Jack, List: JRKC: In understanding Kant's thing in itself, we must throw it [semeiotic] all away (suspend it until the noumena has been comprehended insofar as it can be).
Since all thought is in signs, we cannot discuss whether and how we understand or comprehend *anything *without invoking semeiotic. JRKC: You cannot usefully use Peirce to address the thing-in-itself (via semiotic formalisms) for it transcends the very notion of form. Again, Peirce explicitly and repeatedly *denies *that there is any absolutely incognizable thing-in-itself. You need to make a solid case for it, not just assume it (thus begging the question) and wave off his arguments against it (which I and many others find quite persuasive). JRKC: The noumenal is pre-consubstantiality even as consubstantiality is how we make sense of it. ... Except we know via consubstantiality/contiguity that it, the noumenal, necessarily is. These are just bare assertions. What exactly do you mean by "consubstantiality" and "contiguity" in this context? How does the reality of "the noumenal" *necessarily *follow from affirming them? JRKC: It is not possible to represent the thing in itself via form, or any means, because it goes before - our attempts to do so will always be wrong. Again, anything that is impossible to represent is *unreal*, a "metaphysical figment" (CP 5.312, EP 1:53, 1868). "[A]ll our conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring in judgments of experience. Accordingly, there can be no conception of the absolutely incognizable, since nothing of that sort occurs in experience" (CP 5.255, EP 1:24, 1868). Also, "the absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable ... for, since the meaning of a word is the conception it conveys, the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as 'the real' is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition, in the objective sense of that term" (CP 5.310, EP 1:51, 1868). JRKC: Quality of Element(Snail) = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]). That is the semeiotic "standing for" schema simplified. I.e, Salt-Snail-Poison = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]. No, that "equation" has nothing to do with the irreducibly triadic relation of representing. The *real *qualities of salt are what they are regardless of *any *representation, so they are completely unaffected by the "values" that humans (or snails) assign to those qualities. On the contrary, the purpose of inquiry is to align such assignments with the reality--in semeiotic terms, to conform our *dynamical *interpretants as closely as possible to the *final *interpretant, how the reality *would be* understood by an infinite community after infinite investigation. Moreover, savoriness to humans and poisonousness to snails are not *essential *qualities of salt in itself, they are *relational *qualities that depend on not only the chemical properties of salt, but also the biological constitutions of humans and snails. JRKC: We have no idea - no matter what anyone says - of how a snail perceives salt. So what? How a snail (or a human) *perceives *salt has no effect on the reality of the salt. After all, we routinely *mis*perceive reality, but the scientific method of inquiry is intrinsically self-correcting such that by employing it diligently, we would eventually *conceive *reality accurately in the long run. JRKC: And all such are discursivities - which is why logic goes ahead of mathematics in every schema you've ever seen (epistemological). What exactly do you mean by "goes ahead of" in this context? For Peirce, mathematics is the science *that draws* necessary conclusions about *hypothetical *states of things, so it "comes before" all the positive sciences--including the normative science of logic as semeiotic, the science *of drawing* plausible (abductive/retroductive), probable (inductive), and necessary (deductive) conclusions about *any *states of things--in the sense that they depend on it for principles, not the other way around. JRKC: Q(uality) of E(lement) = derivation of V(alue) but never the thing in itself: (X). A representation - VALUE - of the thing which is never the thing in itself (X). Peirce never claims or implies that a representation of something is identical to that thing. On the contrary, he explicitly affirms that "*really being* and *being represented* are very different," and yet "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable" (EP 2:303&324, c. 1901). In short, really being entails being *capable *of being represented, and so far, your alleged "proof" does not come anywhere close to demonstrating otherwise. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List > > Semeiotic is, however you define it, a schema for a series of relations > between predicates (or qualities or whatever you want to call a > classificatory schema). It is a formalism - to be frank. Now being a > formalism the terms "dynamical object" and so on -- these are about as > arbitrary as it gets. For they are "stand in" predicates for a given > quality within a formal structure (semiotic). In understanding Kant's thing > in itself, we must throw it all away (suspend it until the noumena has been > comprehended insofar as it can be). > > Kant's noumenal/thing in itself is pre-form wherein the metaphysical may > be of the physical but is always pre-physical. Pre-capacity to even > understand form/content. That is what the noumena is (for humans). You > cannot usefully use Peirce to address the thing-in-itself (via semiotic > formalisms) for it transcends the very notion of form. > > The noumenal is pre-consubstantiality even as consubstantiality is how we > make sense of it. It is not possible to represent the thing in itself via > form, or any means, because it goes before - our attempts to do so will > always be wrong. Except we know via consubstantiality/contiguity that it, > the noumenal, necessarily is. > > So > > Salt-Snail-Poison > > Ignoring any formal terms, semeiotic or otherwise, it is best to restrict > theses to the simplest terms possible. Quality/Element/Subject. To a > physicist, perhaps all three are elements? > > That the "quality" of the "element" (salt) is "poison" to a snail, is the > formal - semiotic - classifcation of the relation in its simplest possible > form. > > That the Q of the E(s) is not poison to any other organism (or need not > be) is the point. Thus, the essence of salt, as it is in itself, is proven > (regardless of formal structure but via formal structure - as with Godel). > > Thus Q of E(S) = V(P-H[S]) but not [X]. To humans, always V(-X) (in > itself, there, but not possible to represent). All > mathematics/lexicals/sciences/logics produce a value within a formal relata > (relational schema) which value is never the thing in itself (but we know > the thing in itself necessarily is and is pre-form). That is as scientific > as Semeiotic may ever be. But only if it understands the X restriction > which enables its liftoff - the fallibilism upon which science is based and > which Peirce always embraced - thus there should be no reticience in > disregarding large chunks of Peircean terminology as that is what Peirce > aimed for (semeiotic as science). > > Quality of Element(Snail) = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]). That is the > semeiotic "standing for" schema simplified. I.e, Salt-Snail-Poison = > Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]. > > However, P-H[S] is necessarily not Poison to a Snail which in > semiotic/formal terms is more like P(S[Sa]). The first has a human > intermediary - we cannot pretend that this doesn't "count" (formal logic > and mathematics will tell you that it does). Thus, what salt - as poison - > is to a snail, in absentia of human understanding, cannot be the "same" > thing (Reality or otherwise) as it is to a snail minus the human predicate. > And this is only in logical terms - which occludes the fact that no animal > understands such things via logic (of this lexical, received, variety, > other than the human). > > We have no idea - no matter what anyone says - of how a snail perceives > salt. We assume it is the same - or similar - as in "fire is hot" (Kantian > objectivity 1.0) but similar, mutual threshold of understanding, is not the > "same" (it cannot be, even from the biological point of view - it mightbe > similar, but never the same, for the divergences among humans themselves > tell us this with zero ambiguity: savoury for some, poisonous for others). > Nor is it relativity, it is just true. > > Every single mathematical system ever derived partakes of precisely the > same schema. Bar none. Formal relationships - genres if you like - which > justify certain functions/operations within a given "habitus" (area of > operational protocol - entirely habitual insofar as the numericals/etc go). > And all such are discursivities - which is why logic goes ahead of > mathematics in every schema you've ever seen (epistemological). This is why > Russell derives a paradox and Godel derives incompleteness -- the terms are > arbitrary discursivities (functional, yes, but not innate or universal in > any sense -- consubstantiality may be universal, but no given terms used > "with substance" to "map substance" is necessarily divine/universal). V(X), > however, is universal in every sense but we cannot represent its existence > in formal terms without missing the point. For example, V(X) explains > Peirce's entire schema and continua (the result...) but Peirce's schema, in > itself (not noumenal), cannot do the same thing. > > Q(uality) of E(lement) = derivation of V(alue) but never the thing in > itself: (X). A representation - VALUE - of the thing which is never the > thing in itself (X). Now, this can be formalized a million different ways > but it never breaks. It's the simplest - insofar as I know - means of > explaining formal logic relative to semiotic and the > limitations/possibilities therein as it pertains to the noumenal proof. > > I know - as it goes - that for this to be a "proof" in the academic sense, > I'd have to go further (but I just know it is proven and have been rather > lazy of late - not very well). > > Happy to let others go at it - whether to falsify or prove. > > Jack > >
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