Peter, Stefan, Gary R., list, That's a good point, Peter, about falsification's pertaining to general/universal judgments. Even a perceptual judgment that there are no animals (besides oneself!) in this room is, in Peirce's view, general only in its predicate - we can utter it "All x..." etc. but one perceptually judges of this, that, yon, etc. conjunctively, that this, that, and yon,etc., are such-and-such. A fallibilism about one's perceptually compelled judgments will itself be theoretical in some sense. Hence maybe one could say that scientific falsificationism is 'prefigured' or foreshadowed in fallibilism about perceptual judgments, but only given that such fallibilism is already somewhat theoretically oriented.
The _fallibility_ of perceptual judgments does seem bound up with scientific falsificationism insofar as science depends on perceptual judgments, and involves inferring to universal propositions from perceptual judgments. But could one have a theoretical falsificationism, in particular a scientific falsificationism, without a theoretical falsificationism about perceptual judgments? It seems possible at first glance but seems kind of dicy when one tries to imagine how it would work. I'm left uncertain. Regarding Peirce on singular versus individual, the distinction that he made (at least sometimes) was that which is in one place and time (a singular), and that which is in only one place at a time (an individual). In that sense, we are individuals but not singulars. A singular in that sense is a single point in space and time. Even a mathematical point, when considered as being in motion or stationary in a timelike dimension, does not represent such singularness - it makes a temporoid line. However, later he often used "singular" in the sense that he had given to "individual." In "Questions on Reality" http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/logic/ms148.htm Winter-Spring 1868 (Three Drafts) MS 148 (Robin 931, 396): Writings 2.162-187, perhaps the section that Stefan was trying recall: With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these are called individuals. They are generals that is, not singulars, because these latter [the singulars -B.U.] occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one date. The subject of individuality, in this sense, therefore, belongs to the theory of space rather than to the theory of logic. [....] [....] But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of that which has no generality [the singular -B.U.] and which here appears as a mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will be convenient to call the former a singular and the latter only an individual. So, at that time he held that there are two kinds of individuals, - singular individuals, called singulars, occupy neither space nor time and can only be at one point and can be only at one date. - general individuals, called individuals, can be only in one place at one time (one place at a time). Peirce goes on to say in that text that "In short, those things which we call singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute to them is self-contradictory." But the singulars that Peirce in later years discusses in regard to perceptual judgments are usually that which he earlier called general individuals - you, me, a horse, etc. Best, Ben ----- Original Message ----- From: Stefan Berwing To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 5:08 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" Peter, List, this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the content of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in that form. (Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first part of W2). Best Stefan There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses and hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the subjects of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here... Peter ________________________________________ From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of Gary Richmond Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" Ben, list, I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses (presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd say, is--more basic than falsification). Best, Gary >>> Benjamin Udell 8/5/2011 2:53 PM >>> List, Steven, Peter, It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" propositions said that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time of the compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism. But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that B is in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom, but it entails very little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we often say "presupposes" in the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism can be more basic than scientific falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism. Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. S. Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism." http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of allowing of practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty. Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to posts' ends, when replying to a post. Best, Ben ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith" To: <PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU<mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU>> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" I agree with Peter. Steven On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote: > Gary, > I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. > But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce > and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by > the falsifiability of hypotheses. > Peter ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM > To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU<mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU>; > Skagestad, Peter > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > Peter, Gary F. > Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever > conclusive. > I would agree with you that "Popper was a fallibilist as well as a > falsificationist," and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The > point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very > well in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more > could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly > that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well). See, for > example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, "Two Fallibilists in Search of > the Truth" http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being > exactly Peirce and Popper. > Btw, I too have found the "swamp/bog" metaphor in both their works eeiry > given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work. > Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say > that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his > other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to > agree with him). > See: > http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html > "Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, > is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can > establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever > remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails > fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future > revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge." > Best, > Gary R. > >>>> "Skagestad, Peter" 8/5/2011 12:12 PM >>> > Gary, > This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been > interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's > falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification > and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal > statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no > number of observed black ravens will prove the statement "All ravens are > black," whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, > nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of > course be mistaken both in my belief that am looking at a raven and in my > perception that it is white. > Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery > (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are "basic" only in the sense > that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus > Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of > basic statements concludes: > The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about > it. Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its > theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on > piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to > any natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is > not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied > that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time > being. (L.Sc.D., pp. 11) > This is almost eerily reminiscent of Peirce: > Even if it [science] does find confirmations, they are only partial. It is > still not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and > can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay > till it begins to give way. (EP, vol. 2, p. 55) > Popper apparently arrived at his views with no knowledge of Peirce, although > later in life he came to acknowledge numerous points of agreement with > Peirce. But of course thee remain differences, their divergent conceptions of > metaphysics being, as you note, one of them. > Best, > Peter > ________________________________________ > From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of > Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca] > Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 6:30 AM > To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU<mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU> > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > I'd like to add one minor detail to what Stefan, Michael, Wilfred, d_obrien, > and Stephen have already well said in response to Steven. > Popper's "falsification" is the principle that only a hypothesis that can be > refuted by empirical testing is really testable, because proof that a > hypothesis is false can be conclusive while confirmation is never conclusive. > Peirce said this too, but that's not what he called "fallibilism", which > indeed he applied to all inquiry and not only to special sciences. Besides, > the term "science" has greater breadth for Peirce than it does for you or > Popper. For instance, Peirce speaks of metaphysics as a science, and i don't > think either you or Popper would. > By the way, d_obrien, glad you could join us! We welcome "newbies" (though we > don't always make it easy for them to enter the conversation). I expect we'll > hear more from you, judging from the quality of your post -- and it would be > helpful if you would sign your future contributions (so we don't have to > address you as d_obrien). > Gary F. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
