Jack, List: JRKC: If our representative capacity represented things as they are in themselves, then absolutely no representative capacity would exist
This strikes me as the fundamental premiss of the alleged "proof," but it is blatantly self-contradictory--the antecedent requires a "representative capacity" whose very existence the consequent denies. It is tantamount to saying, "If our representative capacity exists, then our representative capacity does not exist." The underlying assertion seems to be that any *actual *representative capacity is *necessarily *incapable of representing things as they are in themselves, which is a textbook example of begging the question--*assuming *the very conclusion that is supposedly being "proved"--and plainly violates Peirce's injunction against blocking the way of inquiry by "maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be known" (CP 1.138, EP 2:49, 1898). ChatGPT: [JRKC's argument] is discussing the idea that our ability to represent and understand the world is always mediated or filtered through our own subjective experiences and perspectives. This is true as far as it goes, although I think that it would be more accurate to say that our knowledge of dynamical objects is always mediated by signs that produce different dynamical interpretants because each of us has different habits of interpretation as a result of being determined by different previous signs. Peirce was not a fan of Kant's subjective vs. objective dichotomy, preferring internal vs. external and *ego *vs. non- *ego*, and he associated experiences with the objects of signs rather than their interpretants. ChatGPT: [JRKC's argument] suggests that the limitations and mediated nature of representation imply the existence of something beyond representation, referred to as the "thing in itself." This is a more plausible restatement, claiming that the mediating nature of our representative capacity somehow precludes us from *directly *experiencing things as they are in themselves. However, the details of that purported implication are not spelled out, and Peirce quite definitively denies it. CSP: Hereupon comes the third moment of Kant's thought, which ... is really a most luminous and central element of Kant's thought. I may say that it is the very sun round which all the rest revolves. This third moment consists in the flat denial that the metaphysical conceptions do not apply to things in themselves. Kant *never *said that. What he said is that these conceptions do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience. But we have* direct experience of things in themselves*. Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas. That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of all falsity. Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented. Even lies invariably contain this much truth, that they represent themselves to be referring to something whose mode of being is independent of its being represented. This is true even if the proposition relates to an object of representation as such. At the same time, no proposition can relate, or even thoroughly pretend to relate, to any object otherwise than as that object is represented. ... But Kant failed to work out all the consequences of this third moment of thought and considerable retractions are called for, accordingly, from some of the positions of his Transcendental Dialectic. (CP 6.95, 1903) After all ... CSP: Now, otherwise than by reasoning, we can know nothing except what we *directly *experience. So all that we can anyway know relates to experience. All the creations of our mind are but patchworks from experience. So that all our ideas are but ideas of real or transposed experiences. A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even *talk *about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. (R 860, CP 6.492, c. 1893) Nevertheless, Peirce clearly does not maintain that there is no difference whatsoever between *how *things are represented and *how *they are in themselves. On the contrary, he elsewhere explicitly and repeatedly distinguishes the *immediate *object, the object as it is represented by the sign, from the *dynamical *object, the object as it is regardless of any such representation. This is unavoidable because even in cases of direct experience, when we are compelled to formulate abductive and eminently fallible perceptual judgments as "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903), we must (1) prescind predicates from the continuous field of our involuntary sensations, then (2) hypostasize some of those predicates into subjects, and finally (3) attribute other predicates to those subjects. CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of images. Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick the image into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not literally true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus predication involves precisive abstraction. Precisive abstraction creates predicates. Subjectal [hypostatic] abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and subjects are creations of thought. (NEM 3:917, 1904) CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906) CSP: The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject , is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of being. (CP 6.341, 1907) We *prescind *various states of things (immediate object) from reality as a whole (dynamical object) and then *represent *them with propositions, which are symbolic signs and therefore always possess some degree of indeterminacy. If we are sincerely seeking truth, then our *proximate *goal is to minimize the discrepancies between our representations and the reality, and our *ultimate *aim is to eliminate such deviations altogether. CSP: Let me say, by the way, that there is in the logical law this difference between the absolutely first antecedent and the absolutely last consequent, both of which are unattainable limits. The last consequent is the very reality itself. That is our very conception of reality, the essence of the word, namely, what we should believe if investigation was carried to its furthest limit where no change of belief further was possible. (NEM 4:134, 1897-8) CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any man many think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly, observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error always remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually dispelled. (R 953, c. 1899) CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304, c. 1901) Here, Peirce's hyperbolic philosophy comes into play--the absolute truth, perfect knowledge of all reality as it is in itself, is never *actually *achieved; it is an ideal limit that *would be* achieved in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community, when everything would be in the past and thus completely determinate. In the meantime, the standard for representational "success"--which is what makes semeiotic a *normative *science--is *not *the conformity of the immediate object to the dynamical object, it is the conformity of the *dynamical *interpretant (the *actual* effect of an instance of the sign) to the *final* interpretant (the *ideal *effect of the sign), namely, the very effect that the dynamical object *itself *would have. CSP: That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form. ... The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true. The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) CSP: A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391, 1906) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, May 9, 2023 at 7:21 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list > > I know CHATGPT isn't popular, not a fan myself, but using it as > programmatic base to formalize a larger thesis: > > some exhanges: > > My query to CHATGPT: > > (taken form thesis construction... not very apt for programmatic)...What > does this mean? Simply, and consistently, it means this: given a world > which is already always mediated, via contiguous states (Bo[MaMo]), the > person (Bo) cannot represent things as they are in themselves for > mediation, that which corresponds to representation, and to the most minute > and complex representative schemas, across all disciplines, is such that it > presupposes – even before the thing in itself distinction – said always > already mediated condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a > “bracketed” distance, discrete, between “S” and “O”, to bodies within a > shared MaMo (MassMotion) regardless of each individual’s “spin” (the > relativity of time and space which is, itself, a Kantian offshoot in many > way). Rephrase the Kantian, then, and in natural language it reads as: If > our representative capacity represented things as they are in themselves, > then absolutely no representative capacity would exist – with this absence > of the representative capacity now being theoretically apriori. The > discrete Human brain/body/self would be obliterated via the non-bracketing > – distance/discretion – of the “s”/”o” (Subject(Object) in science > relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen thing in itself (ThIT) can be > logically inferred. To make it more encompassing, we sort the RC according > to lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That is, (I)f LA-RC (all > possible RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists. Now, this is proven > before any movements into the noumenal aspect of the thing in itself via > semiotic rather than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, > even if it be MaMo, necessarily, Kantian aprioris in any case (time and > space), to “receive” O. And likewise, O for S. Thus, Representative > Capacity – lexical or affective – via contiguity (lexical as consubtantial > reasoning reflexively turned back upon the affective, the intuition derived > from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is itself proof of the thing in > itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity (as soon as we consider a > few things: formal relations, perspectival, and sequence). > > *CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (1):* > > In simpler terms, the passage is discussing the idea that our ability to > represent and understand the world is always mediated or filtered through > our own subjective experiences and perspectives. It suggests that if we > were able to directly perceive things as they are in themselves, without > any mediation, our capacity for representation would cease to exist. This > mediated condition is seen as inherent and presupposed even before > considering the concept of things in themselves. > > The passage also mentions the concept of a "bracketed" distance between > the subject (S) and object (O), indicating a separation between individuals > within a shared framework of perception. It refers to the relativity of > time and space, which can be seen as a Kantian influence. > > Formally, the passage presents an argument that if our representative > capacity (RC) exists, then the existence of things in themselves can be > logically inferred. It suggests that by considering all possible > representative capacities (LA-RC), the existence of things in themselves > becomes necessary. > > The passage acknowledges the limitations of representation and introduces > the concept of semiotics, which involves the study of signs and meaning. It > argues that representative capacity, whether through language or affective > means, inherently relies on mediation and contiguity. This is seen as > evidence of the existence of things in themselves, particularly when > considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences. > > Overall, the passage explores the relationship between our subjective > representations and the existence of things as they are in themselves, > drawing on Kantian ideas and emphasizing the mediated nature of our > understanding of the world. > Clairifcation of terms from me: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]) Bo=Body > Ma=Mass Mo=Motion LA=Lexical Arbitrary RC = Representative capacity (t)hen > = and only then can you refmorulate the above now in logical form? > > Sure! Here's the rephrased version of the passage in logical form: > > 1. > > (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]) > - The body (Bo) in a state of mass (Ma) and motion (Mo) is represented > as the self (Self) and other (Other) in the same state of mass and > motion. > 2. > > If RC, then ThIT > - If there is a representative capacity (RC), then the existence of > things in themselves (ThIT) can be logically inferred. > 3. > > If LA-RC (all possible RC), then ThIT necessarily exists > - If all possible representative capacities (LA-RC) exist, then the > existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is necessary. > 4. > > [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo > - In the state of mass and motion (MaMo), the self (S) requires > representative capacity (RC) mediation, even if it is in the form of > mass > and motion. > 5. > > Thus, RC via contiguity is proof of ThIT > - Therefore, representative capacity (RC) through contiguity serves as > proof of the existence of things in themselves (ThIT). > > I hope this logical form helps to clarify the structure of the original > passage. > My next request, already formalized (but with additional Predicates) > [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy (V-E-S(S')) > [Sn(S) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn-Sn (SF[l]') ⊃ ? (S-S-SS(SF[l]')) > SN=SNAIL subequsent to SN, "()" = ontological relata wherein E = Element, > S, = Subjectivity, and l=lexicalreflexivty/logic. can yu add this to the > above and summaraize > > CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (2): > Certainly! Taking into account the additional symbols and clarifications > you provided, here's an updated version of the logical form: > > > 1. > > [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy (V-E-S(S')) > - If a snail (Sn) possesses an element (E), has a subjective > experience (Hm(S)), and exhibits higher-level mental processes > (Hmn(S[l]')), then it follows that there is a subjective experience > (Svy) > involving the interaction between the element (E) and the snail's > subjective state (S'). > 2. > > [Sn(S) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn-Sn (SF[l]')] ⊃ ? (S-S-SS(SF[l]')) > - If a snail (Sn) possesses a subjective state (S), has a subjective > experience (Hm(S)), and lacks higher-level mental processes > (Hmn-Sn(SF[l]')), then it implies some unknown outcome (?), involving > the > interaction between the snail's subjective states (S, S') and their > self-reflection (SS) in relation to the lexical reflexivity/logic > (SF[l]'). > > Summary: The first statement establishes a conditional relationship where > the presence of certain conditions in a snail (element, subjective > experience, higher-level mental processes) implies the existence of a > subjective experience involving the interaction between an element and the > snail's subjective state. The second statement introduces a similar > conditional relationship but for a different scenario where a snail > possesses a subjective state and experience but lacks higher-level mental > processes, leading to an unknown outcome involving the interaction between > subjective states and self-reflection in relation to lexical > reflexivity/logic. > Next request: can you formalize that with the first query? > > CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (3): > Certainly! Here's the formalization of the first query along with the > provided symbols and clarifications: > > 1. [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy(V-E-S(S')) > - If a snail (Sn) possesses an element (E), has a subjective > experience (Hm(S)), and exhibits higher-level mental processes > (Hmn(S[l]')), then it follows that there is a subjective experience > (Svy) > involving the interaction between the element (E) and the snail's > subjective state (S'). > > Let's break it down further: > > Let's define the following symbols: > > - Sn: Snail > - E: Element > - Hm: Subjective experience > - S: Subjective state > - Hmn: Higher-level mental processes > - Svy: Subjective experience involving interaction > - V: Interaction > - SF: Lexical reflexivity/logic > - l: Lexical reflexivity/logic context > > Using the provided symbols, the formalization of the first query is: > > 1. (Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')) → Svy(V, E, S(S')) > > This statement can be read as: If a snail possesses an element, has a > subjective experience, and exhibits higher-level mental processes within a > lexical reflexivity/logic context, then there exists a subjective > experience involving interaction between the element, the snail's > subjective state, and the self-reflection (SF[l]'). > > Please note that the symbol '?' from the original query does not have a > clear representation or meaning based on the provided symbols and context. > *Next (long repetitious of first) request*: can you add this framework to > it please: (Bo[MaMo]), the person (Bo) cannot represent things as they are > in themselves for mediation, that which corresponds to representation, and > to the most minute and complex representative schemas, across all > disciplines, is such that it presupposes – even before the thing in itself > distinction – said always already mediated condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as > (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a “bracketed” distance, discrete, between “S” > and “O”, to bodies within a shared MaMo (MassMotion) regardless of each > individual’s “spin” (the relativity of time and space which is, itself, a > Kantian offshoot in many way). Rephrase the Kantian, then, and in natural > language it reads as: If our representative capacity represented things as > they are in themselves, then absolutely no representative capacity would > exist – with this absence of the representative capacity now being > theoretically apriori. The discrete Human brain/body/self would be > obliterated via the non-bracketing – distance/discretion – of the “s”/”o” > (Subject(Object) in science relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen thing in > itself (ThIT) can be logically inferred. To make it more encompassing, we > sort the RC according to lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That > is, (I)f LA-RC (all possible RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists. > Now, this is proven before any movements into the noumenal aspect of the > thing in itself via semiotic rather than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S > requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo, necessarily, Kantian aprioris in > any case (time and space), to “receive” O. And likewise, O for S. Thus, > Representative Capacity – lexical or affective – via contiguity (lexical as > consubtantial reasoning reflexively turned back upon the affective, the > intuition derived from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is itself proof of > the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity (as soon as > we consider a few things: formal relations, perspectival, and sequence). > > CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (4): > > Certainly! Here's an updated version of the formalization, incorporating > the additional framework: > > Let's define the following symbols: > > - Bo: Body > - MaMo: MassMotion > - RC: Representative capacity > - ThIT: Thing in itself > - LA-RC: All possible representative capacities > - S: Subject > - O: Object > > Using the provided symbols and framework, the formalization is as follows: > > 1. > > (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]) > - The body (Bo) in a state of mass motion (MaMo) is represented as the > self (Self) and other (Other) in the same state of mass motion. > 2. > > If RC, then ThIT > - If there is a representative capacity (RC), then the existence of > things in themselves (ThIT) can be logically inferred. > 3. > > If LA-RC (all possible RC), then ThIT necessarily exists. > - If all possible representative capacities (LA-RC) exist, then the > existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is necessary. > 4. > > [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo. > - In the state of mass motion (MaMo), the subject (S) requires > representative capacity (RC) mediation, even if it is in the form of > mass > motion, to perceive the object (O). And vice versa, the object (O) > requires > the subject (S) to perceive it. > 5. > > Thus, Representative Capacity (lexical or affective) via contiguity is > itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative > Capacity when considering formal relations, perspectival, and sequence. > - Therefore, representative capacity (lexical or affective) through > contiguity, where lexical reasoning is turned back upon affective > intuition > derived from sensibility, serves as proof of the existence of things in > themselves (ThIT) beyond representative capacity. This proof becomes > evident when considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences. > > I hope this formalization accurately captures the essence of the provided > framework. > *Final request: *thus, ThIT is adequately proven as beyond > representational capacity? > > Final response: > > Yes, based on the provided framework and formalization, the argument > suggests that the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is adequately > proven to be beyond representational capacity. The passage argues that > representative capacity, whether it be lexical or affective, operates > through mediation and contiguity. It further asserts that even if > representative capacity takes the form of mass motion (MaMo), it still > requires mediation to perceive objects. > > By considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences, the passage > claims that the representative capacity itself becomes evidence of the > existence of things in themselves. It suggests that the limitations and > mediated nature of representation imply the existence of something beyond > representation, referred to as the "thing in itself." Therefore, the > passage argues that ThIT is adequately demonstrated to transcend > representational capacity. > > -------------------------------- > > within the bounds of the above, it isn't actually "proven" (it is, but not > formalized). it's just part of a much greater theses I'm formalizing with > respect to semiotic, semeiotic, language, representational capacity, > ontological orders, and so on. > > but i think it offers "food for thought" if any want to go through it with > Peircean lenses? (fair enough if not, it's a massive text). > > Best, > > Jacl > >
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