I agree with Peter. Steven
On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote: > Gary, > > I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. > But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce > and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by > the falsifiability of hypotheses. > > Peter > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM > To: [email protected]; Skagestad, Peter > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > Peter, Gary F. > > Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever > conclusive. > > I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a > falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The > point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very > well in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more > could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly > that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well). See, for > example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of > the Truth" http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being > exactly Peirce and Popper. > > Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry > given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work. > > Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say > that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his > other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to > agree with him). > See: > http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html > "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, > is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can > establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever > remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails > fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future > revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge." > > Best, > > Gary R. > >>>> "Skagestad, Peter" <[email protected]> 8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>> > Gary, > > This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been > interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's > falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification > and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal > statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no > number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are > black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, > nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of > course be mistaken both in my belief that am looking at a raven and in my > perception that it is white. > > Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery > (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense > that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus > Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of > basic statements concludes: > > The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about > it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its > theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on > piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to > any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is > not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied > that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time > being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11) > > This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce: > > Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is > still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and > can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay > till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55) > > Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although > later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with > Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of > metaphysics being, as you note, one of them. > > Best, > Peter > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on behalf of > Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, > and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven. > > Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that can be > refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof that a > hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never conclusive. > Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called "fallibilism", which > indeed he applied to all inquiry and not only to special sciences. Besides, > the term "science" has greater breadth for Peirce than it does for you or > Popper. For instance, Peirce speaks of metaphysics as a science, and i don't > think either you or Popper would. > > By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies" (though we > don't always make it easy for them to enter the conversation). I expect we'll > hear more from you, judging from the quality of your post -- and it would be > helpful if you would sign your future contributions (so we don't have to > address you as d_obrien). > > Gary F. > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
