Carnap never understood why Popper considered falsification competitive to verification and took the position that the two are entirely compatible.
I think Peter has stated it well, though I am now curious about the reference to Imre Lakatos. With respect, Steven On Aug 6, 2011, at 2:56 PM, Skagestad, Peter wrote: > Jerry, > > I am not sure I know how to expand on my reasoning. Let me just add that the > logic of confirmation, as formulated e.g. by Carnap or Hempel, was in its > time the chief rival to Popper's falsificationism, and Popper explicitly > formulated his views in opposition to this rival program. That is why I > brought it up. I am absolutely no expert on the subject, but at least in > Hempel's formulation, the logic of confirmation certainly presupposes > predicate logic. See Hempel, 'Studies in the Logic of Confirmation' (1945). > Personally, I consider myself a falsificationist - although I also find Imre > Lakatos' modifications of the program mostly convincing - and thus I do not > believe the logic of confirmation has much hope of success. Again, I am no > expert; I have no deep knowledge of Carnap's work, and have no idea what work > has been done within this program in recent decades. > > Peter > From: Jerry LR Chandler [[email protected]] > Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 2:11 PM > To: Skagestad, Peter; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > Peter, Gary(s), Ben, List: > > On Aug 6, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Skagestad, Peter wrote: > >> Ben, list, >> >> My (no doubt fallible) belief is that falsificationism about science and >> fallibilism about perceptual judgements are logically independent of each >> other. To see the independence of the former of the latter, suppose >> perceptual judgements were infallible: I infallibly know that I am looking >> at a raven and I infallibly know what color it is. I still cannot infer the >> universal statement 'All ravens are black' from any number of observations >> of black ravens; the most I can say is that I have, so far, failed to >> falsify it, although it may falsified by my observation of the next raven. >> So we could still have falsificationism without fallibilism about perceptual >> judgements. >> >> What about the other way around? Suppose there were a "logic of >> confirmation," whereby scientific hypotheses are rendered increasingly >> probable as we observe more confirming instances. Whether this would work or >> not seems to me independent of whether our observations are fallible or >> infallible. But fallibilism about perceptual judgements does of course imply >> the fallibility of science - it rules out any conclusive proof of scientific >> hypotheses. >> >> I hope this makes sense. >> >> Peter >> >> > > Your perspective is quite interesting. > > May I ask you to expand on your reasoning? > > I have long been interested in the philosophical distinction between symbols > used internally and symbols used externally. > Many mathematicians, followers of Hilbert, such as the Peircean B. Rotman, > believe that mathematics is purely an internal "sporting" use of signs. > Others believe that mathematics is intuitive, followers of Brouwer, often > using the concept of time as the source of order of signs. > > What would you suppose about a "logic of confirmation"? > Would such a logic necessarily take as a presupposition predicate logic? > Could a Peircean "diagrammatic logic", necessarily signified on a "sheet of > assertion" serve as a general inductive tool for a "logic of confirmation"? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
