Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
yes, that's it. P. 2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com: On 02/05/2013 09:37 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi Kristofer, I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates. For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B, C. Coalition A and B get their first place candidate Coalition C get their second place candidate quoted-in (i.e. they would prefer Agda, but they get Adam due to the quota rules). Coalition A and B get the third and fourth place candidates respectively. Coalition C, again, get their fifth place candidate quoted in (i.e. they would prefer Erica, but they get Eric due to the quota rules). This approach leads to an unproportional distribution of quoted-in seats (candidates) as Coalition C get both of the quoted-in candidates and Coalition A and B get none. So you need not just proportionality in the group as a whole, but proportionality within each gender too? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
James, Jonathan, I need that the quoted-in people are quoted-in in such a way, that the proportionality of the election is not significantly disturbed. I think Rosenthiel's approach has the following insufficiencies: If I elect five women, and then increase the number of elected seats until two more men have been elected, then we might end up with a situation, where a] one coalition of voters get all the seats (the easiest example is when we elect two ordered seats, one man and one woman) - i.e. the resulting list is not a proportionaly ordered list b] one coalition of voters get all the qouted-in men - i.e. the resulting list has no proportionality between gender. Best regards Peter Zborník 2013/2/6 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk: Jonathan Lundell Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 6:40 PM There is, I think, an underlying misconception here, namely that STV order of election can be interpreted as a ranking of level of support. It's not, in the general case. Jonathan is absolutely right. If you want lists ordered by relative support, you need to adopt a procedure like that recommended by Colin Rosenstiel and used by some UK political parties when they have to select ordered lists for closed-list party-PR elections. First you use ordinary STV-PR to elect the required total number of candidates. Then you conduct a series of STV-PR elections, each for one vacancy less than the preceding election. The unsuccessful candidate takes the lowest vacant place on the ordered list. Continue until you run-off between the top-two for the second-last place. For full details, see: http://www.crosenstiel.webspace.virginmedia.com/stv/orderstv.htm and http://www.crosenstiel.webspace.virginmedia.com/stv/ordstvdt.htm The second one includes a constraint for candidate's sex. James Gilmour --- avast! Antivirus: Outbound message clean. Virus Database (VPS): 130205-0, 05/02/2013 Tested on: 05/02/2013 23:49:22 avast! - copyright (c) 1988-2013 AVAST Software. http://www.avast.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Kristofer, to be more exact: I need not just proportionality in the ordered list as a whole (i.e. meaning proportional ranking), but also that seats/candidates are quoted in proportionally within each gender too. Proportionality within each gender is not needed, if the constraints are met. I.e., the guiding principle when constraints are not met and when deciding upon which seat to apply quotas on should be i. to quote-in the seat proportionally within the gender, but ii. without causing an unnecessary disproportionality within the ordered list. This means for instance, that if we have to decide if we should apply the constraint (quote-in) at seat 3, 4 or 5 and the proportionality within the gender would be identical in each case, then the candidate should be quoted-in at seat 5, since seat 5 is less important than seats 3 and 4 and since there is no gain in proportionality within the gender by quoting in at seat 3 or 4 compared to quoting-in at seat 5. It is necessary to quantify what less important above exactly means, but I am not sure of how to do it. P. 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com: yes, that's it. P. 2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com: On 02/05/2013 09:37 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi Kristofer, I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates. For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B, C. Coalition A and B get their first place candidate Coalition C get their second place candidate quoted-in (i.e. they would prefer Agda, but they get Adam due to the quota rules). Coalition A and B get the third and fourth place candidates respectively. Coalition C, again, get their fifth place candidate quoted in (i.e. they would prefer Erica, but they get Eric due to the quota rules). This approach leads to an unproportional distribution of quoted-in seats (candidates) as Coalition C get both of the quoted-in candidates and Coalition A and B get none. So you need not just proportionality in the group as a whole, but proportionality within each gender too? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Is there a quota or gender requirement or both requirements? - If we assume that the quota rules are not needed since both genders will get seats also otherwise, is it ok if one grouping gets 3 women and the other one 2 men? - Is it ok if the second seat goes to a male candidate of some grouping and the fifth seat goes to a female candidate of the same grouping? Juho On 6.2.2013, at 11.47, Peter Zbornik wrote: James, Jonathan, I need that the quoted-in people are quoted-in in such a way, that the proportionality of the election is not significantly disturbed. I think Rosenthiel's approach has the following insufficiencies: If I elect five women, and then increase the number of elected seats until two more men have been elected, then we might end up with a situation, where a] one coalition of voters get all the seats (the easiest example is when we elect two ordered seats, one man and one woman) - i.e. the resulting list is not a proportionaly ordered list b] one coalition of voters get all the qouted-in men - i.e. the resulting list has no proportionality between gender. Best regards Peter Zborník 2013/2/6 James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk: Jonathan Lundell Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 6:40 PM There is, I think, an underlying misconception here, namely that STV order of election can be interpreted as a ranking of level of support. It's not, in the general case. Jonathan is absolutely right. If you want lists ordered by relative support, you need to adopt a procedure like that recommended by Colin Rosenstiel and used by some UK political parties when they have to select ordered lists for closed-list party-PR elections. First you use ordinary STV-PR to elect the required total number of candidates. Then you conduct a series of STV-PR elections, each for one vacancy less than the preceding election. The unsuccessful candidate takes the lowest vacant place on the ordered list. Continue until you run-off between the top-two for the second-last place. For full details, see: http://www.crosenstiel.webspace.virginmedia.com/stv/orderstv.htm and http://www.crosenstiel.webspace.virginmedia.com/stv/ordstvdt.htm The second one includes a constraint for candidate's sex. James Gilmour --- avast! Antivirus: Outbound message clean. Virus Database (VPS): 130205-0, 05/02/2013 Tested on: 05/02/2013 23:49:22 avast! - copyright (c) 1988-2013 AVAST Software. http://www.avast.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
On 6.2.2013, at 12.29, Juho Laatu wrote: - Is it ok if the second seat goes to a male candidate of some grouping and the fifth seat goes to a female candidate of the same grouping? Clarification: In the second and fifth seats the quota rule forced the sex to be changed. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better than STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply ignore that gender of candidates on all ballots. That's not just about eliminations; it also means the count of the top preferences on each (reweighted) ballot means the top eligible preferences. So say there are 7 piles of votes (as an unrealistic illustrative example): 18: W0 W1 M1 W2 17: W0 W1 M2 W2 16: W0 W1 M3 W2 15: W0 W1 M4 W2 14: W0 W1 M5 W2 13: W0 W1 M6 W2 M5 7: W3 For the first seat, the unanimous choice W0 wins, and all votes are rescaled to 5/6 strength. For the second choice, you ignore the preferences for ineligible candidates W1, W2, and W3, and so M6 is eliminated and M5 wins with the transferred votes. Etc. Jameson 2013/2/5 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Dear all, We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.). We used standard fractional STV, with strict quotas, valid empty ballots, Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, no Meek. It was the first bigger usage of STV in the Czech republic. As a footnote, I would like to add, that one big advantage of proportional election methods, is that it elects the best people, i.e. meaning the people, who have the biggest support in the organisation. Now we would like to go on using STV for primary elections to party lists in our party. I have a good idea on how to do it using proportional ranking, but am not entirely confident in how to implement the gender quotas. So here I would like to ask you, the experts, for help. I have only found some old papers in election-methods, but they are not of any great help to resolve the following problem, unfortunately. The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows: We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hagenbach-Bischoff_quota) under the following constraints: Constraint 1: One of the first two seats has to go to a man and the other seat has to go to a woman. Constraint 2: One of seat three, four and five has to go to a man and one of those seats has to go to a woman. Say the default proportional ranking method elects women to all five seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to satisfy the constraints. Now the question is: How should the quoted seats be distributed in order to insure i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at the same time ii] that the proportional ranking method remains fairly proportional? --- Here is how I have been thinking about the problem myself. I am not sure, however, that my line of thinking is the best or the only one, so please read with a healthy amount of scepticism. The problem can be re-formulated as follows. Which method would make sure, 1) that a large number of voters do not get both of the quoted seats? 2) that the quoted seat is by default seat two and five, unless there are compelling reasons to quote-in seat three or four (or, less probably, seat one)? There is a trade-off between questions 1) and 2) above, i.e.: a) if seat two and five are quoted, then a large number of the voters might get both the quoted seats - which would lead the quotas to be non-proportionally distributed, making some voters dissatisfied. b) assume we always quote in seat two (this could, but need not be necessary). If we, by using some appropriate proportionality measure (has to be defined), quote-in the candidate at seat three, four or five, then a fraction of one vote might decide, that the quoted-in seat should be seat number three instead of seat five, or the rule could prefer quoting in at place three, instead of place five, as place three would need to have higher support, than place five. Such a quota rule would ignore the fact, that place three is more important than place five, i.e. that the disturbance in the proportionality of the proportional ranking would be higher, if the candidate would be quoted in at seat three than seat five. I.e. we search for a) a quota proportionality measure and b) a proportional ranking measure and c) a rule, which optimises both the quota proportionality and the proportional ranking proportionality. I am sure the above was not entirely easy to digest. I am happy to take your questions and will do my best to clarify. Any references to relevant papers would be more than welcome. Best regards Peter Zborník Election-Methods mailing list - see
[EM] 3 reasons why mutual majorities would be voted, in the Green scenario
My concern had been that, in IRV, a party, in order to gain media-support, might instruct its voters to rank, in 2nd place, a media-promoted party's candidate. But there are several reasons why that shouldn't be a problem in the Green scenario. 1. With the open media offered in the Green platform, there wouldn't be corporate control of media, or a media agenda to promote corporate-owned parties, or any particular parties. Therefore there wouldn't be pressure, need or incentive for a party, to please the media, to recommend voting against preference. 2. With that more open media, and especially if the non-CW-preferring wing of the mutual majority (MM) could be large enough to eliminate the CW, then voters would have heard, via the media, about its platform policy proposals, and, would be well-aware of the great similarity of policies within the MM. 3. If that wing might be large enough to eliminate the CW, then, in the event that it isn't quite that large, and it gets eliminated first, the CW would very much want its transfer votes, and so there would be incentive to not offend that wing whose support could be important. For those reasons, I suggest that there is little reason to doubt that a progressive mutually majority would be voted as such, in IRV, in the Green scenario. Michael Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Jameson, I am not sure if we understand each other here. I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed, for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in candidates at places 2 and 5. I think the problem is not restricted to STV, so other election methods might be used and extended to resolve it, like Schulze STV. The problem is not to quote in the underrepresented gender at place 2, the problem is to proportionally quote-in the second seat at seat 3, 4 or 5, in order to get a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. A special case is when two women are elected to seats 1 and 2, and three men are elected to seats 3, 4 and 5. Here, the constraints are also breached, but with diferent gender for seats 1 and 2 and for seats 3, 4 and 5. Again, it would be unfair, if, with three coalitions, the same coalition would get both quoted-in candidates. Now, the solution for this problem would be to look for proportionality of quoted-in candidates. I am not sure, that we are looking for proportionality within each gender, but rather proportionality of quoted-in candidates. PZ 2013/2/6 Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com: STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better than STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply ignore that gender of candidates on all ballots. That's not just about eliminations; it also means the count of the top preferences on each (reweighted) ballot means the top eligible preferences. So say there are 7 piles of votes (as an unrealistic illustrative example): 18: W0 W1 M1 W2 17: W0 W1 M2 W2 16: W0 W1 M3 W2 15: W0 W1 M4 W2 14: W0 W1 M5 W2 13: W0 W1 M6 W2 M5 7: W3 For the first seat, the unanimous choice W0 wins, and all votes are rescaled to 5/6 strength. For the second choice, you ignore the preferences for ineligible candidates W1, W2, and W3, and so M6 is eliminated and M5 wins with the transferred votes. Etc. Jameson 2013/2/5 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Dear all, We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.). We used standard fractional STV, with strict quotas, valid empty ballots, Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, no Meek. It was the first bigger usage of STV in the Czech republic. As a footnote, I would like to add, that one big advantage of proportional election methods, is that it elects the best people, i.e. meaning the people, who have the biggest support in the organisation. Now we would like to go on using STV for primary elections to party lists in our party. I have a good idea on how to do it using proportional ranking, but am not entirely confident in how to implement the gender quotas. So here I would like to ask you, the experts, for help. I have only found some old papers in election-methods, but they are not of any great help to resolve the following problem, unfortunately. The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows: We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hagenbach-Bischoff_quota) under the following constraints: Constraint 1: One of the first two seats has to go to a man and the other seat has to go to a woman. Constraint 2: One of seat three, four and five has to go to a man and one of those seats has to go to a woman. Say the default proportional ranking method elects women to all five seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to satisfy the constraints. Now the question is: How should the quoted seats be distributed in order to insure i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at the same time ii] that the proportional ranking method remains fairly proportional? --- Here is how I have been thinking about the problem myself. I am not sure, however, that my line of thinking is the best or the only one, so please read with a healthy amount of scepticism. The problem can be re-formulated as follows. Which method would make sure, 1) that a large number of voters do not get both of the quoted seats? 2) that the quoted seat is by default seat two and five, unless there are compelling reasons to quote-in seat three or four (or, less probably, seat one)? There is a trade-off between questions 1) and 2) above, i.e.: a) if seat two
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Hi Kristofer, to be even more exact and correct: I need not just proportionality in the ordered list as a whole (i.e. meaning proportional ranking), but also that seats/candidates are quoted in proportionally, i.e. that the quoted-in candidates are proportionally distributed. That should be the most exact framing of the problem (I hope). P. 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com: Kristofer, to be more exact: I need not just proportionality in the ordered list as a whole (i.e. meaning proportional ranking), but also that seats/candidates are quoted in proportionally within each gender too. Proportionality within each gender is not needed, if the constraints are met. I.e., the guiding principle when constraints are not met and when deciding upon which seat to apply quotas on should be i. to quote-in the seat proportionally within the gender, but ii. without causing an unnecessary disproportionality within the ordered list. This means for instance, that if we have to decide if we should apply the constraint (quote-in) at seat 3, 4 or 5 and the proportionality within the gender would be identical in each case, then the candidate should be quoted-in at seat 5, since seat 5 is less important than seats 3 and 4 and since there is no gain in proportionality within the gender by quoting in at seat 3 or 4 compared to quoting-in at seat 5. It is necessary to quantify what less important above exactly means, but I am not sure of how to do it. P. 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com: yes, that's it. P. 2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com: On 02/05/2013 09:37 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi Kristofer, I am afraid your approach might in some cases not lead to proportionally distributed quoted-in candidates. For instance, say we have three coalitions: A, B, C. Coalition A and B get their first place candidate Coalition C get their second place candidate quoted-in (i.e. they would prefer Agda, but they get Adam due to the quota rules). Coalition A and B get the third and fourth place candidates respectively. Coalition C, again, get their fifth place candidate quoted in (i.e. they would prefer Erica, but they get Eric due to the quota rules). This approach leads to an unproportional distribution of quoted-in seats (candidates) as Coalition C get both of the quoted-in candidates and Coalition A and B get none. So you need not just proportionality in the group as a whole, but proportionality within each gender too? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Jameson, I am not sure if we understand each other here. I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed, for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in candidates at places 2 and 5. OK. I was responding to your initial statement of the problem, without this additional proportionally-quoting-in constraint. The issue with this constraint is that it is only meaningful if the electorate is meaningfully separable into parties. If, on the other hand, the electorate is in a 2D issue space, it's hard to see exactly what this constraint even means. Thus I suspect no non-partisan system can be made to fit this constraint. I could easily see how to meet this constraint with a party list system (preferably open, because closed list systems are bad), and possibly I could work it out with a pseudo-list system like PAL, but with STV it looks to me like an impossible task. I think the problem is not restricted to STV, so other election methods might be used and extended to resolve it, like Schulze STV. The problem is not to quote in the underrepresented gender at place 2, the problem is to proportionally quote-in the second seat at seat 3, 4 or 5, in order to get a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. A special case is when two women are elected to seats 1 and 2, and three men are elected to seats 3, 4 and 5. Here, the constraints are also breached, but with diferent gender for seats 1 and 2 and for seats 3, 4 and 5. Again, it would be unfair, if, with three coalitions, the same coalition would get both quoted-in candidates. Now, the solution for this problem would be to look for proportionality of quoted-in candidates. I am not sure, that we are looking for proportionality within each gender, but rather proportionality of quoted-in candidates. PZ 2013/2/6 Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com: STV is not my personal favorite PR rule (my favorites are Bucklin Transferrable Vote or PAL Representation, and Schulze PR is also better than STV). However, if you're starting from STV, the way to do the quota is clear. When the quota makes one gender ineligible for a seat, simply ignore that gender of candidates on all ballots. That's not just about eliminations; it also means the count of the top preferences on each (reweighted) ballot means the top eligible preferences. So say there are 7 piles of votes (as an unrealistic illustrative example): 18: W0 W1 M1 W2 17: W0 W1 M2 W2 16: W0 W1 M3 W2 15: W0 W1 M4 W2 14: W0 W1 M5 W2 13: W0 W1 M6 W2 M5 7: W3 For the first seat, the unanimous choice W0 wins, and all votes are rescaled to 5/6 strength. For the second choice, you ignore the preferences for ineligible candidates W1, W2, and W3, and so M6 is eliminated and M5 wins with the transferred votes. Etc. Jameson 2013/2/5 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com Dear all, We recently managed, after some effort to elect some people in our party using STV (five of seven board members of the Czech Green Party and more recently some people to lead the Prague organisation etc.). We used standard fractional STV, with strict quotas, valid empty ballots, Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, no Meek. It was the first bigger usage of STV in the Czech republic. As a footnote, I would like to add, that one big advantage of proportional election methods, is that it elects the best people, i.e. meaning the people, who have the biggest support in the organisation. Now we would like to go on using STV for primary elections to party lists in our party. I have a good idea on how to do it using proportional ranking, but am not entirely confident in how to implement the gender quotas. So here I would like to ask you, the experts, for help. I have only found some old papers in election-methods, but they are not of any great help to resolve the following problem, unfortunately. The problem (after a slight simplification) is as follows: We want to elect five seats with any proportional ranking method (like Schulze proportional ranking, or Otten's top-down or similar), using the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hagenbach-Bischoff_quota) under the following constraints: Constraint 1: One of the first two seats has to go to a man and the other seat has to go to a woman. Constraint 2: One of seat three, four and five has to go to a man and one of those seats has to go to a woman. Say the default proportional ranking method elects women to all five seats, and thus that we need to modify it in a good way in order to satisfy the constraints. Now the question is: How should the quoted seats be distributed
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com mailto:pzbor...@gmail.com Jameson, I am not sure if we understand each other here. I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed, for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in candidates at places 2 and 5. OK. I was responding to your initial statement of the problem, without this additional proportionally-quoting-in constraint. The issue with this constraint is that it is only meaningful if the electorate is meaningfully separable into parties. If, on the other hand, the electorate is in a 2D issue space, it's hard to see exactly what this constraint even means. Thus I suspect no non-partisan system can be made to fit this constraint. I could easily see how to meet this constraint with a party list system (preferably open, because closed list systems are bad), and possibly I could work it out with a pseudo-list system like PAL, but with STV it looks to me like an impossible task. With a council size of 5, it might be possible to do an election between all consistent sets. The general idea would be something to the effect of that you first use a proportional ordering, setting constraints at different places (force woman at position one, position two, etc). Then you find all the sets the proportional ordering produces, and you hold a supermajority election to decide which to use. The supermajority election could be a parliamentary procedures one if the number of members is small, otherwise it would have to be by means of an election method (or Asset/liquid democracy). I say it'd have to be supermajority so that the majority can't force disproportionality on the minority. However, a consensus election might on the other hand give undue power to the minority. So that leads to another problem, which is similar to the question of how to get a proportionally represented council if the only thing you can do is ask the voters to rank the different councils. Simmons had some ideas relating to lotteries in that respect, if I'm not mistaken. I don't remember the details, though. Could they be applied here? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
No, only one election, please, no meta-elections. Two elections would take too much time. Thanks for your understanding. PZ 2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com: On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com mailto:pzbor...@gmail.com Jameson, I am not sure if we understand each other here. I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed, for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in candidates at places 2 and 5. OK. I was responding to your initial statement of the problem, without this additional proportionally-quoting-in constraint. The issue with this constraint is that it is only meaningful if the electorate is meaningfully separable into parties. If, on the other hand, the electorate is in a 2D issue space, it's hard to see exactly what this constraint even means. Thus I suspect no non-partisan system can be made to fit this constraint. I could easily see how to meet this constraint with a party list system (preferably open, because closed list systems are bad), and possibly I could work it out with a pseudo-list system like PAL, but with STV it looks to me like an impossible task. With a council size of 5, it might be possible to do an election between all consistent sets. The general idea would be something to the effect of that you first use a proportional ordering, setting constraints at different places (force woman at position one, position two, etc). Then you find all the sets the proportional ordering produces, and you hold a supermajority election to decide which to use. The supermajority election could be a parliamentary procedures one if the number of members is small, otherwise it would have to be by means of an election method (or Asset/liquid democracy). I say it'd have to be supermajority so that the majority can't force disproportionality on the minority. However, a consensus election might on the other hand give undue power to the minority. So that leads to another problem, which is similar to the question of how to get a proportionally represented council if the only thing you can do is ask the voters to rank the different councils. Simmons had some ideas relating to lotteries in that respect, if I'm not mistaken. I don't remember the details, though. Could they be applied here? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Say twenty, for instance. We might have situations, where we will fill for instance 12 seats (quotas for each triple of seats) and have 30 candidates, as an extreme case. I wanted to focus on the most important case, which is the top five seats. The 12 seats/30 candidates case is an extreme, if someone wants to do serious combinatorics. PZ 2013/2/6 Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org: On 2/6/2013 10:42 AM, Peter Zbornik wrote: Hi Kristofer, to be even more exact and correct: I need not just proportionality in the ordered list as a whole (i.e. meaning proportional ranking), but also that seats/candidates are quoted in proportionally, i.e. that the quoted-in candidates are proportionally distributed. That should be the most exact framing of the problem (I hope). How many candidates would/could compete for the five (open) party-list positions? Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed
Although you do not appear to favour STV-PR to address your problem, I should have made it clear in my post, copied below, that there is only ONE election. That is to determine the set of successful candidates who have to be ordered for the list. There is then a succession of COUNTS of the same ballot papers, with the number of vacancies diminished by one at each successive count and the candidate defeated in the previous count omitted. Apologies if my lack of specificity in the original wording caused any confusion or misunderstanding. James -Original Message- From: James Gilmour [mailto:jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk] Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 11:49 PM To: 'Jonathan Lundell'; 'Peter Zbornik' Cc: 'election-meth...@electorama.com' Subject: RE: [EM] proportional constraints - help needed Jonathan Lundell Sent: Tuesday, February 05, 2013 6:40 PM There is, I think, an underlying misconception here, namely that STV order of election can be interpreted as a ranking of level of support. It's not, in the general case. Jonathan is absolutely right. If you want lists ordered by relative support, you need to adopt a procedure like that recommended by Colin Rosenstiel and used by some UK political parties when they have to select ordered lists for closed-list party-PR elections. First you use ordinary STV-PR to elect the required total number of candidates. Then you conduct a series of STV-PR elections, each for one vacancy less than the preceding election. The unsuccessful candidate takes the lowest vacant place on the ordered list. Continue until you run-off between the top-two for the second-last place. For full details, see: http://www.crosenstiel.webspace.virginmedia.com/stv/orderstv.htm and http://www.crosenstiel.webspace.virginmedia.com/stv/ordstvdt.htm The second one includes a constraint for candidate's sex. James Gilmour --- avast! Antivirus: Outbound message clean. Virus Database (VPS): 130206-1, 06/02/2013 Tested on: 06/02/2013 23:18:27 avast! - copyright (c) 1988-2013 AVAST Software. http://www.avast.com Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
