Edwina, List: ET: We can see from these terms that the answer to 'what' and 'why' refers to the 'organization' of matter-as-form, this hylomorphic synechist continuity of matter in our universe. This, to me, defines the functionality of what some people refer to as 'god'.
In contrast to this opinion, Peirce states plainly what *his *synechism entails about God. CSP: A difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this. In considering personality, that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal God; but in considering communication, it cannot but admit that if there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be the case, the question arises how it is possible that the existence [*sic*] of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody. The only answer that I can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned. That has been remarked from time immemorial. (CP 6.162, EP 1:332-333, 1892) It is in his later writings that Peirce draws a sharp distinction between existence and reality, and applies it specifically to God, as Gary R. has already pointed out. He also comes to recognize phenomenology/phaneroscopy as a science in its own right, and identifies certain faculties that anyone who wishes to practice it properly must cultivate. CSP: The first and foremost is that rare faculty, the faculty of seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by any interpretation, unsophisticated by any allowance for this or for that supposed modifying circumstance. This is the faculty of the artist who sees for example the apparent colors of nature as they appear. When the ground is covered by snow on which the sun shines brightly except where shadows fall, if you ask any ordinary man what its color appears to be, he will tell you white, pure white, whiter in the sunlight, a little greyish in the shadow. But that is not what is before his eyes that he is describing; it is his theory of what ought to be seen. The artist will tell him that the shadows are not grey but a dull blue and that the snow in the sunshine is of a rich yellow. That artist's observational power is what is most wanted in the study of phenomenology. (CP 5.41-42, EP 2:147, 1903) Eventually, he acknowledges that such "philosophical observation" is even *more *difficult than that of the artist. CSP: To assume, however, that the observational part of philosophy, because it is not particularly laborious, is therefore easy, is a dreadful mistake, into which the student is very apt to fall, and which gives the death-blow to any possibility of his success in this study. It is, on the contrary, extremely difficult to bring our attention to elements of experience which are continually present. For we have nothing in experience with which to contrast them; and without contrast, they cannot excite our attention. We can only contrast them with imaginary states of things; but even what we imagine is but a crazy-quilt of bits snipped off from actual experiences. The result is that roundabout devices have to be resorted to, in order to enable us to perceive what stares us in the face with a glare that, once noticed, becomes almost oppressive with its insistency. This circumstance alone would be sufficient to render philosophical observation difficult--much more difficult, for example, than the kind of observation which the painter has to exercise. (CP 1.134, c. 1905) However, this is in the context of "scientific study," where "one's observations and reflections are allowed to specialize themselves" (CP 6.459, EP 2:436, 1908). By contrast, "let religious meditation be allowed to grow up spontaneously out of Pure Play without any breach of continuity; and the Muser will retain the perfect candor proper to Musement" (CP 6.458, EP 2:436). That is why the reality of God "should be obvious to all minds, high and low alike, that should earnestly strive to find the truth of the matter" (CP 6.457, EP 2:435). In other words ... CSP: The most *powerful* of the proofs of His Being is that the sincere inquirer, (who will first have been freed from Nominalism, so as no longer to confound the assertion of God's Reality, with the proposition that God Exists, since this being a contradiction *in terminis*, will not receive five minutes' consideration from any clear-headed person,)--if he meditates well upon God's Reality considered as a mere hypothesis,--and until he has done this, he is unfit to judge of it,--will, as a fact, find himself utterly incapable of doubting it, which is more than a *Proof* of it to him;--it is a *Rational Compulsion*. Meantime, for all those who have not yet themselves received that illumination, testimony to that effect lies open;--testimony stupendous in volume, and moreover quite unopposed if, as I believe to be the case, all Atheists are Nominalists; and this testimony ought to be accepted as a proof that a belief in God is a natural instinct, comparable with the instinct that leads various insects to lay their eggs where the larvae will find abundant food, though the mothers have no experiential acquaintance with eggs, unless they can remember being eggs themselves; and indeed even this would not, of itself, suffice. Now it would certainly be the height of folly to discredit any such natural instinct. Surely, this consideration ought to suffice to induce any non-nominalist, any Scholastic Realist,--don't take fright at the name!--if he cares at all whether God really be or not, to try, for himself, the effect of thorough consideration of the hypothesis, and to devote, say, six or seven per cent of his waking hours for six or seven years to a sincere trial of the experiment. For the exercise, will, in any case, be the most refreshing of pleasures. See my paper in the *Hibbert Journal* for October 1908. (R 641:19-21, 1909) In summary, Peirce *explicitly states* the following. - The synechistic philosophy *must *accept the doctrine of a personal God, such that we have a direct perception of God and are in personal communication with God. - The reality of God should thus be obvious to *all *minds, but directly perceiving God requires attention to elements of experience that are continually present, which is difficult. - The proposition that God *exists *is a contradiction in terms, which nominalists--among whom are all atheists--wrongly confound with the assertion of God's *reality*. - Anyone who has *not *meditated well on the hypothesis of God's reality--which means spending at least an hour a day for six or seven years doing so--is unfit to judge of it. - Anyone who *does *conduct such an experiment will be utterly incapable of doubting God's reality--i.e., rationally compelled to believe it--because belief in God is a natural instinct. To be clear, these are *Peirce's *views, not necessarily mine. Anyone is free to disagree with him about any or all of them, but not to attribute *different *views to him, let alone *contrary *views. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Sep 8, 2021 at 4:12 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, List > > I am sure you understand that the term of 'existence' in my comment refers > to 'reality' - and I wasn't at all using the term of 'existence' to refer > to a 'material entity' in a mode of 2ns!! Therefore, your- and even > Peirce's suggestion of fetishism is not relevant.6.495. But, the term of > 'reality' still does not provide a definition! > > Now, you can say that this 'reality' is 'the creator' of the three > universes of experience [the formations of matter and relations in 1ns, > 2ns, 3ns] but this, to me, is not a definition of 'god' for it does not > analyze or explain 'why' such a creation emerged and 'what' this > 'force/god' actually does. > > Peirce often referred to 'god' as Mind 6.502, and 'reason' ..and 'order' > and even 'nature' 8.211. TO me, these are the key terms. We can see from > these terms that the answer to 'what' and 'why' refers to the > 'organization' of matter-as-form, this hylomorphic synechist continuity of > matter in our universe. This, to me, defines the functionality of what > some people refer to as 'god'. But I am satisfied with Peirce's use of > Mind, Reason, Nature as analogies. > > As for evolution, I certainly don't see it as having any 'morality' [and I > think the term of 'morality' needs to be defined!!] but evolution certainly > has a purpose. In my view, the 'purpose' of evolution is to increase > complexity via diversity and networking of matter. The FUNCTION of such > complexity networking is to prevent the dissipation of matter to free > energy. This is certainly not Neo-Darwinism, which is a mechanical, random > and almost pointless process. This evolution has an 'agenda', so to speak, > and Peirce's agapasm, in my view, fits in well with this evolving 'rational > complex diversity'. But there is no utopian Finale! > > Edwina >
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