Actually, when I asked the question I was referring to the
interpretation not the immortality. I thought QTI was being used for
that.
Mark
On 5/3/05, aet.radal ssg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> I just realized that "MWI" in the discussion meant "many worlds immortality"
> not the standard "m
On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
status.
With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
experiences a sequenc
I just realized that "MWI" in the discussion meant "many worlds immortality" not the standard "many worlds interpretation". I don't have a lot time to sift through the discussions, so I missed that point. I don't buy "MW Immortality " in that case, so it hasn't had any effect on my worldview at all
2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
sense
we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static
entity. So,
you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you
won't
experience youse
Saibal,
Does
your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued
probabilities a la Youssef?
http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm
-- Ben
Goertzel
-Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal
I wasn't aware this thread had fallen off the list. I will make sure
this post goes through...
On Tue, May 03, 2005 at 10:26:47AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Russell,
>
> Of course I disagree. I can explain later. But is it not better to
> discuss this on line?
> If it is ok for you, just
Le 01-mai-05, à 16:51, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
The MWI made me take the idea of multiple universes/multiple realities
serious. When I joined this list I believed that quantum suicide could
work,
but I later found out that it cannot possibly work. I now believe that
there
exists an ensemble of all
Le 18-avr.-05, à 04:13, printmodel a écrit :
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests to me
Hi John,
Le 27-avr.-05, à 16:17, John M a écrit :
again a post from you with your wits. I will post my reply (if I get
the
relevant points from Russell and - if I can - ) onlist.
However your expression:
"... I think we can progress
only by understanding misunderstandings ..."<
(what I assume as '
Le 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the
notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be
defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when
considering copying or sui
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