Dear Rafe,
Yes, there are many similarities to be sure. But one problem in saying
there is a parallel "conjectural turn" is that Peirce actually did develop a
logic of conjecture, that is, abduction, whereas Popper, whose book Logik der
Forschung was strangely translated into English as The Logic of Discovery, did
not have a logic of discovery, abduction, or conjecture.
In Popper's words: "The initial stage, the act of conceiving or
inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be
susceptible of it...my view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there
is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical
reconstruction of this process. My view may be expressed by saying that every
discovery contains 'an irrational element' or a 'creative intuition,' in
Bergson's sense" (Popper 1968: 31-32).
Here Popper expresses the common idea shared by rationalists and
positivists alike, as I put it in my book Meaning and Modernity, that inquiry
begins with an irrational intuition, a creative insight that is not an
inference from observed facts, and whose consequences somehow provide the
guiding idea of an inquiry, despite the fact that the idea itself is utterly
illogical. Peirce, by contrast, demonstrates that conjecture can be taken as
reasonable, logical inference, and subject to further testing.
Dewey also developed a theory of inquiry with similarities to Peirce's
abduction, where inquiry is "the progressive determination of a problem and its
solution," beginning in the "indeterminate situation."
Gene
-----Original Message-----
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf
Of Rafe Champion
Sent: Monday, August 08, 2011 2:46 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis
Process"
Coming to the discussion late, it is good to see some attention to Popper's
ideas because it has long appeared that comparison and contrast of Popper
with Peirce and also with Dewey would be rewarding. Popper's leading idea is
often depicted as falsificationism versus the verificationism of the Vienna
positivsts and the logical empiricists. That is hard to avoid because Popper
made such big effort to engage with Carnap and his associates, however the
standard account of Popper as a falsificationist does not do justice to the
full extent of his program of critical rationalism and evolutionary
epistemology.
The first step of the program can be described as a full-blooded
"conjectural turn", parallel to the fallibilism of Peirce, to claim that
even our best theories may be rendered problematic by new evidence, new
criticisms and new theories. This anticipated the "hermeneutic turn" when
appreciation of the theory-dependence of observations and arguments became
more widespread in the wake of Kuhn and the modern French theorists. Other
"turns" include the "objectivist turn" to break with the obsession with the
justification of beliefs and instead to focus on the strengths and
weaknesses of theories that are stated in a public, inter-subjective or
"objective" form. Then there is Popper's "social turn" to examine the
function of institutions, traditions, conventions and "rules of the game" in
science and society. This has been spelled out by Ian Jarvie. And finally
the "metaphysical turn" to recognise the pervasive influence of
philosophical or metaphysical ideas which are the framework assumptions or
presuppositions of thought.
For more on the "turns" see
http://www.the-rathouse.com/Pop-Schol/PopperTurns.html
Rafe Champion
Sydney, Australia
http://www.the-rathouse.com
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