Just maybe it ia all much more simple than you want to appear it to be.
The meaning of a WORD is its USE in the language.
So what is the meaning of the WORD or REPRESENTAMEN called "use" here?
OF COURSE the meaning of a WORD or REPRESENTAMEN (word being a specific
representamen) is at least mostly connected with language or written text.
DISCOURSE. language.
In this specific case, the word "use" is used in this sentence "the
meaning of a WORD is its use in a language. And all the words used get
their meaning by being used in the language, the discourse, the sentence.
Also if i would ask "why are you ignoring me, steven" it could be
interpretated just focusing on this sentence or on broader discourses like
the previous conversations about this subject and my replies and questions
to Steven about it.
You can forget about fallibilism as it is just stupid insane notion.
Kindest regards,
Wilfred Berendsen
> There is a clear distinction between Peircean "Falliblism," what Popper
> called "Falsification," which is a part of scientific methodology, and
> making informal statements that may be false or confused. "Falliblism" as
> such speaks about the validity of scientific statements, not statements in
> general.
>
> The full context of Wittgenstein's quote :
>
> Philosophical Investigations (I.43): For a large class of casesthough
> not for allin which we employ the word meaning it can be defined thus:
> the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
>
> Adds an important qualification and that qualification may not be obvious.
> It is "in which we employ the word." He is not presenting a standalone
> definition of the term but rather commenting upon the common usage of the
> term. Hence, when the term is employed, in a large class of use cases he
> says, this is indeed how it is defined. Wittgenstein is "referring" to the
> use case.
>
> This does not make the common usage a good or logical definition.
>
> I leave the remainder to Joe:
>
> "It is implicit in this that we never bestow meaning on signs by acts of
> sheer will or intention or "stipulative" fiat. There is no creation of
> meaning ex nihilo. Meaning creation and change is primarily a function of
> the dispositions and spontaneities of the signs themselves; and although
> we may develop our skills of artful production, the result of our efforts
> is never due solely or primarily to what we do: man proposes, but the sign
> disposes. We can indeed successfully stipulate meaning ("lay down" a rule
> of meaning, establish a meaning "by convention"), if that only means that
> we can, for example, say something like "Let X mean such-and-such!" and
> then make it come about--sometimes--that X actually does acquire that
> meaning, provided we are clear-headed enough to know what we are doing,
> skillful enough to know how to do it, and resolute enough to follow
> through on our original resolve. But there is no such thing as a
> stipulation of meaning or an act of establishment of a meaning convention
> or of a rule of meaning which has any logical--as distinct from
> causal--force or effect."
>
> Incidentally, it seems to me that my views are entirely in accord with
> Joe's paper and Peirce in general since this is the view Joe presents. It
> is my intension only to defend his position and seek clarity.
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
>
>
>
>
> On Aug 4, 2011, at 9:23 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
>> List and Steven,
>>
>> I'm replying here to Steven's post, and will do so directly below, but
>> i'm addressing the list first (and changing the subject line) because i
>> think Steven's cryptic remarks furnish a good illustration of what
>> happens when the fallibilism implied in the Ransdell paper is forgotten.
>> Here i'm referring specifically to paragraph 2:
>>
>> [[ Let us note to begin with that to regard semiosis--the generation of
>> the interpretant--as always due primarily to the agency of the sign
>> itself rather than to the agency of an interpreter, human or otherwise,
>> does not deny that human agency has an important role in the occurrence
>> of meaning phenomena, in changes in meaning, in the creation of meaning,
>> and so forth. It does mean, though, that an interpreter's interpretation
>> is to be regarded as being primarily a perception or observation of the
>> meaning exhibited by the sign itself--for the limited purposes of this
>> paper we can equate the meaning of a sign with the interpretants it
>> generates--and that such control as we do have over the powers of signs
>> (thus over meaning phenomena in general) lies in our skill at setting
>> them in interaction with one another in the compositional process in
>> ways favorable to some desired result. But we can predict such results
>> only to a limited extent, owing both to our typically incomplete
>> understanding of what the generative powers of a given sign actually are
>> and to the spontaneity of the signs themselves. ]]
>>
>> If we look at semiosis in terms of the dialogue between Utterer and
>> Interpreter (which Peirce frequently did circa 1906-8), the last
>> sentence of this excerpt refers to the fallibility of the Utterer by
>> saying that the results of even a skillful utterance are not fully
>> predictable. But the Interpreter is also fallible, and this is clearly
>> implied in the second sentence. If the meaning of a sign is the series
>> of interpretants it generates, then the meaning is in futuro, with the
>> ultimate logical interpretant completing itself only at the very end of
>> the semiotic process. It follows that a perception or observation of
>> the meaning exhibited by the sign itself, insofar as it is actualized,
>> is really a prediction, since there is no direct perception of something
>> that does not presently exist. In practice, therefore, interpretation is
>> just as fallible as utterance. This is already implied in Joe's first
>> sentence, and indeed is so obvious that he probably saw no need to make
>> it more explicit.
>>
>> It should also be obvious that successful communication depends not only
>> on respecting the autonomy of the semiotic process (which is Joe's main
>> point) but also on making allowances for our own fallibility as utterers
>> and interpreters. This fallibility entails that any actual interpretant
>> can be a misinterpretant. If we don't recognize our own fallibility, we
>> don't respect the honest (albeit fallible) attempts of others to
>> contribute to the growth of meaning and reasonableness.
>>
>> Turning to the meaning of words which was the specific subject of the
>> Wittgenstein thread launched by Steven we must all recognize that
>> our interpretive acts involving words are necessarily based on habits
>> informed by our previous experience with use of those words. But since
>> any one person's experience is limited, his habits are to some degree
>> idiosyncratic; while the meaning of words must be considered public
>> property, ideally the property of an infinite community. That is a
>> regulative principle, not a historical fact. Communication consists of
>> finite individuals trying to contribute to the development of meaning.
>> Using words to communicate involves an attempt to harmonize and
>> synchronize our fallible habits of usage. This means weeding out
>> idiosyncratic usages when we find them, which we can't do if we overlook
>> our own idiosyncrasies. It also means disambiguating when we can, but
>> also recognizing that ambiguity can never be totally eliminated from
>> communication. (It can be eliminated from an artificial language,
>> perhaps, but not while it's being used to communicate.)
>>
>> Now to the specific example of how communicative dialogue breaks down
>> when the utterer and interpreter ignores his own fallibility.
>>
>> Steven, you wrote that
>> [[ There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a
>> word is merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and
>> arbitrary thing ... ]]
>> (I'm omitting the irrelevant mixed metaphor at the end.) You are
>> reacting here to a statement which you paraphrase thus:
>> [[ the meaning of a word is merely a reference to that usage ]].
>>
>> In saying explicitly that the meaning of a word is a reference, this
>> paraphrase is clearly a misinterpretant of Wittgenstein's original
>> statement, which is that the meaning of a word is its use in the
>> language. It's you, not Wittgenstein, who introduced reference into
>> the statement to which you objected. Since then its become clear that
>> you have also imposed an idiosyncratic interpretation of the word use.
>> Thus your paraphrase arbitrarily interprets Wittgenstein's utterance to
>> suit your own habits of usage, creating a straw man that you could react
>> to, without respecting the autonomy of the semiotic process to which the
>> original sentence was a fallible contribution. This wouldnt have
>> happened if you had stopped to consider what it might mean in a
>> discourse (and a language) wider than the limited world of your
>> interpretive habits. The same goes for your cryptic remark about
>> metaphysics in your reply to Gary R.
>>
>> As to your habits of utterance, you've been asked at least three times
>> to explain your cryptic remark that Peirce would have none of it. But
>> if anything, your subsequent posts have been even more cryptic. My guess
>> is that you don't deign to explain yourself in ordinary public language
>> because your idiosyncratic code is perfectly clear to you, and if it's
>> not clear to others, well, theyre not worth any effort on your part.
>> Your own fallibility as utterer never enters your thoughts. Nor do you
>> acknowledge fallibility as interpreter, since you treat with contempt
>> any suggestion that your arbitrary interpretations are questionable. I
>> don't think you even recognize the irony of signing a contemptuous
>> message With respect.
>>
>> That's my guess, but i remain hopeful that you will prove it wrong by
>> making a genuine contribution to one of these threads. Perhaps you have
>> some real insights to share, into Peirce or Wittgenstein or semiosis or
>> language or even all of them. But they'll remain your private property
>> until you make a genuine (and fallible!) attempt to make them public in
>> a common language, and work with others to reduce the natural ambiguity
>> of that language.
>>
>> Gary F.
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On
>> Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>> Sent: August-03-11 4:11 PM
>> To: [email protected]
>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Wittgenstein on meaning
>>
>> Dear Gary,
>>
>> I'm not clear on why you think I am confusing meaning with reference - I
>> too am generally careful not to confuse the two. Indeed, the purpose of
>> my comment is to observe that Peirce would not confuse a reference to
>> common usage with the act.
>>
>> With respect,
>> Steven
>>
>>
>> On Aug 3, 2011, at 12:52 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>
>> > Steven, your comment appears to confuse meaning with reference,
>> something Peirce was generally careful not to do.
>> >
>> > But if we really wanted to compare Peirce and Wittgenstein on the
>> subject of meaning, we would have to consider my tagline in its
>> context, Philosophical Investigations (I.43): For a large class of
>> casesthough not for allin which we employ the word meaning it can
>> be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Or
>> better, consider that sentence in its original language: Man kann für
>> eine große Klasse von Fällen der Benützung des Wortes Bedeutung
>> wenn auch nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung dieses Wort so
>> erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.
>> >
>> > And if we want to discuss the meaning of any word in that sentence
>> (say, Bedeutung), we will have to consider the role that word plays
>> in that language, will we not? Words can only be meaningful in the
>> context of the larger signs of which they are parts. The sentence is a
>> larger sign, part of a still larger sign (the Philosophical
>> Investigations), and so on. And the sign-system which is the language
>> is the context of them all. The question then is whether the pragmatic
>> use of the word in that context (not a reference to its use!) is the
>> whole of its meaning (in the large class of cases to which
>> Wittgenstein refers). Which strikes me as a remarkably similar
>> question to the one Peirce grappled with in his attempted proof of
>> pragmaticism.
>> >
>> > Perhaps if you could explain to us just what it is that Peirce would
>> have none of, your comment wouldnt hang so loose on the poetic wind.
>> >
>> > Gary F.
>> >
>> > } What a thing means is simply what habits it involves. [Peirce, CP
>> > 5.400] {
>> >
>> > www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]]
>> > On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>> > Sent: August-03-11 1:28 PM
>> >
>> > On Aug 3, 2011, at 10:11 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>> >
>> > > } The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein] {
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>> > There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a
>> word is merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and
>> arbitrary thing that hangs loose upon the poetic wind and scars each
>> of us in its passing.
>> >
>> > And I'm quite sure that Peirce would have none of it.
>> >
>> > With respect,
>> > Steven
>> >
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
>> PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
>> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body
>> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to
>> [email protected]
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body
> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to
> [email protected]
>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
[email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the
message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
