Immediately visible and OK. That is the problem. For state surveillance, there is no need for secrecy.
On Nov 5, 2013, at 7:33 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 3:48 PM, Eric Burger <[email protected]> > wrote: > I do not see how this can help. In fact, I see this as a very DANGEROUS > proposal. > > The reason is precisely because all this proposal does is mean that ONLY the > NSA, GCHQ, MSS (PRC), and GRU gets to analyze all data. Worse, their secrets > stay secret, so there is no accountability. > > Why do I say this? Because these organizations have the capability to take > the full firehose. They do not need to tap anything, they just insert an > extra router and they are in. No need for messy warrants, paid-off > corporations, or undercover ISP employees that are actually in the employ of > the government. > > I do not get how link encryption helps at all. Please illuminate. > > I am taking it as granted that someone who deploys a $500K router knows how > to initialize the crypto securely and that the systems would be performing > the usual PFS/ephemeral do-winkies. > > So inserting an extra router should be immediately visible. > > > -- > Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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