Jack, List: Infinite, continuous, and recursive are not synonymous. Gödel's incompleteness theorems pertain only to axiomatic formal systems of mathematical logic. The term "value" is vague and still lacks a rigorous definition for how it is being used in this particular context. No one is denying "representational inadequacy across all [*actual*] representative schemas," just the additional claim that the thing in itself is unknowable *in principle*.
In short, I cannot "analyze the logical form" of the alleged "proof" as requested because I still do not see a coherent argumentation being presented. What are the premisses, and what conclusions are being drawn from them? Please be specific and explicit. Regards, Jon On Mon, May 22, 2023, 5:50 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I disagree that the premise is false. If you look at the logic, (the > formalism), it is *of the continua*. It is infinite - continuous - in its > recursive form. Not tautological, as in that order of "entailment", but > infinite (perpetuating). Comes with the Kantian price - it, objectivity, > only functions, and it does, function, (very precisely), if we admit the > thing in itself. > > Now, from within the "ontological continua", Godel's incompleteness > resounds for representational inadequacy is that wherein representation > itself, now, is questioned. That is Hume's "value" here. The result is no > single value can be given to a single element consistently (for there exist > competing "values" just as worthy for every instance). Thus, is the Bird's > value for Snail or the Human's value for Snail (situational - in each > instance, for birds may fly past snails and pick a worm, instead, and the > naturalist is not the chef), THE value of that organism as element? Or > salt, in precisely the same formal series? Attached to snail, even. > Continua, style. Now, given infinite time, how should birds and snails and > humans all agree? Absurd? Hardly, for it is metaphysic which Peirce admits > - is true regardless of what any individual thinks of it - but then > compromises via "final interpretant". That is, the thing in itself is > admitted and then denied. > > JAS: In other words, the indeterminacy and fallibility of our current > representations of real objects does not entail that complete and accurate > representations of real objects are impossible in principle. Again, > claiming such an entailment blocks the way of inquiry by imposing an > artificial and unjustifiable limitation on the ongoing quest for knowledge > > It's not indeterminacy or fallibility but a determined human > representative value which clashes with ontological common sense (via > logical formalism, not just arbitrary). It proves representational > inadequacy across all representative schemas. Which, in my opinion, is of > representation (mediation *sui generis*). A "raised" (meta) claim > regarding representation itself from within all systems which, if true, and > I contend it is whilst remaining open to logical refutation (*formally*), > then hardly constitutes a fetter upon inquiry but must necessitate a step > forward. > > You see at once the usefulness of Peirce - for naturalists/but all manners > of disciplines (particle physics/computation/etc.) - in this series (i)f > you acknowledge the "limitation" which is no "limitation" if it be actually > true. Does not having wings correspond to a limitation? Or is it just that > which prevents me from jumping off a tree and hoping to fly? > > I would just ask serious logicians, of which you are one, as far as I know > (for I have read your materials, and commend them), to analyze the logical > form. To disregard the Peircean for a moment and then re-insert it after > (and see where the cookie crumbles). For I do not throw Peirce away, I very > much retain large amounts of his schema - indeed, the entire premise is > Peircean motivated, I just think he has it wrong regarding the thing in > itself (and think, moreover, that it has been proven). > > That is - and this is not aimed at you - rather than pick a summary here > or a quotative there, what I seek is analysis of the logical series and an > alternative. For I know not else how to go about weighing proofs or alleged > proofs. We must disregard the terminologies of any given philosopher - > suspend it for a time - until the logical form is dealt with and then see > which schema, tradition, personage, best accommodates the result. > > Best > > Jack >
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