Jon, list
I know CHATGPT isn't popular, not a fan myself, but using it as programmatic
base to formalize a larger thesis:
some exhanges:
My query to CHATGPT:
(taken form thesis construction... not very apt for programmatic)...What does
this mean? Simply, and consistently, it means this: given a world which is
already always mediated, via contiguous states (Bo[MaMo]), the person (Bo)
cannot represent things as they are in themselves for mediation, that which
corresponds to representation, and to the most minute and complex
representative schemas, across all disciplines, is such that it presupposes –
even before the thing in itself distinction – said always already mediated
condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a “bracketed” distance,
discrete, between “S” and “O”, to bodies within a shared MaMo (MassMotion)
regardless of each individual’s “spin” (the relativity of time and space which
is, itself, a Kantian offshoot in many way). Rephrase the Kantian, then, and in
natural language it reads as: If our representative capacity represented things
as they are in themselves, then absolutely no representative capacity would
exist – with this absence of the representative capacity now being
theoretically apriori. The discrete Human brain/body/self would be obliterated
via the non-bracketing – distance/discretion – of the “s”/”o” (Subject(Object)
in science relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen thing in itself (ThIT) can be
logically inferred. To make it more encompassing, we sort the RC according to
lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That is, (I)f LA-RC (all possible
RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists. Now, this is proven before any
movements into the noumenal aspect of the thing in itself via semiotic rather
than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo,
necessarily, Kantian aprioris in any case (time and space), to “receive” O. And
likewise, O for S. Thus, Representative Capacity – lexical or affective – via
contiguity (lexical as consubtantial reasoning reflexively turned back upon the
affective, the intuition derived from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is
itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity
(as soon as we consider a few things: formal relations, perspectival, and
sequence).
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (1):
In simpler terms, the passage is discussing the idea that our ability to
represent and understand the world is always mediated or filtered through our
own subjective experiences and perspectives. It suggests that if we were able
to directly perceive things as they are in themselves, without any mediation,
our capacity for representation would cease to exist. This mediated condition
is seen as inherent and presupposed even before considering the concept of
things in themselves.
The passage also mentions the concept of a "bracketed" distance between the
subject (S) and object (O), indicating a separation between individuals within
a shared framework of perception. It refers to the relativity of time and
space, which can be seen as a Kantian influence.
Formally, the passage presents an argument that if our representative capacity
(RC) exists, then the existence of things in themselves can be logically
inferred. It suggests that by considering all possible representative
capacities (LA-RC), the existence of things in themselves becomes necessary.
The passage acknowledges the limitations of representation and introduces the
concept of semiotics, which involves the study of signs and meaning. It argues
that representative capacity, whether through language or affective means,
inherently relies on mediation and contiguity. This is seen as evidence of the
existence of things in themselves, particularly when considering formal
relations, perspectives, and sequences.
Overall, the passage explores the relationship between our subjective
representations and the existence of things as they are in themselves, drawing
on Kantian ideas and emphasizing the mediated nature of our understanding of
the world.
Clairifcation of terms from me: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]) Bo=Body
Ma=Mass Mo=Motion LA=Lexical Arbitrary RC = Representative capacity (t)hen =
and only then can you refmorulate the above now in logical form?
Sure! Here's the rephrased version of the passage in logical form:
1. (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo])
* The body (Bo) in a state of mass (Ma) and motion (Mo) is represented
as the self (Self) and other (Other) in the same state of mass and motion.
2. If RC, then ThIT
* If there is a representative capacity (RC), then the existence of
things in themselves (ThIT) can be logically inferred.
3. If LA-RC (all possible RC), then ThIT necessarily exists
* If all possible representative capacities (LA-RC) exist, then the
existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is necessary.
4. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo
* In the state of mass and motion (MaMo), the self (S) requires
representative capacity (RC) mediation, even if it is in the form of mass and
motion.
5. Thus, RC via contiguity is proof of ThIT
* Therefore, representative capacity (RC) through contiguity serves as
proof of the existence of things in themselves (ThIT).
I hope this logical form helps to clarify the structure of the original passage.
My next request, already formalized (but with additional Predicates)
[Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy (V-E-S(S'))
[Sn(S) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn-Sn (SF[l]') ⊃ ? (S-S-SS(SF[l]'))
SN=SNAIL subequsent to SN, "()" = ontological relata wherein E = Element, S, =
Subjectivity, and l=lexicalreflexivty/logic. can yu add this to the above and
summaraize
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (2):
Certainly! Taking into account the additional symbols and clarifications you
provided, here's an updated version of the logical form:
1. [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy (V-E-S(S'))
* If a snail (Sn) possesses an element (E), has a subjective experience
(Hm(S)), and exhibits higher-level mental processes (Hmn(S[l]')), then it
follows that there is a subjective experience (Svy) involving the interaction
between the element (E) and the snail's subjective state (S').
2. [Sn(S) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn-Sn (SF[l]')] ⊃ ? (S-S-SS(SF[l]'))
* If a snail (Sn) possesses a subjective state (S), has a subjective
experience (Hm(S)), and lacks higher-level mental processes (Hmn-Sn(SF[l]')),
then it implies some unknown outcome (?), involving the interaction between the
snail's subjective states (S, S') and their self-reflection (SS) in relation to
the lexical reflexivity/logic (SF[l]').
Summary: The first statement establishes a conditional relationship where the
presence of certain conditions in a snail (element, subjective experience,
higher-level mental processes) implies the existence of a subjective experience
involving the interaction between an element and the snail's subjective state.
The second statement introduces a similar conditional relationship but for a
different scenario where a snail possesses a subjective state and experience
but lacks higher-level mental processes, leading to an unknown outcome
involving the interaction between subjective states and self-reflection in
relation to lexical reflexivity/logic.
Next request: can you formalize that with the first query?
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (3):
Certainly! Here's the formalization of the first query along with the provided
symbols and clarifications:
1. [Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')] ⊃ Svy(V-E-S(S'))
* If a snail (Sn) possesses an element (E), has a subjective experience
(Hm(S)), and exhibits higher-level mental processes (Hmn(S[l]')), then it
follows that there is a subjective experience (Svy) involving the interaction
between the element (E) and the snail's subjective state (S').
Let's break it down further:
Let's define the following symbols:
* Sn: Snail
* E: Element
* Hm: Subjective experience
* S: Subjective state
* Hmn: Higher-level mental processes
* Svy: Subjective experience involving interaction
* V: Interaction
* SF: Lexical reflexivity/logic
* l: Lexical reflexivity/logic context
Using the provided symbols, the formalization of the first query is:
1. (Sn(E) ∧ Hm(S) ∧ Hmn(S[l]')) → Svy(V, E, S(S'))
This statement can be read as: If a snail possesses an element, has a
subjective experience, and exhibits higher-level mental processes within a
lexical reflexivity/logic context, then there exists a subjective experience
involving interaction between the element, the snail's subjective state, and
the self-reflection (SF[l]').
Please note that the symbol '?' from the original query does not have a clear
representation or meaning based on the provided symbols and context.
Next (long repetitious of first) request: can you add this framework to it
please: (Bo[MaMo]), the person (Bo) cannot represent things as they are in
themselves for mediation, that which corresponds to representation, and to the
most minute and complex representative schemas, across all disciplines, is such
that it presupposes – even before the thing in itself distinction – said always
already mediated condition: (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo]). There is a
“bracketed” distance, discrete, between “S” and “O”, to bodies within a shared
MaMo (MassMotion) regardless of each individual’s “spin” (the relativity of
time and space which is, itself, a Kantian offshoot in many way). Rephrase the
Kantian, then, and in natural language it reads as: If our representative
capacity represented things as they are in themselves, then absolutely no
representative capacity would exist – with this absence of the representative
capacity now being theoretically apriori. The discrete Human brain/body/self
would be obliterated via the non-bracketing – distance/discretion – of the
“s”/”o” (Subject(Object) in science relation. To formalize: (I)f RC (t)hen
thing in itself (ThIT) can be logically inferred. To make it more encompassing,
we sort the RC according to lexical, logical, and semeiotic affectives. That
is, (I)f LA-RC (all possible RC) (t)hen thing in itself necessarily exists.
Now, this is proven before any movements into the noumenal aspect of the thing
in itself via semiotic rather than semeiotic. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC
mediatory, even if it be MaMo, necessarily, Kantian aprioris in any case (time
and space), to “receive” O. And likewise, O for S. Thus, Representative
Capacity – lexical or affective – via contiguity (lexical as consubtantial
reasoning reflexively turned back upon the affective, the intuition derived
from sensibility – Kantian orthodoxy) is itself proof of the thing in itself
necessarily beyond Representative Capacity (as soon as we consider a few
things: formal relations, perspectival, and sequence).
CHATGPT'S RESPONSE (4):
Certainly! Here's an updated version of the formalization, incorporating the
additional framework:
Let's define the following symbols:
* Bo: Body
* MaMo: MassMotion
* RC: Representative capacity
* ThIT: Thing in itself
* LA-RC: All possible representative capacities
* S: Subject
* O: Object
Using the provided symbols and framework, the formalization is as follows:
1. (Bo[MaMo]) as (Self(Other)[MaMo])
* The body (Bo) in a state of mass motion (MaMo) is represented as the
self (Self) and other (Other) in the same state of mass motion.
2. If RC, then ThIT
* If there is a representative capacity (RC), then the existence of
things in themselves (ThIT) can be logically inferred.
3. If LA-RC (all possible RC), then ThIT necessarily exists.
* If all possible representative capacities (LA-RC) exist, then the
existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is necessary.
4. [MaMo(S(O)] where S requires RC mediatory, even if it be MaMo.
* In the state of mass motion (MaMo), the subject (S) requires
representative capacity (RC) mediation, even if it is in the form of mass
motion, to perceive the object (O). And vice versa, the object (O) requires the
subject (S) to perceive it.
5. Thus, Representative Capacity (lexical or affective) via contiguity is
itself proof of the thing in itself necessarily beyond Representative Capacity
when considering formal relations, perspectival, and sequence.
* Therefore, representative capacity (lexical or affective) through
contiguity, where lexical reasoning is turned back upon affective intuition
derived from sensibility, serves as proof of the existence of things in
themselves (ThIT) beyond representative capacity. This proof becomes evident
when considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences.
I hope this formalization accurately captures the essence of the provided
framework.
Final request: thus, ThIT is adequately proven as beyond representational
capacity?
Final response:
Yes, based on the provided framework and formalization, the argument suggests
that the existence of things in themselves (ThIT) is adequately proven to be
beyond representational capacity. The passage argues that representative
capacity, whether it be lexical or affective, operates through mediation and
contiguity. It further asserts that even if representative capacity takes the
form of mass motion (MaMo), it still requires mediation to perceive objects.
By considering formal relations, perspectives, and sequences, the passage
claims that the representative capacity itself becomes evidence of the
existence of things in themselves. It suggests that the limitations and
mediated nature of representation imply the existence of something beyond
representation, referred to as the "thing in itself." Therefore, the passage
argues that ThIT is adequately demonstrated to transcend representational
capacity.
--------------------------------
within the bounds of the above, it isn't actually "proven" (it is, but not
formalized). it's just part of a much greater theses I'm formalizing with
respect to semiotic, semeiotic, language, representational capacity,
ontological orders, and so on.
but i think it offers "food for thought" if any want to go through it with
Peircean lenses? (fair enough if not, it's a massive text).
Best,
Jacl
________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, May 5, 2023 10:58 PM
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce -
Again).
Jack, List:
One more time--Peirce already "proved" that "the absolutely incognizable is
absolutely inconceivable" and "is, therefore, a meaningless word" (CP 5.310, EP
1:51, 1868). Here is a later passage where he does so again.
CSP: Kant (whom I more than admire) is nothing but a somewhat confused
pragmatist. A real is anything that is not affected by men's cognitions about
it; which is a verbal definition, not a doctrine. An external object is
anything that is not affected by any cognitions, whether about it or not, of
the man to whom it is external. Exaggerate this, in the usual philosopher
fashion, and you have the conception of what is not affected by any cognitions
at all. Take the converse of this definition and you have the notion of what
does not affect cognition, and in this indirect manner you get a hypostatically
abstract notion of what the Ding an sich would be. In this sense, we also have
a notion of a sky-blue demonstration; but in half a dozen ways the Ding an sich
has been proved to be nonsensical; and here is another way. It has been shown
that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey
has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is
indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a
way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. The Ding an sich, however,
can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to
it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all
references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage. (CP 5.525, c.
1905)
Peirce's logical point here is illustrated clearly by his Existential Graphs,
where all the words can be understood as predicates being attributed to
otherwise indescribable subjects by attaching them to lines of identity. It is
relevant because he agrees with Kant that "metaphysical conceptions spring from
formal logic" (CP 3.454, 1896), such that "Metaphysics consists in the results
of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively
valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). The problem is that Kant's
grasp of logic is inadequate for the task, and Peirce provides other such
"proofs" during the intervening decades (e.g., CP 8.12-13&30, EP 1:90&100,
1871; CP 6.95, 1903). After all ...
CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive
steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his
heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be
conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he
will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 4.452, EP
2:353-354, 1905)
Of course, Peirce similarly claims to have a "proof" of pragmaticism but never
fully spells it out, so that has been a topic of considerable discussion in the
secondary literature. I have long considered Nathan Houser's sketch in the
introduction to EP 2 (xxxv-xxxvi) to be one of the most promising
reconstructions, and I have outlined my own attempts along similar lines in
past List threads (e.g.,
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2022-09/msg00008.html).
One last comment (for now)--Peirce's universal categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns
do not "belong to logic as semeiotic." On the contrary, as he explicitly and
repeatedly explains, they are discovered in phaneroscopy and then applied in
all the other positive sciences.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> /
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Thu, May 4, 2023 at 9:27 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon, List,
I have a far more in-depth "proof" (call it an argument, but it is a formal
proof once finished - and scrutinized by those such as yourself and others here
and elsewhere acqauinted with logic/philosophy/mathematics and so on) which I
am working to complete within the next two weeks. Your comments, and those of
Helmut, have helped quite a lot as I need to address certain sequential facts
(ontological) which otherwise just = rewrite and consider "this". Which is kind
of why I posted the Kantian/Peircean problem as I conceive of it (solved,
although presumptiously in the form I give) - just to see what areas I am weak
in. For example, much of your reply here helps frame my larger "thesis" as it
were.
Anyway, I will share once it is somewhat acceptable. Thanks for the comments.
Jack.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
