On 3/16/12 5:56 PM, "Eduardo Forastieri" <e...@coqui.net> wrote: Claudio, List > On 3/16/12 5:47 PM, "Eduardo Forastieri" <e...@coqui.net> wrote: > >> Claudio, Ben, List: >> >> It is rewarding that Ben¹s table is approximate to what you, Steve, Jon and >> myself have been suggesting on its perimeter. >> >> I would appreciate if you could elaborate more on why and how Peirce narrows >> his conception of time to a synchronistic triadic analysis (granted, however, >> that a trichotomy is an extensive abstraction of time and space relations). >> >> Is Secondness viewed as a tenseless ³logical time² and as independent of >> constative or performative indexicality consistent with Peirce¹s approach >> to synechism, fallibilism or the pragmatic maxim? >> >> Aren¹t they related, both in actuality and real possibility? >> If semiosis is regardless of time but still bound by trychotomic >> implicatures, then it would defeat itself as undecidable and incomplete. >> >> I have nor Peirce text at hand, yet I find it difficult to conceive Peircean >> time as abstract iconic diagrams of Firstness represented in abstract >> Thirdness symbolisms, unless they were to be bound somehow by indexicality in >> a trichotomy¹s implicature. >> Best, >> Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi >> >> >> >> On 3/16/12 3:48 PM, "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: >> >>> Forwarded from Claudio Guerri, who clearly meant to send this to the list. >>> To respond (to a peirce-l post) with a post TO peirce-l, click on "Reply >>> All," not on "Reply." - Best, Ben >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> >>> Ben, Diane, List, >>> >>> Time is for Peirce a 'logical time', so there is no real duration... >>> Past, Present and Future are just logical considered in a synchronic triadic >>> analysis >>> >>> There is an other difficult (and very serious) aspect in Firstness... >>> Ben (and lots of other scholars) gives a perfect explanation from a >>> philosophical point of view, if we consider ONLY Peirce's writings in it >>> self, for the purpose of a logic/semiotic reasoning, for an abstract sign. >>> But what happens if we consider a 'real sign' like a jar of mayonnaise if we >>> have to make a market research or something more complex as the sign >>> Architecture: >>> >>> >>> Firstness Design the vague quality >>> Secondness Construction the determinate/singular fact >>> Thirdness Habitability the general law >>> (thanks Ben for the nice table) >>> Is Design really something 'vague'? >>> Yes, it is 'really vague' in respect of the sign-Architecture, since it is >>> only the possibility, but is is a very complex and consistent aspect in >>> itself... it is a Theoretical Practice (Althusser) in respect to >>> Architecture and its content consist in 3 years (in the US) or 6 years >>> studies (in Argentina) in all Schools or Faculties of Architecture... >>> though, I would propose to consider 'possibility' as a very much better >>> option to explain Firstness... >>> >>> Best >>> Claudio >>> >>> Benjamin Udell said the following on 14/03/2012 04:55 p.m.: >>>> >>>> >>>> Diane, list >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce generally associated the categories with modalities more readily >>>> than with times: >>>> >>>> >>>> Firstness possibility, the may-be the vague quality. >>>> Secondness actuality the determinate/singular fact >>>> Thirdness (conditional) necessity/destiny, the would-be the general law >>>> >>>> >>>> Look up "Firstness" etc. at the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms >>>> <http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html> , whichs consists >>>> of his own definitions. >>>> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce regarded Secondness as action and reaction. In a letter dated Oct. >>>> 4, 1904, to Lady Welby (Collected Papers v. 8 paragraph 330), he discusses >>>> secondness, thirdness, and times. >>>> >>>>> Generally speaking genuine secondness consists in one thing acting upon >>>>> another, -- brute action. I say brute, because so far as the idea of any >>>>> law or reason comes in, Thirdness comes in. When a stone falls to the >>>>> ground, the law of gravitation does not act to make it fall. The law of >>>>> gravitation is the judge upon the bench who may pronounce the law till >>>>> doomsday, but unless the strong arm of the law, the brutal sheriff, gives >>>>> effect to the law, it amounts to nothing. True, the judge can create a >>>>> sheriff if need be; but he must have one. The stone's actually falling is >>>>> purely the affair of the stone and the earth at the time. This is a case >>>>> of reaction. So is existence which is the mode of being of that which >>>>> reacts with other things. But there is also action without reaction. >>>>> _Such is the action of the previous upon the subsequent._ It is a >>>>> difficult question whether the idea of this one-sided determination is a >>>>> pure idea of secondness or whether it involves thirdness. At present, the >>>>> former view seems to me correct. [....] >>>> >>>> >>>> Insofar as action-and-reaction is a thing of the present, Peirce seems to >>>> regard the present as well as the past as a Second. Then Peirce talks about >>>> Kant's ideas and how maybe temporal causation is an action upon ideas, not >>>> upon existents. Then Peirce says: >>>> >>>>> [....] But since our idea of the past is precisely the idea of that which >>>>> is absolutely determinate, fixed, fait accompli, and dead, as against the >>>>> future which is living, plastic, and determinable, it appears to me that >>>>> the idea of one-sided action, in so far as it concerns the being of the >>>>> determinate, is a pure idea of Secondness; and I think that great errors >>>>> of metaphysics are due to looking at the future as something that will >>>>> have been past. I cannot admit that the idea of the future can be so >>>>> translated into the Secundal ideas of the past. To say that a given kind >>>>> of event never will happen is to deny that there is any date at which its >>>>> happening will be past; but it is not equivalent to any affirmation about >>>>> a past relative to any assignable date. When we pass from the idea of an >>>>> event to saying that it never will happen, or will happen in endless >>>>> repetition, or introduce in any way the idea of endless repetition, I >>>>> will say the idea is _mellonized_ ({mellön}}, about to be, do, or >>>>> suffer). When I conceive a fact as acting but not capable of being acted >>>>> upon, I will say that it is _parelelythose_ ({parelélythös}, past) and >>>>> the mode of being which consists in such action I will call >>>>> _parelelythosine_ (-ine = {einai}, being); I regard the former as an idea >>>>> of Thirdness, the latter as an idea of Secondness. >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce sometimes spoke of the present as a single instant of zero duration; >>>> could that kind of present be a first? In its extreme singularity, it would >>>> be a Second in Peirce's terms. We've talked in the past at peirce-l about >>>> how the "bare present," as a tiny, indeterminate, phenomenological moment, >>>> might be a First. >>>> >>>> >>>> Best, Ben >>>> >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> From: Diane Stephens >>>> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU >>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2012 11:56 AM >>>> Subject: [peirce-l] a question >>>> >>>> >>>> In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows >>>> concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds. For example, a first >>>> is quality, a second is fact and a third is law. I understand all but >>>> second as past as in: >>>> >>>> >>>> First - present >>>> Second - past >>>> Third - future >>>> >>>> >>>> I would appreciate some help. >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks. >>>>
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