Re: Diagonalization (solution-sequel)
Tom Caylor wrote: > ... > Actually, it seems we could do this by writing GEN2 to use GEN's > "filter" method as follows: > > begin GEN2(n) > i = 1 > do until i = n > generate "character sequence i" > run "character sequence i" through a fortran compiler > if the result is valid > output "character sequence i" > else > i = i + 1 > end if > end do > end GEN2 > Oops, actually it needs to do the following: begin GEN2(n) i = 1 j = 0 do until j = n generate "character sequence i" run "character sequence i" through a fortran compiler if the result is valid output "character sequence i" j = j + 1 end if i = i + 1 end do end GEN2 Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Lundi 17 Juillet 2006 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > >>You mean that since you can't know which computation generates your present >>moment, you also can't point to which computer is generating that >>computation. > > > Worst than that, there is no computation that contains you, but an infinity > of > them... the problem is not to point, there is nothing to point. > > >>That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and your >>consciousness is a result of the UD. On the other hand, if your >>consciousness is the result of physical processes in a single human brain, >>you *can* point to the computer. > > > When you mean computer, do you mean turing machine ? > Do you mean consciousness is a program ? thus it could be duplicated and run > at infinity (or a big number of times ;). Which part (instance) of this > infinity/big running of the same program are you then ? Your current moment > is not part of a single possible logical history... There are many past and > many future from the present with this view and so many programs who go > through your state. > Another thing if consciousness is a program/computation : > Imagine I run the program for 5 minutes, make a memory dump, continue the > running from the dump on another machine for 5 minutes and so on... When I > change machine it takes times... do you thing you're dead in between ? that > you could be aware of any delays, of the number of instance running the same > computation ? Then how could you say that these 5 minutes of your life was > this computation on this machine, and not any machine which have come to go > through exactly this state ? > > Regards, > Quentin Just to clarify - I take it that when discussing "you as a computation" that the computation must include computation/simulation of the whole of the universe that you interact with during the time period "computed". This computation must start with the boundary conditions defined over your past light cone at the relevant interval. Right? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote: Erratum: > http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/time_growing.jpg > > http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Diagonalization (solution-sequel)
Warning, I progressed in my thinking as I responded below, so please
read the whole post before taking time to respond/correct my earlier
paragraphs.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 15-juil.-06, à 02:56, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> > ...
> > You've written a sort of intuitive code for G above, where you say
> > "generate".
>
>
> Yes. With Church thesis fortran *is* universal.
> Fortran, like Java, Python, Lisp, Diophantine equations, rational
> unitary matrices or other rich recursively presented groups, etc...
> Chose your favorite one, once and for all. To fiw the idea I take
> fortran, and old and venerable programming language.
> Those language are grammatically well defined.
> So you *can* write a well defined precise (I would even say concrete)
> program fortran capable of generating all fortran programs computing
> function of one variable. It is enough to write a program which
> generate successively all strings of length n, and which filter out
> those strings which are not fortran one variable programs.
> I gave an intuitive code just for not alarming people with piece of
> code, but it should be clear that anyone knowing at least one
> programming language, and knowing the notion of alphabetic order on a
> finite set of symbols (like the keyboard buttons of a computer) should
> be able to write, in that programming language, a program generating
> (just generating) successively all the (one variable) programs in that
> language. Then by coding "finite inputs" by natural numbers, you can
> think of those programs as computing functions from N to N, or from
> subset of N to N.
>
OK. I'm OK with this if it is "just generating" the programs. I see
where I was getting wrapped around the self-referential axle by trying
to make the generation program self-aware. But GEN just generates all
programs, so when it gets to "itself" it just generates the code and
then goes on to generating the next program, totally oblivious to the
fact that it just generated itself.
> If you agree with this, you agree with the fact that there is a
> program, let us call it GEN, in fortran which generates the sequence of
> codes P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 ... Now the partial computable functions are
> those functions computed by those programs, and I wrote the sequence of
> those functions Fi. That is F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 ...
>
So GEN, as you said, could be implemented as a program that generates
all possible character sequences and filters out the valid fortran
programs. Perhaps it would do that by running each character sequence
through a fortran compiler (which would be included as part of GEN) and
sees which ones don't end up with a fatal compilation error. I will
call this GENfilter, for reasons below.
begin GENfilter
do for i = 1 to infinity
generate "character sequence i"
run "character sequence i" through a fortran compiler
if the result is valid
output "character sequence i"
else
i = i + 1
end if
end do
end GENfilter
> Note that GEN is not in the list {P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 ...} for the non
> interesting contingent fact that GEN is a 0 variable program.
> But GEN2, defined by GEN2(n) = the code of the nth program in the list,
> belongs to the list, given that GEN2 is a one variable program. So
> GEN2(1) = P1, GEN2(2) = P2, GEN2(3) = P3, etc.
So if you had all of the programs GEN2(n) for n = 1 to infinity, could
you implement a GEN equivalent to GENfilter, which I will call GENcall
in the following manner?
begin GENcall
do for n = 1 to infinity
call GEN2(n) and output its output (i.e. Pn)
end do
end GENcall
> And now, giving that GEN2 is in the list, there is a number k such that
> GEN2 = Pk. Nothing magic here. True: GEN2(k) = Pk. Nothing paradoxical
> here. GEN2 compute a total function, that is GEN2 on any n gives the
> nth programs, and (diagonlaization), on its own indice k it gives its
> own code Pk.
OK. Now I agree there's nothing magical about the generation part.
>
> Now *your* G is just defined by G(n) = GEN2(n).
But doesn't G output the range of one of the set of *all* partial
recursive functions, whereas GEN2 outputs the code of a *fortran*
program? So shouldn't it be the following, where execute() actually
executes the fortran program generated by GEN2(n)?
G(n) = execute(GEN2(n))
> It will use most
> probably GEN as subroutine. I have already send to this list the code
> of a GEN2 in LISP.
I guess I was assuming that G would be implemented as the following,
similar to the method of GENcall, but as a one-variable program. My G
would be
begin G(n)
call GEN2(n) and store its output in Pn
execute(Pn) and output its output
end G
Perhaps this is where I am going astray. I wondered why you kept
saying, in order to compute G(k), you have to generate *all* of the
programs for G(1) to G(k) (and then execute G(k)) , whereas if G is
defined as above, you would just call G with input k. I guess in order
to have the code for GEN2(k) available to call, you woul
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > >Jesse Mazer wrote: > >IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work. > > No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I > said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the > relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the > claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do > you agree with this principle or not? If a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, the claim that they are not all the same is unsupported. > >That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one > >value at a time. > > That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is > *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the > relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they > are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about > the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the > probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, > where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the > context of a single event. In the absence of evidence to the contrary , you have to assume that probabilites are even. > > > In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept > >which > > > humans have collectively defined; > > > >No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference > >is out-of-the-head. > > OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in "most > people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single > horn"; would the "concept" itself be a reference? Only the reference of "a concept" is a concept. Fictional terms don't have referents. That's why they are unreal. The point is that you don't need reference for meaning. > >If we can reason about (for instance) > >historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel > >dimensions, we can reason about maths without taking > >a trip to Plato's heaven. > But I have already made clear that I *don't* think that we need to refer to > platonic forms which somehow causally interact with people's brains in our > explanation of how people reason about math, just like David K Lewis doesn't > think we need a causal interaction between different possible worlds to > explain how people reason about possibilities. So how do we need to refer to them ? Why do we need to refer to them ? If they are causally inactive, an evil daemon could snap his fingers and make them vanish. How do we know that hasn't happened already ? We can interact with real-world objects, and we must interact it them in order to confirm the truth of non-mathematical, not-fictional sentences. If we had reason to think mathematical sentences were uniform with empirical sentences, we would be forced to require the existence of mathematical objects in spite of their lack of a role to play. But it is the very fact that we do not need experiment or observation to confirm mathematical sentences that shows they are differnt from empirical sentences, and different in a way that absolves them from requiring reference. > > > The question was to try to help me grasp what you meant by "sense > >without > > > reference" and "mind-independent". If it's impossible to come up with > >any > > > examples outside of math, that should make you suspicious whether > > > mathematics really has the strange and marvellous property of there > >being > > > objective mind-independent truths about mathematical terms even though > >they > > > lack any reference. > > > >No it shoudn't. Maths is obviously unique in a number of respects. > >That is why there is such a subject as philosophy-of-mathematics. > That's pretty vague--unique in what respects? Does uniqueness in these other > respects somehow justify the belief that it is unique in the respect of > involving both sense-without-reference and mind-independence? Yes. Maths is apriori. It doesn't require experiment or observation. Aprioriness is explained by analycity. An analytical sentences contains in its meaning everything necessary to determine its truth-value. Analycity is explained by sense. Analycity requires a kind of meaning that is in-the-head, in addition to reference. Analycity and aprioriness explain objectivity and necessity. if mathematical sentence doesn't require anything outside itself to arrive at its truth value, then its truth-value is not going to vary between times, places and persons. > > > If you really believe this, you should at least be able > > > to give an argument about *why* math is different from every other > >domain in > > > this respect. > > > > > >It is on a deeper level of abstraction. > > That doesn't remotely resemble an argument--can you define precisely what > "deeper level of abstraction" means, and why "
Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?
Jesse Mazer wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > >Jesse Mazer wrote: > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is > >not > > > in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are > >equally > > > likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and > > > definite prediction. > > > >IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work. > > No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I > said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the > relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the > claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do > you agree with this principle or not? If a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the relative probability of different possibilities, the claim that they are not all the same is unsupported. > >That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one > >value at a time. > > That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is > *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the > relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they > are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about > the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the > probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, > where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the > context of a single event. In the absence of evidence to the contrary , you have to assume that probabilites are even. > Anyway, it is quite possible that even if string theory could make > predictions about the value of the cosmological constant, it would only be a > probabilistic prediction rather than predicting a single unique value, which > means that if you are prepared to entertain either the MWI of quantum > mechanics or "chaotic inflation" where new universes bubble from prior ones > via inflation, then there might in fact be different "universes" with > different values of the cosmological constant. > > > >We can make "sense" of "unicorns have horns", despite > > > >the lack of reference. > > > > > > In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept > >which > > > humans have collectively defined; > > > >No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference > >is out-of-the-head. > > OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in "most > people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single > horn"; would the "concept" itself be a reference? Only the reference of "a concept" is a concept. Fictional terms don't have referents. That's why they are unreal. The point is that you don't need reference for meaning. > > > I agree, and even a "modal realist" philosopher like David Lewis (see > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher) ), who thinks > >that > > > propositions about possibilities can only be objectively true or false > >if we > > > assume all possible worlds actually exist, would not say that there is > >any > > > kind of causal interaction between worlds needed to explain our ability > >to > > > reason about them. > > > >If we can reason about (for instance) > >historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel > >dimensions, we can reason about maths without taking > >a trip to Plato's heaven. > But I have already made clear that I *don't* think that we need to refer to > platonic forms which somehow causally interact with people's brains in our > explanation of how people reason about math, just like David K Lewis doesn't > think we need a causal interaction between different possible worlds to > explain how people reason about possibilities. So how do we need to refer to them ? Why do we need to refer to them ? If they are causally inactive, an evil daemon could snap his fingers and make them vanish. How do we know that hasn't happened already ? We can interact with real-world objects, and we must interact it them in order to confirm the truth of non-mathematical, not-fictional sentences. If we had reason to think mathematical sentences were uniform with empirical sentences, we would be forced to require the existence of mathematical objects in spite of their lack of a role to play. But it is the very fact that we do not need experiment or observation to confirm mathematical sentences that shows they are differnt from empirical sentences, and different in a way that absolves them from requiring reference. > > > The question was to try to help me grasp what you meant by "sense > >without > > > reference" and "mind-independent". If it's impossible to come up with > >any > > > examples outside of math, that should make you suspicious whether > > > mathematics really has the strange and marvellous property of there > >being > > > objective mind-independent
Re: Bruno's argument
Le Lundi 17 Juillet 2006 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > You mean that since you can't know which computation generates your present > moment, you also can't point to which computer is generating that > computation. Worst than that, there is no computation that contains you, but an infinity of them... the problem is not to point, there is nothing to point. > That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and your > consciousness is a result of the UD. On the other hand, if your > consciousness is the result of physical processes in a single human brain, > you *can* point to the computer. When you mean computer, do you mean turing machine ? Do you mean consciousness is a program ? thus it could be duplicated and run at infinity (or a big number of times ;). Which part (instance) of this infinity/big running of the same program are you then ? Your current moment is not part of a single possible logical history... There are many past and many future from the present with this view and so many programs who go through your state. Another thing if consciousness is a program/computation : Imagine I run the program for 5 minutes, make a memory dump, continue the running from the dump on another machine for 5 minutes and so on... When I change machine it takes times... do you thing you're dead in between ? that you could be aware of any delays, of the number of instance running the same computation ? Then how could you say that these 5 minutes of your life was this computation on this machine, and not any machine which have come to go through exactly this state ? Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Sorry, I could not control my mouse: just a side-remark on a side remark: > You mean that since you can't know which computation > generates your present moment, you also can't point > to which computer is generating that computation. In my 'wholistic' (not 'holistic!) 'taste' (<:I don't call my narrative a worldview or hypo or theory:>) the entire interconnection generates ANY further item (step in any process) with no excludability of any. One cannot pick ONE without tacitly including all others. It has more consequences on the entire discussion, so I skip them and keep reading whatever I do follow of it. Best Johb --- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Quentin, Bruno: > > Quentin Anciaux wrote, > > >Hi Stathis, > The fact that comp => no material world is this: > 1- If comp is true, then you (the 1st person) is > defined by all computations (an infinity) that pass > through your state, hence the "you" does not belong > to one and only one computation. > > Yes. > >2- Then as you cannot associate you with a > computation you won't be able to do it in a so > called material world if any, because the material > world is perceive through you and you by the > preceding point is generated by all computation > going through this point, hence material world is > useless. > > You mean that since you can't know which computation > generates your present moment, you also can't point > to which computer is generating that computation. > That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and > your consciousness is a result of the UD. On the > other hand, if your consciousness is the result of > physical processes in a single human brain, you > *can* point to the computer. > >The demonstration of Bruno is based on physical > supervenience (whether or not a change in the > physical level implies a change in the computation > level). I think the olympia machine of lee maudlin > and the movie graph argument of Bruno show that a > computation does not supervene on the material > level. > > This is the difficult issue of what implements a > computation. I don't see why a physical system must > handle counterfactuals to implement a computation, > which seems to be taken as given. Is it because > without it any physical system implements any > computation (hence, all conscious experiences, if > computationalism is correct)? A way around this is > to say that all computations are, in fact, > implemented everywhere, but only those implemented > by a well-behaved computer can interact with the > physical world. This would mean that the UD is in > fact run (at least contingent on the existence of > anything at all, but perhaps necessarily - i.e. by > virtue of the existence of computations as > mathematical objects), so that every thought we have > is massively parallel. Most of the thoughts we have > would thus be generated by the UD, but those not (as > it were) anchored in the physical world would lead > to instantaneous chaos, hence would not be part of a > recognisable stream of consciousness. Hence, it is > possible that (a) an infinitesimal proportion of > possible OM's for a given person are at least partly > implemented in the physical world, (b) an > infinitesimal proportion of that subset are in fact > implemented in the real world, (c) we cannot know > where a particular OM is being implemented (even if > that question is meaningful), but nevertheless, all > the OM's strung together to make up a person's > stream of conscious are of the type that has a > subset implemented in the real world. > > >Another thing is, if you are part of a computation, > and somehow someone succeed to throw you out of it > and tells you that now you are in the real world... > How could you know this one is real (despite the > fact that you know the preceding wasn't in front of > evidence showed to you) ? If the first wasn't real, > then why this would be ? why a primary real would > exists in this system ? > > If it is *possible* that we are living in a > simulation, then we cannot be sure that we aren't. > However, we assume that we aren't because there is > no reason to think that we are. This is not to say > *what is the case* (because only a god outside of > reality could actually know this), but rather what > we should *tentatively believe* is the case. The > world looks flat, so we should believe it is flat, > but if evidence arises suggesting we are wrong, we > should change this belief. > > Stathis Papaioannou > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Existence, individuation, instantiation
Stephen Paul King wrote: > [SPK] > > How is a "class/object or type/instance" within computer programing > different? Forgive me, but I am completely ignorant of the minutia of > computer programing. I was unable to get past page one of the manula on > Basic and failed Algebra in Highschool. (It was discoved that I am memory > dislexic...) Well, classes have properties (or prototypes of properties) within themselves , it's not all done relationally. (Actually whilst dictionaries define things, inasmuch as they define things, relationally, it is oftern said to be fall short of a sufficient definitions of meaning "present: gift", "gift: present"). > http://www.dyslexia-adults.com/info1.html > > In order to comprehend a consept it is necessary for me to generate a > way to somehow grasp it as a visual picture or as something that can be felt > by tactile means. http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_space.html Now with added diagrams! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Quentin, Bruno:
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote,
> >Another thing is, if you are part of a computation, and somehow someone
> >succeed to throw you out of it and tells you that now you are in the real
> >world... How could you know this one is real (despite the fact that you know
> >the preceding wasn't in front of evidence showed to you) ? If the first
> >wasn't real, then why this would be ? why a primary real would exists in
> >this system ?
>
> If it is *possible* that we are living in a simulation, then we cannot be
> sure that we aren't. However, we assume that we aren't because there is no
> reason to think that we are. This is not to say *what is the case* (because
> only a god outside of reality could actually know this), but rather what we
> should *tentatively believe* is the case. The world looks flat, so we should
> believe it is flat, but if evidence arises suggesting we are wrong, we should
> change this belief.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
Just a thought, I'm sure not that original, on Simulation vs. Reality?:
That we should believe that the world we are in is "real", seems to be
almost a tautology. ("Believe" is a loaded word that we don't think
about much of the time that we use it. "Believing" in something means,
or at least implies, acting as if it's real.) Or at least this is
equivalent to saying that we should not be paranoid (or "it would be
paranoid to be paranoid"), or "we should not be afraid that belief in
the reality of our world is a dangerous belief". Perhaps it is
equivalent to faith in conservation/induction. But again, faiths last
only as long as the thing we're putting our faith in, like having faith
in a chair by sitting on it. What does the word "should" mean in the
context of believing? Yes, in the global universe of truth the ideal
would be to believe in *all* truth, to be aware of *all* reality, but
this is impossible. (Some here would say that all reality is nothing,
but I disagree, but that's not my purpose here.) So we have to settle
for a belief in local truth, not necessarily relative truth (that could
be false from a different perspective), but local/limited. It seems to
be a pragmatic (or qualia?) based concept:
1. We should believe in whatever is worth believing in.
2. (True) reality is (defined as?) what is worth believing in.
Hence, we should believe in reality. :)
Tom
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Le 17-juil.-06, à 14:14, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I understand up to the point in step 7 where you explain the workings of the UD. You've tried explaining it again a couple of weeks ago, and I think it is clearer every time I look at it, but I still have some difficulties. I will reply to Quentin's post (which is admirably concise) later. Quite fair. I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to occur: It is a bit harder, no doubt. And, according to some personal basic everything philosophy, the Maudlin argument is important of not is this requirement just to avoid saying that everything implements every computation? Jacques Mallah makes that point some years ago (in this list), and I think Hal Finney has developed that point. I think their argument are valid. But then I don't think the Putnam-Mallah-Chalmers is really a problem once you get the idea that the physical world emerge from the mathematical world of computations. Personally I have never seen a convincing argument that everything implements every computations, just perhaps some tiny part of some computations. I will postpone saying more on the movie-graph/Olympia type of argument (if only to avoid to much simultaneous threads and to modulate the difficulties). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Quentin, Bruno: Quentin Anciaux wrote, >Hi Stathis, The fact that comp => no material world is this: 1- If comp is true, then you (the 1st person) is defined by all computations (an infinity) that pass through your state, hence the "you" does not belong to one and only one computation. Yes. >2- Then as you cannot associate you with a computation you won't be able to do it in a so called material world if any, because the material world is perceive through you and you by the preceding point is generated by all computation going through this point, hence material world is useless. You mean that since you can't know which computation generates your present moment, you also can't point to which computer is generating that computation. That makes sense, assuming the UD is running and your consciousness is a result of the UD. On the other hand, if your consciousness is the result of physical processes in a single human brain, you *can* point to the computer. >The demonstration of Bruno is based on physical supervenience (whether or not a change in the physical level implies a change in the computation level). I think the olympia machine of lee maudlin and the movie graph argument of Bruno show that a computation does not supervene on the material level. This is the difficult issue of what implements a computation. I don't see why a physical system must handle counterfactuals to implement a computation, which seems to be taken as given. Is it because without it any physical system implements any computation (hence, all conscious experiences, if computationalism is correct)? A way around this is to say that all computations are, in fact, implemented everywhere, but only those implemented by a well-behaved computer can interact with the physical world. This would mean that the UD is in fact run (at least contingent on the existence of anything at all, but perhaps necessarily - i.e. by virtue of the existence of computations as mathematical objects), so that every thought we have is massively parallel. Most of the thoughts we have would thus be generated by the UD, but those not (as it were) anchored in the physical world would lead to instantaneous chaos, hence would not be part of a recognisable stream of consciousness. Hence, it is possible that (a) an infinitesimal proportion of possible OM's for a given person are at least partly implemented in the physical world, (b) an infinitesimal proportion of that subset are in fact implemented in the real world, (c) we cannot know where a particular OM is being implemented (even if that question is meaningful), but nevertheless, all the OM's strung together to make up a person's stream of conscious are of the type that has a subset implemented in the real world. >Another thing is, if you are part of a computation, and somehow someone succeed to throw you out of it and tells you that now you are in the real world... How could you know this one is real (despite the fact that you know the preceding wasn't in front of evidence showed to you) ? If the first wasn't real, then why this would be ? why a primary real would exists in this system ? If it is *possible* that we are living in a simulation, then we cannot be sure that we aren't. However, we assume that we aren't because there is no reason to think that we are. This is not to say *what is the case* (because only a god outside of reality could actually know this), but rather what we should *tentatively believe* is the case. The world looks flat, so we should believe it is flat, but if evidence arises suggesting we are wrong, we should change this belief. Stathis PapaioannouBe one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: (offlist) Bruno's argument
John, Le 16-juil.-06, à 18:07, John M a écrit : > Bruno: > > 1. And if someones (1-?)personal "taste" does not > accept the (and only) math ways? > Can I say: I am right and the rest of the world is > wrong? I will ask her/him why. If she/he answers me that she believes in some strong form of NON-COMP, I will say ok, no problem, etc. But if she pretends to accept comp then SHE MUST be happy. Why? because the "only math", at the third person description level, gives a guarantee that, strictly speaking, the "only math" philosophy is false. Indeed, once you take comp seriously enough, you can give a complete 3-person (scientific) justification that the first person is beyond all possible mathematical theories. In some sense, Godel's incompleteness and Loewenheim theorems already justified this for the "natural number" or "finiteness" quale; like I have tried to illustrated recently somehow. I insist on that: comp is a vaccine against a very large variety of reductionism. People who believes that comp is a reductionism are in general confusing comp with "comp + (weak) materialism". I recall weak materialism is Aristotle's doctrine according to which there is a primitive matter at the ontological bottom. This (comp+mat) *is* reductionist, and could lead to first person eliminativism. Of course this lead to some counter-intuitive facts: like the fact that the first person plenitude is bigger than anything we can conceive and still, is "contained" in the standard interpretation of the natural numbers with usual addition and multiplication. This is a mathematical fact: many mathematical structure are like that: from outside they look minuscule and miserable; from inside they look immeasurably gigantic. Later we will perhaps get the opportunity to say more on this phenomenon which I called a long time ago the Wonderland or Yellow Submarine effects because they are poetically well illustrated in those pieces of art. Even just a book has already that feature. From outside it looks like a finite volume cylinder, but when you open it, it could be a path to the infinite understanding of everything ... 'course this is only an analogy. > > 2.You mention Occam, I was in love with him for many > years. Now: I consider his razor-cut "essence" as a > simulacron, a limited model of the content I just want > to consider (talk abouit), keaving out any further > ramifications as 'only obscuring the clear view'. My heart is with you, and this is probably the reason I take years to present my work without invoking Occam Razor (and that is why the Movie-graph should be included in UDA). Still, there is a sense we *use* OCCAM all the time relatively to the "empirical world", for example we believe that if we take a fork on a table, we tend to believe the simplest explanation for such a possibility, like "there is fork on the table". And we don't believe in invisible horse pulling the cars or things like that. The use of Occam principle's is also easily explainable with Darwin: costly theories cost. And the eighth step is made easier with Occam, so, at least for beginners, I indulge in invoking it. But strictly speaking we can avoid it, and that is why I talk of a proof (that comp -> reversal), not just an argument, still less a speculation. Like the proof that sqrt(2) is not rational: you don't need Occam for that. > Do we want to "see clearly" the part we want to see > clearly? Are "all possible cases" the selection we > want (or can) include? By "we" what do you mean? "Us" the Hungarians? "Us" the Europeans? "Us" the occidentals? "Us" the humans? "Us" the homeotherm animals ? (about those who dream according to Jouvet) "Us" the living creature? "Us" the conscious creature? "Us" the Lobian machine? "Us" the machines? "Us" the self-referentially correct machines "us" the self-referentially correct entities "Us" the numbers (who can't really believe that their are numbers)? "Us" the persons? When I use "us" in a reasoning, I always mean by default the lobian machines/numbers (assuming comp explicitly or implicitly), or their associated first person. The "all possible cases" is then handled thanks to Church thesis/Godel's miracle/Post Law. Reductionism is defeated through the mathematical theory of our (cf above) mathematical and non mathematical 3 and 1 limitations. Comp and Church thesis makes it possible to study the mathematical structure describing "our" ignorance, and this is useful given that the UD-Argument shows that the physical laws emerge from that universal intrinsic lobian ignorance. I stop here. I think I should made some effort to make shorter posts! Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this gr
RE: Bruno's argument
Bruno Marchal writes: > Hi Stathis, Hi Quentin, Hi All,> > Le 14-juil.-06, à 01:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :> > > Quentin,> > > > I think I can follow Bruno's UDA up to the point of the point where > > he shows that comp => no material world exists. You seem to understand > > it and you aren't Bruno (at least, I assume you're not Bruno: none of > > us on this list can really be sure of these things, can we? ;). Would > > you be kind enough to explain it to me?> > > > Stathis > Stathis,> > In what sense is this message an offlist post? Is it just an "oops" > phenomenon? Yes, a mistake, I'm getting used to the new Windows webmail beta, which so far presents a different interface every time I use it... but never mind, since you're still patient with me, I've deleted the "offlist" from the subject line. > Now I am curious: you say you understand UDA up to "comp => no material > world exists". Well that's a reasonable part of it. Does it means that > you don't see the last thing, i.e. that physics should emerge from some > 1-measure on the computational histories? I understand up to the point in step 7 where you explain the workings of the UD. You've tried explaining it again a couple of weeks ago, and I think it is clearer every time I look at it, but I still have some difficulties. I will reply to Quentin's post (which is admirably concise) later. I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to occur: is this requirement just to avoid saying that everything implements every computation? Stathis Papaioannou Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: (offlist) Bruno's argument
Hi Stathis,The fact that comp => no material world is this:1- If comp is true, then you (the 1st person) is defined by all computations (an infinity) that pass through your state, hence the "you" does not belong to one and only one computation. 2- Then as you cannot associate you with a computation you won't be able to do it in a so called material world if any, because the material world is perceive through you and you by the preceeding point is generated by all computation going through this point, hence material world is useless. The demonstration of Bruno is based on physical supervenience (whether or not a change in the physical level implies a change in the computation level). I think the olympia machine of lee maudlin and the movie graph argument of Bruno show that a computation does not supervene on the material level. Another thing is, if you are part of a computation, and somehow someone succeed to throw you out of it and tells you that now you are in the real world... How could you know this one is real (despite the fact that you know the preceeding wasn't in front of evidence showed to you) ? If the first wasn't real, then why this would be ? why a primary real would exists in this system ? Regards,QuentinOn 7/14/06, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote: Quentin, I think I can follow Bruno's UDA up to the point of the point where he shows that comp => no material world exists. You seem to understand it and you aren't Bruno (at least, I assume you're not Bruno: none of us on this list can really be sure of these things, can we? ;). Would you be kind enough to explain it to me? Stathis > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?> Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2006 21:40:20 +> > > Hi,> > 1Z wrote:> > I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until > > demostrated> > otherwise.> > This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that> Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary> reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this > context.> > So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and> stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept> computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not > (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism> at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible.> > Regards,> Quentin> > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
