Lakatos has a more plausible account than Popper of the history of science. As I understand it, scientific theories are in fact rarely abandoned simply because there are observed counterexamples. There are almost always ways to explain them away. By contrast, Thomas Kuhn gave a very good descriptive account of how scientific revolutions in fact take place, but without offering any clue to why revolutions take place when they do. This latter was supplied by Lakatos, in his account of "degenerative research programmes," i.e, research programmes that only address problems generated within the programme itself. I find this an extremely valuable contribution, and one that has been way too little appreciated - although my dissertation adviser Alasdair MacIntyre has cited it as an inspiration for his own abandonment of contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy in favor of Thomistic Aristotelianism.
One more anecdotal observation: In his long article 'Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic,' Lakatos instances Carnap's programme as a prime example of a degenerative research programme. And yet, I have heard Lakatos testify that, when Carnap died, his widow wrote Lakatos to thank him for providing her husband with such stimulating criticism towards the end of his life! As said before, I cannot claim much knowledge of Carnap's work, but I have the impression that he practiced a great deal of what Popper preached. Peter ________________________________________ From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith [[email protected]] Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 7:05 PM To: Skagestad, Peter Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" Carnap never understood why Popper considered falsification competitive to verification and took the position that the two are entirely compatible. I think Peter has stated it well, though I am now curious about the reference to Imre Lakatos. With respect, Steven On Aug 6, 2011, at 2:56 PM, Skagestad, Peter wrote: > Jerry, > > I am not sure I know how to expand on my reasoning. Let me just add that the > logic of confirmation, as formulated e.g. by Carnap or Hempel, was in its > time the chief rival to Popper's falsificationism, and Popper explicitly > formulated his views in opposition to this rival program. That is why I > brought it up. I am absolutely no expert on the subject, but at least in > Hempel's formulation, the logic of confirmation certainly presupposes > predicate logic. See Hempel, 'Studies in the Logic of Confirmation' (1945). > Personally, I consider myself a falsificationist - although I also find Imre > Lakatos' modifications of the program mostly convincing - and thus I do not > believe the logic of confirmation has much hope of success. Again, I am no > expert; I have no deep knowledge of Carnap's work, and have no idea what work > has been done within this program in recent decades. > > Peter > From: Jerry LR Chandler [[email protected]] > Sent: Saturday, August 06, 2011 2:11 PM > To: Skagestad, Peter; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > Peter, Gary(s), Ben, List: > > On Aug 6, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Skagestad, Peter wrote: > >> Ben, list, >> >> My (no doubt fallible) belief is that falsificationism about science and >> fallibilism about perceptual judgements are logically independent of each >> other. To see the independence of the former of the latter, suppose >> perceptual judgements were infallible: I infallibly know that I am looking >> at a raven and I infallibly know what color it is. I still cannot infer the >> universal statement 'All ravens are black' from any number of observations >> of black ravens; the most I can say is that I have, so far, failed to >> falsify it, although it may falsified by my observation of the next raven. >> So we could still have falsificationism without fallibilism about perceptual >> judgements. >> >> What about the other way around? Suppose there were a "logic of >> confirmation," whereby scientific hypotheses are rendered increasingly >> probable as we observe more confirming instances. Whether this would work or >> not seems to me independent of whether our observations are fallible or >> infallible. But fallibilism about perceptual judgements does of course imply >> the fallibility of science - it rules out any conclusive proof of scientific >> hypotheses. >> >> I hope this makes sense. >> >> Peter >> >> > > Your perspective is quite interesting. > > May I ask you to expand on your reasoning? > > I have long been interested in the philosophical distinction between symbols > used internally and symbols used externally. > Many mathematicians, followers of Hilbert, such as the Peircean B. Rotman, > believe that mathematics is purely an internal "sporting" use of signs. > Others believe that mathematics is intuitive, followers of Brouwer, often > using the concept of time as the source of order of signs. > > What would you suppose about a "logic of confirmation"? > Would such a logic necessarily take as a presupposition predicate logic? > Could a Peircean "diagrammatic logic", necessarily signified on a "sheet of > assertion" serve as a general inductive tool for a "logic of confirmation"? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. 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