Hi Phill, And just how does one get from Phill and friends in perpass talking about clever schemes, to "forcing" all the governments, vendors, and providers of the world to implement those schemes? That seems like a rather large and important step to be asserting as part of your technical(?) plan! :-)
You do realize that ironically at this very moment, there are ITU-T meetings occurring where some of those actors are collaborating on doing the opposite. In fact, if you examine the appendix to the original submitted Rec. Y.2770, you'll see about 34 use cases for the commercial benefits of pervasive surveillance. And, that doesn't include government use cases. One of the unintended consequences of the past couple months of exposing stolen UK and US documents is that the budgets and stature of the services of a great many other countries became substantially increased, and the providers/vendors will be subject to more extensive pervasive surveillance requirements. It's funny how the real world works. best, tony On 11/5/2013 10:01 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
And there would be an issue of collusion with the carriers and governments. But reducing the attack surface from every government who can rent a back hoe to one government with a subpoena is very powerful. And forcing the intelligence agencies to collude to perform traffic analysis would further limit capabilities.
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