Re: [peirce-l] a questionClaudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list, 

I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This time, 
from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in CP 2.84 (on the past 
as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86 (on the future as Third). 
From CP 2.85:

  Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present instant were it 
utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is more 
occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no action; and without 
the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be to utter words without 
meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or feeling, with no self; and 
this feeling might have its tone. Notwithstanding what William James has said, 
I do not think there could be any continuity like space, which, though it may 
perhaps appear in an instant in an educated mind, I cannot think could do so if 
it had no time at all; and without continuity parts of the feeling could not be 
synthetized; and therefore there would be no recognizable parts. There could 
not even be a degree of vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of 
vividness] is the comparative amount of disturbance of general consciousness by 
a feeling. At any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and whether it is 
psychologically true or not is of no consequence. The world would be reduced to 
a quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of binarity. I 
cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality. I may call its form 
Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would be something _which is what it is 
without reference to anything else_ within it or without it, regardless of all 
force and of all reason. Now the world is full of this element of 
irresponsible, free, Originality. Why should the middle part of the spectrum 
look green rather than violet? There is no conceivable reason for it nor 
compulsion in it. [...]
Note that there he discusses "what could appear as being in the present instant 
were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is 
more occult than the absolute present." 

Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536 in an undated manuscript, he says "The 
consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, involves 
them both.":

  Thus, every reasoning involves another reasoning, which in its turn involves 
another, and so on _ad infinitum_. Every reasoning connects something that has 
just been learned with knowledge already acquired so that we thereby learn what 
has been unknown. It is thus that the present is so welded to what is just past 
as to render what is just coming about inevitable. The consciousness of the 
present, as the boundary between past and future, involves them both. Reasoning 
is a new experience which involves something old and something hitherto 
unknown. The past as above remarked is the _ego_. My recent past is my 
uppermost _ego_; my distant past is my more generalized _ego_. The past of the 
community is _our ego_. In attributing a flow of time to unknown events we 
impute a quasi-_ego_ to the universe. The present is the immediate 
representation we are just learning that brings the future, or non-ego, to be 
assimilated into the _ego_. It is thus seen that learning, or representation, 
is the third Kainopythagorean category.

So that _consciousness of_ the present seems to match that which Gary Richmond 
said at peirce-l on April 8, 2011 about the present "moment" as distinguished 
from the present "instant," the present moment as a "triadic moment" 
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995

I also find that, in Peirce's letter of Oct. 12, 1904 to Lady Welby, if I had 
looked at what he had written in the same (long) paragraph (CP 8.330) before 
the excerpt that I sent, I would have seen Peirce discusses Firstness of the 
quiet and Firstness of a shrill piercing whistle, and does so in a way that 
supports the idea of the present as a First. For it is the breaking of the 
quiet by the shrill whistle that he says involves Secondness, and that is the 
breaking of one moment by another, though each moment, taken apart, simply has 
its quality, its Firstness.

Bet, Ben

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Benjamin Udell 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 7:10 PM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question 

Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, list, 

Let's note that, especially for Diane, that Jon has pointed us to passage where 
Peirce DOES associate the present with Firstness, in "The Reality of Thirdness" 
from the 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism. I missed it because I narrowed my 
search too much. Peirce: "The immediate present, could we seize it, would have 
no character but its Firstness." Peirce also in that passage (CP 1.343-349) 
associates Secondness with the past and Thirdness with the future. 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/03/16/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-the-reality-of-thirdness/.
 It looks like I misinterpreted the quote (from Peirce's letter to Lady Welby) 
that I sent a day or two ago, unless Peirce changed his mind. Somehow I 
remember reading somebody's claim (I think in a discussion about the light 
cone) of an association by Peirce of Secondness with both present and past, but 
it's too long ago, I forget. So now we can say:

      Firstness Possibility, the may-be. The vague Quality. Present. 
      Secondness Actuality. The determinate/singular Fact Past. 
      Thirdness (Conditional) necessity/destiny, the would-be. The general. 
Law. Future. 

Yes, I was a little surprised by Claudio's "logical time" comment too.

  Time is for Peirce a 'logical time', so there is no real duration... 
  Past, Present and Future are just logical considered in a synchronic triadic 
analysis 
Maybe Peirce did so in logic, but I'd have thought that he did otherwise in 
metaphysics. The quote that I offered from Peirce's letter to Lady Welby does 
not seem a synchronic analysis of time without real duration.

I agree with you, Claudio, that your "design - construction - habitability" 
trichotomy seems to work with better with the trichotomy of possibility/quality 
- actuality/reaction - necessity/habit  than with the trichotomy of present - 
past - future. Well, Peirce seems not to have focused on the trichotomy of 
present - past - future too often. 

Best, Ben

----- Original Message ----- 
From: Eduardo Forastieri 

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