Gary R., Gary F., List: Upon reflection, I was indeed too hasty and dismissive in my initial responses, for which I sincerely apologize. As I only belatedly acknowledged, "abduction" may be more suitable in certain contexts than "retroduction," which Peirce himself evidently recognized. In particular, I agree that his preference for the latter applies primarily to the logical notion of "reasoning from consequent to antecedent" (CP 6.469, EP 2:441, 1908) in order to *explain *something, especially in scientific contexts where "the well-prepared mind has wonderfully soon guessed each secret of nature" (CP 6.476, EP 2:444; presumably this is the quote that Gary R. had in mind).
What this has in common with "moments of 'pure inspiration'" in the arts and humanities is that the basis of assurance is *instinct*, rather than experience or form. Such signs belong to the class that Peirce calls "abducent" in one of the taxonomies that he wrote in his Logic Notebook (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31), and as far as I know, he never proposes "retroducent" as an alternative. From that standpoint, "abduction" does seem to be potentially broader in meaning than "retroduction," as you both have been suggesting. I was wrong to assert otherwise. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Jun 20, 2020 at 5:49 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary F., List, > > As a supplement to my last post, I've cut and pasted excerpts from some of > the definitions of 'retroduction' which can be found in the *Commens * > Dictionary. > > I'm putting the last dated definition from the dIctionary first because it > tends to make an important point I've been trying to get at, and it does it > most simply and plainly, that point being that, as I see it, 'Retroduction' > is best thought of as a kind of *reasoning*, that it works to *form* "an > explanatory hypothesis." And while in the early history of our movement > from superstition to science it may have amounted to little more than > guessing (but guessing *out of experience*), that as science advances, it > is a "prepared mind" (I looking for a quotation related to that idea of the > prepared scientific mind) steeped in the science in which it is making > perhaps bold conjectures, say, in quantum theory, that > retroductively arrives at a hypothesis. Retroduction is *not* in and of > itself a hypothesis but rather the *consequence* of retroduction. Or to > state it otherwise, retroduction is the *type of inference* which > *results* in a hypothesis being formed, the actual hypothesis being the > product of retroductive inference, an intellectual process. And that is > why retroduction is given as one of the three stages of a complete inquiry > according to Peirce. > > nd | Logic: Fragments [R] | MS [R] S64 > > There are three stages of inquiry, demanding as many different kinds of > reasoning governed by different principles. They are, > > 1, *Retroduction*, forming an explanatory hypothesis[;] > 2, *Deduction*, tracing out the consequences that would ensue upon the > truth or falsity of that hypothesis; and > 3, *Induction*, the experimental testing of the hypothesis by inquiring > whether its consequences are born out by fact, or not. > > Retroduction > > The recommendations of an explanatory hypothesis are > 1st, verifiability; 2nd, simplicity; 3rd, economy. > 1898 | Cambridge Lectures on Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The First > Rule of Logic | RLT 170; CP 5.581 > > As for retroduction, it is itself an experiment. A retroductive research > is an experimental research; and when we look upon Induction and Deduction > from the point of view of Experiment and Observation, we are merely tracing > in those types of reasoning their affinity to Retroduction. [—] To return > to Retroduction, then, it begins with Colligation. Something corresponding > to Iteration may or may not take place. And then comes an Observation. Not, > however, an External observation of the objects as in Induction, nor yet an > observation made upon the parts of a Diagram, as in Deduction; but for all > that just as truly an observation. > 1906 [c.] | Reasoning [R] | MS [R] 753:3 > > *Retroductive* reasoning is the only one of the three which produces any > new idea. It originates a theory. > 1906 [c.] | Suggestions for a Course of Entretiens leading up through > Philosophy to the Questions of Spiritualism, Ghosts, and finally to that of > Religion | MS [R] 876:2-3 > > *Retroduction* is the passage of the mind from something observed or > attentively considered to the representation of a state of things that may > explain it. Its conclusion is usually regarded as a more or less likely > conjecture; but it may be a mere suggestion of a question or, on the other > hand, it may be the most confident of convictions. The essential point is > that the consideration of what is observed or known produces some > representation of something not so known. > 1907 | Pragmatism | MS 318:21-3 > > …*Retroduction*, or that process whereby from a surprising array of facts > we are led to a conjectural theory to account for them. Many logicians > refuse to call this last ‘inference’, because its conclusion is so > extremely problematical as to amount to little more than an interrogation. > I am sure they are wrong, however: they have not possessed themselves of > the true scientific definition of ‘inference’. The logical justification of > a retroduction, of which the proper conclusion is that the conjectured > state of things is “likely,” in the vague sense of tending to resemble the > real state of things, consists in the two-fold truth that in case the > conjectured state of things should closely resemble the real state of > things, then the acceptance of the vague proper conclusion will prove of > some considerable advantage in the conduct of further inquiry, even if not > also (as usually will be the case,) in some future practical conduct; > while, on the other hand, should the conjectured state of things be > markedly in contrast to the real state of things, the acceptance of the > same proper conclusion would bring comparatively little disadvantage.1907 > | Pragmatism | MS 318:21-3 > > …*Retroduction*, or that process whereby from a surprising array of facts > we are led to a conjectural theory to account for them. Many logicians > refuse to call this last ‘inference’, because its conclusion is so > extremely problematical as to amount to little more than an interrogation. > I am sure they are wrong, however: they have not possessed themselves of > the true scientific definition of ‘inference’. The logical justification of > a retroduction, of which the proper conclusion is that the conjectured > state of things is “likely,” in the vague sense of tending to resemble the > real state of things, consists in the two-fold truth that in case the > conjectured state of things should closely resemble the real state of > things, then the acceptance of the vague proper conclusion will prove of > some considerable advantage in the conduct of further inquiry, even if not > also (as usually will be the case,) in some future practical conduct; > while, on the other hand, should the conjectured state of things be > markedly in contrast to the real state of things, the acceptance of the > same proper conclusion would bring comparatively little disadvantage. > 1908 [c.] | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (G) | MS [R] 842: > 29-30 > > … Another question to be noted for later consideration is whether this > first step in inquiry can conclude, if it can be called “concluding,” > otherwise than in the interrogative mood, if grammarians will acknowledge > such a mood. Certain it is that if a series of experience does no more > than suggest an idea interrogatively, the mere occurrence of the > suggestion, warrants us in regarding the movement of thought as having the > essential character of this first stage of inquiry. I call this mode of > inference, or, if you please, this step toward inference, in which an > explanatory hypothesis is first suggested, by the name of *retroduction*, > since it regresses from a consequent to a hypothetical antecedent. But > while this explains why I have selected the vocable ‘retroduction’ to > express my meaning, I claim the right, as inventor of the term, to make > its definition to be, the passage of thought from experiencing something, > E, to predicating a concept of the mind’s creating; the subject of the > predication being a specified class to which E belongs, or an indefinite > part of such class. > > The second stage of inquiry consists in deducing the consequences of the > retroductive hypothesis. The word “retroductive,” however, is surplusage; > for every hypothesis, however arbitrary, is suggested by something > observed, whether externally or internally and such suggestion is, from a > purely logical point of view, retroduction. > > NOTE: In the following Peirce does connect retroduction to 'guessing', at > least in the initial stages of inquiry by humankind, from "primitive > notions into modern science." [CSP: . . ."every step in the development > of primitive notions into modern science was in the first instance mere > guess-work, or at least mere conjecture. But the stimulus to guessing, the > hint of the conjecture, was derived from experience.] > > > 1908 [c.] | A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (G) | CP 2.755 > > Retroduction and Induction face opposite ways. The function of > retroduction is not unlike those fortuitous variations in reproduction > which played so important a *rôle* in Darwin’s original theory. In point > of fact, according to him every step in the long history of the development > of the moner into the man was first taken in that arbitrary and lawless > mode. Whatever truth or error there may be in that, it is quite > indubitable, as it appears to me, that every step in the development of > primitive notions into modern science was in the first instance mere > guess-work, or at least mere conjecture. But the stimulus to guessing, the > hint of the conjecture, was derived from experience. The order of the march > of suggestion in retroduction is from experience to hypothesis. > > 1910 [c.] | Letters to Paul Carus | CP 8.227-231. . .The general body of > logicians had also at all times come very near recognizing the trichotomy. > They only failed to do so by having so narrow and formalistic a conception > of inference ( as necessarily having formulated judgments for its premises) > that they did not recognize Hypothesis (or, as I now term it, > *retroduction*) as an *inference* … . > > When one contemplates a surprising or otherwise perplexing state of things > (often so perplexing that he cannot definitely state what the perplexing > character is) he may formulate it into a judgment or many apparently > connected judgments; he will often finally strike out a hypothesis, or > problematical judgment, as a mere possibility, from which he either fully > perceives or more or less suspects that the perplexing phenomenon would be > a necessary or quite probable consequence. > > That is a retroduction. Now three lines of reasoning are open to him. [—] > > Or, second, he may proceed still further to study the phenomenon in order > to find other features that the hypothesis will *explain* (i.e. in the > English sense of explain, to deduce the facts from the hypothesis as its > necessary or *probable* consequences). That will be to continue reasoning > retroductively, i.e., by hypothesis. > 1910 [c.] | On the Three Kinds of Reasoning [R] | MS [R] 755:14 > > That kind of reasoning by which we are more or less inclined to believe in > a theory because it explains facts that without the theory would be very > surprising is what I call Retroduction, or reasoning from consequent to > antecedent. To understand the legitimacy of this kind of reasoning (often > and often as it deceives us,) is to understand the legitimacy, the > truth-leading power of all reasoning. > 1911 | Letter to J. H. Kehler | NEM 3:177-178 > > . . .A scientific inquiry must usually, if not always, begin with > retroduction. An Induction can hardly be sound or at least is to be > suspected usually, unless it has been preceded by a Retroductive reasoning > to the same general effect. > 1911 | Letter to J. H. Kehler | NEM 3:206 > . . .So Retroduction comes first and is the least certain and least > complex kind of Reasoning. > > nd | Lecture I | MS [R] 857: 4-5 > > . . . But since this, after all, is only conjectural, I have on reflexion > decided to give this kind of reasoning the name of *retroduction* to > imply that it turns back and leads from the consequent of an admitted > consequence, to its antecedent. > > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Sat, Jun 20, 2020 at 1:40 AM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, Gary F, List, >> >> Gary F wrote: >> >> I think [GR's comments represented a] . . . context-sensitive way of >> communicating the idea abduction/retroduction. To a logician, I guess it >> would make “abduction” a “looser” or more vague term than “retroduction”. >> Or we might say that abduction is more *preconscious* than retroduction. >> This approach seems to be supported by Peirce’s remark that “I perform an >> abduction when I so much as express in a sentence anything I see. . ." >> >> >> This notion that abduction may be considered looser and vaguer and even >> "more preconscious than retroduction" seems to me to be well supported by >> Peirce's remark above and several other comments he made (see below) >> despite JAS's opinion to the contrary. >> >> JAS at first responded that GF's remark above (with the Peirce snippet) >> reminded him of Peirce's third cotary proposition (1903 Lectures on >> Pragmatism): >> >> CSP: . . . "that abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment >> without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or in other words our >> first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme >> case of abductive inferences." >> >> >> How interesting that "perceptual judgments" may be seen "as an extreme >> case of abductive inference;" and so far GF, JAS, and I would appear to be >> in agreement. But then JAS added: "I honestly think that we could >> substitute "retroduction" for "abduction" and "retroductive" for >> "abductive" in all these quotes without changing their meaning at all." Not >> at all? >> >> Let's try out this substitution with the third cotary: >> >> >> CSP (modified): ". . . that [retroductive] inference shades into >> perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or >> in other words our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be >> regarded as an extreme case of [retroductive] inferences." >> >> >> Given that 'retroduction' has the etymology that it has, viz., moving >> from effect to cause (see below), it would appear that, in contrast to >> 'abduction', that it is a *less vague* and *more conscious* matter than >> retroduction (and this, whether or not it is true, as JAS contends, that *for >> Peirce *the terms are strictly equivalent). That Peirce was inconsistent >> in his use of these two terms suggests to me that, while -- perhaps -- in >> Peirce's work, which centers as it does on *scientific inquiry*, they >> *may* be equivalent (even if Peirce may have introduced retroduction as >> a possibly 'better' term than abduction for the function of hypothesis in >> scientific inquiry), that GF's analysis above regarding the specific >> connotations brought up by the very etymology of 'retroduction', suggests >> that whether or not Peirce thought of them as equivalent, that there may be >> good reason for us (in the 21st century) not to be so hasty in assuming >> that they are strictly so. Moreover, there is reason enough for us to >> employ them as if they are *not *strictly equivalent. >> >> But JAS, frankly rather prematurely and dismissively, seems to reject >> that line of thinking altogether: "Frankly, I am not aware of any more >> warrant in Peirce's writings for drawing this distinction than for the one >> proposed by Chiasson, which we both [i.e., JAS and GR] find unpersuasive" >> rather misses the thrust both of GF's argument above and, perhaps more so, >> mine. For the point that I was making was that in the latter half of the >> 20th century and now in the 21st century, that there are many Peirceans in >> the arts and humanities, and that they may have gravitated towards >> 'abduction' *because* of its looser, vaguer connotations. Indeed, Peirce >> sometimes refers to abduction as if it mere "guessing," sometimes *even* >> in discussing scientific abduction. Yet, I don't at the moment recall his >> employing 'retroduction' as a term more or less equivalent to 'guessing', >> although it is clear that in 1908 that he is employing it as equivalent to >> 'hypothesis' in being the first step in a 'complete inquiry'. >> >> GF also wrote: >> >> >> Thanks [to JAS] as always for tracing out the full history of Peirce’s >> own usage of the two terms. I too have treated them as synonymous in *Turning >> Signs*, and I don’t think Gary R was suggesting otherwise — just that >> the different terms are somewhat different in their suitability for >> communicating the one idea in different contexts, or communicating it to >> different audiences. >> >> >> JAS replied: >> >> JAS: That is a valid point, consistent with my hypothesis that despite >> preferring "retroduction," Peirce uses "abduction" in 1901-1906 because his >> audiences were likely to be at least somewhat familiar with that term as >> the usual and traditional English translation of Aristotle's *ἀπαγωγή*. >> >> >> So, JAS's hypothesis is that Peirce did indeed 'prefer' 'retroduction' >> (but, again, *why* is that?) And despite the fact that the etymology of >> 'retroduction' is quite clear and simply stated (GF did it in less than a >> sentence), yet Peirce declined to use it for his audiences between 1901 and >> 1906. While I have stated above that I do not see the two terms as >> *exactly* synonymous -- not even necessarily for Peirce for exactly the >> etymological reasons already stated by GF, "that the different terms are >> somewhat different in their suitability for communicating the one idea in >> different contexts, or communicating it to different audiences" is >> precisely my point in consideration of the *contemporary *employment of >> the term 'abduction' in the arts, humanities, and even some of the 'soft' >> sciences, especially those which have been informed by Peirce's philosophy. >> >> Gary F had earlier given a tentative hypothesis as to why Peirce >> experimented with substituting 'retroduction' for 'abduction' -- that it is >> a better term in suggesting how science "works *back* from the observed >> effect to the hypothesized cause." But this -- *hypothesis formation*, >> an idea which JAS seemingly rejects such that for him a hypothesis would >> seemingly just 'magically' appear (I suppose, like a 'guess') without the >> long preparation of a disciplined scientific mind capable of thinking from >> effect to cause -- is not necessarily the way of the arts or the humanities >> generally. In these there are often moments of 'pure inspiration'. Those >> working in the arts are rarely, if ever, looking for the 'cause' of >> something, and that whatever their own forms of 'experimentation' may take, >> perhaps especially in the actual creation of a work of art. It seems to >> me that for many artists there is much 'guessing' involved, little, if any, >> 'working from effect to cause'. >> >> GF: I think one of Peirce’s major contributions to the logic of inquiry >> as the idea of *abduction*. But sometime late in the 1890s, Peirce >> decided that a better term for the concept was *retroduction* (RLT 141, >> CP 1.65, NEM 4.331), and that was the term he used in his 1908 “Neglected >> Argument” (and several unpublished late works). My tentative hypothesis is >> that *retroduction* is the better name because the *retro-* prefix >> suggests a backward or *returning* movement of thought. This seems to me >> related to Peirce’s analogy between causality and reasoning: just as we >> think of *cause* > *effect* as a forward motion in time, we think of >> deductive reasoning as a forward movement from premisses to conclusion. >> *Retroduction*, though, [. . .] works *back* from the observed effect to >> the hypothesized cause. >> >> >> That such circular causality "seems to be characteristic of life itself" >> makes retroduction the optimal first step in scientific inquiry, most >> obviously so in the biological sciences, but not at all limited to those. >> >> For me the question is not merely *how Peirce looked at these matters* >> in choosing the terminology that he did -- and as already noted, I think >> there may be *reasons* why Peirce himself was "consistently >> inconsistent" in moving back and forth between 'abduction' and >> 'retroduction' -- but over a hundred years after his death, it is clear >> that some in the arts and humanities find Peirce's term 'abduction' of >> value in creating, reflecting on, and analyzing work in those fields. And I >> would further suggest that there is good reason to believe that it is the >> *looseness* and *vagueness *(and even *preconsciousness*) of that term >> which makes it suitable for use in the humanities whereas 'retroduction' is >> not. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >>>
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