Jon, List It is deductively valid if you fill in the gap re thing in itself, which I have done/explained/qualified within the various formalism. It just assumes basic knowledge of that.
JAS: "As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry." I don't see how that is possible except as some variety of ideal which Kant, differentially, would not even disagree with (as in stressed objectivity, "fire is hot", and mutual comprehension). Throwing it to an infinite community, what effect does that have? Because the nature of infinity is that it continues. Do you have knowlede of an object as it is in itself after that ideal time? Logically, it seems to me, the key isn't "infinite community" but whether it is necessary to infer the existence of the thing in itself. For if this is necessary, then it matters not if the period of time be finite or infinite. And, again, I side with Peirce in the Welby exerpt. I believe it is necessary. Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Saturday, June 3, 2023 4:01 AM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jack, List: I appreciate the summary as requested, but that argumentation is not deductively valid. Indeed, our impressions of things are not identical to those things (they are signs of them), and those things in themselves are as they are regardless of our impressions of them (dynamical objects). Nevertheless, it does not follow necessarily that our impressions of things--and the inferences that we subsequently draw from them (dynamical interpretants)--cannot represent those things as they are in themselves, i.e., that we cannot cognize those things as they are in themselves (final interpretant). Indeed, Peirce said, "We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect" (SS 141, 1911). However, this does not at all contradict his earlier explicit and repeated denials of an incognizable thing-in-itself. As I keep emphasizing, what is at issue is not whether the finite community of humans can ever actually attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of our finite inquiries, it is whether it would be possible for an infinite community to attain knowledge of things as they are as the result of infinite inquiry. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 4:04 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie<mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote: Jon, List, 1. Things impress upon me, 2. My impressions of those things are not those things. 3. If 2, and I don't see how we can deny that, then 4. such things exist in themselves regardless of how they impress upon us. 5. Thus, we cannot cognize that which necessarily exist in themselves, beyond our impressions (formal) of them. That is the most basic format of the Kantian distinction. I must also include this, ‘We can never attain knowledge of things as they are. We can only know their human aspect”. May 20, 1911, Letter to Lady Welby. Now, I can very well infer the thing in itself but I cannot possibly cognize it for it is necessarily beyond me. How can my mental impressions which are of things, but not those things, ever cognize those things as they are in themselves? The very mediatory aspect of representation necessitates that such things are in themselves. Formally, I have outlined this very precisely (natural language muddies things) and it's not ambiguous. It is upon me to put those formalisms here rather than muddled chatgpt postings, but I do know that they stand, consistently in all manner of logical forms. John Sowa made a comment about the "various Peirces". I think that is accurate. As Peirce contradicts himself, as all people do, being fallible, when it comes to thing in itself for he was continuously evolving as scholar (polymath) until his death. Best, Jack
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