Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Sat, 31/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > (I hope the role of public image > > doesn't get so strong that people > > would start thinking that their > > whitened teeth and wide smile are > > what they are, more than their > > internal thoughts. :-) > > All of us shaking hands and kissing babies. :) Yes, usually that comes from the heart, which is just a sign of health. :-) Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > (I hope the role of public image > doesn't get so strong that people > would start thinking that their > whitened teeth and wide smile are > what they are, more than their > internal thoughts. :-) All of us shaking hands and kissing babies. :) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Thu, 29/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > But I think people [a] also try to keep > > the internals of their head in good > > order. They don't voluntarily become > > irrational inside. Many [b] believe that > > they are almost always right and > > consistent, and want to maintain > > this belief. > > Agreed, but it can't be understood from just one > perspective > (private). Private individuals draw strength from public > engagement > (its positive aspects), and this protects them from its > negative > aspects. Engagement with others helps them to [a] > "keep the internals > of their head in good order", and [b] challenge their > own personal > biases and blindnesses. Thus strengthened, they can look > out for > themselves. This much is built into people. It's a > given. Yes, the input from the surrounding society is typically necessary and often positive. (I hope the role of public image doesn't get so strong that people would start thinking that their whitened teeth and wide smile are what they are, more than their internal thoughts. :-) > > Given that, it would be ideal if people could use that > strength to > look out - not only for themselves - but also for society > as whole. > Because modern society is more than the private and public > spheres, > and the larger whole can be threatened in ways that people > aren't > equipped to deal with. So it would be ideal if we could > build the > necessary equipment into society, in the form of > institutions. A good > first step (I think) would be to give our voting systems > the same > private/public synergy as people have. I think the democratic political system already is supposed to have these features. The systems can and should be improved though. > > Currently, they're too one-sided. They take individual > opinion > straight from the private sphere (one way), and they inform > it via > mass media in the public sphere (other way). That's > not the kind of > dialogue that people are built to handle. It was the best > we could > mangage in the past (and a big step forward), but now we > can try to do > better. It is unfortunate that in many societies people consider the "institutions of the society" not to represent "us" and our opinion but "them" and their needs. Where that is the case, reform is clearly needed. Juho > > > Sometimes the pressure of the society > > may force the voters to make good > > choices. But also the other direction > > is possible, e.g. when the dominant > > opinion is to discriminate some group > > of people. > > I was at ChangeCamp on the weekend (an un-conference about > governance), here in Toronto. One of the best sessions was > "How do we > promote and maintain a sense of personal > responsibility?". It gave me > the idea of adding some stories to Votorola's home > page. All of these > are concerned with responsibility, and two of them (2 and > 4) show how > social pressures (different kinds) can actually contribute > to it: > (pardon my writing skills - and pardon the length of this > post) > > (1) Who to nominate as Mayor? It's a difficult choice, > and you need > more information, so you decided to begin close to home, by > voting for > a neighbour. She's something of a leader in the local > community, > someone you know pretty well, and whose opinion you respect > - a good > choice for a delegate. But now you're looking over the > latest > results, and considering whether to shift your vote. You > can see how > your vote has been carried from delegate to delegate, until > it reached > a consensus candidate. But there are several of them, and > it's > difficult to choose among them. So you decide to speak > with your > neighbour, and ask her, "Why do you think *our* > candidate is the best > choice?" > > (2) Someone has initiated a proposal to change the Landlord > and Tenant > Act, and people are voting on it. You're concerned > about the issue, > because you live in an apartment block. But you're > unsure how to > vote, so you decided to vote for a friend who works at a > real-estate > agency. And now you're with some neighbours and > they're shaking their > heads. They say you're voting for the wrong version of > the proposal - > one that puts apartment dwellers at a disadvantage. So you > call up > your friend and ask, "Are you sure we're voting > for the right version > of the proposal?" > > (3) You are crossing the local park, when you meet someone > who is > carrying a sign. She says she is campaigning to improve > the park, and > has a plan. She explains the plan to you, and it sounds > pretty good, > so you cast a vote for her from your mobile phone. Later > that night, > you're looking over the details on her Web site. > You're thinking, > "Maybe there's something I can do, to help." > > > Not also that it is possible the > > people will not vote at all (or vote > > as some opinion leaders expect them > > to vote) if they fear that this
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > But I think people [a] also try to keep > the internals of their head in good > order. They don't voluntarily become > irrational inside. Many [b] believe that > they are almost always right and > consistent, and want to maintain > this belief. Agreed, but it can't be understood from just one perspective (private). Private individuals draw strength from public engagement (its positive aspects), and this protects them from its negative aspects. Engagement with others helps them to [a] "keep the internals of their head in good order", and [b] challenge their own personal biases and blindnesses. Thus strengthened, they can look out for themselves. This much is built into people. It's a given. Given that, it would be ideal if people could use that strength to look out - not only for themselves - but also for society as whole. Because modern society is more than the private and public spheres, and the larger whole can be threatened in ways that people aren't equipped to deal with. So it would be ideal if we could build the necessary equipment into society, in the form of institutions. A good first step (I think) would be to give our voting systems the same private/public synergy as people have. Currently, they're too one-sided. They take individual opinion straight from the private sphere (one way), and they inform it via mass media in the public sphere (other way). That's not the kind of dialogue that people are built to handle. It was the best we could mangage in the past (and a big step forward), but now we can try to do better. > Sometimes the pressure of the society > may force the voters to make good > choices. But also the other direction > is possible, e.g. when the dominant > opinion is to discriminate some group > of people. I was at ChangeCamp on the weekend (an un-conference about governance), here in Toronto. One of the best sessions was "How do we promote and maintain a sense of personal responsibility?". It gave me the idea of adding some stories to Votorola's home page. All of these are concerned with responsibility, and two of them (2 and 4) show how social pressures (different kinds) can actually contribute to it: (pardon my writing skills - and pardon the length of this post) (1) Who to nominate as Mayor? It's a difficult choice, and you need more information, so you decided to begin close to home, by voting for a neighbour. She's something of a leader in the local community, someone you know pretty well, and whose opinion you respect - a good choice for a delegate. But now you're looking over the latest results, and considering whether to shift your vote. You can see how your vote has been carried from delegate to delegate, until it reached a consensus candidate. But there are several of them, and it's difficult to choose among them. So you decide to speak with your neighbour, and ask her, "Why do you think *our* candidate is the best choice?" (2) Someone has initiated a proposal to change the Landlord and Tenant Act, and people are voting on it. You're concerned about the issue, because you live in an apartment block. But you're unsure how to vote, so you decided to vote for a friend who works at a real-estate agency. And now you're with some neighbours and they're shaking their heads. They say you're voting for the wrong version of the proposal - one that puts apartment dwellers at a disadvantage. So you call up your friend and ask, "Are you sure we're voting for the right version of the proposal?" (3) You are crossing the local park, when you meet someone who is carrying a sign. She says she is campaigning to improve the park, and has a plan. She explains the plan to you, and it sounds pretty good, so you cast a vote for her from your mobile phone. Later that night, you're looking over the details on her Web site. You're thinking, "Maybe there's something I can do, to help." > Not also that it is possible the > people will not vote at all (or vote > as some opinion leaders expect them > to vote) if they fear that this is > a test of their understanding. (4) *** joining channel #albion ... synced in 0.043 secs chri. So which draft of the EU constitution are you voting for, Nick? Or do you have your own draft, like me? nick. You're kidding me, Christabel. I'm voting against the whole thing. Brussels can stuff it. chri. Are you out of your tree? Brussels is opposed to it. If we don't reach *some* kind of agreement, then we're stuck with whatever the Eurocrats give us. Nick, you're voting for the status quo! ... chri. Look Nicky, you know me, we see eye-to-eye. Why not vote for me on this one? nick. Sure Chris... if it matters to you. chri. You see, I've gathered quite a few votes for my draft. It's no big deal, I've only made a few changes here and there. But they listen to me. The drafter I'm voting for (she has a lot of votes) she's using my changes! And s
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent!
Dave Ketchum wrote: >> Yes and no. What we're discussing is described in the original post, >> at the top of the thread. The terms are defined there. Is anything >> unclear there? > When? Anyway: Sorry? When was it posted? Jan 6: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2009-January/023872.html > Proxy is an existing word with an idea - a meaning. > > I see that Abd has a new word, DP, for an idea that is similar enough that > a slightly modified label makes distinguishing the ideas doable. > > You have a new, DIFFERENT, idea but chose to use an existing word to label > this - NONproductive! Well, you haven't read the original post. The word 'proxy' occurs only where I cite Abd. Please read it, and then share your critique. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent!
On Tue, 27 Jan 2009 14:25:57 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: Real topic here is whether you MEAN secret when you use the word... Scout's honour - when I say 'secret', I mean secret. The vote is anonymous. The voter's identity is undisclosed. All that good stuff, just like a traditional secret ballot. 8^) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Proxy voting and delegated voting are procedures for the delegation to another member of a voting body of that member's power to vote in his absence. Proxy appointments can be used to form a voting bloc that can exercise greater influence in deliberations or negotiations. A person so designated is called a "proxy" and the person designating him is called a "principal." You seem to be thinking of something else. Yes and no. What we're discussing is described in the original post, at the top of the thread. The terms are defined there. Is anything unclear there? When? Anyway: Proxy is an existing word with an idea - a meaning. I see that Abd has a new word, DP, for an idea that is similar enough that a slightly modified label makes distinguishing the ideas doable. You have a new, DIFFERENT, idea but chose to use an existing word to label this - NONproductive! -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Two > specialized voting systems that intercommunicate (state and > public) > can give better results than one system, on its own. There are both positive and negative factors. > > The public vote is maybe more > ""sincere"" > > in the sense that that opinion will hold > > (since doing otherwise would not look nice) > > but not more sincere in the sense of > > representing her true feelings inside > > (maybe e.g. more unstable ones). > > True, rigid opinions are not sincere. And I never > considered that a > fear of admitting past mistakes could make public > expression > (including votes) more rigid than private - but only in > some cases, as > the level of fear varies widely. > > On the other hand, I argue that public expression is likely > to be more > sincere (also truthful and legitimate), not only because of > *anticipation* of challenges, but also because of actual > challenges. > So a vote may be challenged as insincere if it is > inconsistent with > other expressions of the voter - "I don't believe > you are sincere. > You say one thing, and you do another!" Such > challenges are not > possible when the vote is kept private. But I think people also try to keep the internals of their head in good order. They don't voluntarily become irrational inside. Many believe that they are almost always right and consistent, and want to maintain this belief. > Likewise, a vote may be challenged as untruthful if > it's for something > manifestly false - e.g. an urban transit plan that defies > the laws of > physics - "Don't you realize? You're voting > for a plan that assumes > zero gravity!" But this challenge requires a public > vote. > > Likewise, a vote may be challenged as illegitimate if > it's for > something that would contradict an accepted norm - e.g. a > vote to > expell all people of a particular skin colour - > "Don't you realize? > You're voting to discriminate on the basis of > race!" But again, this > challenge requires a public vote. Sometimes the pressure of the society may force the voters to make good choices. But also the other direction is possible, e.g. when the dominant opinion is to discriminate some group of people. Not also that it is possible the people will not vote at all (or vote as some opinion leaders expect them to vote) if they fear that this is a test of their understanding. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Dave Ketchum wrote: > Real topic here is whether you MEAN secret when you use the word... Scout's honour - when I say 'secret', I mean secret. The vote is anonymous. The voter's identity is undisclosed. All that good stuff, just like a traditional secret ballot. 8^) > From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia > > Proxy voting and delegated voting are procedures for the delegation to > another member of a voting body of that member's power to vote in his > absence. Proxy appointments can be used to form a voting bloc that can > exercise greater influence in deliberations or negotiations. A person so > designated is called a "proxy" and the person designating him is called a > "principal." > > You seem to be thinking of something else. Yes and no. What we're discussing is described in the original post, at the top of the thread. The terms are defined there. Is anything unclear there? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
On Mon, 26 Jan 2009 22:30:41 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sphere Thanks for this. I did a search on "vot" and am convinced voting is not one of their topics - and suspect you stretched to tie it in. I had to learn new things, and got stretched that way. I learned about this concept of the public sphere, which is part of theoretical social science. I'm not an expert on it, but I think it fits with the voting mechanism. I describe the fit in the original post. Is anything stretched? I see now you're not offering secrecy. Seems to me it should not be offered unless whoever is offering is attempting to actually deliver. Thus, while a voter might assert to having voted as stated, secrecy would forbid proving this. True, I don't offer secrecy, at present - votes are forced to be openly disclosed. But, as I concede to Juho, we must eventually add an option for a secret ballot, so giving the voter a choice of disclosure type (mixed type 2). If I understand, you are saying Juho's type 2 is no good? So, if a secret ballot is made available to some voters (who demand it), then it must be forced on all other voters too? Even on those who demand open voting? I think the word "secret" should not be used unless secrecy is actually promised and attempted. I see little value in what you call open voting, but could understand that being offered in other elections. Again, the voter does not control secrecy. Whoever is controlling the method of voting should not claim secrecy unless doing their best to provide as claimed. Else the voter could be coerced (social pressure) into voting openly, when she'd rather vote secretly? (This came up earlier, near top of thread.) Real topic here is whether you MEAN secret when you use the word. And, yes, a voter could fear open voting so properly needs to know whether secrecy protection is offered. Note that, in extremes, knowing some votes can be useful in determining other votes. ... The verification process rests on proving the individual votes of each voter... The proxy claims, and needs to be able to prove, authority to vote as if 14 voters. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Proxy voting and delegated voting are procedures for the delegation to another member of a voting body of that member's power to vote in his absence. Proxy appointments can be used to form a voting bloc that can exercise greater influence in deliberations or negotiations. A person so designated is called a "proxy" and the person designating him is called a "principal." You seem to be thinking of something else. No such claim. No need for proxy (P) even to be aware she is a proxy. For example: ... Could be the authority includes some direction as to how to vote - my point is that the proxy could simply be trusted to vote in the permission giver's interest. ... -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Dave Ketchum wrote: >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sphere > Thanks for this. I did a search on "vot" and am convinced voting is > not one of their topics - and suspect you stretched to tie it in. I had to learn new things, and got stretched that way. I learned about this concept of the public sphere, which is part of theoretical social science. I'm not an expert on it, but I think it fits with the voting mechanism. I describe the fit in the original post. Is anything stretched? > I see now you're not offering secrecy. Seems to me it should not be > offered unless whoever is offering is attempting to actually deliver. Thus, > while a voter might assert to having voted as stated, secrecy would forbid > proving this. True, I don't offer secrecy, at present - votes are forced to be openly disclosed. But, as I concede to Juho, we must eventually add an option for a secret ballot, so giving the voter a choice of disclosure type (mixed type 2). If I understand, you are saying Juho's type 2 is no good? So, if a secret ballot is made available to some voters (who demand it), then it must be forced on all other voters too? Even on those who demand open voting? > Again, the voter does not control secrecy. Whoever is controlling the > method of voting should not claim secrecy unless doing their best to > provide as claimed. Else the voter could be coerced (social pressure) into voting openly, when she'd rather vote secretly? (This came up earlier, near top of thread.) >> ... The verification process rests on proving the individual votes >> of each voter... > The proxy claims, and needs to be able to prove, authority to vote > as if 14 voters. No such claim. No need for proxy (P) even to be aware she is a proxy. For example: (1) The first vote cast, time (t-1): P > X (2) Other votes, subsequently cast at time (t): A > P B > P C > Q D > Q E > Q F > X (3) Results are computed. Although the voting is continuous, the results are computed in a series of snapshots. So here's a snapshot at time (t): (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) | /| / / / | / | / / / |/ |/---/ (P) (Q) / | / | --- |/ (X) (4) Report a summary of these results: --- Candi Votes -date Received - X 4 Q 3 P 2 --- at time (t) X is currently winning. Anyone doubt? Need only verify the individual votes (1 and 2), as archived at time (t). The results will follow automatically. > Could be the authority includes some direction as to how to vote - my point > is that the proxy could simply be trusted to vote in the permission giver's > interest. (Not sure I understand.) P may vote as she pleases. But then again, A and B may shift their votes. So voters are looking out for their own interests. If P is a good politician, however, she will try to help wherever possible. For instance, she will listen to A and B. She will talk to X on their behalf. So there will be lots of talking. That's one reason why this type of voting will fit in the public sphere, which is essentially a space for talking. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
On Mon, 26 Jan 2009 17:59:56 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: By a voting system "of the public sphere", I mean... Dave Ketchum wrote: I do not see voters getting a choice. Whoever has power or authority sets up the system. Voters, at most, can choose whether to participate and/or complain. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sphere Thanks for this. I did a search on "vot" and am convinced voting is not one of their topics - and suspect you stretched to tie it in. We're using different definitions. There's no power or authority to speak of in the public sphere. Consider this analogy with another another domain in the public sphere - that of the press: voter = journalist voting systems = broadcast media + Weblog software secret ballot = anonymous authorship Consider enforcing anonymity on all press systems (type 1), such that journalists can no longer attach their names to news articles. You see, it is impossible. There is going to be a mix of types, and in fact it is: 1. Economist, etc. 2. Weblogs, many smaller newspapers, etc. 3. New York Times, etc. Type 2 predominates, meaning the journalist decides whether to reveal her identity. In any case, journalists have the choice of where to post their articles, and are always free to start their own papers, Weblogs, etc. Likewise for voting systems in the public sphere. The state cannot enforce a pure type 1 (secret ballot) system. Voters will choose which system to vote in, and thus choose their own level and mix of restrictions. (Aside - it follows that we're building these systems exclusively for the convenience of voters, and we should expect a radical departure in designs.) I see now you're not offering secrecy. Seems to me it should not be offered unless whoever is offering is attempting to actually deliver. Thus, while a voter might assert to having voted as stated, secrecy would forbid proving this. I start below with a couple examples of true type 1 secrecy. This has serious need, though other methods with the ability can be managed with MUCH care as to details. Agreed, but only for voting systems on the government/administrative side - as usually discussed in this list. (This thread is mostly not about those.) The society [club] can give up on the secrecy if its members agree that there is no value in the secrecy (they must have seen need or they would never have invested the effort). Agreed, but this differs from an individual member having choice of secret|open for a particular vote, and from a choice of which system to cast the vote in. These differences distinguish an administrative voting system (in the club), from the voting systems of the public sphere (outside the club). Again, the voter does not control secrecy. Whoever is controlling the method of voting should not claim secrecy unless doing their best to provide as claimed. Proxies? There is need for a verifiable record as to how many votes a proxy can cast. etc... My point was that if the proxy claims to have 14 votes, self plus permission by 13 voters must be provable. I see... The verification process rests on proving the individual votes of each voter (including the delegates). Then all the rest - the flow of 13 additional votes through the delegate, and the overall flow in the cascade - follows from the individual votes. Does this answer? Or are you interested in technical details of proving the individual votes? The proxy claims, and needs to be able to prove, authority to vote as if 14 voters. Could be the authority includes some direction as to how to vote - my point is that the proxy could simply be trusted to vote in the permission giver's interest. -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
>> By a voting system "of the public sphere", I mean... Dave Ketchum wrote: > I do not see voters getting a choice. Whoever has power or > authority sets up the system. Voters, at most, can choose whether > to participate and/or complain. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_sphere We're using different definitions. There's no power or authority to speak of in the public sphere. Consider this analogy with another another domain in the public sphere - that of the press: voter = journalist voting systems = broadcast media + Weblog software secret ballot = anonymous authorship Consider enforcing anonymity on all press systems (type 1), such that journalists can no longer attach their names to news articles. You see, it is impossible. There is going to be a mix of types, and in fact it is: 1. Economist, etc. 2. Weblogs, many smaller newspapers, etc. 3. New York Times, etc. Type 2 predominates, meaning the journalist decides whether to reveal her identity. In any case, journalists have the choice of where to post their articles, and are always free to start their own papers, Weblogs, etc. Likewise for voting systems in the public sphere. The state cannot enforce a pure type 1 (secret ballot) system. Voters will choose which system to vote in, and thus choose their own level and mix of restrictions. (Aside - it follows that we're building these systems exclusively for the convenience of voters, and we should expect a radical departure in designs.) > I start below with a couple examples of true type 1 secrecy. This has > serious need, though other methods with the ability can be managed with > MUCH care as to details. Agreed, but only for voting systems on the government/administrative side - as usually discussed in this list. (This thread is mostly not about those.) > The society [club] can give up on the secrecy if its members agree > that there is no value in the secrecy (they must have seen need or > they would never have invested the effort). Agreed, but this differs from an individual member having choice of secret|open for a particular vote, and from a choice of which system to cast the vote in. These differences distinguish an administrative voting system (in the club), from the voting systems of the public sphere (outside the club). >>> Proxies? There is need for a verifiable record as to how many votes a >>> proxy can cast. >> >> etc... > > My point was that if the proxy claims to have 14 votes, self plus > permission by 13 voters must be provable. I see... The verification process rests on proving the individual votes of each voter (including the delegates). Then all the rest - the flow of 13 additional votes through the delegate, and the overall flow in the cascade - follows from the individual votes. Does this answer? Or are you interested in technical details of proving the individual votes? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > I was thinking about public formal > elections (e.g. parliamentary). They > nowadays generally use secret votes. > Doing that same at the very bottom > level of a proxy system would not be > too difficult. Sorry, I missed where you said "current systems". So you're talking about the state/administrative side. OK. > > All of this is easier, more natural, if... > > Secret votes could also be seen as an > invention of the human race that relieves > some problems that they have (coercion, > vote buying, fear of revealing too much > of oneself). Agreed, not strictly dependent: whether system design is natural, and whether it's useful. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
> > Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy with the > > government's voting systems (?). Juho Laatu wrote: > You indicated that you would use this > method so that it would not be tied to > the formal decision making process. > That reduces the continuous voting > related problems. Yes, so we're agreed, rationalization is good in that instance. Two specialized voting systems that intercommunicate (state and public) can give better results than one system, on its own. > The public vote is maybe more ""sincere"" > in the sense that that opinion will hold > (since doing otherwise would not look nice) > but not more sincere in the sense of > representing her true feelings inside > (maybe e.g. more unstable ones). True, rigid opinions are not sincere. And I never considered that a fear of admitting past mistakes could make public expression (including votes) more rigid than private - but only in some cases, as the level of fear varies widely. On the other hand, I argue that public expression is likely to be more sincere (also truthful and legitimate), not only because of *anticipation* of challenges, but also because of actual challenges. So a vote may be challenged as insincere if it is inconsistent with other expressions of the voter - "I don't believe you are sincere. You say one thing, and you do another!" Such challenges are not possible when the vote is kept private. Likewise, a vote may be challenged as untruthful if it's for something manifestly false - e.g. an urban transit plan that defies the laws of physics - "Don't you realize? You're voting for a plan that assumes zero gravity!" But this challenge requires a public vote. Likewise, a vote may be challenged as illegitimate if it's for something that would contradict an accepted norm - e.g. a vote to expell all people of a particular skin colour - "Don't you realize? You're voting to discriminate on the basis of race!" But again, this challenge requires a public vote. > In addition I think that also the secret > vote based methods of modern societies > could benefit of corresponding > deliberative/proxy systems. I note that > the (at least partially) secret vote > based systems are likely to be able to > collect opinions from wider set of > citizens, and the expressed opinions may > reflect more the internal feelings of > the voters (as opposed to publicly > expressed commitments that the public > votes/expressions tend to record). Agreed, and the mix is beneficial both across system types (as in rationalization), and within a single system. In latter case, a mix can sometimes be the *ideal*, I agree. In general, however, there is no *feasible* alternative to a mix. No pure method (like secret ballot alone) can be generally enforced across all public systems, even if the enforcement is restricted to a subset of voters (such as non-delegates) - ref. discussion w/ Dave K. - so the pure systems are nothing but a lab curiosity. > Both public debate and secret vote based > opinion measuring are needed and may be > developed further. Mixtures of these two > are possible and may collect benefits of > both (and some of the problems too). -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
On Sun, 25 Jan 2009 13:19:13 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) here. 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or buyer how she voted. 2) The voter can choose if her vote is public or secret. She can also tell what her secret vote was. 3) The vote is public. What I mean is that also enforced secrecy and free speech can be combined. Michael Allan replied: Not in the public sphere - neither (1) nor (3) is enforceable - only (2) is allowed. It is the nature of the public sphere, and part of the legitimacy it confers on the process. More on that later... Dave Ketchum replied: I get dizzy on public vs private as used here, but have to disagree on some of the above. As discussed below, need for secrecy/publicity varies on both sides. My argument above is a continuation from previous posts. To reiterate: By a voting system "of the public sphere", I mean a system situated in a common space where systematic force is inapplicable. Unlike the voting systems of the state (general electoral and in-house legislative), where the state enforces a monopoly system of a particular design, there is no way to enforce a pattern of design on the systems of the public sphere (primary voting systems). Competing designs are allowed, and voters may choose among them. I do not see voters getting a choice. Whoever has power or authority sets up the system. Voters, at most, can choose whether to participate and/or complain. Just as people are free to speak their minds in the public sphere, so they are free to propose and build their own voting systems for public use. This is especially easy, because much of the software is open source. No authority can *generally* enforce a secret ballot. If some people happen to dislike the strictly secret ballot of one system (1), they may build an alternative system (3) that restricts itself to a public, fully disclosed ballot. And if others prefer no restrictions at all, they may build yet another system (2) that allows for *both* secret and public ballots (voter choice). Mutatis mutandis, the least restrictive of these systems will eventually acquire a broader level of participation. So I argue - neither type 1 nor 3 is likely to be stable in the face of competition from type 2. We may therefore assume type 2 voting systems in public sphere. This is important, because the design of type 1 is quite different than 2 and 3. We can save effort by forgetting about type 1, and concentrating our thoughts on 3 (the simplest overall), moving later to 2 (not much different, so an easy migration). I start below with a couple examples of true type 1 secrecy. This has serious need, though other methods with the ability can be managed with MUCH care as to details. True secret voting - important to protect a voter's vote from being known: A society can use a ballot box with black and white balls, especially for deciding whether to accept a new member. There is NO record to protect or lose as to who voted black. Each such voting system is enforced by the private "society" (club, etc.) that employs it. It is therefore not a system "of the public sphere". To change voting systems, one must change clubs. (There is no way to change public spheres, we all share the same one.) The society can give up on the secrecy if its members agree that there is no value in the secrecy (they must have seen need or they would never have invested the effort). Lever voting machines can be used in public elections. At least originally these were as secret, though all kinds of cheating now becomes possible. Machines could be used... the interface medium is irrelevant to the argument. A public voting system must be open to all members of the public, and they must have (in principle, if not in practice) a choice of alternative systems, with no design restrictions. So the public (in effect) designs its own voting system. The medium matters. I cited one that offers secrecy. With other media more attention as to needed details matters. Paper absentee ballots can be handled in a way that, if done properly, maintains secrecy. The envelope has the voter's name. The ballot is forbidden to identify the voter in any way, and is void otherwise. When the envelope is opened the ballot is placed in a stack of such without looking at content. (Again, the interface medium is irrelevant to the argument.) Signing petitions is generally non-secret - with this known to the signers. But this (type 3) cannot be generally enforced. General rules are not possible in the public sphere. It must be allowed that some petitions be of type 1 and 2 - if that is feasible for a petition. Speech is only occasionally kept secret - courts and legislatures and societies choose when they need this. Secret
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: >>> I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) >>> here. >>> >>> 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted >>> (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or >>> buyer how she voted. >>> >>> 2) The voter can choose if her vote is public or secret. She can >>> also tell what her secret vote was. >>> >>> 3) The vote is public. >>> >>> What I mean is that also enforced secrecy and free speech can be >>> combined. Michael Allan replied: > > Not in the public sphere - neither (1) nor (3) is enforceable - only > > (2) is allowed. It is the nature of the public sphere, and part of > > the legitimacy it confers on the process. More on that later... Dave Ketchum replied: > I get dizzy on public vs private as used here, but have to disagree > on some of the above. My argument above is a continuation from previous posts. To reiterate: By a voting system "of the public sphere", I mean a system situated in a common space where systematic force is inapplicable. Unlike the voting systems of the state (general electoral and in-house legislative), where the state enforces a monopoly system of a particular design, there is no way to enforce a pattern of design on the systems of the public sphere (primary voting systems). Competing designs are allowed, and voters may choose among them. Just as people are free to speak their minds in the public sphere, so they are free to propose and build their own voting systems for public use. This is especially easy, because much of the software is open source. No authority can *generally* enforce a secret ballot. If some people happen to dislike the strictly secret ballot of one system (1), they may build an alternative system (3) that restricts itself to a public, fully disclosed ballot. And if others prefer no restrictions at all, they may build yet another system (2) that allows for *both* secret and public ballots (voter choice). Mutatis mutandis, the least restrictive of these systems will eventually acquire a broader level of participation. So I argue - neither type 1 nor 3 is likely to be stable in the face of competition from type 2. We may therefore assume type 2 voting systems in public sphere. This is important, because the design of type 1 is quite different than 2 and 3. We can save effort by forgetting about type 1, and concentrating our thoughts on 3 (the simplest overall), moving later to 2 (not much different, so an easy migration). > True secret voting - important to protect a voter's vote from being known: > A society can use a ballot box with black and white balls, especially > for deciding whether to accept a new member. There is NO record to protect > or lose as to who voted black. Each such voting system is enforced by the private "society" (club, etc.) that employs it. It is therefore not a system "of the public sphere". To change voting systems, one must change clubs. (There is no way to change public spheres, we all share the same one.) > Lever voting machines can be used in public elections. At least > originally these were as secret, though all kinds of cheating now becomes > possible. Machines could be used... the interface medium is irrelevant to the argument. A public voting system must be open to all members of the public, and they must have (in principle, if not in practice) a choice of alternative systems, with no design restrictions. So the public (in effect) designs its own voting system. > Paper absentee ballots can be handled in a way that, if done > properly, maintains secrecy. The envelope has the voter's name. The > ballot is forbidden to identify the voter in any way, and is void > otherwise. When the envelope is opened the ballot is placed in a stack of > such without looking at content. (Again, the interface medium is irrelevant to the argument.) > Signing petitions is generally non-secret - with this known to the signers. But this (type 3) cannot be generally enforced. General rules are not possible in the public sphere. It must be allowed that some petitions be of type 1 and 2 - if that is feasible for a petition. > Speech is only occasionally kept secret - courts and legislatures and > societies choose when they need this. Secret speech in a public space. OK, but not too much, or the space is no longer public. Think of a private speech in Parliament. Weird, but this has become the norm since the late 1800's or so. The real debates moved to back-rooms, where the organized parties hammer out their differences in private. Parliament is now a stage on which these parties speak in front of the public, and exlusive of it. So Parliament is no longer an institution *of* the public, but rather of the party and state administrations - as we all intuitively know. Likewise, in a broader public voting system, as I propose. If private voting comes to pre-dominate in such a system, then it is no longer *of* the
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > >> d) voting on laws, too > > > > I read this as allowing individual > > voters to vote directly too, without > > any proxies between them and the > > decisions (on laws and on anything). > > > > Quite OK but I have some concerns > > on what will happen in the tax > > raise questions. It is possible that > > the society would spend more than > > save. > > > > One could set some limits on the > > number of levels. One could e.g. > > allow only proxies with n votes to > > vote in certain questions. Use of > > hysteresis could help making the > > role of proxies of different levels > > clear (last minute decisions or > > alternative direct and proxy votes > > would be more complex). > > > > The proxy systems may allow (also > > for other reasons) different proxies > > or direct voting to be used for > > different questions. > > Some idea of what this would lead to can be gathered from > states with initiative and referendum, where the citizenry > can force a referendum or the passing of a law. It seems to > work in the United States states that have them, and also in > Switzerland, though the circumstances there are more > complex. > > On the other hand, one could argue that the signature > requirements to start the referendum process constitutes a > form of hysteresis: because starting the process requires > some effort, the system won't oscillate wildly. > > The real trick is to find the balance between something > that oscillates and something that doesn't respond at > all - and that's not a problem that's particular to > politics, but appears in various guises in all kinds of > systems involving feedback. Set the PID controller wrong and > it's off to hunting land... Yes, that's the target, to find a balance where the problems don't destroy the benefits of the system. That could mean balancing between representative and direct democracy, speed of changes, conditions on when to allow direct decisions, complexity etc. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > > > with these counter-features: > > > > > > a) continuous results, with shifting votes > > > > Maybe mostly positive, but also > > something negative. > > Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy > with the > government's voting systems (?). You indicated that you would use this method so that it would not be tied to the formal decision making process. That reduces the continuous voting related problems. > > > c) open ballot > > > > What was the reason why you consider > > open vote to be a requirement? (or a > > "counter-feature") > > I read your other post. I understand you are asking about > the > necessity of open voting at the periphery, among plain > voters. Yes. > You've been asking this question from the beginning, > and it's been > difficult for me to answer definitively. Now I see > there's a big > white space in the theory, where the answer should fit. I > don't have > the whole of it covered yet (been thinking about it, the > last couple > of days) but here's a sketch of it: > > There's difference when we speak in public, with an aim > to mutual > understanding or consensus. We are forced to take the view > of the > others to whom we are speaking. We are forced to be > self-critical in > anticipation of their challenges, to prepare ourselves to > reasons for > what we say, to back up the claims we make. There is a > theory that > ties these various types of claims to to various types of > speech acts, > and it's called formal pragmatics.^[TCA1] > > This has been tied to autonomy, rational agency and > responsibility, to > the effect that only a public speaker in this social > context is an > autonomous individual, a rational and responsible > actor.^[1] > > A public vote is the formalization of a speech act, and is > covered by > these theories. The opinion of a private individual that > is expressed > as a public vote has a claim to truth, legitimacy and > sincerity that a > private opinion (not so expressed) has not. Yes. A public vote is a public claim and therefore the individual may carefully consider what she says, and she may commit to what she says. I wouldn't say that this opinion is more sincere than her private thoughts that she might express in a secret vote. The public vote is maybe more ""sincere"" in the sense that that opinion will hold (since doing otherwise would not look nice) but not more sincere in the sense of representing her true feelings inside (maybe e.g. more unstable ones). > There is a connection between communicative reason (in > these public > utterances) and the rationalization of modern society. The > rationalization of modern society is its division into > specialized > spheres and subsystems - like public sphere, private > sphere, economic > system, and administration system - that spin according to > their own > internal logics, and interrelate across interfaces. This > correlates > with our rationalization of voting systems, splitting them > into > separate systems of the public sphere (on one hand) and > administrative > system (on other) - each specialized for its place and > purpose, and in > communication with the other. So we modernize voting. > > There is a connection between human reason (how we moderns > think and > speak) and the rationalization of modern society. I do not > understand > it well enough, but there's a sense in which the > universality of > communicative action (its inclusion of others, and raising > of validity > claims) can bind together the fragmented pieces of modern > society. > It's the last "glue" that's left to us > moderns. Both the > fragmentation and the glue are enhanced by the addition of > public > voting. It separates out two voting systems (public and > private) that > work better when kept apart (but in communication). It > also helps to > separate the public sphere from the other parts of society, > while > simultaneously binding it to them. So we make modern > society even > more modern - ultra modern. > > There is a sense too in which this might further the > critical theory > of society. That type of theory is supposed to be both > diagnostic of > problems, and to propose remedies, but it tends to be weak > on remedies > these days.^[2] And it's traditional in critical theory > that the > remedy is in the evil - the spear of modernity must heal > the wound of > modernity.^[3] > > There is also the consideration that this type of public > voting may be > applied to a text that is broadly cultural, and yet has > normative > potential. What would it mean, for instance, if people > were to begin > voting on utopian visions of society? Is that another way > to glue > society together (science, art, politics, etc.) and steer > the whole > with a sense of purpose. Nobody has ever thought along > these lines, > so far as I know. But there are hints in Segal.^[4] > > (If above can be redacted, it would put real flesh
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > > I think current systems rely on > > private voting and public discussion > > (although different than the proxy > > based discussion). It may be possible > > to enrich this with better mutual > > discussion / delegable voting rights > > without sacrificing secret votes / > > privacy. > > Yes, it might be *possible*, but I think it would be > difficult in > practice (and not ideal in principle) to do so within a > *single* > voting system. The most rational design is separate, > special purpose > systems (primary and general) that work together. I was thinking about public formal elections (e.g. parliamentary). They nowadays generally use secret votes. Doing that same at the very bottom level of a proxy system would not be too difficult. > > I don't see the need of a > > representative / proxy to know who > > her voters exactly are to be crucial. > > In some aspect it is better that she > > doesn't know (no vote buying, > > services to those that voted, no hard > > feelings against those that this time > > voted someone else etc.). > > > > The (secret) voters on the other hand > > will get more power when they can let > > several representatives / proxies > > understand that they got or may get > > the vote :-). > > All of this is easier, more natural, if agreement (voter > for > candidate/delegate) is *actually* expressed. Then it's > more human. > We weren't *built* to deal with the strange paradox of > private > expression (collective mass opinion). There's no > natural correlate > for it. Secret votes could also be seen as an invention of the human race that relieves some problems that they have (coercion, vote buying, fear of revealing too much of oneself). Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
On Fri, 23 Jan 2009 10:22:13 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > >>Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual >>discussion better. My aim with this >>discussion is to study if one can >>combine that with the good old >>privacy / secret vote principles. > > > The most significant combo (I think) is that of the existing general > electoral systems of the state (private/secret ballot), and the new > primary system of the public sphere (public/open ballot). There's a > synergy between them - both together are better than either would be > alone. Likewise for state legislative voting (closed, inaccessible) > and public voting on norms (open, accessible) - synergy there too. So > we rationalize society's voting systems. > > >>>But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are at >>>least two practical problems: i) Given the protections of free >>>speech, there is no way to generally enforce a secret ballot >> > >>I see three alternative approaches >>(for each individual voter) here. >> >>1) The vote is forced secret. The >>voter can tell how she voted >>(=freedom of speech). But she can >>not prove to the coercer or buyer >>how she voted. >> >>2) The voter can choose if her vote >>is public or secret. She can also >>tell what her secret vote was. >> >>3) The vote is public. >> >>What I mean is that also enforced >>secrecy and free speech can be >>combined. > > > Not in the public sphere - neither (1) nor (3) is enforceable - only > (2) is allowed. It is the nature of the public sphere, and part of > the legitimacy it confers on the process. More on that later... > I get dizzy on public vs private as used here, but have to disagree on some of the above. True secret voting - important to protect a voter's vote from being known: A society can use a ballot box with black and white balls, especially for deciding whether to accept a new member. There is NO record to protect or lose as to who voted black. Lever voting machines can be used in public elections. At least originally these were as secret, though all kinds of cheating now becomes possible. Paper absentee ballots can be handled in a way that, if done properly, maintains secrecy. The envelope has the voter's name. The ballot is forbidden to identify the voter in any way, and is void otherwise. When the envelope is opened the ballot is placed in a stack of such without looking at content. Signing petitions is generally non-secret - with this known to the signers. Speech is only occasionally kept secret - courts and legislatures and societies choose when they need this. ... Proxies? There is need for a verifiable record as to how many votes a proxy can cast. -- da...@clarityconnect.compeople.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: d) voting on laws, too I read this as allowing individual voters to vote directly too, without any proxies between them and the decisions (on laws and on anything). Quite OK but I have some concerns on what will happen in the tax raise questions. It is possible that the society would spend more than save. One could set some limits on the number of levels. One could e.g. allow only proxies with n votes to vote in certain questions. Use of hysteresis could help making the role of proxies of different levels clear (last minute decisions or alternative direct and proxy votes would be more complex). The proxy systems may allow (also for other reasons) different proxies or direct voting to be used for different questions. Some idea of what this would lead to can be gathered from states with initiative and referendum, where the citizenry can force a referendum or the passing of a law. It seems to work in the United States states that have them, and also in Switzerland, though the circumstances there are more complex. On the other hand, one could argue that the signature requirements to start the referendum process constitutes a form of hysteresis: because starting the process requires some effort, the system won't oscillate wildly. The real trick is to find the balance between something that oscillates and something that doesn't respond at all - and that's not a problem that's particular to politics, but appears in various guises in all kinds of systems involving feedback. Set the PID controller wrong and it's off to hunting land... Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
> > Oddly, the preceding design need not be altered. It remains > > essential. All we need is to add a separate, primary voting > > system, ... Juho Laatu wrote: > I didn't yet quite understand what > parts of the old system are kept and > what will be replaced with the new > system. All is kept, nothing is replaced or altered. There is only the addition of a new primary system in the public sphere - no formal connection to government, or to political parties. > > with these counter-features: > > > > a) continuous results, with shifting votes > > Maybe mostly positive, but also > something negative. Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy with the government's voting systems (?). > > b) peer-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates > > You may need also some approval from > the citizens to become candidates. > (Or alternatively you could allow them > to indicate if they will not accept > the role of a proxy.) Candidature is a consequence of receiving a vote. There is no formal effect aside from receiving the vote. It's like you're standing on the street corner, and somebody says, "Hey, I know you. You're Juho Laatu. I think you'd make a great City Councillor!" So the person says, and there is no way to prevent it. And others may start to agree with him. You cannot stop people from proclaiming you as a *primary* candidate, and hoping to see your name on the ballot, come the next general election. (But you are under no obligation to stand for election, as a *general* candidate.) > > c) open ballot > > What was the reason why you consider > open vote to be a requirement? (or a > "counter-feature") I read your other post. I understand you are asking about the necessity of open voting at the periphery, among plain voters. You've been asking this question from the beginning, and it's been difficult for me to answer definitively. Now I see there's a big white space in the theory, where the answer should fit. I don't have the whole of it covered yet (been thinking about it, the last couple of days) but here's a sketch of it: There's difference when we speak in public, with an aim to mutual understanding or consensus. We are forced to take the view of the others to whom we are speaking. We are forced to be self-critical in anticipation of their challenges, to prepare ourselves to reasons for what we say, to back up the claims we make. There is a theory that ties these various types of claims to to various types of speech acts, and it's called formal pragmatics.^[TCA1] This has been tied to autonomy, rational agency and responsibility, to the effect that only a public speaker in this social context is an autonomous individual, a rational and responsible actor.^[1] A public vote is the formalization of a speech act, and is covered by these theories. The opinion of a private individual that is expressed as a public vote has a claim to truth, legitimacy and sincerity that a private opinion (not so expressed) has not. There is a connection between communicative reason (in these public utterances) and the rationalization of modern society. The rationalization of modern society is its division into specialized spheres and subsystems - like public sphere, private sphere, economic system, and administration system - that spin according to their own internal logics, and interrelate across interfaces. This correlates with our rationalization of voting systems, splitting them into separate systems of the public sphere (on one hand) and administrative system (on other) - each specialized for its place and purpose, and in communication with the other. So we modernize voting. There is a connection between human reason (how we moderns think and speak) and the rationalization of modern society. I do not understand it well enough, but there's a sense in which the universality of communicative action (its inclusion of others, and raising of validity claims) can bind together the fragmented pieces of modern society. It's the last "glue" that's left to us moderns. Both the fragmentation and the glue are enhanced by the addition of public voting. It separates out two voting systems (public and private) that work better when kept apart (but in communication). It also helps to separate the public sphere from the other parts of society, while simultaneously binding it to them. So we make modern society even more modern - ultra modern. There is a sense too in which this might further the critical theory of society. That type of theory is supposed to be both diagnostic of problems, and to propose remedies, but it tends to be weak on remedies these days.^[2] And it's traditional in critical theory that the remedy is in the evil - the spear of modernity must heal the wound of modernity.^[3] There is also the consideration that this type of public voting may be applied to a text that is broadly cultural, and yet has normative potential. What would it mean, for in
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual > discussion better. My aim with this > discussion is to study if one can > combine that with the good old > privacy / secret vote principles. The most significant combo (I think) is that of the existing general electoral systems of the state (private/secret ballot), and the new primary system of the public sphere (public/open ballot). There's a synergy between them - both together are better than either would be alone. Likewise for state legislative voting (closed, inaccessible) and public voting on norms (open, accessible) - synergy there too. So we rationalize society's voting systems. > > But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are at > > least two practical problems: i) Given the protections of free > > speech, there is no way to generally enforce a secret ballot > I see three alternative approaches > (for each individual voter) here. > > 1) The vote is forced secret. The > voter can tell how she voted > (=freedom of speech). But she can > not prove to the coercer or buyer > how she voted. > > 2) The voter can choose if her vote > is public or secret. She can also > tell what her secret vote was. > > 3) The vote is public. > > What I mean is that also enforced > secrecy and free speech can be > combined. Not in the public sphere - neither (1) nor (3) is enforceable - only (2) is allowed. It is the nature of the public sphere, and part of the legitimacy it confers on the process. More on that later... > I think current systems rely on > private voting and public discussion > (although different than the proxy > based discussion). It may be possible > to enrich this with better mutual > discussion / delegable voting rights > without sacrificing secret votes / > privacy. Yes, it might be *possible*, but I think it would be difficult in practice (and not ideal in principle) to do so within a *single* voting system. The most rational design is separate, special purpose systems (primary and general) that work together. > I don't see the need of a > representative / proxy to know who > her voters exactly are to be crucial. > In some aspect it is better that she > doesn't know (no vote buying, > services to those that voted, no hard > feelings against those that this time > voted someone else etc.). > > The (secret) voters on the other hand > will get more power when they can let > several representatives / proxies > understand that they got or may get > the vote :-). All of this is easier, more natural, if agreement (voter for candidate/delegate) is *actually* expressed. Then it's more human. We weren't *built* to deal with the strange paradox of private expression (collective mass opinion). There's no natural correlate for it. > Yes. Having a rich hierarchical > discussion structure is one key > benefit of the proxy structure. > (Also secret voters may participate. > Some of the proxies are low level > and nearby in any case.) Yes, and there *will* be secret voters in the public primaries. We cannot disallow secret ballots, and enforce purity. Nor would it even be ideal - some allowance for extreme situations is better. But hopefully there will not be *too* many private voters, as they will not be able to participate properly (more on this later). > > > Yes, continuous talk may improve the > discussion. > > This topic has however also the other > side. One reason behind terms of few > years is that this way the > representatives will have some time > to work in peace. Continuous voting > may also make the system more > populist (no tax raises ever since > all those representatives might be > kicked out right away, without the > calming period before the next > elections). There is no direct action as a consequence of primary results. The public cannot *force* anything. All power remains with the administration, the general electoral systems (non-continuous), and the legislative assembly (inaccessible to public). But those systems are *informed* by the public system, and this can amount to effective control. It sounds paradoxical, because we've separated control from power, but it's actually the rational thing to do. In engineering theory, the control/guidance systems and the power systems are kept well separate from each other, and their designs are radically different. The pilot in the cockpit does not reach his hands into the engine turbines, or forcefully move the elevator, ailerons, and rudder. The cockpit is fitted with low power instruments and controls, at a safe distance from the engines etc. > It is possible to have also some > hysteresis in the system. This allows > for example short protests by the > voters and allowing them to still > change their mind before the > representative will be kicked out. > In some systems and at some levels > it however may not matter if the > representatives / proxies change > frequently. Hysteresis and other decoupling is provided by the separatio
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Juho Laatu wrote: > > c) open ballot > > What was the reason why you consider > open vote to be a requirement? (or a > "counter-feature") I need to clarify my own question. In the top layers open votes are the default way of doing things. So the question is why should also the votes at the very bottom level be open. Already at the next level above the bottom level there is an interest to know how one's own or potential future proxy voted, but at the bottom level there is no such reason. (Also making the votes of a proxy that has not volunteered for the job public is problematic (maybe doesn't even know herself that she is a proxy).) Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > I don't see any big conflict. They are > > free to speak even if the society does > > not provide them with tools to prove > > to others how they voted. (And they > > can still tell others how they voted.) > > The problem was to design a democracy in which people: > > * are free to engage with political issues; > > * know this, and are continually reminded of it; > > * yet fail to do so. > > The design solution was: > > a) a single vote, every 4 years or so > > b) mass voting for a few pre-selected candidates Could be also numerous. > > c) secret ballot > > d) no voting on laws, only on the law makers Yes, there are not many direct democracies. (One justification is that this work requires expertise. I don't fully buy this though. Proxies and modern means of communication also help.) > > Now the problem is to design a substansive democracy, in > which > political engagement is a fact. Probably you can not force it, but you can make participation easier and nicer. > Oddly, the preceding > design need not > be altered. It remains essential. All we need is to add a > separate, > primary voting system, I didn't yet quite understand what parts of the old system are kept and what will be replaced with the new system. > with these counter-features: > > a) continuous results, with shifting votes Maybe mostly positive, but also something negative. > > b) peer-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates You may need also some approval from the citizens to become candidates. (Or alternatively you could allow them to indicate if they will not accept the role of a proxy.) > > c) open ballot What was the reason why you consider open vote to be a requirement? (or a "counter-feature") > > d) voting on laws, too I read this as allowing individual voters to vote directly too, without any proxies between them and the decisions (on laws and on anything). Quite OK but I have some concerns on what will happen in the tax raise questions. It is possible that the society would spend more than save. One could set some limits on the number of levels. One could e.g. allow only proxies with n votes to vote in certain questions. Use of hysteresis could help making the role of proxies of different levels clear (last minute decisions or alternative direct and proxy votes would be more complex). The proxy systems may allow (also for other reasons) different proxies or direct voting to be used for different questions. Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Wed, 21/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > I see two valid ways to form opinions. > > - opinion formation based on mass media > > - opinion formation based on mutual discussion > > > > Individuals may use one or both > > approaches when forming their private > > opinion, and also when forming their > > public opinion (public ballot or > > other public expression of their > > opinion). > > That's true, both are valid. But mutual discussion is > in short > supply. The vacuum is filled by mass media, giving them > too much > leverage as instruments of manipulation. So we need to > facilitate > mutual discussion. Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual discussion better. My aim with this discussion is to study if one can combine that with the good old privacy / secret vote principles. > > > I don't see any big conflict. They are > > free to speak even if the society does > > not provide them with tools to prove > > to others how they voted. (And they > > can still tell others how they voted.) > > But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are > at least > two practical problems: > >i) Given the protections of free speech, there is no way > to > generally enforce a secret ballot. So a competing > system that > allows for public voting cannot be excluded. Mutatis > mutandis, > that system will win the competition, because at > least some > people will prefer to cast their votes openly. The > most likely > outcome is that individual voters will have a choice > - secret or > open ballot. I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) here. 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or buyer how she voted. 2) The voter can choose if her vote is public or secret. She can also tell what her secret vote was. 3) The vote is public. What I mean is that also enforced secrecy and free speech can be combined. > > ii) Harder to verify the results. Verification based on > full > disclosure of all voter data is easier and more > transparent. Yes, secrecy makes verification more demanding. > > And one theoretical problem: > > iii) The asymettry between private voting and public > discussion is > ugly (seems to me), and may lead to unforseen > problems. We > could switch to private discussions, but that sits > poorly with > the aim of public consensus. I think current systems rely on private voting and public discussion (although different than the proxy based discussion). It may be possible to enrich this with better mutual discussion / delegable voting rights without sacrificing secret votes / privacy. I don't see the need of a representative / proxy to know who her voters exactly are to be crucial. In some aspect it is better that she doesn't know (no vote buying, services to those that voted, no hard feelings against those that this time voted someone else etc.). The (secret) voters on the other hand will get more power when they can let several representatives / proxies understand that they got or may get the vote :-). > > Leaving aside secret/open ballots, the other design > features in > support of mutual discussion are: > > a) Peer-to-peer voting as a stuctural support for large > scale > discussion - keeping it de-centred, so it doesn't > collapse to > inaccessible, mass communication. Yes. Having a rich hierarchical discussion structure is one key benefit of the proxy structure. (Also secret voters may participate. Some of the proxies are low level and nearby in any case.) > > b) Continuous voting to make the issue more concrete, and > to > thematize the discussion. There will always be lots > to talk > about because the results are continuously revealed, > and never > final. Yes, continuous talk may improve the discussion. This topic has however also the other side. One reason behind terms of few years is that this way the representatives will have some time to work in peace. Continuous voting may also make the system more populist (no tax raises ever since all those representatives might be kicked out right away, without the calming period before the next elections). It is possible to have also some hysteresis in the system. This allows for example short protests by the voters and allowing them to still change their mind before the representative will be kicked out. In some systems and at some levels it however may not matter if the representatives / proxies change frequently. Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > I don't see any big conflict. They are > free to speak even if the society does > not provide them with tools to prove > to others how they voted. (And they > can still tell others how they voted.) The problem was to design a democracy in which people: * are free to engage with political issues; * know this, and are continually reminded of it; * yet fail to do so. The design solution was: a) a single vote, every 4 years or so b) mass voting for a few pre-selected candidates c) secret ballot d) no voting on laws, only on the law makers Now the problem is to design a substansive democracy, in which political engagement is a fact. Oddly, the preceding design need not be altered. It remains essential. All we need is to add a separate, primary voting system, with these counter-features: a) continuous results, with shifting votes b) peer-to-peer voting, with no pre-selected candidates c) open ballot d) voting on laws, too -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > I see two valid ways to form opinions. > - opinion formation based on mass media > - opinion formation based on mutual discussion > > Individuals may use one or both > approaches when forming their private > opinion, and also when forming their > public opinion (public ballot or > other public expression of their > opinion). That's true, both are valid. But mutual discussion is in short supply. The vacuum is filled by mass media, giving them too much leverage as instruments of manipulation. So we need to facilitate mutual discussion. > I don't see any big conflict. They are > free to speak even if the society does > not provide them with tools to prove > to others how they voted. (And they > can still tell others how they voted.) But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are at least two practical problems: i) Given the protections of free speech, there is no way to generally enforce a secret ballot. So a competing system that allows for public voting cannot be excluded. Mutatis mutandis, that system will win the competition, because at least some people will prefer to cast their votes openly. The most likely outcome is that individual voters will have a choice - secret or open ballot. ii) Harder to verify the results. Verification based on full disclosure of all voter data is easier and more transparent. And one theoretical problem: iii) The asymettry between private voting and public discussion is ugly (seems to me), and may lead to unforseen problems. We could switch to private discussions, but that sits poorly with the aim of public consensus. Leaving aside secret/open ballots, the other design features in support of mutual discussion are: a) Peer-to-peer voting as a stuctural support for large scale discussion - keeping it de-centred, so it doesn't collapse to inaccessible, mass communication. b) Continuous voting to make the issue more concrete, and to thematize the discussion. There will always be lots to talk about because the results are continuously revealed, and never final. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Mon, 19/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote:
>
> > > If private and public opinions differ, then which
> is the
> > > manipulated one?
> >
> > If they deviate it is hard to imagine
> > that the private opinion would not be
> > the sincere one.
>
> That's because you are thinking of individual opinion.
> Consider:
>
> * private opinion informed by mass media, and likewise
> measured by
> mass elections with a secret ballot
>
> * public opinion formed in mutual discussion, and
> likewise measured
> by peer-to-peer voting with a public ballot
>
> It makes a difference when people act socially
> (inter-subjectively)
> amongst themselves, rather than alone. When they act
> alone, they are
> apt to be systematically manipulated as objects. Alone
> they have
> subjective truth (personal sincerity), but together they
> have
> communicative reason (mutual understanding or consensus).
I see two valid ways to form opinions.
- opinion formation based on mass media
- opinion formation based on mutual discussion
Individuals may use one or both
approaches when forming their private
opinion, and also when forming their
public opinion (public ballot or
other public expression of their
opinion).
>
> > I think the common practice is to force
> > privacy on everyone in order to allow
> > the weakest of the society to keep
> > their privacy.
>
> That's because you are thinking of an administrative
> context. Force
> is permitted in that context. We can be restrained from
> choosing our
> own voting methods, at the polling station. We can be
> forced to use
> the methods as provided, or to abstain from voting.
>
> The public sphere is different. There, people can choose
> their own
> means of expression. We cannot restrict them to a private
> voting
> method, except by violating the principle of free speech.
> And if that
> didn't stop us, the law would.
I don't see any big conflict. They are
free to speak even if the society does
not provide them with tools to prove
to others how they voted. (And they
can still tell others how they voted.)
Juho
>
> > It is true that public votes help
> > implementing some features, but in
> > most typical ("low level") elections
> > privacy has been considered to be
> > essential.
>
> Privacy is essential, I agree, but it's insufficient.
> The secret
> ballot *does* work in state elections. I don't mean it
> any
> disrespect. But it will work even better when it's
> complemented by a
> public ballot in cross-party primaries. (That's what I
> argue,
> anyway.)
>
> --
> Michael Allan
>
> Toronto, 647-436-4521
> http://zelea.com/
>
>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see
> http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Could not these domains work together? To my knowledge, that's what happens > now. People discuss politics and find out what they're going to vote. Any > sort of improvement on the availability of discussion, as well as of > information of representatives' actions will help that domain. Then, when > the voters actually decide to vote, they have privacy. Their opinions may > change based on what they hear or discuss, but at the end, it's a private > decision who they'll give their vote to. I was thinking along the same lines, replying to your previous post! Here it is: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (previously): > You may put it that way, but I think that goes the other direction as well: > if it is true that distortions (by carrot or by stick, e.g vote-buying or > coercion) degrade the public sphere so that one have to use a secret ballot > in ordinary elections, then the distortions will remain when using a method > that relies on public sphere information (that is, what you call > communicative assent), yet the means of masking that distortion no longer > applies, because it's no longer a private matter of voting, but a public > one of discussion. > > Or to phrase it in another way: the distortions of action can be called > corruption, since this is really what happens when you're letting the > distortions govern how you act when you're supposed to be acting either in > accordance to your own opinion, or as an agent of someone else. For obvious > reasons, we don't want corruption, and we would seek to minimize it, but > it's still a problem. Consider all three types of voting system, the two existing, and the third proposed: TABLE 1. SYSTEMATIC CORRUPTION OF VOTERS -- Voting System IndividualCollective -- State --manipulation by mass Electoral propaganda, financed by campaign contributions, or by influence peddling State Party discipline, -- Legislative the whipping system Vote buying, influence peddling Public Primary Social pressure from -- (Electoral and employer, school, Legislative) church, union, etc. * Vote buying, influence peddling - * family pressure is more nature-like than systematic, so consider it separately > The secret ballot came into use to protect voters from the distortion. > Presumably the distortion was real and sufficiently severe to need such > measures. If we remove the protection, the distortion will again be > uncovered. It may be a problem with society, or with the method, but it'll > be there, whatever the cause. That protection will not be removed. No changes to the existing voting systems are proposed. On the other hand, we cannot extend the same protection to the public system, not even partially. To enforce a secret ballot would violate the guarantees of free speech in the public sphere. Ad hoc, people can make public voting a fact. We can take any of the corruptions (Table 1), and investigate it in detail. That's one approach. Another (as suggested in your other post) is to consider how the two categories of system (state and public) will interact. There could be a positive synergy between them, with the corruptions of the state being weakened by the public system, while those of the public system are filtered out by the state's secret ballot. I would argue this is generally true, for all of the corruptions listed in the table. > The vote-buying effort would, of course, be a this-for-that endeavor. I > provide money, you provide the vote - I "buy" your vote. After you've > voted, I got what I bought, and I may buy another vote later. > > Alternately, it can be continual: for as long as you, as a proxy, mirror > me, I'll pay you. Stop doing it and I stop paying. > > In both cases, the vote is the commodity. Only the latter case would apply, as the commodity is continuous. There is a single vote on the table, and the voter can shift it around or withdraw it, at any time. So the payments must be meted out continually in nickles and dimes (as you suggest), or deferred. These types of payment will be less attractive to typical vote sellers. They won't be banking their returns, but spending them immediately. In addition to this, and the other factors (i to iv) that weigh against vote buying, I would add: v) Vote sellers may be identified by pattern analysis, and simple record keeping. Once identified and marked with a probability label, their collective behaviour may be tracked. The track
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Michael Allan wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: If private and public opinions differ, then which is the manipulated one? If they deviate it is hard to imagine that the private opinion would not be the sincere one. That's because you are thinking of individual opinion. Consider: * private opinion informed by mass media, and likewise measured by mass elections with a secret ballot * public opinion formed in mutual discussion, and likewise measured by peer-to-peer voting with a public ballot It makes a difference when people act socially (inter-subjectively) amongst themselves, rather than alone. When they act alone, they are apt to be systematically manipulated as objects. Alone they have subjective truth (personal sincerity), but together they have communicative reason (mutual understanding or consensus). Could not these domains work together? To my knowledge, that's what happens now. People discuss politics and find out what they're going to vote. Any sort of improvement on the availability of discussion, as well as of information of representatives' actions will help that domain. Then, when the voters actually decide to vote, they have privacy. Their opinions may change based on what they hear or discuss, but at the end, it's a private decision who they'll give their vote to. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote:
> > If private and public opinions differ, then which is the
> > manipulated one?
>
> If they deviate it is hard to imagine
> that the private opinion would not be
> the sincere one.
That's because you are thinking of individual opinion. Consider:
* private opinion informed by mass media, and likewise measured by
mass elections with a secret ballot
* public opinion formed in mutual discussion, and likewise measured
by peer-to-peer voting with a public ballot
It makes a difference when people act socially (inter-subjectively)
amongst themselves, rather than alone. When they act alone, they are
apt to be systematically manipulated as objects. Alone they have
subjective truth (personal sincerity), but together they have
communicative reason (mutual understanding or consensus).
> I think the common practice is to force
> privacy on everyone in order to allow
> the weakest of the society to keep
> their privacy.
That's because you are thinking of an administrative context. Force
is permitted in that context. We can be restrained from choosing our
own voting methods, at the polling station. We can be forced to use
the methods as provided, or to abstain from voting.
The public sphere is different. There, people can choose their own
means of expression. We cannot restrict them to a private voting
method, except by violating the principle of free speech. And if that
didn't stop us, the law would.
> It is true that public votes help
> implementing some features, but in
> most typical ("low level") elections
> privacy has been considered to be
> essential.
Privacy is essential, I agree, but it's insufficient. The secret
ballot *does* work in state elections. I don't mean it any
disrespect. But it will work even better when it's complemented by a
public ballot in cross-party primaries. (That's what I argue,
anyway.)
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Sun, 18/1/09, Michael Allan wrote:
> > I believe the practice/principle of having
> > secret votes also often implies interest
> > in allowing people to vote as they
> > privately think. Difference between public
> > and private opinions is thus often seen to
> > mean some sort of unwanted pressure that
> > makes people vote some other way than they
> > really would like to vote.
>
> If private and public opinions differ, then which is the
> manipulated
> one?
If they deviate it is hard to imagine
that the private opinion would not be
the sincere one.
> > > You and Kristopher went on to discuss how you
> might solve this
> > > problem [of coersion] by precluding the
> possibility of public
> > > expression entirely (as far as votes go), and
> falling back to a
> > > medium of private expression.
> >
> > Yes. Or at least by keeping the lowest
> > layers secret.
>
> Even if that design path were a good one, it wouldn't
> be open to us.
> We may certainly *allow* for private voting at the
> perhipery. Some
> people will want it (maybe many), I agree. But we cannot
> force it on
> everyone.
I think the common practice is to force
privacy on everyone in order to allow
the weakest of the society to keep
their privacy.
> > I don't see how secret voting would
> > particularly limit public participation.
> > Public voting maybe automatically
> > forces/encourages public participation but
> > secret votes allow that too. People are
> > also free to tell how they voted even if
> > their vote was secret. One limitation is
> > that the voter can not prove to the
> > candidate that she voted that she really
> > voter for her. But that also does not
> > limit public participation.
>
> It's true, private voting imposes no effective limits.
> And mass
> democracy allows us complete freedom. What's crucial
> is not what it
> imposes, but what it omits to facilitate.
>
> We can make up for some of its shortfalls by adding a
> voting system to
> the public sphere. A well designed voting facility will:
It is true that public votes help
implementing some features, but in
most typical ("low level") elections
privacy has been considered to be
essential.
Juho
>
> a. reveal the fact of agreement (and disagreement) on
> issues - what
> other people are agreeing to
>
> b. report the quantity of agreement - for and against -
> in definite
> numbers
>
> c. characterize the *quality* of agreement, especially
> the concrete
> options under discussion - exactly what people are
> agreeing to,
> and how the consensus (and dissensus) is distributed
>
> d. open participation to everyone in the community, with
> no formal
> restrictions on age, mental ability, citizenship, etc.
>
> e. help newcomers to join in the discussion by revealing
> the
> existing participants, and showing easy points of
> entry at the
> periphery
>
> f. keep the proximal scale of discussion to a humanly
> mangageable
> size, by organizing it in a tree structure, like the
> votes
>
> g. promote consensus without forcing it, or limiting it
>
> h. provide assurance of ultimate action - a conduit for
> consensus
> votes to cross into legislative assemblies and general
> elections
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Michael Allan wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: The general problem is that if there's a way of finding out what a certain person voted, or whether a certain person voted in a particular way, one can apply pressure to get that person to vote a desired way (to the one applying the pressure). That can be simple coercion, be it formal (in "democratic" countries that aren't fully democratic yet), semi-formal (mob bosses, or "vote this way or you're fired"), or informal (social pressure). The coercion is "do it my way or something bad happens" - it can also easily be changed into "do it my way and something good happens", as with vote buying. If coercion is a problem in this case, then it is strictly a social problem. If the private sphere of individuals, families, employers, and so forth, is restricting the public communications of individuals wrongly, in defiance of the norms, then society itself has a problem in the relations between its private and public spheres. It is not a problem for a voting medium that functions exclusively in the public sphere. The purpose of the medium is to accurately mirror public opinion, and so it must also mirror the distortions, including those caused by private coercion. If people cannot *speak* their minds freely, they ought not to *vote* them either. This connection between speech and voting is especially crucial to a voting system that is based on communicative assent, as I propose here. It is essential that the voters, delegates and candidates all be engaged in mutual discussion. If the votes were not public, then the discussion would die out, and voter behaviour would cease to be informed by communicative reason. You may put it that way, but I think that goes the other direction as well: if it is true that distortions (by carrot or by stick, e.g vote-buying or coercion) degrade the public sphere so that one have to use a secret ballot in ordinary elections, then the distortions will remain when using a method that relies on public sphere information (that is, what you call communicative assent), yet the means of masking that distortion no longer applies, because it's no longer a private matter of voting, but a public one of discussion. Or to phrase it in another way: the distortions of action can be called corruption, since this is really what happens when you're letting the distortions govern how you act when you're supposed to be acting either in accordance to your own opinion, or as an agent of someone else. For obvious reasons, we don't want corruption, and we would seek to minimize it, but it's still a problem. The secret ballot came into use to protect voters from the distortion. Presumably the distortion was real and sufficiently severe to need such measures. If we remove the protection, the distortion will again be uncovered. It may be a problem with society, or with the method, but it'll be there, whatever the cause. None of the above applies to traditional voting mechanisms, of the sort normally discussed here in election-methods. Those mechanisms are not designed for the public sphere. They are designed for the private sphere, opening a private communication channel from individuals to the government. Traditionally, the only communications that become public are those of the reverse channel, in which the voters are informed via the mass media, as a passive audience. Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has the kind of feedback that enables coercion or vote-buying. ... Re vote buying: Although the vote is public and compliance may easily be verified by the buyer, there is no guarantee of *continued* compliance. The voter may take the money from one side, then shift her vote and take it from the other. Vote buying is likely to be a poor investment. The vote-buying effort would, of course, be a this-for-that endeavor. I provide money, you provide the vote - I "buy" your vote. After you've voted, I got what I bought, and I may buy another vote later. Alternately, it can be continual: for as long as you, as a proxy, mirror me, I'll pay you. Stop doing it and I stop paying. In both cases, the vote is the commodity. ... if the conspirators assume law X has near-majority support, they can buy the votes of enough to get a majority, and then pay them if X does indeed pass ... Such a deferred and contingent payment will be unattractive to someone who is selling her vote for a few dollars. She probably wants the money right away. If her payment is contingent on subsequent administrative action by the government - what the buyer really cares about - then the delay is apt to be too long. In a legislative context, for example, the assembly must schedule a separate, in-house vote. The vote buyer must then engineer a massive shift in public votes, just prior to the in-house vote. But caveat emptor, because of the: i) cost of buying votes in vast numbers; ii) risk of discovery in such
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > What would be a typical case where you > recommend public votes to be used? Where the voting system is intended to be in the public sphere, and to serve as the voice of the public - but in that case, there's no alternative. Public opinion can only be expressed in and through the public. As far as votes are part of that expression, the votes must also be public. Habermas relates this anecdote, from history: ^[2] The exclusion of the public from the parliamentary deliberations could no longer be maintained at a time in which "Memory" Woodfall was able to make the Morning Chronicle into the leading London daily paper because he could reproduce verbatim sixteen columns of parliamentary speeches without taking notes in the gallery of the House of Commons, which was prohibited. A place for journalists in the gallery was officially provided by the Speaker only in the year 1803; for almost a century they had to gain entry illegally. But only in the House of Parliament newly constructed after the fire of 1834 were stands for reporters installed - two years after the first Reform Bill had transformed Parliament, for a long time the target of critical comment by public opinion, into the very organ of this opinion. It subsequently lost that role, as mass democracy took hold. It wasn't just the publication of the votes that mattered, but the debates leading up to them. The debates retreated into private negotiations between the parties, and the votes in the house were whipped. Parliament became a theatre once again, with lots of critics and a disinterested audience. > I believe the practice/principle of having > secret votes also often implies interest > in allowing people to vote as they > privately think. Difference between public > and private opinions is thus often seen to > mean some sort of unwanted pressure that > makes people vote some other way than they > really would like to vote. If private and public opinions differ, then which is the manipulated one? Consider state electoral systems that are based on private voting. Every 4 years or so, the state must legitimize its authority. So it takes a poll, sums up the private votes, and presents them as "public opinion". But despite being expressed *in* public, the resulting synthetic opinion is not an expression *of* the public. It's not clear who it belongs to (in its aggregate form), but it seems closer to mass opinion, as characterized by C. W. Mills: ^[4] In a public, as we may understand the term, (1) virtually as many people express opinions as receive them. (2) Public commununications are so organized that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3) readily finds an outlet in effective action, even against - if necessary - the prevailing system of authority. And (4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which is thus more or less autonomous in its operation. In a mass, (1) far fewer people express opinions than receive them; for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The communications that prevail are so organized that it is difficult or impossible for the individual to answer back immediately or with any effect. (3) The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels of such action. (4) The mass has no autonomy from institutions; on the contrary, agents of authorized institutions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have in the formation of opinion by discussion. > > You and Kristopher went on to discuss how you might solve this > > problem [of coersion] by precluding the possibility of public > > expression entirely (as far as votes go), and falling back to a > > medium of private expression. > > Yes. Or at least by keeping the lowest > layers secret. Even if that design path were a good one, it wouldn't be open to us. We may certainly *allow* for private voting at the perhipery. Some people will want it (maybe many), I agree. But we cannot force it on everyone. We cannot force anything in the public sphere. The most we can do is *omit* to facilitate. But where we omit, others will come along to make up the shortfall. > I don't see how secret voting would > particularly limit public participation. > Public voting maybe automatically > forces/encourages public participation but > secret votes allow that too. People are > also free to tell how they voted even if > their vote was secret. One limitation is > that the voter can not prove to the > candidate that she voted that she really > voter for her. But that also does not > limit public participation. It's true, private voting imposes no effective limits. And mass democracy allows us complete freedom. What's crucial is not what it imposes, b
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Sat, 17/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > > 1) Most countries of the world have > > decided to base their democratic > > processes on secret votes. It would > > be difficult to change their current > > principles. > > It's true that most of them decided to use *private* > voting in the > state's electoral systems. On the other hand, they > also decided to > use *public* voting in the legislative assemblies. OK. That's why I drafted the version where "low level" votes are secret and "high level" votes public. > > (These are not "principles", in any case. > Principles are usually not > open to decision. These are "practices".) > > I do not suggest that state practices ought to be changed. > The > changes I suggest are entirely in the public sphere (among > ordinary > people) and leave untouched the practices of voting in > state elections > and legislative assemblies. What would be a typical case where you recommend public votes to be used? > (They will not affect > "how" we vote at > state facilities, but they could affect "who and > what" we vote for.) > > My experience so far is that people are somewhat reluctant > to consider > the possibility of voting openly in primary elections. I > can't say > whether this stems from the novelty of casting public > votes, or an > unfamiliarity with the purpose of primaries, or some other > factor - I > lack the data. > > Based on this experience, though, I decided to postpone > alpha trials > of the medium until after I've added normative voting. > People may > have a different reaction to the possibility of drafting > and voting on > legislative bills. They can't do *that*, even in > private. And the > traditional practice is that legislators vote publicly, so > there > shouldn't be any gut reactions against it. I will know > more, soon... > > > 2) The biggest problems may not be in > > large coercion/buying campaigns and > > explicit coercion/buying but in small > > scale and voters' own independent > > decisions. There may be intentional or > > imagined pressure at homes, work and > > many types of communities (village, > > friends, religious, professional). > > Yes, it's an important point. But I did answer to it > in the post you > quote, which I also quote in this footnote: > > http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#fn-2 > > The general observation is that private opionion and public > opinion > are not equivalents. In the original post (and link > above), I propose > a medium for the expression of *public* opinion. I also > describe how > it will (as best I can forsee) relate to other media for > the > expression of both *private* opinion in party primaries and > state > electoral systems, and *public* opinion in state > legislatures, city > councils, and so forth. You see a problem in this, but > what exactly? I believe the practice/principle of having secret votes also often implies interest in allowing people to vote as they privately think. Difference between public and private opinions is thus often seen to mean some sort of unwanted pressure that makes people vote some other way than they really would like to vote. > > I understand that you are concerned that *some* people > cannot > participate in public politics, or cannot participate as > honestly as > they would like. Yes. Or actually I was talked about that being a common attitude in societies in general. > You and Kristopher went on to discuss how > you might > solve this problem by precluding the possibility of public > expression > entirely (as far as votes go), and falling back to a medium > of private > expression. Yes. Or at least by keeping the lowest layers secret. > But that does not solve the problem of public > participation. It can only contribute to it. If we > preclude public > voting, then it's no longer just a fraction of the > population that is > intimidated, silenced and excluded from the public sphere - > all are > silenced and excluded. I don't see how secret voting would particularly limit public participation. Public voting maybe automatically forces/encourages public participation but secret votes allow that too. People are also free to tell how they voted even if their vote was secret. One limitation is that the voter can not prove to the candidate that she voted that she really voter for her. But that also does not limit public participation. > > On the other hand, if we facilitate public voting, then we > enable the > vast majority of people to participate in the public > sphere, to > discuss problems such as this, and to come up with real > solutions. I guess there are also other more common reasons to why people do not actively participate in public sphere (lack of time, lack of interest, risk of disagreements with others, not knowing enough, higher interest in some other areas). Juho > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mail
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > 1) Most countries of the world have > decided to base their democratic > processes on secret votes. It would > be difficult to change their current > principles. It's true that most of them decided to use *private* voting in the state's electoral systems. On the other hand, they also decided to use *public* voting in the legislative assemblies. (These are not "principles", in any case. Principles are usually not open to decision. These are "practices".) I do not suggest that state practices ought to be changed. The changes I suggest are entirely in the public sphere (among ordinary people) and leave untouched the practices of voting in state elections and legislative assemblies. (They will not affect "how" we vote at state facilities, but they could affect "who and what" we vote for.) My experience so far is that people are somewhat reluctant to consider the possibility of voting openly in primary elections. I can't say whether this stems from the novelty of casting public votes, or an unfamiliarity with the purpose of primaries, or some other factor - I lack the data. Based on this experience, though, I decided to postpone alpha trials of the medium until after I've added normative voting. People may have a different reaction to the possibility of drafting and voting on legislative bills. They can't do *that*, even in private. And the traditional practice is that legislators vote publicly, so there shouldn't be any gut reactions against it. I will know more, soon... > 2) The biggest problems may not be in > large coercion/buying campaigns and > explicit coercion/buying but in small > scale and voters' own independent > decisions. There may be intentional or > imagined pressure at homes, work and > many types of communities (village, > friends, religious, professional). Yes, it's an important point. But I did answer to it in the post you quote, which I also quote in this footnote: http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#fn-2 The general observation is that private opionion and public opinion are not equivalents. In the original post (and link above), I propose a medium for the expression of *public* opinion. I also describe how it will (as best I can forsee) relate to other media for the expression of both *private* opinion in party primaries and state electoral systems, and *public* opinion in state legislatures, city councils, and so forth. You see a problem in this, but what exactly? I understand that you are concerned that *some* people cannot participate in public politics, or cannot participate as honestly as they would like. You and Kristopher went on to discuss how you might solve this problem by precluding the possibility of public expression entirely (as far as votes go), and falling back to a medium of private expression. But that does not solve the problem of public participation. It can only contribute to it. If we preclude public voting, then it's no longer just a fraction of the population that is intimidated, silenced and excluded from the public sphere - all are silenced and excluded. On the other hand, if we facilitate public voting, then we enable the vast majority of people to participate in the public sphere, to discuss problems such as this, and to come up with real solutions. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Two observations. 1) Most countries of the world have decided to base their democratic processes on secret votes. It would be difficult to change their current principles. 2) The biggest problems may not be in large coercion/buying campaigns and explicit coercion/buying but in small scale and voters' own independent decisions. There may be intentional or imagined pressure at homes, work and many types of communities (village, friends, religious, professional). Juho --- On Fri, 16/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > From: Michael Allan > Subject: Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by > communicative assent > To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Friday, 16 January, 2009, 2:20 PM > Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > > > The general problem is that if there's a way of > finding out what a certain > > person voted, or whether a certain person voted in a > particular way, one > > can apply pressure to get that person to vote a > desired way (to the one > > applying the pressure). That can be simple coercion, > be it formal (in > > "democratic" countries that aren't fully > democratic yet), semi-formal (mob > > bosses, or "vote this way or you're > fired"), or informal (social pressure). > > The coercion is "do it my way or something bad > happens" - it can also > > easily be changed into "do it my way and > something good happens", as with > > vote buying. > > If coercion is a problem in this case, then it is strictly > a social > problem. If the private sphere of individuals, families, > employers, > and so forth, is restricting the public communications of > individuals > wrongly, in defiance of the norms, then society itself has > a problem > in the relations between its private and public spheres. > > It is not a problem for a voting medium that functions > exclusively in > the public sphere. The purpose of the medium is to > accurately mirror > public opinion, and so it must also mirror the distortions, > including > those caused by private coercion. If people cannot *speak* > their > minds freely, they ought not to *vote* them either. This > connection > between speech and voting is especially crucial to a voting > system > that is based on communicative assent, as I propose here. > It is > essential that the voters, delegates and candidates all be > engaged in > mutual discussion. If the votes were not public, then the > discussion > would die out, and voter behaviour would cease to be > informed by > communicative reason. > > None of the above applies to traditional voting mechanisms, > of the > sort normally discussed here in election-methods. Those > mechanisms > are not designed for the public sphere. They are designed > for the > private sphere, opening a private communication channel > from > individuals to the government. Traditionally, the only > communications > that become public are those of the reverse channel, in > which the > voters are informed via the mass media, as a passive > audience. > > > Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has > the kind of feedback > > that enables coercion or vote-buying. ... > > Re vote buying: Although the vote is public and compliance > may easily > be verified by the buyer, there is no guarantee of > *continued* > compliance. The voter may take the money from one side, > then shift > her vote and take it from the other. Vote buying is likely > to be a > poor investment. > > > ... if the conspirators assume law X has near-majority > support, they > > can buy the votes of enough to get a majority, and > then pay them if > > X does indeed pass ... > > Such a deferred and contingent payment will be unattractive > to someone > who is selling her vote for a few dollars. She probably > wants the > money right away. If her payment is contingent on > subsequent > administrative action by the government - what the buyer > really cares > about - then the delay is apt to be too long. In a > legislative > context, for example, the assembly must schedule a > separate, in-house > vote. The vote buyer must then engineer a massive shift in > public > votes, just prior to the in-house vote. But caveat emptor, > because of > the: > >i) cost of buying votes in vast numbers; > > ii) risk of discovery in such a large operation; > > iii) likelihood of the assembly ignoring the vote shift, > knowing it > to be a momentary artifact. > > Crucial to (iii), public vote shifting for/against the > proposed bill &
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Replying to Kristofer Munsterhjelm and Juho Laatu, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Ultimately, what we want is for the "representatives" to be > effectively aligned with the wishes of the people, while not being > disproportionally more aligned with the wishes of those who have > more power. How to do that isn't obvious, since the mechanisms > don't know about power. In the context of executive elections, where the issue is power itself, the voting mechanism actually does "know about power". It will be deeply informed by it, assuming the proxy structure and the power structure are in close alignment, as I predict (see original post, section 2). I figure we'll be voting for proxies partly *because* they are plugged into a power structure. So there would be no separating the cross influences - of votes on power, and power on votes - the two would likely join as a whole. (At first, I thought that was definitely a problem. Now I think it might be OK.) But if the question is influence peddling, I agree that the proxy structure offers more opportunities to a vote buyer - more than the periphery of voters anyway (see my other post) - but probably no more than the status quo. In one sense, there is *less* opportunity than the status quo, because the candidates and their supporters (proxies) will have less need of money. The voters will be informed by peer-to-peer communication and (where the issue is executive office) by the actual competence of power, so bills for mass advertising campaigns will be reduced. It might no longer cost millions to get elected, so there'll be less need for candidates to sell themselves. Juho Laatu wrote: > I note that flexible proxy systems are > in some respects also safer than current > systems with fixed representatives since > those changing proxies are harder to > contact and they are not really part of > the "fixed club of leaders" that may well > have lots of all kind of bindings and > dependences among them. I think Juho's argument is best supported in the context of normative voting, where the issue is the on-going construction of a norm, such as a law, and the typical proxy is also a drafter. In that context, vote shifts will be guided almost exclusively by the distribution of text in the population of drafters - attractive text content pulling in votes - and the anticipation of influencing that distribution - votes pushing text content. In such a shifting, fluid environment, it's hard to see where a corrupt (bought) drafter could hold influence. With no structural supports for her corrupted decisions, she'd get washed away in the general flow of votes. It would be different if people were voting for her - not because of her text content, or her drafting and consensus building skills - but on the basis of other, irrelevant factors. For example, she might be a popular Hollywood actress. Her fame would then give her an external support, and the relative freedom to write anything she liked into her text (suppose), and still retain a following among her irrational fans. She could therefore sell that freedom for money, if she was unscrupulous. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > The general problem is that if there's a way of finding out what a certain > person voted, or whether a certain person voted in a particular way, one > can apply pressure to get that person to vote a desired way (to the one > applying the pressure). That can be simple coercion, be it formal (in > "democratic" countries that aren't fully democratic yet), semi-formal (mob > bosses, or "vote this way or you're fired"), or informal (social pressure). > The coercion is "do it my way or something bad happens" - it can also > easily be changed into "do it my way and something good happens", as with > vote buying. If coercion is a problem in this case, then it is strictly a social problem. If the private sphere of individuals, families, employers, and so forth, is restricting the public communications of individuals wrongly, in defiance of the norms, then society itself has a problem in the relations between its private and public spheres. It is not a problem for a voting medium that functions exclusively in the public sphere. The purpose of the medium is to accurately mirror public opinion, and so it must also mirror the distortions, including those caused by private coercion. If people cannot *speak* their minds freely, they ought not to *vote* them either. This connection between speech and voting is especially crucial to a voting system that is based on communicative assent, as I propose here. It is essential that the voters, delegates and candidates all be engaged in mutual discussion. If the votes were not public, then the discussion would die out, and voter behaviour would cease to be informed by communicative reason. None of the above applies to traditional voting mechanisms, of the sort normally discussed here in election-methods. Those mechanisms are not designed for the public sphere. They are designed for the private sphere, opening a private communication channel from individuals to the government. Traditionally, the only communications that become public are those of the reverse channel, in which the voters are informed via the mass media, as a passive audience. > Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has the kind of feedback > that enables coercion or vote-buying. ... Re vote buying: Although the vote is public and compliance may easily be verified by the buyer, there is no guarantee of *continued* compliance. The voter may take the money from one side, then shift her vote and take it from the other. Vote buying is likely to be a poor investment. > ... if the conspirators assume law X has near-majority support, they > can buy the votes of enough to get a majority, and then pay them if > X does indeed pass ... Such a deferred and contingent payment will be unattractive to someone who is selling her vote for a few dollars. She probably wants the money right away. If her payment is contingent on subsequent administrative action by the government - what the buyer really cares about - then the delay is apt to be too long. In a legislative context, for example, the assembly must schedule a separate, in-house vote. The vote buyer must then engineer a massive shift in public votes, just prior to the in-house vote. But caveat emptor, because of the: i) cost of buying votes in vast numbers; ii) risk of discovery in such a large operation; iii) likelihood of the assembly ignoring the vote shift, knowing it to be a momentary artifact. Crucial to (iii), public vote shifting for/against the proposed bill will continue non-stop, even after the assembly accepts or rejects it. So the assembly members will have ample opportunity to learn from the public's past voting behaviour, and avoid mis-interpreting it. They will have ample incentive too, because their seats will be the issue of public voting in separate polls. For another example, consider an electoral context, where the issue is an office. The issue depends on the public voters recasting their votes come election day. Only then can the buyer see the outcome, and know whether to pay or not. But he cannot tie that outcome back to the public votes that he bought, because the translation was carried out by the voter themselves, in secret ballots. The best the buyer could hope for, once again, is to engineer a massive shift in public votes just prior to election day, thus attempting to persuade other voters to go along with it. But the same cost/risk considerations apply (i and ii). And caveat voter too, considering the: iv) embarrassment of being implicated as a vote seller, in a scheme that was subsequently exposed. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Tue, 13/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has the > kind of feedback that enables coercion or vote-buying. In > order to verify that a certain voter "votes" a > certain way, the candidate or party in question can tell the > voter to connect to an allied proxy. The proxy can then > determine whether or not the voter actually connected. Are you saying that it is not possible to build a proxy system that uses secret votes? Most election methods have traps that may reveal the opinions of individual voters. A voter-reconfigurable proxy system could fight these problems e.g. by collecting atomic changes to sufficiently large groups of changes to hide changes in the individual preferences. > Now, there may seem to be a way around this by having the > proxy be publicly available, so that voters that > "subscribe to" a certain proxy just duplicate the > proxy's suggestions when voting. This would be another way to group the individual changes (delayed until the next vote). I assume that you meant that every voter would vote, possibly copying the opinion from a proxy. In this model the proxy would not know how strong she is (unless that info would be collected when voting). > Producing the required > feedback becomes more difficult in that case, but it can > still be done. For instance, if the conspirators assume law > X has near-majority support, they can buy the votes of > enough to get a majority, and then pay them if X does indeed > pass; How about voters that are certainly not going to change their opinion but that are happy to take part in the campaign in the hope of being paid in case the other camp wins? Aren't these problems quite similar also in some more traditional election methods? > or they can try to corrupt a proxy instead, since the > proxies' positions are publicly availably. Today the opinions of some high level representatives, e.g. MPs can be bought, but this problem is probably quite well in control. In proxy democracy where the number of proxies is high there would be a bigger risk of some of them selling votes. Of course those proxies could lose support when their voters notice that their opinions tend to be something else than what the voters assumed. It is also possible that the opinions of the proxies are not known beforehand. If there are many of them and they change often then their opinions can not be easily followed. If the proxies may change (or sell) their opinion just before the election there is maybe no point anyway in officially maintaining the opinions of the candidates (so information on their opinions would be available in the traditional way, for private/voluntary/ campaigning reasons only or could be guessed based on party affiliations). > > The problem reaches further. I think we can generalize that > it's not only proxy democracies that has this problem. > The problem itself is that of conflicting goals: in order > that the public knows what their representatives are doing, > the representatives' votes should be public. But the > greater the proportion of the people become representatives, > the more votes will be public, and so coercion and > vote-buying becomes easier. Yes. The votes need not be public beforehand though. (In a some forms of proxy democracy voters may also be able to vote directly at any time if they want to be sure what their vote will be.) > > By that, one would assume that it'd be a problem in > ordinary representative democracies as well, because the > representatives' votes are known and thus one could use > feedback there. I think the difference is that > representatives stay in their position for some time, so any > use of such tricks would also become known and would hurt > the representative in the end. I guess it's also related > to that there are few representatives compared to the > people, so each can be checked more thoroughly. Yes. Modern technology could also allow the voters to follow the opinions of all the numerous proxies / final voters (or at least those that are happy to publish their voting behaviour (there could be also low level proxies that consider themselves private people and want to keep their vote secret)). > > Ultimately, what we want is for the > "representatives" to be effectively aligned with > the wishes of the people, while not being disproportionally > more aligned with the wishes of those who have more power. > How to do that isn't obvious, since the mechanisms > don't know about power. I note that flexible proxy systems are in some respects also safer than current systems with fixed representatives since those changing proxies are harder to contact and they are not really part of the "fixed club of leaders" that may well have lots of all kind of bindings and dependences among them. > Perhaps each voter could vote twice - once in public and > once in secret. The secret vote either says "defer to > public", or something separate, in wh
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: --- On Mon, 12/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: ... The topmost thoughts in my mind when thinking about this approach is that 1) the principles are good and 2) making the votes public limits the usability of the method. Traditionally secret votes have been a building block of democracies. Public votes work somewhere but not everywhere. (1). Re good principles. I've heard it suggested that modern democracy is the political form that is best suited to capitalism.^[1][2] If we change it to something with a firmer base in principles - a more substansive democracy - will it continue to be friendly to business entrepreneurs? If not, what will happen? Has anyone explored that scenario? (Any references?) I can imagine that in some cases also dictatorship can be the best option for capitalism (in the sense of "capital owners"). Democracy is however probably more stable in the long run and therefore better basis for a working market economy. Good principles may help market economy by allowing the citizens to see the state as "we", and thereby increasing overall trust in the system, and thereby enabling smoother (hassle free) operation of the markets. There would have to be some degree of democracy so the dictatorship doesn't get lost in things that benefit only himself (and thus risk a revolt), but if you go by the strict definition of capitalism, there can also be too much democracy, I think. Since the labor market must remain a market, people can't be given enough influence that they form oligopolies of labor (that is, national unions). The other side of that coin, though, is that nor should producers be given enough influence that they can form oligopolies or monopolies either. In any case, dictators usually limit organization of labor before they limit organization of capital. (2). Re public/private voting. Maybe there are two possibilities: i) Initial participation by a small group of public "pioneers" gradually changes attitudes. Open voting comes to be accepted as a natural form of expression in the public sphere. Participation levels grow. (There remains a core who will not/cannot vote openly. We can get empirical data on this.) I'm afraid there will be also a third category, people that do vote but that do not dare to vote as they feel. People may also vote since not voting could be interpreted as not supporting the mainstream opinions or as possibility of having some unwanted opinions. Examples of group pressure are working places where "all others" are believed to vote certain way. Also in homes it might be problematic for some members to have radically different opinions. The general problem is that if there's a way of finding out what a certain person voted, or whether a certain person voted in a particular way, one can apply pressure to get that person to vote a desired way (to the one applying the pressure). That can be simple coercion, be it formal (in "democratic" countries that aren't fully democratic yet), semi-formal (mob bosses, or "vote this way or you're fired"), or informal (social pressure). The coercion is "do it my way or something bad happens" - it can also easily be changed into "do it my way and something good happens", as with vote buying. Any sort of voter-reconfigurable proxy democracy has the kind of feedback that enables coercion or vote-buying. In order to verify that a certain voter "votes" a certain way, the candidate or party in question can tell the voter to connect to an allied proxy. The proxy can then determine whether or not the voter actually connected. Now, there may seem to be a way around this by having the proxy be publicly available, so that voters that "subscribe to" a certain proxy just duplicate the proxy's suggestions when voting. Producing the required feedback becomes more difficult in that case, but it can still be done. For instance, if the conspirators assume law X has near-majority support, they can buy the votes of enough to get a majority, and then pay them if X does indeed pass; or they can try to corrupt a proxy instead, since the proxies' positions are publicly availably. The problem reaches further. I think we can generalize that it's not only proxy democracies that has this problem. The problem itself is that of conflicting goals: in order that the public knows what their representatives are doing, the representatives' votes should be public. But the greater the proportion of the people become representatives, the more votes will be public, and so coercion and vote-buying becomes easier. By that, one would assume that it'd be a problem in ordinary representative democracies as well, because the representatives' votes are known and thus one could use feedback there. I think the difference is that representatives stay in their position for some time, so any use of such tricks would also become known and would hurt th
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
--- On Mon, 12/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > Juho Laatu wrote: > > ... The topmost thoughts in my mind when thinking > about this > > approach is that 1) the principles are good and 2) > making the votes > > public limits the usability of the method. > Traditionally secret > > votes have been a building block of democracies. > Public votes work > > somewhere but not everywhere. > > (1). Re good principles. I've heard it suggested that > modern > democracy is the political form that is best suited to > capitalism.^[1][2] If we change it to something with a > firmer base in > principles - a more substansive democracy - will it > continue to be > friendly to business entrepreneurs? If not, what will > happen? Has > anyone explored that scenario? (Any references?) I can imagine that in some cases also dictatorship can be the best option for capitalism (in the sense of "capital owners"). Democracy is however probably more stable in the long run and therefore better basis for a working market economy. Good principles may help market economy by allowing the citizens to see the state as "we", and thereby increasing overall trust in the system, and thereby enabling smoother (hassle free) operation of the markets. > (2). Re public/private voting. Maybe there are two > possibilities: > > i) Initial participation by a small group of public > "pioneers" > gradually changes attitudes. Open voting comes to be > accepted as > a natural form of expression in the public sphere. > Participation > levels grow. (There remains a core who will > not/cannot vote > openly. We can get empirical data on this.) I'm afraid there will be also a third category, people that do vote but that do not dare to vote as they feel. People may also vote since not voting could be interpreted as not supporting the mainstream opinions or as possibility of having some unwanted opinions. Examples of group pressure are working places where "all others" are believed to vote certain way. Also in homes it might be problematic for some members to have radically different opinions. > ii) A private voting facility (secret ballot) is grafted > onto the > public medium. Anyone who is content to participate > merely as a > voter (not as a delegate, or legislative drafter, > etc.) may vote > without disclosure. So we could extend participation > to those > who will not/cannot vote openly. Results verification > (and maybe > voter authentication) would be complicated by this, > but the > overall function of the medium should be unaffected. There are some (although smaller) problems also in this case. If someone casts a secret ballot that may be interpreted as having something to hide. This may lead to pressure to cast a public vote (and that could be less sincere than the secret one). One approach would be to keep all the "low level" votes secret and publish only the "representative level" votes (it is however not easy to separate these two categories). Juho > [1] Jürgen Habermas. 1973. Legitimation Crisis. > Translated by > Thomas McCarthy, 1975. Beacon Hill, Boston. > > [2] John Dunn. 1992. Conclusion. In Democracy: the > Unfinished > Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993. Edited by John Dunn. > Oxford > University Press. > > -- > Michael Allan > > Toronto, 647-436-4521 > http://zelea.com/ > > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Juho Laatu wrote: > ... The topmost thoughts in my mind when thinking about this > approach is that 1) the principles are good and 2) making the votes > public limits the usability of the method. Traditionally secret > votes have been a building block of democracies. Public votes work > somewhere but not everywhere. (1). Re good principles. I've heard it suggested that modern democracy is the political form that is best suited to capitalism.^[1][2] If we change it to something with a firmer base in principles - a more substansive democracy - will it continue to be friendly to business entrepreneurs? If not, what will happen? Has anyone explored that scenario? (Any references?) (2). Re public/private voting. Maybe there are two possibilities: i) Initial participation by a small group of public "pioneers" gradually changes attitudes. Open voting comes to be accepted as a natural form of expression in the public sphere. Participation levels grow. (There remains a core who will not/cannot vote openly. We can get empirical data on this.) ii) A private voting facility (secret ballot) is grafted onto the public medium. Anyone who is content to participate merely as a voter (not as a delegate, or legislative drafter, etc.) may vote without disclosure. So we could extend participation to those who will not/cannot vote openly. Results verification (and maybe voter authentication) would be complicated by this, but the overall function of the medium should be unaffected. [1] Jürgen Habermas. 1973. Legitimation Crisis. Translated by Thomas McCarthy, 1975. Beacon Hill, Boston. [2] John Dunn. 1992. Conclusion. In Democracy: the Unfinished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993. Edited by John Dunn. Oxford University Press. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
Here's one comment. The topmost thoughts in my mind when thinking about this approach is that 1) the principles are good and 2) making the votes public limits the usability of the method. Traditionally secret votes have been a building block of democracies. Public votes work somewhere but not everywhere. Juho --- On Tue, 6/1/09, Michael Allan wrote: > I completed a theory outline, and here I'm posting it > for the record. > Critique is also welcome. Please point out flaws or > ommissions. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent
I completed a theory outline, and here I'm posting it for the record. Critique is also welcome. Please point out flaws or ommissions. The voting mechanism (delegate cascade) is essentially identical to Abd's "delegable proxy". I describe the nuts and bolts of it. I also describe its interface to collaborative drafting media for the purpose of legislative voting, and so forth. Where Abd is primarily concerned with its application to "free associations" in the private sphere, I analyze its fit with the broader public sphere, and with society as a whole. It is similar to Fred Gohlke's Practical Democracy in its recursive structure. The main difference is that a delegate cascade is not elaborated serially, and then frozen; rather it is continuously regenerated, and remains fluid. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht -- THE STRUCTURING OF POWER AND THE COMPOSITION OF NORMS BY COMMUNICATIVE ASSENT -- Revised from: Michael Allan. 2008. SourceForge.net, project Votorola, release 0.1.12, file d/theory.xht. http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=204780&package_id=244575. CONTENTS 1. Peer-to-Peer Voting and Communicative Assent Introduces a medium of communicative assent for the purpose of consensus building. The backbone of the medium is a peer-to-peer voting mechanism that is open to continuous recasting (delegate cascade). It differs from the conventional media of *mass* assent in preserving the deliberative basis of consensus, regardless of scale. 2. The Communicative Structuring of Power Explains how the medium may function as a primary electoral system, one in which candidates for executive office are nominated by open, cross-party consensus. Defines the ultimate election of a consensus candidate as an instance of communicative action by society as a whole. Defines assent as a steering medium, alongside money and power, and describes how it might rationalize the relations between lifeworld and system. Describes how the structure of assent may serve as scaffolding for the construction of power. 3. The Communicative Composition of Norms Explains how the medium may be combined with a peer-to-peer medium of collaborative drafting (recombinant text), in order to build consensus on the composition of societal norms (laws, plans and policies). Describes how vote flow and text flow are interwoven in the composition, such that voters and drafters are made equal in its authorship. Suggests how a consensus norm might be actualized by government. Provides an example from a legislative context, in which the unofficial participation of assembly members opens a "public bridgehead" into the legislature. * Notes and References * Glossary 1. PEER-TO-PEER VOTING AND COMMUNICATIVE ASSENT --- COMMUNICATIVE ASSENT is the expression of an agreement that arises from discussion. This section introduces a medium in which communicative assent is formalized through voting. The voting mechanism is a delegate cascade that is open to continuous recasting. In a delegate cascade, a delegate is any participant who both receives votes (like a candidate), and casts a vote of her own (like a voter). But when a delegate casts a vote, it carries with it those received. And so on... Passing from delegate to delegate, the votes flow together and gather in volume - they cascade - like raindrops down the branches of a tree.^[1] FIGURE 1. Cascades in tree form. The current measure of assent for each participant is the quantity of votes received (circled number). Vote flow is depicted by arrows, and quantified by volume. The votes flow together until they pool at bottom, where they are held by the leading candidates. The red numbers are the quantities of votes held, and thus removed from circulation. (Cascades would likely be bushier in practice, with a typical candidate having 5-20 immediate voters.) http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/theory/cascade.png Every eligible participant has a single vote, and is thus a potential voter. She may either withold her vote or cast it. She may vote for anyone. There are no pre-declared candidates. All participants are eligible to receive votes. All non-participants are also eligible. A non-participant who receives a vote is thereby made a participant, in the role of candidate. Votes are open to recasting. If a voter changes her mind about a candidate, she is free to withdraw her vote, or to recast it for another candidate. Voting is intended to remain open indefinitely, year round, with the votes shifting as new information becomes available to the participants. The resu
