Jon, list, I present a very brief draft, once more - albeit much neater than perhaps it has been before - which demonstrates the necessary inference of the thing in itself which cannot, in any respect, be cognized. I know not how to make it more simple than this (though I am trying - and facing the problem, in micro-form, perhaps, that Kant had with his Prolegomena). That is, the more complicated version no one can understand (Critique) but surely this simple version everyone must understand. The premises follow each other, I have checked them dozens of ways, differentially, and the primary points - semantic - are all sound.
Whether one accepts this as proof or not is not up to me, as I, too, used to think the thing in itself was utter nonsense. But, in all honesty, I cannot see how it is now other than necessary given the logical situation (minus Peirce, for the moment, whom I bring back in at a later date - comments from yourself, Helmut, some private correspondence, and J Sowa have been very helpful in allowing me to understand the primary objections). If they are not met here, within this draft, it is only because I am literally cutting paper upon the chopping board and going through hundreds of thousands of words to try and find the best means of articulation. Best Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, June 5, 2023 10:31 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Your persistent claim is that the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is a necessary inference, i.e., a deductive conclusion. The problem is that it almost certainly follows only from premisses (still not fully spelled out) that Peirce and I would dispute. Moreover, we cannot infer the existence of anything strictly by deduction; as Peirce says, "It is to ideal states of things alone--or to real states of things as ideally conceived, always more or less departing from the reality--that deduction applies" (CP 2.778, 1902). In fact, our inference that Socrates existed is not deductive at all, it is abductive/retroductive--a very plausible explanation of extensive evidence. The problem with taking this approach to the existence of an incognizable thing-in-itself is that it does not actually explain anything. CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. It is as though a man furnished with a pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that enemy very redoubtable, to use his pistol to blow his own brains out to escape being killed by his enemy. Despair is insanity. True, there may be facts that will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405, EP 1:, 1887-8) Again, for Peirce, asserting that it is impossible to cognize/represent/know something as it is in itself is straightforwardly blocking the way of inquiry. Moreover, a person as an existent is not a predicate, but a subject--that to which propositions can attribute predicates. Likewise, if the thing-in-itself were to exist, then it would be a subject to which propositions could attribute predicates; but as Peirce observes, "no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). In other words, there is no logical justification for asserting the existence of something to which we cannot determinately attribute any predicates whatsoever. As for the "unknown known" or "known unknown" ... CSP: A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy. The nominalists in giving their adherence to that doctrine which is really held by all philosophers of all stripes, namely, that experience is all we know, understand experience in their nominalistic sense as the mere first impressions of sense. These "first impressions of sense" are hypothetical creations of nominalistic metaphysics: I for one deny their existence. But anyway even if they exist, it is not in them that experience consists. By experience must be understood the entire mental product. (CP 6.492, c. 1896) Peirce clarifies later, "But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense" (CP 7.538, 1899). Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, Jun 5, 2023 at 11:09 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, Just with respect to "inference": I just wish to say, in advance of what I think will be a slow creep, on my part, toward a methodological break down of an already confirmed thesis (as it stands to me, but necessary for its confirmation is not understood by others or accepted) that my use of inference/infer is correct. I infer it, the thing in itself exists, but as it is in itself, as to its qualities re cognition, I cannot cognize it even as I do. My imagination of it is not what it is, but merely my analytical attempt, foolhardy, as it must be, to imagine it. That is, I know that Socrates existed. I do not know what he looked like but I might imagine such a man. I do not pretend my imagining of Socrates is what Socrates, the actual man, appeared in physical characteristic. But that I have an imagining of such a man, and know it to be incorrect, and also know that such a man existed, to which some "truthful" quality pertained, this is no contradiction at all. Thus, I infer that Socrates existed whilst also inferring that my representation of Socrates, in image, is not what Socrates, the man, actually looked like. More accurately, then: People operate upon this structural basis quite frequently. I'm sure I have read of this very means in Peirce. And yet, I cannot point you precisely to it, as it were, which is, diagrammatically, a micro-variety of the same phenomena. However, consider this: I hear of a person - predicate 1 - and something they've done/something qualitatively associated with them - predicate 2. I do not know the first predicate at all - the person - but am very familiar with the second predicate - the quality which is "something" they've done or is "something associated with them". Now, let's pretend the second predicate is "died/death". Thus, I may justly infer a conclusion, which is both inductive and deductive and have it stand entirely valid despite absolutely no knowledge of the first predicate. Insofar as "naturally occurring propositions" go, then, limited/no exposure to the first predicate beyond formal acquaintance, that it represents "a person", but quite a lot of exposure with/to the second predicate, which here is the quality of "death/died" is such, sui generis, that my inference corresponds to UnknownKnown wherein my attempts to imagine the Unknown, are entirely fallible And such is a logical truism: that the unknown may exist, and frequently does, (ordinally here), as in the above scenario where I have never met the first person, but I may still imagine that person via whatever images, as result of Collateral Experience, are present to my mind as means of furnishing. Yet, such images, I know, simultaneously, are not, at all, what that person, the unknown-but-really-extant "predicate", actually is/looks-like. It is Schopenhauer who posits the Known Unknown within the Kantian context of the thing in itself. He deviates, I have to recall here as it is ten years since I have read Schopenhauer, from my understanding of Kant, but that UnknownKnown, or KnownUnknown, is something, which, experientially, you find in Peirce (as Peirce explaining things as they are in representational terms - within his schema: is it abduction? the term is not important to me here, but what it refers to, as it were, is a rather true phenomena). At any rate, to infer that the thing in itself necessarily exists but that all cognitions of it are not it, beyond the mere fact that it exists, is not as contradictory as it may seem. Best Jack
Metaphysical Proof. Necessity of the thing in itself..docx
Description: Metaphysical Proof. Necessity of the thing in itself..docx
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