RE: subjective reality
Stephen writes I would like to refute your [Lee's] common sense Realism and show that it is missing the most salient point of Realism: that it not have any cracks through which anything unreal might slip. An interestingly stated goal: it *sounds* as though you've written as preamble to the rest of your post that we need to abandon any system that keeps out the unreal. Well, to each his own! Stephen writes Just one point while I have some time and mental clarity. Can a Realist accept that a wholly independent world out there exists and existed before he did and yet can admit that the particular properties of this independent world are not *definite* prior to the specification of a particular observational context? [LC] My opinion is that realists, even those completely up to speed on quantum physics, will assert that many macroscopic properties of the independent world are indeed *definite* before specification of an observational context (as you write). If we are to be consistent with the dictum all is amplitudes that add Well, my phrasing of that observation of what QM really boils down to is: At the basis of things are amplitudes that add. we must admit that such assertions are a posteriori and not a priori, thus the problem of explaining the appearance of *definiteness*. They are epistemologically later (as our knowledge of objects came first), but ontologically prior. That is, we believe that QM provides a theoretical basis to most of physics. It can be unassailably proven that one cannot embed a quantum universe inside a classical universe and that one can embed *at least one* classical universe within a quantum universe. What does this imply? It implies that the *property definiteness* that comes along with classical universes is something that cannot be taken as *existing prior to the specification* of an observational context! I'm not too sure what you mean by to embed. If we are seeking to *explain* ---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical physics, but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating in---*explaining*.) You speak of A existing prior to B. I'm not real clear what that means. Ontologically or epistemologically? All of the claims that many macroscopic properties of the independent world are indeed *definite* before specification... are ignoring that that entire independent world is knowable AFTER the fact of comparing the observations of many observers. When we assume the contrary we are ignoring the fact that what we know - the content of our OMs as it were- was specified after the act of having the experience. It seems rather false to me that the entire independent world is knowable only AFTER the fact of comparing observations. Indeed no. The tiger, for example, is a device for ascertaining the most important aspects of its existence. Robinson Crusoe also makes hypotheses and conjectures (and refutes many of them!) with help from no one. His primate nervous system is pretty good at it. So a single observer can know quite a bit. You say that what we know is specified (or becomes definite) only after the act of having an experience. I submit that 99% of the knowledge of a particular human does not work this way: the knowledge implantation occurs at the same time that the experience occurs. It would have been a costly mistake for nature to wait around for the internal philosopher to ponder the importance of his experience before some knowledge generated and some actions taken. Time and space compel me to ignore the remainder of your long post, sorry. Lee We can point to the idea that Numbers and their relationships exist as such without any dependence on some mathematician's scribbles on a blackboard, and I would say that that is true, but the notion of the meaningfulness of the concept of numbers, here a case of *property definiteness*, requires that at least one mathematician scribble on a blackboard somewhere AND that that scribbling means something to some other mathematician. A skeptic could point out that chickens scratching in the dirt could reproduce exactly the same arrangements of points, lines, etc. that make up 2+2 = 4, but does it mean anything to the chickens? No! Meaningfulness requires something *to whom it has meaning* and the same applies here to our idea of an independent world. [LC] For example, if today I ascertain certain properties of, oh, say, the relative sizes and populations of a number of North American cities, then it is best to regard those as entirely fixed. That is, that they are *completely* unaffected by measurement. (Which is entirely true up to bone-picking.) Evolution in fact did not at all prepare me to deal with things whose properties emerge only upon measurement, as witnessed by the
RE: subjective reality
Chris writes I admire Descartes as a man [I would have said scientist and mathematician], not so much as a philosopher. I admire his method more than his results, he looked inwards. He also did a tremendous amount of good work in science and math. Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless others. These people were the forefathers of science, not the resistance to it. Europe, having been freed from the authority of dogma by commerce and free enterprise, these people voiced a challenge that had been long suppressed. Yes Brent wrote I think you are attacking a straw man realist. Im challenging comments and attitudes I saw on this board. Introspection was deemed an archaic relic of pre 16th century superstition, when in fact the cogito was the cornerstone of the enlightenment and has been important ever since. Interesting that you denigrate the guy's philosophy (so do I), but then say this. Yes, he did contribute to the foundations of rationalism. Not just in substance but in method too. People might not be happy about 'souls' and worse 'soul stuff', but really Descartes participated in putting thinking and rationalising back on the map. Yes. I doubt very much for instance that there would be cognitive psychology were it not for the work of Descartes filtered through Chomskian Linguistics. Our conscious robot is a product of the idea that there are innate mental structures. Its the pattern and/or process computable function - that has become important in philosophy of mind - even if its at the most basic level of a stimulated neural nets, weighted sums et al. We have reached this point because in a subjective sense we all experience these intractable processes first hand, like finding a word once lost at the tip of your tongue. How do we know about that? Because we experience it! Yes, that's right. That's how we first knew something was going on in humans. So far as I know, the best way to then investigate the phenomenon is not through further introspection---however helpful that may be in suggesting hypotheses---but by actual lab work in psychology. Its the method thats worth saving, not the indivisible soul languishing somewhere near the penal gland. Its not even whether souls provide a good account of identity, its the method that Im defending, and the method that I saw attacked. So far, Im still convinced Im right, which is very rare. Might you say a few more words about the method you refer to? I know that I may be asking a lot with the following so please ignore it if inconvenient: about this method: is there a body of work based upon this method? Is it at all falsifiable? (perhaps an unfair question---I don't know.) What other practitioners have there been? Lee
RE: subjective reality
Colin writes ACCURACY Extent to which a measurement matches and international standard. REPEATABILITY Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement. For example the SICK DME 200 laser distance measurement instrument has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm Why does this matter? Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not matter what the accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are repeatable, the systems behaviour will be repeatable... Sounds reasonable. And indeed, matches the *reliability* vs. *validity* of statistical measurements and performance. Does this distinction between accuracy and repeatability get the same kind of press that reliability vs. validity does? So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally standardized RED #12398765). This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be completely different and as long as the experience is consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will be the same OUCH. Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an extremely important function for our survival as animals. Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your read'? Haven't we all concluded that we'd never be able to ascertain the difference because it really does not matter? No, only the philosophically inclined ever ask that. And yes, they conclude (or should conclude) that it doesn't matter and is actually a wrong question. It's analogously bad to What is it like to be a bat? another question that only a philosopher would ask, and which just derails thinking into unproductive channels IMO. ...we all point to the object and agree its red repeatability meanwhile the actual physical reality of 'redness' is simply irrelevant and may not represent any real quality of the observed system at all... That's *possible*, of course. Sometimes brains malfunction from the viewpoint of evolution. It was, after all, actual physical reality of redness WARNING WARNING WARNING PHILOSOPHICAL DANGER ALERT USE OF COLOR IN PHILOSOPHY EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS okay, okay, It was, after all, properties of objects conveyed by the wavelengths of photons they reflected that gave a survival advantage to some species while other species (e.g. canines) found that information to be irrelevant to survival. I really wish mathematicians and philosophers and theoreticians would get out and get dirty in the real world some times. half of the damned wordfest would disappear immediately. Hear! Hear! Grumpy today sorry. You ain't seen 'nothin. Wait until you are in your late fifties, pal. Lee
RE: subjective reality
Lee Corbin writes: The realist does *not* want the world to be as it seems to be. No, the realist focuses on the fact that a wholly independent world out there exists and existed before he did. In fact, it is the subjectivists who start calling their own unassailable introspections reality. The only real problems about perception and subjectivity are scientific ones, having to do with the way that brains create models of (outside) reality and also of themselves in it, and also---often to the point of diminishing returns---models of themselves thinking about their perceptions. But subjectivity is certain. Since the only thing that is certain is I think therefore I am or ...I am thinking, it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile knowledge is certain. All knowledge is conjectural. To be fair, you should google for Pan Critical Rationalism if you have not already read up on it. From: http://clublet.com/c/c/why?PanCriticalRationalism Currently, Pancritical Rationalists are people who believe that there is an external reality but that they will never be sure they know it, that no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one, (or some) will turn out to be better (closer to reality) than others in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism. In other words, you believe that there is a real physical world (because this theory has great explanatory power and is absolutely consistent with every experience you have ever had, as well as the fact that it is obvious and intuitive), but if evidence should come to light showing that the theory is wrong, then you'll change your mind. Is this correct? I can't see much that could be found objectionable in this position. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
Re: subjective reality
Russell wrote: *I'm using the term concrete reality to refer to what some people call common sense reality, that there is stuff out there, independent of us as observers. Sometimes I might use objective reality for the 1st person plural reality that the AP guarantees for subsets of observers. Isn't this what was called earlier the perception of reality? John M --- Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, Aug 16, 2005 at 01:08:12PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SNIP
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey, Le 15-août-05, à 21:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : [GK] The point I am trying to make is that a lot of your back and forth discourse on the 1st versus the 3rd person misses the 2nd person in between them! More specifically: I am quite convinced that one good part of what we call the Mind or the Self and perhaps even Consciousness is generated by social interaction rather than by any inner realm of subjectivity. I suspect this is true about all of what we call symbolic or meaningful including a lot of the support for mathematical understanding though I guess I am a platonist to the extent that I think of mathematical objects as existing independently of any of our semantics in a realm of their own. Nice your platonism. Although it is not entirely relevant, I do not believe consciousness is generated by social interactions. I think consciousness has evolved with the ability of self-moving by the need to anticipate collisions (thus consciousness evolved from interaction but not necessarily social interaction (unless you call the invention of the cables by amoebas a social interaction). Self-consciousness is perhaps due to social interaction. I will give you a definition of consciousness below. As for consciousness I do agree with you that whatever explains it may seriously require a revision of our oldest and, very possibly, some of our newest prejudices about reality but certainly most of outr old prejudices about... consciousness- yours (and mine) included! ;-) Consciousness can be defined by the first person high level description of the result of an unconscious (totally automated) *guess* that there is at least one observer-moment (world, state, etc.). More simply: consciousness is the belief in a world. With such a definition it is possible to explain both 1) why consciousness has a role and which one: the role consists in giving us the ability of self-speeding up ourself relatively to our most probable (Turing) universal environment. 2) why consciousness is ineffable (not justifiable). But then it explains also how the physical laws are generated logically by the Lobian machine's dream (in that verifiable way described in my papers). See also the work by Helmholtz on perception. I would rather not bring Penrose to this discussion though he is someone I much appreciate and will not easily dismiss. Unfortunately I can't claim I understand his Byzantine time-asymmetric proposals as alternatives for QM and GR enough to criticize them, and I am not alone in this. In the emperor new clothes Penrose is wrong in its use of Godel's theorem. In the shadows of the mind Penrose made the necessary correction, but he puts it into parentheses and does not take it really into account. But I find Penrose very courageous to tackle the fundamental questions. Godel's incompleteness cannot be used to show that we are not machine, just that we cannot known which machine we are (and thus which computations support us). This is related to the mathematical form of the first person comp indeterminacy. The physical laws emerge from the border of machine's intrinsic ignorance; a measure on or of incompleteness. But I thought about your COMP and such over the weekend and I realized I have to take back what I said above! I can perfectly well imagine a world in which no one has yet built a conscious machine from scratch but someone has found a procedure for replacing one's consciousness by a digital one in the way you describe. Why should one imply the other? To make a conscious machine (if that can be tested!) from scratch does not logically imply we are machine (machine think does not entail that only machine think (no OCCAM in logic or math). And to be able to copy a human machine (assuming comp) does not imply we can build a conscious machine from scratch). None of the implications exist. [GK] Oh, I am sorry, than! As you speak so much of acts-of-faith I concluded, too soon I gather, that you took all those years of toil as a consequence of your beliefs. Silly me! No problem. Some people would like to think I am a defenser of comp. But I am not. I am a defenser of the idea that we can do philosophy or theology still keeping the modesty of the scientific attitude. It needs just courage if only to acknowledge that we are just at the very beginning, and that until now many fundamental questions are just tabu. [GK] Oh but you make it sound so easy! See: its is the derive physics from computer science that I have my first problem with! That is the object of the proof I gave. The proof is 100% third person accessible, like any proof. What is hard, perhaps, is that the proof is done in a field which is in the intersection of theoretical physics, theoretical computer science and theoretical cognitive science. [GK] And just how sure are you that there is such an intersection? Or is that also an article
Re: subjective reality
Hi Lee, As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive realism and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits of introspection I have to take issue with half of what you say below: -Original Message- From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] ... I'm not too sure what you mean by to embed. If we are seeking to *explain* ---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical physics, but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating in---*explaining*.) ... Lee Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical world we know and love with its well defined and assigned elements of (naive) physical reality that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger Cat's around to haunt us... You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply and square! I hope this does not add to your grumpiness. The miracle of experience you talk about is still there, of course. Even more so, perhaps. Regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Chris Peck: But subjectivity is certain. Lee: Since the only thing that is certain is I think therefore I am or ...I am thinking, it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile knowledge is certain. All knowledge is conjectural. To be fair, you should google for Pan Critical Rationalism if you have not already read up on it. Only scientific knowledge is conjectural. Only third person communicable knowledge is conjectural. You did acknowledge the ineffable knowledge of what is is like having a friend putting a needle in your finger. And, of course, I would not be happy if when I complain about headache to my Doctor if he tells me your headache? Pure conjecture! First person knowledge is not conjectural, at least not consciously so, nor consistently so. It is Descartes fixed point of its systematic doubting procedure, when you doubt that you doubt making up an unavoidable place for an indubitable reality, though ineffable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Le 16-août-05, à 04:59, John M a écrit : (The original went only to Bruno's addressw) To: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Bruno, your postulate of testability is falling into obsolescence. Thanks John! (I agree that testability should not be an obsession, but once you get it in a field traditionnally considered has making untestable propositions , it is hard to resist pointing on the feature, and also, it is the best way to attract people for many other scientific community, among the contemplators, for example. Proof within the model can be applied to testable events within the model. Logicians make jumps back and forth between theories and models (note the plural). If the model proves too narrow, you have to 'assume' beyond and 'theorize' beyond the in-model testability. Then, later on, you may find indications whether your assumed novelty is 'solid' or discardable. OK. Most of the discussions on this list since the early 90s are non-testable. I would add many nuances. Thay are degree of non-testability. Tests can be indirect, or on some horizon. Tests can address matter of consistency or necessity. I cannot measure the blood pressure of the white rabbit or the length of all the universes. Hal Ruhl (and myself, not far from his) presented some worldview without testable origins. But it is very hard to prove something is not testable. You need to anticipate many conclusions of your saying before. We should not 'wall in' ourselves into the existing framework of a testable ambiance if we want to think further. We should not wall ourself. Comma. Justifiability is another question, but it can be raised later on. The same may apply to the 'screening' by human logic (formal or not) and we have plenty of examples on this list when human logic was not applied as a liiting model. Take Lobian logics. (I am joking, partially ;) I would not restrict nature (te wholeness) to anything we can muster in our capabilities. No. But my point is that if we just take digital mechanism seriously enough then, necessarily, the observable wholeness emerges from what lobian machines can dream about their capacities. The beauty of it, is that, continuing assuming comp after that reversal, it can be shown that it is NOT a restriction of Nature or of Whatever. By incompleteness, to believe it is a restriction, is a lack of modesty in front of the unknown (assuming comp!!!). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, Thanks for indulging my skepticism. I think I am getting a clearer picture of what you are up to. There is only one point in our exchange below to which I would like to respond and than I have some unrelated comments. I will erase the rest of the conversation to which I don't have much to add. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi Godfrey, Le 15-août-05, à 21:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Also if Newtonian physics is enough to shoot down your hypothesis than it must be dead already since Newtonian physics is the correspondence limit of QM and QM is right!!! I really don't follow you here... [BM] Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman integral (see my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CCQ.pdf for a little summary. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the classical world from QM, as I pointed out to Lee, but one can surely object to a third party theory from the fact that it does not reproduce a classical world any better than quantum mechanics. This is a complicated issue because: (a) Classical physics does not explain the classical world either as it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance, which only QM explains. (b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena that we do observe as part of the classical world i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum etc... In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a way that would not obviously violate the correspondence limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above. But do not worry because I think you are a lot better shot by QM. Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP: I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a full statement of your hypothesis since you were not kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read French that well and your English paper is somewhat sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page : http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to the following sentence: Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following three sub-hypotheses: after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and will just short as 1) YD for Yes-doctor, 2) CT for Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism. My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be called an hypothesis! CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable but favored by overwhelming heuristic support. I know that there are some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation could produce a counterexample to shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is unlikely. And AR is a metaphysical position which I happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove or empirically test (nor do I have any idea on how to do it! Do you?) Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the rest of your argument to go. But I find that it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to have to stand in company of the other two to assert its merits!!! In other words as (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR (2) CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we both like them that way, which is the same). (3) No one that we know has been able to extract conclusions such as yours from CT AR without YD (right) would you have any objections to us concentrating, from here on, on your YD hypothesis? I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not need those two other huge body guards which I happen to be friends with. OK? If you agree with this I may have something interesting to tell you about your idea that you have not anticipated! Please,don't COMP out! Say yes, Doctor Bruno! -Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfray, I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses. I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not need those two other huge body guards which I happen to be friends with. OK? I can say yes. Nevertheless, the bodyguards will appear necessary when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it! Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough). None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out. But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just print it now. A demain, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, Thanks for your assent on this. I am sure that CT and AR are needed, at some point, for your really outrageous conclusions. But I am sure you agree that they cannot save them if the Yes doctor presumption can be shot down by itself. Right? This would save me from having to read through your Dovetail-Lob etc... argument which is probably way above my head! We obviously move in very different circles because I was taught by very stubborn old strong AI types and cognoscendi cognitivists and I have never heard anyone argue for something like that YD hypothesis! But as you have conceded no one needs it to defend the old-fashioned materialist functionalism credo that you (and I) do not subscribe to anyway. But I will wait for your other comments. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 19:48:35 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfray, I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses. I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not need those two other huge body guards which I happen to be friends with. OK? I can say yes. Nevertheless, the bodyguards will appear necessary when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it! Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough). None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out. But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just print it now. A demain, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Naive Realism and QM
Godfrey writes As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive realism Good heavens! How many times must it be said? What is going on with people? There is a *clear* definition of naive realism. Try the almost always extremely reliable wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naive_realism If one is very clear that information about events outside the skin is conveyed to one's brain by layers of intermediate processes, (usually beginning with emissions of photons or by vibrations imparted to air), then you are *not* a naive realist. Since this has come up so many times before---and not just on this list---I'm really starting to wonder what the explanation is. You can even find links on the web that confuse realism and naive realism. The acid test of what to call something is do the adherents of the view themselves use the term?. Then, in cases like this, we see it for what it is: name calling. and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits of introspection. I have to take issue with half of what you say below: Of course. Anyone who understands and believes in PCR always invites criticism, as least as much as he has time for. I'm not too sure what you mean by to embed. If we are seeking to *explain*---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical physics, but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating in---*explaining*.) Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical world we know and love with its well defined and assigned elements of (naive) physical reality that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger Cat's around to haunt us... Quantum mechanics' greatest successes have included explanations for what you cite. That is why QM is accepted. But you seem to be saying that the *correct* results of classical physics cannot be obtained from QM. Surely you don't mean that. Of course they can! If they could not, then they'd be wrong! True, classical physics *cannot* explain many phenomena, such as why black bodies radiate the way that they do, and this bothered 19th century physicist a great deal. Planck was *forced* to come up with the concept of the quantum, if he was to be able to explain. You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply and square! Why, of course. Just how innocent of QM do you suppose that I am? I invented the phrase at the basis of things are amplitudes that add after a thorough study of Feynman's volume 3. The multiplication obtains---at the very beginning ---simply from concatenating paths: you multiply amplitudes to get a total amplitude for one path. Your point about the squared modulus is well taken. Just why *probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of everything, though). Lee
Re: Naive Realism and QM
On Wed, Aug 17, 2005 at 04:30:21PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: Your point about the squared modulus is well taken. Just why *probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of everything, though). Lee This is simply the Born rule - I give a derivation of the Born rule in my paper Why Occam's Razor. Some other people on this list have asserted prior derivations of the Born rule also, which wouldn't overly surprise me as its not that mysterious. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpF7VOTnN4h7.pgp Description: PGP signature
RE: subjective reality
Lee Corbin Colin writes ACCURACY Extent to which a measurement matches an international standard. REPEATABILITY Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement. For example the SICK DME 2000 laser distance measurement instrument has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm Why does this matter? Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not matter what the accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are repeatable, the systems behaviour will be repeatable... Sounds reasonable. And indeed, matches the *reliability* vs. *validity* of statistical measurements and performance. Does this distinction between accuracy and repeatability get the same kind of press that reliability vs. validity does? I’m just talking about data sheets. Reliability is a 'mean time between failure' number in hours. 'Validity'? Dunno what that is. 'Availability' is another figure like reliability a %uptime, if you like, more to do with how much time is spent with the instrument out of service being calibrated. When you buy instruments you have to understand the use to which it will be put. ‘Repeatability’ is an Ockham’s razor solution for instrumentation: it costs less! If the measurement’s accuracy matters outside the system being measured you must go for accuracy and get out your cheque book. All else equal it stands to reason that the cheaper option (repeatability) is what will be used by nature it will be selected. So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally standardized RED #12398765). This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be completely different and as long as the experience is consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will be the same OUCH. Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an extremely important function for our survival as animals. Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the measurement probe), is that our brain literally becomes hot? I don;t know about you, but to me very cold things feel like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to different thermal behaviour in the world. Also this is not what is found in any experimental tests. The transduction at your fingertip (in the candle flame) makes use of the thermal effects on cell excitability in your finger nerves. Thinking the way you suggest is like saying that the voltmeter indicates voltage by altering the voltage of the volt meter chassis, as opposed to altering the display. A fairly agricultural analogy but descriptive enough. There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none! That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves. We simply don't have to have the argment: it's over. Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your red'? Haven't we all concluded that we'd never be able to ascertain the difference because it really does not matter? No, only the philosophically inclined ever ask that. And yes, they conclude (or should conclude) that it doesn't matter and is actually a wrong question. It's analogously bad to What is it like to be a bat? another question that only a philosopher would ask, and which just derails thinking into unproductive channels IMO. I was trying to instill an understanding of the implications of repeatability vs accuracy from the point of view of ‘being’ the instrument. The last thing I need to do is get philosophical! :-) ...we all point to the object and agree its red repeatability meanwhile the actual physical reality of 'redness' is simply irrelevant and may not represent any real quality of the observed system at all... That's *possible*, of course. Sometimes brains malfunction from the viewpoint of evolution. It was, after all, actual physical reality of redness WARNING WARNING WARNING PHILOSOPHICAL DANGER ALERT USE OF COLOR IN PHILOSOPHY EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS okay, okay, It was, after all, properties of objects conveyed by the wavelengths
RE: subjective reality
Colin writes So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally standardized RED #12398765). This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be completely different and as long as the experience is consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will be the same OUCH. Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an extremely important function for our survival as animals. Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the measurement probe), is that our brain literally becomes hot? You think that I am saying that when one has an experience of something being hot, the brain is hot? What kind of a fool do you take me for, anyway? How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F where you went to elementary school? So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns out to be in your use of the word intimately, which I failed to infer correctly what you meant by it. I took you to mean intimately related in the sense that there is a tight *causal* connection in the nervous systems of animals between outside objects and inside readings, and of course, it is *generally* true that there is such a tight causal connection. But you meant something a bit different, and I should have picked up on it, sorry. I don't know about you, but to me very cold things feel like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to different thermal behaviour in the world. Yes, I've heard of that before. Doesn't happen to me, though. In any case, we easily see what is happening here (we know all the facts). Evolution programmed you to remove your hand post haste from anything extreme in temperature either way, and I guess it didn't affect the survival rates of our ancestors, as the idea was just to bring the dangerous phenomenon to the attention of your higher centers. There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none! That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves. You are quite correct, but the statement the experiences do not match the physics of the real world is really misleading. Of course they have to match---to a certain fidelity---the physics of the real world, or our ancestors would have been unable to propagate as well. I needn't give you countless examples of how, for example, your hand reaches out rather unerringly for door handles when you approach them. My reading of experiences matching the physics of the real world include those numerous examples. But I hope that you don't think that I'm ignorant of how phantom limbs work (the very best book is Ramachandran's Phantoms of the Brain, which I highly recommend). But after assuming that I thought that brains get hot, I just don't know. We simply don't have to have the argument: it's over. If you say so! (I did agree with the remaining parts of your email.) Lee
RE: Naive Realism and QM
Russel writes why *probabilities* emerge from squared amplitudes, I couldn't tell you. I'm not sure that anyone knows---as I recall, many this is related to the basis problem of the MWI (though Deutsch and others say that decoherence takes care of everything, though). This is simply the Born rule - I give a derivation of the Born rule in my paper Why Occam's Razor. Some other people on this list have asserted prior derivations of the Born rule also, which wouldn't overly surprise me as its not that mysterious. Is it in the part of http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/occam.html that begins QUANTUM MECHANICS In the previous sections, I demonstrate that formal mathematical systems are the most compressible, and have highest measure amongst all members of the Schmidhuber ensemble. or if not, just where? Lee
RE: subjective reality
Lee Corbin Colin writes So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally standardized RED #12398765). This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be completely different and as long as the experience is consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will be the same OUCH. Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an extremely important function for our survival as animals. Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the measurement probe), is that our brain literally becomes hot? You think that I am saying that when one has an experience of something being hot, the brain is hot? What kind of a fool do you take me for, anyway? How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F where you went to elementary school? So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns out to be in your use of the word intimately, which I failed to infer correctly what you meant by it. Sloppy me. Yes you are right. Gazzumpt by the language again. I was actually going to quote Ramachandran. Glad you did, for the rest of the list... there's a didactic role here... Back to the measurement thing, just to be very clear The _event_ of the expression of the experiential quality in the brain is directly causally connected to the act of measurement(peripheral sensory neurons behaving appropriately). The experience itself (the detail of the quality thereof) could be anything (you could make sensing heat a sound if you wanted - synthesthesia, Ramachandran again). Exactly what experiential quality is selected for representation of hotness will be something for future biophysics to work out. My 'hot' and you 'hot' could be different. In terms of brain operation as long as the resultant behaviour is appropriate and consistently used the quality of the experience is irrelevant. The result is that an assumption that one can necessarily claim similarity of the physics of the real world and the brain physics of the behind experience is simply not justified. This does not mean that the physics of the distal world is not in some conformally mapped/useful way _similar_ to the physics of the experience. It just means that you cannot assume that the relationship. Exactly what 'ism this is I don’t know. Indirect realism? It doesn’t matter much. Naïve realism is out. The philosophers of perception can retrofit the actual nomenclature situation after it’s sorted out by the biophysicists. I think this encapsulates the position. I declare you the winner of today's grumpy old guy contest.. :-) Colin
