I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven.
Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that can be refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof that a hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never conclusive. Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called "fallibilism", which indeed he applied to all inquiry and not only to special sciences. Besides, the term "science" has greater breadth for Peirce than it does for you or Popper. For instance, Peirce speaks of metaphysics as a science, and i don't think either you or Popper would. By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies" (though we don't always make it easy for them to enter the conversation). I expect we'll hear more from you, judging from the quality of your post -- and it would be helpful if you would sign your future contributions (so we don't have to address you as d_obrien). Gary F. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
