that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality
The mistake Kant makes, in my opinion, and the opinions of many a philosopher (as people here will know), is to try and qualify the noumenal. He is correct, that is, to imply the necessity of the thing in itself, but as it cannot be cognized, which is no fallacy, or tautology, (Peirce could grasp it in 1911), then there is very little beyond interference which one can say about the "realm" to which it corresponds. His system, the Critique, is pulled apart for these reasons. But, as Kant said of Hume - just because certain things are inconsistent within a given philosopher's system does not mean we have to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and I say the same with respect to Kant and his treatment, discursive, of the noumenal which beyond speculation cannot really be described. The Hegelian "Geist" (if we take it as Spirit, somewhat as Hegel would have it?, except much less defined as it is in Hegel for the same reasons which apply to Kant), is about as close as one may get (it is a known incognizable, ala Schopenhauer, except here I depart from Schopenhauer and Hegel, by implication, for Schoperhauer's telos is of Hegel's Geist: overly defined). Best Jack ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 3:34 AMal To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jeff, List: Admittedly, I have not read a lot of Kant, so I am mostly just agreeing with Peirce that "the absolutely incognizable has no meaning because no conception attaches to it. It is, therefore, a meaningless word; and, consequently, whatever is meant by any term as 'the real' is cognizable in some degree, and so is of the nature of a cognition" (CP 5.310, EP 1:51, 1868). Also, "The Ding an sich ... can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage" (CP 5.525, c. 1905). I further agree with Peirce that the noumenal does not consist of "creations of the understanding" as claimed by Kant in the passage quoted below, but of intelligible reality--that which is as it is regardless of any representation of it, but which is nevertheless capable of being represented, and thus "cognizable in some degree" and "itself of a representative nature." While our representations of reality--prescinded predicates, hypostasized subjects, and composed propositions attributing the former to the latter--are "creations of [our] thought," the reality itself is not. Again, this reflects the distinction between the immediate and dynamical objects of a sign. Kant and Peirce indeed agree that "the metaphysical conceptions ... do not apply beyond the limits of possible experience," but Peirce immediately adds that "we have direct experience of things in themselves. ... Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented" (CP 6.95, 1903). By contrast, "Kant failed to work out all the consequences of this third moment of thought and considerable retractions are called for, accordingly, from some of the positions of his Transcendental Dialectic" (ibid). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 3:47 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi Jon, Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms. As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads. Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena: § 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought. And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility) to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever." What strikes me about this passage is the extent to which Kant and Peirce appear to agree about the "rule which admits of no exception." --Jeff ________________________________ From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 1:23 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no. Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the "thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, "as it is in itself". Best Jack
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