Peter, Gary F. Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever conclusive. I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very well in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well). See, for example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth" http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being exactly Peirce and Popper.
Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work. Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to agree with him). See: http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge." Best, Gary R. >>> "Skagestad, Peter" <[email protected]> 8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>> Gary, This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of course be mistaken both in my belief that am looking at a raven and in my perception that it is white. Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements concludes: The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11) This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce: Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55) Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of metaphysics being, as you note, one of them. Best, Peter ________________________________________ From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on behalf of Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven. Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that can be refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof that a hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never conclusive. Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called "fallibilism", which indeed he applied to all inquiry and not only to special sciences. Besides, the term "science" has greater breadth for Peirce than it does for you or Popper. For instance, Peirce speaks of metaphysics as a science, and i don't think either you or Popper would. By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies" (though we don't always make it easy for them to enter the conversation). I expect we'll hear more from you, judging from the quality of your post -- and it would be helpful if you would sign your future contributions (so we don't have to address you as d_obrien). Gary F. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. 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