On 07 Oct 2011, at 01:59, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Thanks Bruno for patiently explaining things.
It's interesting that you bring up computer science as I am doing a
career change right now and am going into computer science. I
eventually want to work in brain simulation. A lot of the ideas in
On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand.
Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't
mean a pile of gray and white matter.
Suppose that you have a brain disease, and you doctor propose to
Thanks Bruno for patiently explaining things.
It's interesting that you bring up computer science as I am doing a
career change right now and am going into computer science. I
eventually want to work in brain simulation. A lot of the ideas in
this group are relevant.
From the paper, I'll quote
On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote:
From page 17
It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to
deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular
program can
generate conscious awareness in the first place.
What about the possibility
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand.
Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't
mean a pile of gray and white matter.
Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Is
digital more nonphysical than artificial?
On
On 02 Oct 2011, at 01:55, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 01, 2011 at 05:15:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of
On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 05:31:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The states are countable, but not the (3-)states + the neighborhhood
of (infinite) computations that you are mentioning yourselves.
Not sure if I see where is the problem. It seems that you have
answered it. The 1-OMs *are* set
From page 17
It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular
program can
generate conscious awareness in the first place.
What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious
moments
On 01 Oct 2011, at 22:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2011 8:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or
computational state),
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or
computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of
first person state).
The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not.
Could you explain more why
On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or
computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of
first person state).
The 3-OM are countable,
On 10/1/2011 8:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or
computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of
On Sat, Oct 01, 2011 at 05:15:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or
computational state), not Bostrom notion of
On 21 Sep 2011, at 12:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if
we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible*
partitionings of the tangent spaces of
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if
we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible*
partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces
wherein the Lagrangians and
On 9/21/2011 6:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if
we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible*
partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical
On 9/21/2011 7:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
I consider an Observer moment to be the content of experience on an ideal
non-anthropomorphic observer that might obtain in a minimum quantity of time, thus there
is a maximum quantity of energy involved, as per the energy-time uncertainty
On 9/21/2011 2:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/21/2011 7:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
[SPK]
I consider an Observer moment to be the content of experience on
an ideal non-anthropomorphic observer that might obtain in a minimum
quantity of time, thus there is a maximum quantity of energy
On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:08:55AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/21/2011 6:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if
we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to
On 9/22/2011 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:08:55AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/21/2011 6:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if
we
On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 03:12:31PM -0700, David Nyman wrote:
This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and
the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness
supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find
this
On 9/19/2011 3:20 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 03:12:31PM -0700, David Nyman wrote:
This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and
the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness
supervening on any single deterministic
Sophistry has a smell. Sometimes an argument smells of it, but it may
be a lot harder to pin down where the specious logic is – especially
when it’s all dressed up in a mathematical formalism that may be
inaccessible to the non-mathematician/logician. However the problem
with the arguments
Hi David,
It looks not so bad :)
At first sight it is based on the ASSA (absolute self-samplings, like
in the doomsday argument; may be Russell can comment on this). He
seems naïve on the identity thesis, but that could be a reduction ad
absurdum. The use of classical chaos is interesting,
Hi,
I have found what I believe is a flaw in the reasoning in the paper.
On pages 5-6 we find:
In Section 5, I attempt to apply this reasoning to the case of an
infinite lifetime. I find that, on the one hand, in discovering his
current moment out of an infinite ensemble of moments, the
25 matches
Mail list logo
