Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Stanley N Salthe]

One of the most special properties of science -- indeed its core that
differentiates it from natural philosophy -- is the practice of testing
hypotheses.  Leaving aside the 'human' weaknesses involved here, there is,
however, the 'Duhem-Quine thesis' to be faced.  In order to test an
hypothesis, one must rig up some more or less elaborate set-up. This
involves various ancillary  assumptions, and even other hypotheses, that
enable the test, but that are not being tested themselves.  A failure to
corroborate an hypothesis does not automatically lead to rejection, because
some of these ancillary assumptions may have been inappropriate.  And so on.
 No single failure to corroborate can impugn an hypothesis, but the question
even is -- 'can anything at all be tested adequately?'.

This need not slow down a science.  For example take evolutionary biology
and its key hypothesis that natural selection is the mode by which
macroevolution (e.g., ape -> human) occurs.  Natural selection has been
tested adequately, and shown to operate to preserve the adaptedness of a
population, from one generation to the next.  But its application to
macroevolution has been testable (?) only in laboratory populations of
microorganisms.  Nevertheless natural selection remains the key ASSUMPTION
of all evolutionary thinking. Its role in macroevolution is NOT testable,
but is used to organize a major research program on the basis of its
plausibility.

STAN

On Thu, Jan 6, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear John and colleagues,
>
>
>
> The idea that the rationality of science is in the specifics of its nature
> as an institution goes back at least to C.S. Peirce, and does not lie in the
> activities or reasoning of specific scientists. The the sociological
> approach misses the target completely, and is rather mundane and relatively
> uninteresting (to use Jim Brown's words). Science is, indeed, just another
> institution, but it has rather special properties that are missed when we
> focus on the activities and rationales of individuals within the
> institution.
>
> I would maintain that both the institutions and the individuals reflect
> developments in the communication of science at the global level. Thus they
> participate insofar as the communication can be understood and brought
> forward (reproduced and changed). The codes of communication are specific;
> the institutions follow historically; for example, in moving from academies
> to universities during the 19th century. Of course, institutions can last
> longer than  individuals.
>
>
>
> I am not pleading against ethnography and other forms of sociology of
> science. However, the core subject is our subject: how is scientific
> information communicated? And how is this communication system (including
> scholarly discourses) evolving? The study of institutions provides us with
> windows of instantiations which can be interesting in themselves (for
> example, national differences).
>
>
>
> Best wishes for a happy New Year,
>
> Loet
>
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Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear John and colleagues, 

 

The idea that the rationality of science is in the specifics of its nature
as an institution goes back at least to C.S. Peirce, and does not lie in the
activities or reasoning of specific scientists. The the sociological
approach misses the target completely, and is rather mundane and relatively
uninteresting (to use Jim Brown's words). Science is, indeed, just another
institution, but it has rather special properties that are missed when we
focus on the activities and rationales of individuals within the
institution.

I would maintain that both the institutions and the individuals reflect
developments in the communication of science at the global level. Thus they
participate insofar as the communication can be understood and brought
forward (reproduced and changed). The codes of communication are specific;
the institutions follow historically; for example, in moving from academies
to universities during the 19th century. Of course, institutions can last
longer than  individuals.

 

I am not pleading against ethnography and other forms of sociology of
science. However, the core subject is our subject: how is scientific
information communicated? And how is this communication system (including
scholarly discourses) evolving? The study of institutions provides us with
windows of instantiations which can be interesting in themselves (for
example, national differences). 

 

Best wishes for a happy New Year, 

Loet

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Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[John Collier]

one can measure the extent to which innovation has become systemic
instead of assuming the existence of national (or regional) systems of
innovations on a priori grounds. Systemness of innovation patterns,
however, can be expected to remain in transition because of integrating
and differentiating forces. Integration among the functions of wealth
creation, knowledge production, and normative control takes place at the
interfaces in organizations, while exchanges on the market, scholarly
communication in knowledge production, and political discourse tend to
differentiate globally. The neo-institutional and the neo-evolutionary
versions of the Triple Helix model enable us to capture this tension
reflexively. Empirical studies inform us whether more than three helices
are needed for the explanation. The Triple Helix indicator can be
extended algorithmically, for example, with local-global as a fourth
dimension or, more generally, to an N-tuple of helices. 
 
Hopefully, I did not use my second chance this week on this Monday
morning. J 
Best wishes, 
 
Loet
 


Loet Leydesdorff 
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ;

http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
 
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
[
mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N
Salthe
Sent: Sunday, December 12, 2010 10:37 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible)
trialism
 
(As my first posting for this week) Loet -- replying
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 2:20 AM, Loet Leydesdorff
<l...@leydesdorff.net>
wrote:
Dear Stan, Pedro, and colleagues,
I hesitated to react to Pedro’s post to which you in turn react. However,
it seems important to me to distinguish between science as a system of
rationalized expectations and a belief system such as a religion or a
worldview (or even a “philosophy of science” such as creationism). Of
course, one can also BELIEVE in science as a Worldview (a la the Vienna
Circle), but science remains different in its construction from a
religious system. The advent of modern science in the 17th
century is also called “the scientific revolution”. It was precisely a
clash with religion (e.g., Galileo).
 
Do you recall 'Laboratory Life' by Latour and Woolgar?  They
observed activities in a lab as ethnographers observe tribesmen. All
systematized behaviors have the flavor of ritual.  I recall myself
secretly 'praying' that my spectrophotometer readings would come out as I
wished, and being as careful as a priest working to gain 'purity' in
setting up each experiment.    


 

Within social constructivism, indeed, many scholars have tried –since
the 1970s­to explain science as a belief system or in the plural: “belief
systems”. This is also sometimes called the Durkheimian paradigm in the
sociology of science (Mary Douglas, David Bloor). It over-sociologizes
science, as sometimes scientific arguments can be overpoliticized.
Cognition, however, cannot be reduced to authorship or text. The
mechanisms which enable us to generate DISCURSIVE knowledge from messages
(knowledge claims) can be studied by considering science as a
communication system (or again in the plural: the sciences as differently
codified communication systems). The research question then becomes how
the communication of knowledge is different from the communication of
information. To which extent individual agents have access to this
communication may depend on their “intelligence” as a reflexive
capacity.

 
 I don't see how this general description differs
from one that would describe the activities of any discourse.  Could
you make a comparative 'chart' or something to show differences? 


 

The specific codifications which make it possible to proceed from
common-sense knowledge (or personal/tacit knowledge) to discursive
knowledge (which can also be counterintuitive) close the system off from
the external referent (“nature”) because the communication of reports
about the latter is always mediated by individual
perceptions/observations. The observations have to be communicated before
they can be appreciated and validated. The system(s) can thus further
develop abstracting from the specific agents or texts reporting and in
this sense anonymously. These cognitive constructs can be expected to
develop differently from social constructs.

 
 Surely 'the Church' proceeds in much the same
way.  What is distinctive here? 


 

Similarly, one can raise research questions about how religious
codification can be expected to operate differently from scientific
codification. Within these cognitive constructs – which one can analyze
only after hypothesizing them – one cannot expect distinctions to be
crystal-clear because the cognitive constructs remain discursively
constructed (that is, in terms of distributio

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Stanley N Salthe]

icular disciplinary pathway. I have also argued that in different angles
> of that story, at least in Nature (cells, nervous systems, people), one has
> to re-enter populational thinking, optimality guidance, and the doctrine of
> limitation. The hierarchy/heterarchy theme is also of importance in the
> populational aspect (as what we see often is "nested agencies"), etc.
>
> My contention is that the general relationship between information &
> intelligence (and their respective disciplines) needs a new form of
> discourse. Whether the depicted scaffolding may be of interest or not, is
> highly debatable!
>
> best wishes
>
> Pedro
>
>
> Stanley N Salthe escribió:
>
> in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph:
>
>  Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to the
> postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a logical
> construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of the world we
> are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts we create a logical
> simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World.  Its basis is logic and
> esthetic, but today it also passes through a pragmatic filter imposed by
> those who pay for the science.  This latter bias works mostly in choice of
> study objects.  Stepping back from active engagement in the process of
> gaining primary knowledge in these ways, I feel that I am these days
> engaging in a renewed Natural Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a
> scientifically based 'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to
> religious myths.  These latter importantly have also engaged, via rituals,
> the qualia we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no such
> practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging Nature is
> to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the rituals in an
> attempt to unseat the associated political establishments (Rome, the
> Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that enforce them.
>
> On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:
>
>> Dear All,
>>
>> In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is not
>> "theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something essential
>> missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the "life
>> and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows different
>> rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
>> dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity and
>> discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities play
>> out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for example
>> in information and non-information.
>>
>> It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or
>> hierarchies
>> in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as is his
>> use
>> of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but away from
>> it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I
>> challenge
>> anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
>> real, also receive some logical treatment.
>>
>> I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of (cf. our
>> fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
>> sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
>> means pushing it as the full story.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Joseph
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> From: "Robert Ulanowicz" 
>> To: 
>> Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky
>>
>>
>> Dear All:
>>
>> At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
>> wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
>> mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
>> among monist scenarios.
>>
>> I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
>> Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
>> principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
>> and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
>> disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)
>>
>> But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
>> Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
>> The process starts by using up external gradi

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

ation and non-information.

It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or
hierarchies
in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as
is his use
of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but
away from
it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I
challenge
anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms",
which are
real, also receive some logical treatment.

I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of
(cf. our
fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
means pushing it as the full story.

Cheers,

Joseph


- Original Message -
From: "Robert Ulanowicz" mailto:u...@umces.edu>>
To: mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky


Dear All:

At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
among monist scenarios.

I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)

But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
The process starts by using up external gradients as quickly as
possible, but gradually shuts down as the autocell nears
self-completion. (Deacon, T.W. and J. Sherman. 2008. The Pattern Which
Connects Pleroma to Creatura: The Autocell Bridge from Physics to
Life. Biosemiotics 2:59-76.)

The best to all,
Bob

-
Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
University of Florida  |  Email mailto:u...@cbl.umces.edu>>
Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web
<http://www.cbl.umces.edu/~ulan <http://www.cbl.umces.edu/%7Eulan>>
--


Quoting Stanley N Salthe mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu>>:

> *Replying to Karl, who said:*
>
>
> one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to
come closer
> to understanding how our brain works. This can help to formulate the
> thoughts Pedro mentioned being obscure.
>
> One pictures the brain as a quasi-meteorological model of an
extended
> world
> containing among others swamp, savanna, arid zones. The
dissipation of
> water
> above these regions causes clouds to form and storms to
discharge the
> vapor
> within the clouds. The model observes the lightnings in the
model and sets
> them as an allegory to thoughts (these being electrical
discharges) as
> opposed to hormones (that are the fluids in the swamps). So
there is an
> assumed independence between the rainfall, the humidity of the
ground,
> cloud
> formation and lightnings. The real meteorologists would not
agree with the
> simplification that the lightning is the central idea of a
rainfall, but
> this is how the picture works (at present).
>
> Why I offer these idle thoughts from the biologic sciences to
FIS is that
> it
> is now possible to make a model of these processes in an
abstract, logical
> fashion. The colleaugues in Fis are scientists in the rational
tradition
> and
> may find useful that a rational algorithm can be shown to allow
simulating
> the little tricks Nature appears to use.
>
> Nature changes the form of the imbalance, once too many or too few
> lightnings, once too much or lacking water - relative to the other
> representation's stable state. There are TWO sets of reference. The
> deviation between the two sets of references is what Nature uses
in its
> manifold activities.
>
>
>   This model looks at the physical equivalences in two realms by
> modeling in thermodynamics.  Today in thermodynamics we have an
   

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Stan, 

 

In this model the “qualia” are not accessible as discursive knowledge. They
remain tangential, accessible to individual perception. Only after their
translation into an observational report, they can be represented (!) in the
scientific knowledge base. Otherwise, this remains tacit knowledge at the
individual level. 

 

The environment of the system thus remains “unknown” otherwise than in terms
of theoretically informed (!) hypotheses. 

 

Best wishes, 

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
 <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> l...@leydesdorff.net ;
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 

 

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
Sent: Thursday, December 09, 2010 10:07 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

 

in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph: 

 

Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to the
postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a logical
construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of the world we
are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts we create a logical
simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World.  Its basis is logic and
esthetic, but today it also passes through a pragmatic filter imposed by
those who pay for the science.  This latter bias works mostly in choice of
study objects.  Stepping back from active engagement in the process of
gaining primary knowledge in these ways, I feel that I am these days
engaging in a renewed Natural Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a
scientifically based 'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to
religious myths.  These latter importantly have also engaged, via rituals,
the qualia we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no such
practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging Nature is
to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the rituals in an
attempt to unseat the associated political establishments (Rome, the
Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that enforce them. 

On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

Dear All,

In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is not
"theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something essential
missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the "life
and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows different
rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity and
discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities play
out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for example
in information and non-information.

It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or hierarchies
in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as is his use
of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but away from
it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I challenge
anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
real, also receive some logical treatment.

I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of (cf. our
fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
means pushing it as the full story.

Cheers,

Joseph


----- Original Message -
From: "Robert Ulanowicz" 
To: 
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky


Dear All:

At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
among monist scenarios.

I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)

But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
The process starts by using up external gradients as quickly as
possible, but gradually shuts down as the autocell nears
self-completion. (Deacon, T.W. and J. Sherman. 2008. The Pattern Which
Connects Pleroma to Creatura: The Autocell Bridge from Physics to
Life. Biosemiotics 2:59-76.)

The best to 

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

[Stanley N Salthe]

in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph:

Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to the
postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a logical
construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of the world we
are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts we create a logical
simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World.  Its basis is logic and
esthetic, but today it also passes through a pragmatic filter imposed by
those who pay for the science.  This latter bias works mostly in choice of
study objects.  Stepping back from active engagement in the process of
gaining primary knowledge in these ways, I feel that I am these days
engaging in a renewed Natural Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a
scientifically based 'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to
religious myths.  These latter importantly have also engaged, via rituals,
the qualia we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no such
practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging Nature is
to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the rituals in an
attempt to unseat the associated political establishments (Rome, the
Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that enforce them.

On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is not
> "theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something essential
> missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the "life
> and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows different
> rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
> dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity and
> discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities play
> out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for example
> in information and non-information.
>
> It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or
> hierarchies
> in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as is his
> use
> of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but away from
> it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I
> challenge
> anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
> real, also receive some logical treatment.
>
> I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of (cf. our
> fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
> sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
> means pushing it as the full story.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Robert Ulanowicz" 
> To: 
> Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky
>
>
> Dear All:
>
> At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
> wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
> mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
> among monist scenarios.
>
> I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
> Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
> principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
> and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
> disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)
>
> But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
> Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
> The process starts by using up external gradients as quickly as
> possible, but gradually shuts down as the autocell nears
> self-completion. (Deacon, T.W. and J. Sherman. 2008. The Pattern Which
> Connects Pleroma to Creatura: The Autocell Bridge from Physics to
> Life. Biosemiotics 2:59-76.)
>
> The best to all,
> Bob
>
> -
> Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
> Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
> Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
> Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
> University of Florida  |  Email 
> Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web <http://www.cbl.umces.edu/~ulan>
> --
>
>
> Quoting Stanley N Salthe :
>
> > *Replying to Karl, who said:*
> >
> >
> > one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to come
> closer

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

[Robert Ulanowicz]

Quoting Joseph Brenner :

> I challenge
> anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
> real, also receive some logical treatment.

Dear Joseph,

I agree with almost all that you said. I won't take up your challenge,  
however, because I think you may be correct. No one has ever been able  
to reduce a dialectic to an algorithm, for example.

Furthermore, I think there is good reason why no one ever will. In a  
nutshell, I think the options that appear as a dialectic evolves are  
combinatorically unmanageable. (In Stu Kauffman's words, the "adjacent  
possible" is overwhelming.)

Happy Holidays to all,
Bob

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Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear All,

In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is not
"theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something essential
missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the "life
and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows different
rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity and
discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities play
out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for example
in information and non-information.

It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or hierarchies
in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as is his use
of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but away from
it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I challenge
anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
real, also receive some logical treatment.

I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of (cf. our
fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
means pushing it as the full story.

Cheers,

Joseph


- Original Message - 
From: "Robert Ulanowicz" 
To: 
Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky


Dear All:

At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
among monist scenarios.

I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)

But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
The process starts by using up external gradients as quickly as
possible, but gradually shuts down as the autocell nears
self-completion. (Deacon, T.W. and J. Sherman. 2008. The Pattern Which
Connects Pleroma to Creatura: The Autocell Bridge from Physics to
Life. Biosemiotics 2:59-76.)

The best to all,
Bob

-
Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
University of Florida  |  Email 
Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web <http://www.cbl.umces.edu/~ulan>
--


Quoting Stanley N Salthe :

> *Replying to Karl, who said:*
>
>
> one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to come closer
> to understanding how our brain works. This can help to formulate the
> thoughts Pedro mentioned being obscure.
>
> One pictures the brain as a quasi-meteorological model of an extended
> world
> containing among others swamp, savanna, arid zones. The dissipation of
> water
> above these regions causes clouds to form and storms to discharge the
> vapor
> within the clouds. The model observes the lightnings in the model and sets
> them as an allegory to thoughts (these being electrical discharges) as
> opposed to hormones (that are the fluids in the swamps). So there is an
> assumed independence between the rainfall, the humidity of the ground,
> cloud
> formation and lightnings. The real meteorologists would not agree with the
> simplification that the lightning is the central idea of a rainfall, but
> this is how the picture works (at present).
>
> Why I offer these idle thoughts from the biologic sciences to FIS is that
> it
> is now possible to make a model of these processes in an abstract, logical
> fashion. The colleaugues in Fis are scientists in the rational tradition
> and
> may find useful that a rational algorithm can be shown to allow simulating
> the little tricks Nature appears to use.
>
> Nature changes the form of the imbalance, once too many or too few
> lightnings, once too much or lacking water - relative to the other
> representation's stable state. There are TWO sets of reference. The
> deviation between the two sets of references is what Nature uses in its
> manifold activities.
>
>
>   This model looks at the physical equivalences in two realms by
> modeling in thermodynamics.  Today in

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky

[karl javorszky]

On the difference between natural numbers and theories:

The tool offered for use is based on natural numbers. It is devoid of any
interpretations aside the interpretation relating to common axes that are
rectangular. It is pleasing that Stan sees many ways to use the
interdependence among natural numbers to be relevant and applicable in
thermodynamics.

The accountant is satisfied after having found an accounting trick Nature
appears to use. That this accounting trick is used all over the manifold
activities of Nature is what the accountant says. Stan's remarks show that
the model does have practical relevance.

The inventor of triangulation by means of trigonometry may have been
ridiculed that he does not know the geography of England, although he may
have implied that this table can be useful in mapping England.

Let me restate: the Table offered shows additional ways of dealing with
summands, aside the old method of joining them. Sorting and resorting brings
forth two Euclid spaces connected by two planes. The natural unit of
transaction is a triplet, which is a logical-numerical statement about the
spatial coordinates of fragmentational states.

It is a pleasure to learn that the idea appears applicable to Stan to deal
with thermodynamic terms of reference in reformulating the concept.

Karl


2010/12/3 Stanley N Salthe 

> *Replying to Karl, who said:*
>
>
> one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to come closer
> to understanding how our brain works. This can help to formulate the
> thoughts Pedro mentioned being obscure.
>
> One pictures the brain as a quasi-meteorological model of an extended world
> containing among others swamp, savanna, arid zones. The dissipation of water
> above these regions causes clouds to form and storms to discharge the vapor
> within the clouds. The model observes the lightnings in the model and sets
> them as an allegory to thoughts (these being electrical discharges) as
> opposed to hormones (that are the fluids in the swamps). So there is an
> assumed independence between the rainfall, the humidity of the ground, cloud
> formation and lightnings. The real meteorologists would not agree with the
> simplification that the lightning is the central idea of a rainfall, but
> this is how the picture works (at present).
>
> Why I offer these idle thoughts from the biologic sciences to FIS is that
> it is now possible to make a model of these processes in an abstract,
> logical fashion. The colleaugues in Fis are scientists in the rational
> tradition and may find useful that a rational algorithm can be shown to
> allow simulating the little tricks Nature appears to use.
>
> Nature changes the form of the imbalance, once too many or too few
> lightnings, once too much or lacking water - relative to the other
> representation's stable state. There are TWO sets of reference. The
> deviation between the two sets of references is what Nature uses in its
> manifold activities.
>
>
>   This model looks at the physical equivalences in two realms by
> modeling in thermodynamics.  Today in thermodynamics we have an advancing
> perspective known as the ‘Maximum Entropy Production Principle’ (MEPP) for
> relatively simple systems like weather, or Maximum Energy Dispersal
> Principle’ (MEDP) for complicated material systems like the brain.  In both
> cases the dynamics are controlled by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which
> imposes that the available energy gradients will be dissipated in the least
> possible time, taking the easiest routes available.  This becomes very
> interesting in the brain, where the flow of depolarizations would then be
> predicted to be biased in the direction of more habitual ‘thoughts’.  I
> think that this prediction seems to be born out in our own experiences of
> the frequent return of our attention to various insistent thoughts.  I
> recommend that Karl inquire into MEPP.  For this purpose I paste in some
> references.
>
>
> STAN
>
>
> MEPP related publications:
>
>
> Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2009.  Economies evolve by energy dispersal.
>  Entropy, 2009, 11: 606-633.
>
>
> Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2010. Physical foundations of evolutionary
> theory. Journal on Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics 35: 301-321.
>
>
> Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2010.  Cultural naturalism.  Entropy, 2010, 12:
> 1325-1352.
>
>
> Bejan, A. and S. Lorente, 2010.  The constructal law of design and
> evolution in nature. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B,
> 365: 1335-1347.
>
>
> Brooks, D.R. and E.O. Wiley, 1988. Evolution As Entropy: Toward A Unified
> Theory Of Biology (2nd. ed.) Chicago. University of Chicago Press.
>
>
> Chaisson, E.J., 2008.  Long-term global heating from energy usage.  Eos,
> Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 89: 353-255.
>
>
> DeLong, J.P., J.G. Okie, M.E. Moses, R.M. Sibly and J.H. Brown, 2010.
> Shifts in metabolic scaling, production, and efficiency across major
> evolutionary transitions of life

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky

[Robert Ulanowicz]

Dear All:

At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey  
wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to  
mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives  
among monist scenarios.

I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of  
Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist  
principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round  
and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as  
disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886–1892].)

But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry  
Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.  
The process starts by using up external gradients as quickly as  
possible, but gradually shuts down as the autocell nears  
self-completion. (Deacon, T.W. and J. Sherman. 2008. The Pattern Which  
Connects Pleroma to Creatura: The Autocell Bridge from Physics to  
Life. Biosemiotics 2:59-76.)

The best to all,
Bob

-
Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
University of Florida  |  Email 
Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web 
--


Quoting Stanley N Salthe :

> *Replying to Karl, who said:*
>
>
> one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to come closer
> to understanding how our brain works. This can help to formulate the
> thoughts Pedro mentioned being obscure.
>
> One pictures the brain as a quasi-meteorological model of an extended world
> containing among others swamp, savanna, arid zones. The dissipation of water
> above these regions causes clouds to form and storms to discharge the vapor
> within the clouds. The model observes the lightnings in the model and sets
> them as an allegory to thoughts (these being electrical discharges) as
> opposed to hormones (that are the fluids in the swamps). So there is an
> assumed independence between the rainfall, the humidity of the ground, cloud
> formation and lightnings. The real meteorologists would not agree with the
> simplification that the lightning is the central idea of a rainfall, but
> this is how the picture works (at present).
>
> Why I offer these idle thoughts from the biologic sciences to FIS is that it
> is now possible to make a model of these processes in an abstract, logical
> fashion. The colleaugues in Fis are scientists in the rational tradition and
> may find useful that a rational algorithm can be shown to allow simulating
> the little tricks Nature appears to use.
>
> Nature changes the form of the imbalance, once too many or too few
> lightnings, once too much or lacking water - relative to the other
> representation's stable state. There are TWO sets of reference. The
> deviation between the two sets of references is what Nature uses in its
> manifold activities.
>
>
>   This model looks at the physical equivalences in two realms by
> modeling in thermodynamics.  Today in thermodynamics we have an advancing
> perspective known as the `Maximum Entropy Production Principle´ (MEPP) for
> relatively simple systems like weather, or Maximum Energy Dispersal
> Principle´ (MEDP) for complicated material systems like the brain.  In both
> cases the dynamics are controlled by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which
> imposes that the available energy gradients will be dissipated in the least
> possible time, taking the easiest routes available.  This becomes very
> interesting in the brain, where the flow of depolarizations would then be
> predicted to be biased in the direction of more habitual `thoughts´.  I
> think that this prediction seems to be born out in our own experiences of
> the frequent return of our attention to various insistent thoughts.  I
> recommend that Karl inquire into MEPP.  For this purpose I paste in some
> references.
>
>
> STAN
>
>
> MEPP related publications:
>
>
> Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2009.  Economies evolve by energy dispersal.
>  Entropy, 2009, 11: 606-633.
>
>
> Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2010. Physical foundations of evolutionary
> theory. Journal on Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics 35: 301-321.
>
>
> Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2010.  Cultural naturalism.  Entropy, 2010, 12:
> 1325-1352.
>
>
> Bejan, A. and S. Lorente, 2010.  The constructal law of design and evolution
> in nature. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B, 365:
> 1335-1347.
>
>
> Brooks, D.R. and E.O. Wiley, 1988. Evolution As Entropy: Toward A Unified
> Theory Of Biology (2nd. ed.) Chicago. University of Chicago Press.
>
>
> Chaisson, E.J., 2008.  Long-term global heating from energy usage.  Eos,
> Transa