Gary, This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of course be mistaken both in my belief that am looking at a raven and in my perception that it is white.
Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements concludes: The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11) This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce: Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55) Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of metaphysics being, as you note, one of them. Best, Peter ________________________________________ From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on behalf of Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven. Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that can be refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof that a hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never conclusive. Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called "fallibilism", which indeed he applied to all inquiry and not only to special sciences. Besides, the term "science" has greater breadth for Peirce than it does for you or Popper. For instance, Peirce speaks of metaphysics as a science, and i don't think either you or Popper would. By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies" (though we don't always make it easy for them to enter the conversation). I expect we'll hear more from you, judging from the quality of your post -- and it would be helpful if you would sign your future contributions (so we don't have to address you as d_obrien). Gary F. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
