Agreed, but I would add that Peirce also articulated - or came close to articulating - falsificationism, without using the word. Take the following: "That which is to be done with the hypothesis is to trace out its consequences by deduction, to compare them with results of experiment by induction, and to discard the hypothesis, and try another, as soon as the first has been refuted; as it presumably will be. How long it will be before we light upon the hypothesis which shall resist all tests we cannot tell; but we hope we shall do so, at last." (CP, 7.220) I think there are clearer passages than this, but it is the best I can come up with without a fair amount of research.
Peter ________________________________________ From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on behalf of Gary Fuhrman [[email protected]] Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:33 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" Thanks, Peter, for this clarification and correction, which is much more exact than my post about Popper. I assume that we are in agreement that, although "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist", what he called "falsification" is quite different from what Peirce called "fallibilism". Gary F. } I was sure until they asked me ... now I don't know. [Jane Siberry (after St. Augustine)] { www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home -----Original Message----- From: Skagestad, Peter [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: August-05-11 12:13 PM Gary, This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of course be mistaken both in my belief that am looking at a raven and in my perception that it is white. Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of basic statements concludes: The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11) This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce: Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55) Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of metaphysics being, as you note, one of them. Best, Peter --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
