Jeff, List, I did notice, Jeff, that your usage of "phenomenology" is very close to John's - that is, it agrees with the "general" definition of the word that I quoted from the OED, as opposed to the "Philosophy" definition given there, which is much more detailed - but i won't try to persuade you, any more than i did John, that Peirce's definitions are more philosophical than general. I also noticed your reference to the "distinction between the phenomenological and nomological phases of inquiry," but i don't see the relevance of that distinction to phenomenological practice as Peirce defined it, so i don't intend to argue that point either.
JD: I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses. GF: I don't think Peirce's phenomenology does that, so i certainly can't provide "an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience" does that kind of thing. Some phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition do try to give an account of how phenomenology can inform psychology in those ways; one example is Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind (3rd edition, 2021). But i don't see Peirce giving any such account for his phenomenology. If his phenomenology were more concerned with the material elements (or material categories) of phenomena, it might be possible to talk about "phenomenological phases of inquiry" within the special sciences, but Peirce says quite explicitly and consistently that his phenomenology/ phaneroscopy is concerned only with the formal elements and not the material elements of the phaneron. I have seen no text by Peirce suggesting that his phenomenological method can be of any direct assistance to special sciences such as astronomy, biology or psychology in the ways you list above. Some of these distinctions verge on hairsplitting, so i can easily see how Jon A.S. could be in general agreement with both posts (yours and mine). That's why i would rather not spend more time arguing over these distinctions, which may turn out to be more verbal than pragmatic. The outcome would make no difference to my practice of phaneroscopy, or anyone else's, as far as I can see. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 30-Aug-21 14:20 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List, Jon says: "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff." Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main "business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I may have some disagreements. At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on the apparent disagreement? Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that: 1. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are particularly puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for explanations of consciousness. 2. The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific intelligence. An account of the elemental features in experience--both material and formal--will be helpful for the practice of analyzing scientific observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses of the phenomena that are part of our common experience will be important for philosophical inquiry because we are highly prone to observational error in philosophy, and we are often at a loss as to how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to formulate plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly helpful in the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about (1) the proper forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the plausibility of various hypotheses. Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's phenomenology: Atkins, Richard Kenneth. Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2018. The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main advantage of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then be able to formulate better metaphysical explanations of human consciousness. As I've indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on a misunderstanding of Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that Richard Atkins is committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for himself. Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses. All of this is part of what is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous--i.e., mathematical as a science. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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