Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno, Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my computer. (The original at the Iridia web site http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the recording of an earlier physical process. It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of a physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these two time intervals. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Parfit's token and type
Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno marchal writes: Le 05-oct.-06, à 20:49, markpeaty a écrit : Bruno, I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but mostly very well worth the effort of ploughing through it. Parfit is good. I stop to follow him when he insists that we are token. I paraphrase myself sometimes by the slogan MANY TYPES NO TOKEN. Can you explain the disagreement with Parfit? My reading of chapter 99 of R P is that a token is a particular instantiation of a person while a type is the ensemble of related instantiations. Mary Smith is a type, Mary Smith coming out of replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM is a token. When I say MANY TYPES NO TOKEN, I assume comp *and* the conclusion I derive from it, that is the reversal between physics and number theoretical machine theory (say). In particular I take from granted that my next observer moment is somehow determined by two things: a proportion of computational histories going through my actual computational state, and the proportion of consistent extensions, which are related to a proportion of similar computational histories. So with comp Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM is a type. It is the type of all (2^aleph_0) histories going through that event (supposedly well 3-described). From a third person point of view, if you are willing to say that the natural numbers are token (I am neutral on that), then it would make sense to see the nth step of an immaterial execution of a DU, (or an enumeration of the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences) as (immaterial) tokens. But even in that case, there would be no sense to attribute tokenness to Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM, because there is no way to privilege one instantiation from another. We must take them all, and they constitute highly undecidable sets. It appears that in this terminology (actually due to Bernard Williams, not Parfit) once generated a token remains the same token until there is another branching, but my preference is to generalise the term and say that a token has only transient existence, which then makes token equivalent to observer moment. OK. I prefer. With comp it has to correspond to the third person Observer Moment (OM hereafter). They are the true Sigma_1 sentences, or the accessible states by the UD. This is literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of teleportation etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none of the matter in your body is the same, and before this time the fact that some of the matter in your body is the same is accidental and makes no difference to your conscious experience. Assuming bodies. I see the point. As to whether I am token or type: obviously, literally, I-who-write-this-now am a token. This looks like the first person OM. It is different from the preceding one. The 3-OM are enumerable, even recursively enumerable. The 1-OM are enumerable but not recursively enumerable (for those who have the Cutland, it is a simple consequence of Rice theorem). And the similarity classes of the 1-OM (= states plus its relative proportion) has the power of the continuum. My present token is included in the set of related tokens in the past, future, other branches of the multiverse, surreptitious emulations of my mind made by aliens, and so on: the type. Note that the definition of a particular token (especially in my generalised sense, fixed to a specific and unique position in the multiverse) can be made completely unambiguous, How? With comp (with the multiverse = UD*) you have to bet on a level of description of you, and then, even in the lucky case of a correct bet, I still don't see how you will discover you present token, if only because of the many undistinguishable computational histories going through that state (which I recall you can only bet on). This was about your 3-OM token. The situation is even more difficult for the 1-OM token, which is determined in the neighborhood of the infinite. And frankly if you believe a recording can be conscious, don't forget to look for the infinitely any emulation any recording before telling me where is your 1-OM in UD*. while the definition of a type is necessarily vague and fuzzy arround the edges. For example, if a being exists somewhere with 70% of my memories and 30% of your memories, should he be included in my type, your type, a new type, or some combination of these? It is only because we experience a linear existence from birth to death, so that only a single token is extant at a time and there is clear
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Le 07-oct.-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : my reductionism is simple: we have a circle of knowledge base and view the world as limited INTO such model. Well, it is not. The reductionist view enabled homo to step up into technological prowess but did not support an extension of understanding BEYOND the (so far) acquired knowledge-base. We simply cannot FIND OUT what we don't know of the world. Sciences are reductionistic, logic can try to step out, but that is simple sci-fi, use fantasy (imagination?) to bridge ignorance. I am stubborn in I don't know what I don't know. It is a little ambiguous, but if by I you refer to your first person view I could agree with you. But for the 3-person view then, once I bet on a theory I can bet on what I don't know. Example. If I just look at the moon without theory, I cannot know nor describe what I don't know. As soon I bet on a theory, like saying that the moon is a big ball, then I can know a part of what I don't know (like is there life form on that sphere, or what is the shape of the other face of that sphere). From a third person point of view, a theory (a model in your term) is a catalyzer for knowing we don't know much, and then formulating problems and then solving some of them or sometimes changing the theory (the model). Jump outside our knowledge? it is not 'ourselves', it is ALL we know and outside this is NOTHINGNESS for the mind to consider. Blank. In which model (theory)? This is how most of the religions came about. Provide a belief. Scientific theories also provide beliefs. Theology has been extracted from science for political purpose (about 1500 years ago), just to give name for what is really economical if not just xenophobical conflicts. The same happened in the USSR with genetics. No discipline, even math, is vaccine against the possible human misuses. PS Er..., to Markpeaty and other readers of Parfit: I think that his use of the term reductionist is misleading, and due in part to his lack of clearcut distinction between the person points of view. Well said. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of assumptions involving numbers and their relations. Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. As he often reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive explanatory truth, He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines and discovering their povs. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? In achieving these results, AFAICS, no claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers: rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the normal way. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we go about our daily affairs is of course another issue. And yet antoher issue is whether the conclusions of a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises. It may of course eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions - e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition. Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. But as Bruno is again at pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will always entail some 'act of faith'. To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult, No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. and perhaps at root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data at our disposal? David Bruno Marchal wrote: There is no need to reify the numbers.[...] I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view) are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking? I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit : That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists, structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not Platonists. After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. Of course not. If they say that they are formalist it means they are not platonist about things extending numbers like sets. Or it means they does not follows the mathematical news. That is not how they describe themselves. Formalism at the level of numbers has been shown senseless. This is already clear in Dedekind, but provable in all details by using theorems by Skolem or Godel. I think you are getting the Hilbertian programme, of mechanising mathematics, confuse with formalism, which is a claim about the meaning of mathematical propositions. Formalists believe that mathematical propositions in general take their meanings from systems of rules and defintions in general . The discovery that particular systems have particular limitations does not destroy that claim. A strict formalist about natural numbers cannot even interpret the modus ponens rule and explains what formalism is. It is false to pretend (like we can heard sometimes) that Godel incompleteness has kill the formalist doctrine in mathematics, but it is correct to say that godel's incompleteness has kill the formalist doctrine in arithmetics. But I agree with David's yesterday post, you should should less quibble about terminology and try to understand the reasoning instead. No-one can understand anyhting withiut clear definitions. That would provide much more help for settling the possible interpretation problems. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. Only under MWI. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument)
Bruno: once I 'learn' about what you imply as 3rd pers. theory, my personal interpretation absorbs it (partly, distorted, or perfectly) as MY 1st pers. knowledge. It ENTERS my knowledge and from there on I can formulate my 'theories' (models) about it. Whether it is true or not. So when I hear you saying that the moon is a big lighting ball, I know so, it is not 'outside' my circle of information anymore. 3rd pers info is not a catalyst, it is an addition. (Right/wrong, accepted/rejected). * Sorry for the NESS after 'nothing-'. I don't look for a model when there is nothing to be found. Theory? maybeG. * I drew a parallel (with the differences pointed out) between religion and science in an earlier draft. Of course both are belief systems. And I don't think I am talking about 'theology' when I say religion. Th-y is a reductionist science of a non-science. It is the speculation about the belief. ONE belief. It tries to apply secular thinking to mystical stuff: an oxymoron. In the logic of the believers.(Oxym. No2). The Greeks were honest: their gods cheated, lied, were adulterous, raped and stole etc., just as the humans they were simulated after. The JudeoChrIslamics retained mostly the vainness: fishing for praise, the uncritical obedience, (religio?)chauvinism, wrath and punishing, vengefulness and a lot of hypocrisy. Science is subtle: the potentates just prevent the publication, tenure and grants for an opposing point-of-view - the establishment guards its integrity against new theories (enlarged models). John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2006 10:15 AM Subject: Re: Maudlin's Demon (Argument) Le 07-oct.-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : my reductionism is simple: we have a circle of knowledge base and view the world as limited INTO such model. Well, it is not. The reductionist view enabled homo to step up into technological prowess but did not support an extension of understanding BEYOND the (so far) acquired knowledge-base. We simply cannot FIND OUT what we don't know of the world. Sciences are reductionistic, logic can try to step out, but that is simple sci-fi, use fantasy (imagination?) to bridge ignorance. I am stubborn in I don't know what I don't know. It is a little ambiguous, but if by I you refer to your first person view I could agree with you. But for the 3-person view then, once I bet on a theory I can bet on what I don't know. Example. If I just look at the moon without theory, I cannot know nor describe what I don't know. As soon I bet on a theory, like saying that the moon is a big ball, then I can know a part of what I don't know (like is there life form on that sphere, or what is the shape of the other face of that sphere). From a third person point of view, a theory (a model in your term) is a catalyzer for knowing we don't know much, and then formulating problems and then solving some of them or sometimes changing the theory (the model). Jump outside our knowledge? it is not 'ourselves', it is ALL we know and outside this is NOTHINGNESS for the mind to consider. Blank. In which model (theory)? This is how most of the religions came about. Provide a belief. Scientific theories also provide beliefs. Theology has been extracted from science for political purpose (about 1500 years ago), just to give name for what is really economical if not just xenophobical conflicts. The same happened in the USSR with genetics. No discipline, even math, is vaccine against the possible human misuses. PS Er..., to Markpeaty and other readers of Parfit: I think that his use of the term reductionist is misleading, and due in part to his lack of clearcut distinction between the person points of view. Well said. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. Yet the fact remains that I do. Until we have a better idea of the mechanisms behind consciousness, it is a little too early to rule out any specific conclusion. I think Penrose and Lockwood are dead wrong in their specific quantum mechanical connections with consciousness, but I retain a suspicion that quantum effects are important in some way. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - isn't this more interesting? He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two varieties. The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e that physical processes can 'compute'. So how does he get computationalism is incompatible with materialism out of such interviews? From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*, then it can't also supervene on the physical. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does the work. I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense. However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation). Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour. The UDA argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp' constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It *assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact, the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in this view. Comp and materialism start from radically different assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions. However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing his toe on the stone. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real in the sense that I am real', or where are we? No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable) results, without fully committing as a believer - but then that is not what is demanded. However, I acknowledge the robustness of your Johnsonian approach to refutation! David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any way. Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of assumptions involving numbers and their relations.Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. As he often reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive explanatory truth,He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines and discovering their povs.So
RE: Parfit's token and type
Bruno Marchal writes: Parfit is good. I stop to follow him when he insists that we are token. I paraphrase myself sometimes by the slogan MANY TYPES NO TOKEN. Can you explain the disagreement with Parfit? My reading of chapter 99 of R P is that a token is a particular instantiation of a person while a type is the ensemble of related instantiations. Mary Smith is a type, Mary Smith coming out of replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM is a token. When I say MANY TYPES NO TOKEN, I assume comp *and* the conclusion I derive from it, that is the reversal between physics and number theoretical machine theory (say). In particular I take from granted that my next observer moment is somehow determined by two things: a proportion of computational histories going through my actual computational state, and the proportion of consistent extensions, which are related to a proportion of similar computational histories. So with comp Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM is a type. It is the type of all (2^aleph_0) histories going through that event (supposedly well 3-described). From a third person point of view, if you are willing to say that the natural numbers are token (I am neutral on that), then it would make sense to see the nth step of an immaterial execution of a DU, (or an enumeration of the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences) as (immaterial) tokens. But even in that case, there would be no sense to attribute tokenness to Mary Smith coming out of a replicator no. 978 at 11:05 AM, because there is no way to privilege one instantiation from another. We must take them all, and they constitute highly undecidable sets. I think this might be a terminology issue. There may be many computations or processes in the multiverse implementing the OM Mary Smith no. 978 at 11:05 AM. From a third person POV it may be possible to point to a computer and say that's MS 978 #1 and another computer and say that's MS 978 #2, these being two instantiations of the one OM, but from a first person POV it is not possible to make such a distinction, otherwise they would be different OM's. I would further add that if the third person distinction leads to any interaction with the two instantiations as separate entities then that also forces them to become distinct OM's since it changes their first person experience. It is really only an observer who will not interact with the separate instantiations, like a deistic god overseeing the universe, who can tell them apart. So someone who has a relationship with Mary Smith will at any one time have a relationship with a particular Mary Smith token, which might actually have multiple instantiations not distinguishable by either Mary Smith or the observer as separate. I think it is the term token that is confusing. OM is less problematic. It appears that in this terminology (actually due to Bernard Williams, not Parfit) once generated a token remains the same token until there is another branching, but my preference is to generalise the term and say that a token has only transient existence, which then makes token equivalent to observer moment. OK. I prefer. With comp it has to correspond to the third person Observer Moment (OM hereafter). They are the true Sigma_1 sentences, or the accessible states by the UD. This is literally true, given that from moment to moment, even in the absence of teleportation etc., the atoms in your body turn over such that after a certain time none of the matter in your body is the same, and before this time the fact that some of the matter in your body is the same is accidental and makes no difference to your conscious experience. Assuming bodies. I see the point. As to whether I am token or type: obviously, literally, I-who-write-this-now am a token. This looks like the first person OM. It is different from the preceding one. The 3-OM are enumerable, even recursively enumerable. The 1-OM are enumerable but not recursively enumerable (for those who have the Cutland, it is a simple consequence of Rice theorem). And the similarity classes of the 1-OM (= states plus its relative proportion) has the power of the continuum. My present token is included in the set of related tokens in the past, future, other branches of the multiverse, surreptitious emulations of my mind made by aliens, and so on: the type. Note that the definition of a particular token (especially in my generalised sense, fixed to a specific and unique position in the multiverse) can be made completely unambiguous, How? With comp (with the multiverse = UD*) you have to bet on a level of description of you, and then, even in the lucky case of a correct bet, I still don't see how you will discover you present token, if only because of the many undistinguishable computational histories
