasive because I am not aware of any text where Peirce uses both >> terms, as he surely would have if that had been what he intended. >> Moreover, "A Neglected Argument" is unambiguous in >> identifying retroduction as "the First Stage of Inquiry," followed by >> deduction and then induction (CP 6.468-473, EP 2:440-442, 1908). >> >> I agree that Phyllis Chiasson's guess (abduction? does it apply to >> philosophy as well?) which Jon quotes above, that retroduction is "the form >> of a deliberate and overarching logical method which incorporates >> abduction, deduction, and induction for its full performance," is certainly >> clever, but finally misguided, especially, as Jon notes, since as late as >> 1908, in "A Neglected Argument," Peirce clearly makes retroduction "the >> First Stage of Inquiry," followed by deduction and then induction." >> >> >> >> In any event, this is how I've come to look at the matter and how I employ >> the terms 'abduction' and 'retroduction' in my own thinking and writing. >> Indeed, more and more I tend to use 'abduction' primarily in consideration >> of art creation, and I use 'retroduction' and 'hypothesis' exclusively in >> consideration of science. >> >> >> >> So, as I see it, in sum: *abduction* is a general term for a certain >> kind of 'guessing' in the arts and (possibly) the sciences, while >> *retroduction >> *specifically and exclusively applies to that familiar kind of >> scientific thinking which works backwards, from effect to cause, and which, >> I believe, ought best be thought of as 'hypothesis *formation*." In >> other words, an *hypothesis* is the possible result of a mental act of >> *retroduction*. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Gary R >> >
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