Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

Wed, 10 May 2023 08:02:15 -0700

Jack, List,
 
I feel quite critical towards some forms of constructivism, but in this case I ask: Migtn´t it be, that a representation is a reconstruction, and that, of which it is one, is a reconstruction too, and so on, and in the beginning there doesn´t necessarily have to stand a thing-in-itself, because the "reconstruction-of-reconstruction-of-reconstruction..."-chain may go in a circle? Or each link of the chain adds some more aspect to the former chain, so in the beginning there might just be one tiny aspect, which is also added, but not to something former, but to nothing, just made up, or a supposition about something completely different from the final reconstruction? I´m just sceptical.
 
Best, Helmut
 
 
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 10. Mai 2023 um 02:21 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).
Jon, list
 
I know CHATGPT isn't popular, not a fan myself, but using it as programmatic base to formalize a larger thesis:
 
some exhanges:
 

 

My query to CHATGPT:

(taken form thesis construction... not very apt for programmatic)...What does this mean? Simply, and consistently, it means this: given a world which is already always mediated, via contiguous states (Bo[MaMo]), the person (Bo) cannot represent things as they are in themselves for mediation, that which corresponds to representation, and to the most minute and complex representative schemas, across all disciplines, is such that it presupposes – even before the thing in itself distinction – said always already mediated condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a “bracketed” distance, discrete, between “S” and “O”, to bodies within a shared MaMo (MassMotion) regardless of each individual’s “spin” (the relativity of time and space which is, itself, a Kantian offshoot in many way). Rephrase the Kantian, then, and in natural language it reads as: If our representative capacity represented things as they are in themselves, then absolutely no representative capacity would exist – with this absence of the representative capacity now being theoretically apriori. The discrete Human brain/body/self would be obliterated via the non-bracketing – distance/discretion – of the “s”/”o” (Subject(Object) in science relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen thing in itself (ThIT) can be logically inferred. To make it more encompassing, we sort the RC according to lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That is, (I)f LA-RC (all possible RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists. Now, this is proven before any movements into the noumenal aspect of the thing in itself via semiotic rather than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo, necessarily, Kantian aprioris in any case (time and space), to “receive” O. And likewise, O for S. Thus, Representative Capacity – lexical or affective – via contiguity (lexical as consubtantial reasoning reflexively turned back upon the affective, the intuition derived from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity (as soon as we consider a few things: formal relations, perspectival, and sequence).
 
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (1):
 

 

In simpler terms, the passage is discussing the idea that our ability to represent and understand the world is always mediated or filtered through our own subjective experiences and perspectives. It suggests that if we were able to directly perceive things as they are in themselves, without any mediation, our capacity for representation would cease to exist. This mediated condition is seen as inherent and presupposed even before considering the concept of things in themselves.

The passage also mentions the concept of a "bracketed" distance between the subject (S) and object (O), indicating a separation between individuals within a shared framework of perception. It refers to the relativity of time and space, which can be seen as a Kantian influence.

Formally, the passage presents an argument that if our representative capacity (RC) exists, then the existence of things in themselves can be logically inferred. It suggests that by considering all possible representative capacities (LA-RC), the existence of things in themselves becomes necessary.

The passage acknowledges the limitations of representation and introduces the concept of semiotics, which involves the study of signs and meaning. It argues that representative capacity, whether through language or affective means, inherently relies on mediation and contiguity. This is seen as evidence of the existence of things in themselves, particularly when considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences.

Overall, the passage explores the relationship between our subjective representations and the existence of things as they are in themselves, drawing on Kantian ideas and emphasizing the mediated nature of our understanding of the world.

 
 

 

Clairifcation of terms from me: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]) Bo=Body Ma=Mass Mo=Motion LA=Lexical Arbitrary RC = Representative capacity (t)hen = and only then can you refmorulate the above now in logical form?
 
 
 

 

Sure! Here's the rephrased version of the passage in logical form:

  1. (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo])

    • The body (Bo) in a state of mass (Ma) and motion (Mo) is represented as the self (Self) and other (Other) in the same state of mass and motion.

  2. If RC, then ThIT

    • If there is a representative capacity (RC), then the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) can be logically inferred.

  3. If LA-RC (all possible RC), then ThIT necessarily exists

    • If all possible representative capacities (LA-RC) exist, then the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is necessary.

  4. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo

    • In the state of mass and motion (MaMo), the self (S) requires representative capacity (RC) mediation, even if it is in the form of mass and motion.

  5. Thus, RC via contiguity is proof of ThIT

    • Therefore, representative capacity (RC) through contiguity serves as proof of the existence of things in themselves (ThIT).

I hope this logical form helps to clarify the structure of the original passage.

 
 

My next request, already formalized (but with additional Predicates)

[Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy (V-E-S(S'))
[Sn(S) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn-Sn (SF[l]') ⊃ ? (S-S-SS(SF[l]'))
SN=SNAIL subequsent to SN, "()" = ontological relata wherein E = Element, S, = Subjectivity, and l=lexicalreflexivty/logic. can yu add this to the above and summaraize
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (2):
Certainly! Taking into account the additional symbols and clarifications you provided, here's an updated version of the logical form:

 

  1. [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy (V-E-S(S'))

    • If a snail (Sn) possesses an element (E), has a subjective experience (Hm(S)), and exhibits higher-level mental processes (Hmn(S[l]')), then it follows that there is a subjective experience (Svy) involving the interaction between the element (E) and the snail's subjective state (S').

  2. [Sn(S) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn-Sn (SF[l]')] ⊃ ? (S-S-SS(SF[l]'))

    • If a snail (Sn) possesses a subjective state (S), has a subjective experience (Hm(S)), and lacks higher-level mental processes (Hmn-Sn(SF[l]')), then it implies some unknown outcome (?), involving the interaction between the snail's subjective states (S, S') and their self-reflection (SS) in relation to the lexical reflexivity/logic (SF[l]').

Summary: The first statement establishes a conditional relationship where the presence of certain conditions in a snail (element, subjective experience, higher-level mental processes) implies the existence of a subjective experience involving the interaction between an element and the snail's subjective state. The second statement introduces a similar conditional relationship but for a different scenario where a snail possesses a subjective state and experience but lacks higher-level mental processes, leading to an unknown outcome involving the interaction between subjective states and self-reflection in relation to lexical reflexivity/logic.

 
 

 

Next request: can you formalize that with the first query?
 
 
 
 
 
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (3):
Certainly! Here's the formalization of the first query along with the provided symbols and clarifications:
  1. [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy(V-E-S(S'))
    • If a snail (Sn) possesses an element (E), has a subjective experience (Hm(S)), and exhibits higher-level mental processes (Hmn(S[l]')), then it follows that there is a subjective experience (Svy) involving the interaction between the element (E) and the snail's subjective state (S').

Let's break it down further:

Let's define the following symbols:

  • Sn: Snail
  • E: Element
  • Hm: Subjective experience
  • S: Subjective state
  • Hmn: Higher-level mental processes
  • Svy: Subjective experience involving interaction
  • V: Interaction
  • SF: Lexical reflexivity/logic
  • l: Lexical reflexivity/logic context

Using the provided symbols, the formalization of the first query is:

  1. (Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')) → Svy(V, E, S(S'))

This statement can be read as: If a snail possesses an element, has a subjective experience, and exhibits higher-level mental processes within a lexical reflexivity/logic context, then there exists a subjective experience involving interaction between the element, the snail's subjective state, and the self-reflection (SF[l]').

Please note that the symbol '?' from the original query does not have a clear representation or meaning based on the provided symbols and context.

 
 

 

Next (long repetitious of first) request: can you add this framework to it please: (Bo[MaMo]), the person (Bo) cannot represent things as they are in themselves for mediation, that which corresponds to representation, and to the most minute and complex representative schemas, across all disciplines, is such that it presupposes – even before the thing in itself distinction – said always already mediated condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a “bracketed” distance, discrete, between “S” and “O”, to bodies within a shared MaMo (MassMotion) regardless of each individual’s “spin” (the relativity of time and space which is, itself, a Kantian offshoot in many way). Rephrase the Kantian, then, and in natural language it reads as: If our representative capacity represented things as they are in themselves, then absolutely no representative capacity would exist – with this absence of the representative capacity now being theoretically apriori. The discrete Human brain/body/self would be obliterated via the non-bracketing – distance/discretion – of the “s”/”o” (Subject(Object) in science relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen thing in itself (ThIT) can be logically inferred. To make it more encompassing, we sort the RC according to lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That is, (I)f LA-RC (all possible RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists. Now, this is proven before any movements into the noumenal aspect of the thing in itself via semiotic rather than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo, necessarily, Kantian aprioris in any case (time and space), to “receive” O. And likewise, O for S. Thus, Representative Capacity – lexical or affective – via contiguity (lexical as consubtantial reasoning reflexively turned back upon the affective, the intuition derived from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity (as soon as we consider a few things: formal relations, perspectival, and sequence).
 
 
 
 
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (4):

 

Certainly! Here's an updated version of the formalization, incorporating the additional framework:

Let's define the following symbols:

  • Bo: Body
  • MaMo: MassMotion
  • RC: Representative capacity
  • ThIT: Thing in itself
  • LA-RC: All possible representative capacities
  • S: Subject
  • O: Object

Using the provided symbols and framework, the formalization is as follows:

  1. (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo])

    • The body (Bo) in a state of mass motion (MaMo) is represented as the self (Self) and other (Other) in the same state of mass motion.

  2. If RC, then ThIT

    • If there is a representative capacity (RC), then the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) can be logically inferred.

  3. If LA-RC (all possible RC), then ThIT necessarily exists.

    • If all possible representative capacities (LA-RC) exist, then the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is necessary.

  4. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo.

    • In the state of mass motion (MaMo), the subject (S) requires representative capacity (RC) mediation, even if it is in the form of mass motion, to perceive the object (O). And vice versa, the object (O) requires the subject (S) to perceive it.

  5. Thus, Representative Capacity (lexical or affective) via contiguity is itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity when considering formal relations, perspectival, and sequence.

    • Therefore, representative capacity (lexical or affective) through contiguity, where lexical reasoning is turned back upon affective intuition derived from sensibility, serves as proof of the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) beyond representative capacity. This proof becomes evident when considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences.

I hope this formalization accurately captures the essence of the provided framework.

 
 

 

Final request: thus, ThIT is adequately proven as beyond representational capacity?
 
 
Final response:
 

Yes, based on the provided framework and formalization, the argument suggests that the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is adequately proven to be beyond representational capacity. The passage argues that representative capacity, whether it be lexical or affective, operates through mediation and contiguity. It further asserts that even if representative capacity takes the form of mass motion (MaMo), it still requires mediation to perceive objects.

By considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences, the passage claims that the representative capacity itself becomes evidence of the existence of things in themselves. It suggests that the limitations and mediated nature of representation imply the existence of something beyond representation, referred to as the "thing in itself." Therefore, the passage argues that ThIT is adequately demonstrated to transcend representational capacity.

 

 

 

--------------------------------

 

 

within the bounds of the above, it isn't actually "proven" (it is, but not formalized). it's just part of a much greater theses I'm formalizing with respect to semiotic, semeiotic, language, representational capacity, ontological orders, and so on.

 

but i think it offers "food for thought" if any want to go through it with Peircean lenses? (fair enough if not, it's a massive text).

 

 

Best,

Jacl

 
 
 
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, May 5, 2023 10:58 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).
 
Jack, List:
 
One more time--Peirce already "proved" that "the absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable" and "is, therefore, a meaningless word" (CP 5.310, EP 1:51, 1868). Here is a later passage where he does so again.
 
CSP: Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist. A real is anything that is not affected by men's cognitions about it; which is a verbal definition, not a doctrine. An external object is anything that is not affected by any cognitions, whether about it or not, of the man to whom it is external. Exaggerate this, in the usual philosopher fashion, and you have the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions at all. Take the converse of this definition and you have the notion of what does not affect cognition, and in this indirect manner you get a hypostatically abstract notion of what the Ding an sich would be. In this sense, we also have a notion of a sky-blue demonstration; but in half a dozen ways the Ding an sich has been proved to be nonsensical; and here is another way. It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c. 1905)
 
Peirce's logical point here is illustrated clearly by his Existential Graphs, where all the words can be understood as predicates being attributed to otherwise indescribable subjects by attaching them to lines of identity. It is relevant because he agrees with Kant that "metaphysical conceptions spring from formal logic" (CP 3.454, 1896), such that "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). The problem is that Kant's grasp of logic is inadequate for the task, and Peirce provides other such "proofs" during the intervening decades (e.g., CP 8.12-13&30, EP 1:90&100, 1871; CP 6.95, 1903). After all ...
 
CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 4.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905)
 
Of course, Peirce similarly claims to have a "proof" of pragmaticism but never fully spells it out, so that has been a topic of considerable discussion in the secondary literature. I have long considered Nathan Houser's sketch in the introduction to EP 2 (xxxv-xxxvi) to be one of the most promising reconstructions, and I have outlined my own attempts along similar lines in past List threads (e.g., https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2022-09/msg00008.html).
 
One last comment (for now)--Peirce's universal categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns do not "belong to logic as semeiotic." On the contrary, as he explicitly and repeatedly explains, they are discovered in phaneroscopy and then applied in all the other positive sciences.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
 
On Thu, May 4, 2023 at 9:27 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
Jon, List,
 
I have a far more in-depth "proof" (call it an argument, but it is a formal proof once finished - and scrutinized by those such as yourself and others here and elsewhere acqauinted with logic/philosophy/mathematics and so on) which I am working to complete within the next two weeks. Your comments, and those of Helmut, have helped quite a lot as I need to address certain sequential facts (ontological) which otherwise just = rewrite and consider "this". Which is kind of why I posted the Kantian/Peircean problem as I conceive of it (solved, although presumptiously in the form I give) - just to see what areas I am weak  in. For example, much of your reply here helps frame my larger "thesis" as it were.
 
Anyway, I will share once it is somewhat acceptable. Thanks for the comments.
 
Jack.
 
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