Dear Jeff, list,
Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.
For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,
that it is inconsistent to agree with you
and to agree with Gary *at the same time*,
-which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and Jeff’,
which is what JAS has said,
when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.
“I didn’t presuppose that!”
That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),
“I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the
Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences is:
1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
conscious human experience.
1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
scientific intelligence.”
(for where and when, *exactly*, does Peirce say this? Please state the
reference and year)
So then, what *needs* to be done?
What, here, is *necessary* to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous
* in order to* ultimate aim?
I see the answer as being obvious.
We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, *amirite*?
For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!
And what we do, *as* Peircean phenomenologist, must be *right*, amirite?
For we *cannot* be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean
phenomenologist.
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,
>
>
> Jon says: "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and
> Jeff."
>
>
> Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main
> "business"
> of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying
> phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that
> Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I
> may have some disagreements.
>
>
> At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still
> somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say
> more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you
> stand on the apparent disagreement?
>
>
> Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes
> to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:
>
>
>
> 1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of
> conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are
> particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for
> explanations of consciousness.
> 2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of
> the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of
> scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in
> experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice
> of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better
> analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will
> be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to
> observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to
> how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate
> plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental
> forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific
> questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical
> explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly
> helpful in the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about
> (1) the proper forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the
> plausibility
> of various hypotheses.
>
>
> Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's
> phenomenology:
>
>
> Atkins, Richard Kenneth. *Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and
> Consciousness*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
>
>
> The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to
> understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main
> advantage of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then
> be able to formulate better metaphysical explanations of human
> consciousness. As I've indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on
> a misunderstanding of Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that
> Richard Atkins is committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for
> himself.
>
>
> Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's
> phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to
> provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features
> of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and
> correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space
> of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate
> forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal
> mathematical models for competing hypotheses.
>
>
> All of this is part of what is necessary to make philosophical inquiry
> more rigorous--i.e., mathematical as a science.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]>
> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> *Sent:* Monday, August 30, 2021 10:35 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
>
> John, Edwina, List:
>
> ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
>
>
> I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in
> the case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a
> *distinct
> *science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and
> must be carefully distinguished from its *applications *within the other
> positive sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the
> special sciences.
>
> ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the *subject matter* of
> a science from the *agent-who-works* with that subject.
>
>
> Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure
> hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or
> caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to
> be primarily talking about the *subject matter* rather than the
> *agent-who-works*. In other words, "mathematician" here simply means
> "practitioner of (pure) mathematics." Someone who *does *inquire and care
> about such things might be a self-described mathematician, but is not
> engaged in *pure *mathematics as defined by Peirce within his
> classification of the sciences. After all, Peirce himself was an
> accomplished mathematician, but was not doing *pure *mathematics during
> his phaneroscopic, logical, metaphysical, and scientific investigations. In
> those contexts, he was instead *applying *mathematics as a
> phaneroscopist, logician, metaphysician, and scientist, respectively.
>
> ET: This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and
> networked than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
>
>
> Please elaborate on this remark. Where exactly does André state or imply
> that thought is simple and linear, rather than complex and networked?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 8:05 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> John, List
>>
>> Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.
>>
>> I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a
>> science from the agent-who-works with that subject.
>>
>> Therefore, to set up mathematics/AND mathematicians, as De Tienne seems
>> to do, as alienated from other sciences, and requiring a Move-On situation
>> is illogical. And this is exactly what a number of us have been critiquing
>> about De Tienne's outline.
>>
>> Therefore - as John points out, the mathematician is not working as an
>> isolate, indifferent to whether his theories are relevant in the 'real
>> world' but - as in the example of Peirce - is quite capable of using
>> abstract AND practical theories in his work. Some people might be more
>> comfortable in the abstract vs the practical and vice versa but the point
>> is - to differentiate between the Agent and the Subject matter.
>>
>> This also suggests, to me, that thought is far more complex and networked
>> than the linearity offered by De Tienne.
>>
>> Again, thanks to John for pointing this out.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
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