Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/25/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

 I think we have been through this before actually.
>

Thanks for being patient, sometimes I just like to argue :0

Can you point to any aspect of the world which can't be simulated no matter
> how powerful the computer?
>
> MP: For us mortals, this universe is in many respects infinite. If
> 'someone' IS running it within a 'computer' then they have to be running all
> of it. Why? Because humans can do science. This means that our little brains
> can come up with questions about everything and we do; in fact we can say
> that 'we' - collectively the whole human species - must have asked questions
> about everything we already have beliefs about. The formal and systematic
> way of checking out answers to practical questions of fact is through the
> assertion of an explanation which is able to make specific predictions
> because we assume causality, then someone sets up experimental situation to
> test the predictions. Now the experiment will either falsify the assertions
> of the explanation because the predictions were not correct, or the
> predictions will turn out to be correct in which case the assertions will
> gain strength as explanatory tools and become linked, in the minds of ever
> more people, with all the other assertions that didn't get falsified. The
> more this happens, the more the universe is constrained to comply with our
> explanations. 'So what?' you say.
>
> Well, as curious people keep asking questions about their world, so more
> and more pervasive and detailed application of scientific theory occurs.
> Curious kids grow up to be curious adults, and some are always going to
> refuse to be fobbed off with the 'because it IS' response. And the ways of
> asking questions are potentially infinite because answers get re-input as
> new questions, which more or less guarantees non-linear results. So newer
> experiments get created which just by the by incorporate new juxtapositions
> of previously accepted results as part of the experimental set up. Over time
> this effectively demands that the accepted theories have to be 100% correct
> because any slight errors will be multiplied over time. Now I realise this
> is a rather informal way of asserting this but, as I said before,
> plain-English is what I want and yes I know this does seem to make things
> long winded. But the bottom line here is that, over time, scientific
> theories are constrained to be ever more exactly correct with less and less
> margin for error. In effect the human species will test just about all
> significant and practically useful theories to vanishingly small tolerances
> so whatever might be 'simulating' the universe as seen from planet Earth has
> ever less margin for error. Simply put the 'universe in the bottle' has to
> be perfectly consistent and ontologically complete.
>
> So the conspiratorial simulators must have 'computers' that are able to
> increase their representational power to infinite precision when needed. And
> can the conspirators predict before they start the simulation running just
> precisely what tests and outlandish ideas the humans will come up with? I
> think not.
>
> I think this means that Stathis's 'no matter how powerful the computer?'
> is a bit of a cheat [nothing personal you understand; what I am saying is
> that I think the whole project of Mathematical universe and 'Comp' may be
> just a very sophisticated house of cards.] I believe that either all of our
> universe as seen on, at and from planet Earth is being simulated perfectly
> or none of it is being simulated at all.
>

God or an advanced civilization could make an actual universe by gathering
raw material (whatever that might mean), setting starting parameters and
laws of physics, then letting it all unfold: Big Bang, planets, evolution,
the US invading Iraq, etc. Alternatively, God or an advanced civilization
could build a simulated universe on a big computer by starting with virtual
raw material, setting starting parameters and laws of physics, then clicking
"run". Is there any way from the inside of determining whether we are more
likely living in one than the other?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mark Peaty wrote:
> Brent: '
> the simulation doesn't have to simulate the whole complicated universe, 
> only the part we can investigate and understand'
> 
> MP: as I argued in my response to Stathis, the 'part we can investigate 
> and understand' can be ever expanding and the exactitude of our 
> understanding can in time reach just about arbitrarily fine degrees of 
> resolution. Or, which would be more the worry for 'emulators' who wished 
> to remain invisible, the emulation would need to be able to be 
> controlled to a finer resolution than scientists' contemporary 
> measurement skills.

Which scientists...ours of theirs?  

I don't disagree, but suppose the level at which we could see it was a 
simulation was the Planck scale.  This is not entirely speculative, since the 
Planck scale is where a conflict between quantum mechanics and general 
relativity must manifest itself.  If the Simulators were only interested in how 
the world operates far above that level then maybe they were sloppy and just 
left potential inconsistencies in the simulation.  The program will crash when 
we do the right experiment to reveal it.  But that level is thirty orders of 
magnitude smaller than anything we can reach now.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mark Peaty]

Brent: '
the simulation doesn't have to simulate the whole complicated universe, 
only the part we can investigate and understand'

MP: as I argued in my response to Stathis, the 'part we can investigate 
and understand' can be ever expanding and the exactitude of our 
understanding can in time reach just about arbitrarily fine degrees of 
resolution. Or, which would be more the worry for 'emulators' who wished 
to remain invisible, the emulation would need to be able to be 
controlled to a finer resolution than scientists' contemporary 
measurement skills.
 
 
Regards
Mark Peaty  CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
 


Brent Meeker wrote:
> John Mikes wrote:
>> This has been a long discussion between Jason and Mark. How do I get
>> into it is
>> by Mark's remark:
>> "I don't think I go anywhere as far as John M. in this but then maybe 
>> that
>> is just because I fear to let go of my sceptical reductionist walking
>> stick. "
>> --Stop half-way: when the guy received $10,000 in the bank in 100s and
>> counted
>> them 37,38,39, - then stopped and said: well. so far it was a match,
>> let me believe that the rest is also OK.
>> We are much earlier into the completion of what we know about our
>> existence.
>> Then again you both wrote about simulations (even: emulations) horribile
>> dictu:
>> " The key point is that a wilful entity or conspiracy seeks to emulate
>> all or part of another wilful entity's world to the extent that the
>> latter can't tell the difference when the change is made."
>> Untold: "restricted to details known" Nobody can simulate or look for
>> unknown details. Of course "the latter" can't tell whether 'simulated'
>> if looking only at the portion that matches. (I am not clear about
>> "wilful entity".)
>> The fallacy of the simulational business is more than that: you (get?)
>> simulate(d?) HERE and NOW and continue HERE under these conditions,
>> while THERE the simulacron lives under THOSE conditions and in no time
>> flat becomes different from you original. That the world of THERE is
>> also simulated? Just add: and lives exactly the life of THIS one? then
>> the whole thing is a hoax, a mirror image, no alternate.
>> *
>> Jason: " A reversible computation is one that has a 1 to 1 mapping
>> between input
>> and output. " Going up in the $100 bills to #45, the map may change.
>> Don't tell me please such "Brunoistic" examples like 1+1 = 2, go out
>> into the 'life' of a universe (or of ourselves).
>> How can you reverse the infinite variations of a life-computation? You
>> have got to restrict it into a limited model and work on that. Like:
>> reductionist physics (QM?) .
>> It seems to me like a return to Carnot, disregarding Prigogine, who
>> improved the case to some (moderate) extent from the classical
>> reversible even isotherm thermodynmx,
>> from which I used to form the joke (as junior in college) that it shows
>> how processes would [theoretically] proceed, wouldn't they proceed as
>> they do proceed.
>> We can reverse a closed model content, all clearly known in it. Not life.
>> Just count into the simulations and reversals the constantly
>> (nonlinearly!) changing world not allowing any 'fixing' of
>> circumstances/processes. No static daydreams.
>> *
>> Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and
>> uncomputable to
>> those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
>> universe evolves deterministically. " - right on. I just wonder why all
>> those many worlds are 'emulated' after this one feeble universe we
>> pretend to observe. In my 'narrative' I allowed 'universes' of
>> unrestricted variety of course 'nobody' can ever continue in a totally
>> different 'universe' a life from here. With e.g. a different logic.
>> *
>> "Are you saying that a perfectly efficient computer could not be built
>> or that the physics of this universe are not computable? "
>> You mean: with unrestricted, filled memory banks working on the
>> limitless variations nature CAN provide? A perfectly efficient computer
>> could then compute this universe as well. Maybe not these binary embryos
>> we are proudly using today. Indeed: you ask about the physics of this
>> universe, is it the reductionist science we are fed with in college?
>> That may be computed. Discounting the randomness and indeterminism shown
>> for members of this quantum universe of ours.
>>
>> Sorry for the length and my unorthodoxy.
>>
>> John M
>
> You seem to have two themes: (1) The universe is more complex than 
> current physics makes it out and may not be computable, and in 
> comparison, (2) Our ability to comprehend things is quite limited. But 
> these two together imply that is quite possible that we live in a 
> simulation. If the simulation is being performed in a universe like 
> ours, one with very complex physics, then the physics of that universe 
> could provide a simulation that was beyond our ability to discern as a 
> simulation - because o

Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/25/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> [SP, in response to Tom Caylor]:
> 
>  > Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or
> tangential.
>  > Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a
>  > closed system which is supposedly totally explainable will always
> have
>  > at least one fixed point that is unexplainable".
> 
> This is somewhat beside the point anyway.  Positivists (and all
> foundationists) suppose that there are some things known directly,
> without explanation, usually by direct perception or by
> introspection.  Just as mystics suppose some things are directly
> intuited or revealed by meditation, e.g. "...such things as
> fundamentality, generality and beauty."
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
> 
> But then why value a scientific explanation over a mystical explanation? 

Because, as you pointed out, it works.  When knowledge is tested against 
perception and intersubjective agreement on that perception (to rule out 
hallucinations) it seems to be reliable.  When it's based on mystic revelation, 
it's not.  I was referring to Tom's statement you quoted when I said it was 
somewhat beside the point.

> It's straightforward when we stick to science as a method for making 
> predictions and creating technology (penicillin works better than 
> prayer), but where does this leave the example you raised recently, the 
> interpretation of quantum mechanics? I understand that some journals 
> will not publish papers on this subject on positivist grounds, i.e. that 
> it is metaphysics rather than science.

Some physics journals and proceeding of symposia do publish papers on the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  This kind of metaphysics (literally 
"about physics") is useful in guiding the development of new theories.  When 
Einstein developed general relativity he assumed some "meta-" rules, e.g. no 
derivatives higher than second.  Since there's a conflict between quantum 
mechanics and general relativity at the ontological level, the resolution is 
likely to require something that is "meta-" relative to the current theories.

Brent Meeker

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/25/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

[SP, in response to Tom Caylor]:

> > Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential.
> > Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a
> > closed system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have
> > at least one fixed point that is unexplainable".
>
> This is somewhat beside the point anyway.  Positivists (and all
> foundationists) suppose that there are some things known directly, without
> explanation, usually by direct perception or by introspection.  Just as
> mystics suppose some things are directly intuited or revealed by meditation,
> e.g. "...such things as fundamentality, generality and beauty."
>
> Brent Meeker
>

But then why value a scientific explanation over a mystical explanation?
It's straightforward when we stick to science as a method for making
predictions and creating technology (penicillin works better than prayer),
but where does this leave the example you raised recently, the
interpretation of quantum mechanics? I understand that some journals will
not publish papers on this subject on positivist grounds, i.e. that it is
metaphysics rather than science.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/24/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Feb 23, 8:51 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  > On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  >
>  > > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
>  > > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that
> science is
>  > > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some
> kind
>  > > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a
> whole.
>  >
>  > > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
>  > > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since,
> again,
>  > > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
>  > > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that
> science
>  > > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
>  > > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
>  > > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we
> have
>  > > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
>  > > metaphysics.
>  >
>  > > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that
> metaphysics,
>  > > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
>  > > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
>  > > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
>  > > Everything.]
>  >
>  > > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
>  > > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and
> Everyone,
>  > > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It
> assumes
>  > > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
>  > > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything
> (as I've
>  > > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious
> circle.
>  >
>  > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us.
> All we can
>  > do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make
> a best
>  > guess as to what's going on.
> 
> This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
> disagree on rational grounds.
> 
> 
> One of the problems with the verification principle of logical 
> positivism was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification 
> principle, and hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated 
> metaphysics (and, I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject 
> to the charge that it was a circular argument). But I would get around 
> the problem by stating the principles by which science works thus: IF 
> you want to predict the weather, build planes that fly, make sick people 
> better THEN you should do such and such. By putting it in this 
> conditional form there is no metaphysical component.
> 
>  > Science is just a systematisation of this
>  > process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> 
> So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
> agree.
> 
>  > However, it's
>  > all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative:
> tomorrow pigs
>  > might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened
> before. I
>  > would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because
> there is no
>  > reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute
> certainty. A
>  > metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity
> or an
>  > anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is
> arrogant as
>  > well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or
> absolute
>  > anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If
> there are some
>  > things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
>  > unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
> absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
> unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
> I don't hold that view. 
> 
> 
> Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential. 
> Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a 
> closed system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have 
> at least one fixed point that is unexplainable". 

This is somewhat beside the point anyway.  Positivists (and all foundationists) 
suppose that there are some things known directly, without explan

Re: Believing in Divine Destiny is one of the pillars of faith, and, in accordance with this belief, everything in the universe is determined by God, the All-Mighty. While there are countless absolute

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/25/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Believing in Divine Destiny is one of the pillars of faith, and, in
> accordance with this belief, everything in the universe is determined
> by God, the All-Mighty. While there are countless absolute evidences
> of Destiny, it may be sufficient to make some introductory remarks to
> demonstrate how important a place this pillar of faith has for the
> whole of creation.
>
> The Qur'an specifically explains that everything is predetermined...


If God decided to lay off the pressure on you to fulfil your destiny, so
that you could do whatever you wanted, but you didn't know that he had done
this and believed firmly that you were still guided by divine destiny, how
would your behaviour be different?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> On Feb 23, 8:51 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 2/24/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
> >
> > > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> > > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> > > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> > > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a whole.
> >
> > > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> > > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
>
> > > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> > > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> > > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> > > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> > > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> > > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> > > metaphysics.
> >
> > > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics,
> > > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> > > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> > > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> > > Everything.]
> >
> > > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> > > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> > > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It assumes
> > > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> > > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> > > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle.
> >
> > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> can
> > do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a best
> > guess as to what's going on.
>
> This is a metaphysical judgment.  There are those who strongly
> disagree on rational grounds.


One of the problems with the verification principle of logical positivism
was that it, itself, cannot be verified by the verification principle, and
hence is subject to the charge of being part of the hated metaphysics (and,
I suppose, if it could be verified it would be subject to the charge that it
was a circular argument). But I would get around the problem by stating the
principles by which science works thus: IF you want to predict the weather,
build planes that fly, make sick people better THEN you should do such and
such. By putting it in this conditional form there is no metaphysical
component.

> Science is just a systematisation of this
> > process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
>
> So science is a just systematisation of a metaphysical judgment.  I
> agree.
>
> > However, it's
> > all tentative, and the scientific method itself is tentative: tomorrow
> pigs
> > might sprout wings and fly, even though this has never happened before.
> I
> > would bet that pigs will still be land-bound tomorrow, because there is
> no
> > reason to think otherwise, but I have to stop short of absolute
> certainty. A
> > metaphysical position would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an
> > anathema and therefore pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant
> as
> > well as wrong to create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or
> absolute
> > anything else by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are
> some
> > things we can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be
> > unfortunate, but it's the way the world is.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Looking over my previous post, I cannot see why you are bringing up
> absolute certainty.  Also I don't know what "absolute meaning" means,
> unless it means knowing meaning with absolute certainty in which case
> I don't hold that view.


Sorry if I have misunderstood, and if I have been unclear or tangential.
Several posts back you spoke of positivism being deficient because "a closed
system which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one
fixed point that is unexplainable". I read into this an implication that God
would solve the problem because he could be outside the system, indeed
outside all possible systems. But this runs into two problems. The first is
that positivists are in fact very modest and make no claim to explain
everything; the very opposite, in fact. The second is that the concept of an
entity outside all possible systems, and therefore requiring no cause,
design, meaning or any of the other things allegedly necessary for the
universe and its components constitutes a restatement of the ontological
argument for the existence of God, an argument that is 900 years old and has
been rejected as invalid even by most theists.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~

Re: Believing in Divine Destiny is one of the pillars of faith, and, in accordance with this belief, everything in the universe is determined by God, the All-Mighty. While there are countless absolute

[Brent Meeker]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Believing in Divine Destiny is one of the pillars of faith, and, in
> accordance with this belief, everything in the universe is determined
> by God, the All-Mighty. While there are countless absolute evidences
> of Destiny, it may be sufficient to make some introductory remarks to
> demonstrate how important a place this pillar of faith has for the
> whole of creation.
> 
> The Qur'an specifically explains that everything is predetermined, and
> then recorded after its coming into existence, as indicated in many
> verses like,
> 
> Nor anything green or withered except it is all in a Manifest Book.

I guess the Koran's author hadn't heard about quantum randomness.

Anyway that's not an explanation, it's just an assertion - and why should 
anyone credit assertions written without supporting evidence by a man who 
didn't even know that the Earth orbits the Sun. 

> This Quranic statement is confirmed by the universe, 

It's not only not confirmed, it would be impossible to confirm even if it were 
true.

Brent Meeker


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Believing in Divine Destiny is one of the pillars of faith, and, in accordance with this belief, everything in the universe is determined by God, the All-Mighty. While there are countless absolute evi

[[EMAIL PROTECTED]]

Believing in Divine Destiny is one of the pillars of faith, and, in
accordance with this belief, everything in the universe is determined
by God, the All-Mighty. While there are countless absolute evidences
of Destiny, it may be sufficient to make some introductory remarks to
demonstrate how important a place this pillar of faith has for the
whole of creation.

The Qur'an specifically explains that everything is predetermined, and
then recorded after its coming into existence, as indicated in many
verses like,

Nor anything green or withered except it is all in a Manifest Book.

This Quranic statement is confirmed by the universe, this macro-Qur'an
of the Divine Power, through its creational and operational signs like
order, harmony, balance, forming and shaping, adornment and
distinguishing. All seeds, fruit stones, measured proportions and
forms demonstrate that everything is pre-determined before its earthly
existence. Each seed or fruit stone has a protective case formed in
the factory of Kaf Nun[*], into which the Divine Destiny has in-built
the life-story of a tree or plant. The Divine Power employs the
particles according to the measure established by Divine Destiny so as
to cause the particular stone to grow miraculously into the particular
tree. This means that the future life-history of that tree is as
though written in its seed.

While there is variety between individuals and between species, the
basic materials from which these plants and animals are formed are
identical. The plants and animals that grow from the same constituent
basic elements display, amid abundant diversity, such harmony and
proportion that man cannot help but conclude that each of them has
been individually given its particular form and measure. It is the
Divine Power which gives to each its particular form according to the
measure established for it by Divine Destiny. For example, consider
how vast and innumerable a mass of inanimate particles shift, cohere,
separate so that this seed grows into this tree or that drop of semen
grows into that animal.

Since there are the manifestations of Divine Destiny to this extent in
visible material things, for certain, the forms with which things are
clothed with the passing of time and the states they acquire through
their motions are also dependent on the ordering of Divine Destiny.
Indeed, a single seed displays Destiny in two ways, one by
demonstrating the Manifest Book (Kitabun Mubin) which is but another
title for Divine Will and God's creational and operational laws of the
universe; the other is by displaying the Manifest Record (Imamun
Mubin), another title for Divine Knowledge and Command. If we regard
these two as different manifestations of Divine Destiny, the former
can be understood and referred to as 'Destiny Actual' and the latter
as 'Destiny For-mal or Theoretical'. The future full-grown form of the
tree can be understood as its Destiny Actual, whilst Destiny Formal
refers to all the stages together through which the tree has to pass
in its life, and comprehends the entire history of its life. Such
manifestations of the Divine Destiny, so easily observed in a life
such as that of a tree, are illustrative of how everything has been
pre-determined in a Record before its worldly existence. On the other
hand, all the fruits and seeds which are signs of the Manifest Book
(Kitabun Mubin) and the Manifest Record (Imamun Mubin), together with
all human memories which indicate the Preserved Tablet (Lawhun
Mahfuz), prove that, as everything has been pre-recorded, its life-
history is also recorded. The life-history of every tree, for example,
is recorded in each of its fruits, which is the outcome of its entire
life. The life-history of man including events occurring in the
external world is likewise recorded in his memory. Thus, the Divine
Power registers a man's deeds with the Pen of Destiny by lodging it in
his memory so that he will be able to remember them on the Day of
Reckoning.

Man should also be assured that in this world of transience and
upheavals there are numerous 'mirrors' pertaining to eternity in which
the All-Powerful and Wise One depicts and makes permanent the
identities of mortals. There are also many tablets upon which the All-
Knowing Preserver writes down the meanings of transient beings.

In short: While plants, which are the simplest and lowest level of
life, are completely de-pendent upon Divine Destiny, it is also
evident that the life of man, which is the highest level, has also
been minutely determined by that Destiny. Just as drops of rain are
indicative of a cloud, and trickles of water disclose a spring, and
receipts and vouchers suggest the existence of a ledger, so fruits,
sperms, seeds, and forms are indicators of the Manifest Book and the
Manifest Record.

The expression Manifest Book symbolizes the Destiny Actual, which is a
title for Divine Will and God's creational and operational laws of the
universe and the physical order displayed by 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> This has been a long discussion between Jason and Mark. How do I get 
> into it is
> by Mark's remark:
> "I don't think I go anywhere as far as John M. in this but then maybe that
> is just because I fear to let go of my sceptical reductionist walking 
> stick. "
> --Stop half-way: when the guy received $10,000  in the bank in 100s and 
> counted
> them 37,38,39, - then stopped and said: well. so far it was a match, 
> let me believe that the rest is also OK.
> We are much earlier into the completion of what we know about our 
> existence.
> Then again you both wrote about simulations (even: emulations) horribile 
> dictu:
> " The key point is that a wilful entity or conspiracy seeks to emulate 
> all or part of another wilful entity's world to the extent that the 
> latter can't tell the difference when the change is made."
> Untold: "restricted to details known"  Nobody can simulate or look for 
> unknown details. Of course "the latter" can't tell whether 'simulated' 
> if  looking only at the  portion that matches.  (I am not clear about 
> "wilful entity".)
> The fallacy of the simulational business is more than that: you (get?) 
> simulate(d?) HERE and NOW and continue HERE under these conditions, 
> while THERE the simulacron lives under THOSE conditions and in no time 
> flat becomes different from you original. That the world of THERE is 
> also simulated? Just add: and lives exactly the life of THIS one? then 
> the whole thing is a hoax, a mirror image, no alternate.
> *
> Jason: " A reversible computation is one that has a 1 to 1 mapping 
> between input
> and output. " Going up in the $100 bills to #45, the map may change. 
> Don't tell me please such "Brunoistic" examples like 1+1 = 2, go out 
> into the 'life' of a universe (or of ourselves).
> How can you reverse the infinite variations of a life-computation? You 
> have got to restrict it into a limited model and work on that. Like: 
> reductionist physics (QM?) .
> It seems to me like a return to Carnot, disregarding Prigogine, who 
> improved the case to some (moderate) extent from the classical 
> reversible even isotherm thermodynmx,
> from which I used to form the joke (as junior in college) that it shows 
> how processes would [theoretically] proceed, wouldn't they proceed as 
> they do proceed.
> We can reverse a closed model content, all clearly known in it.  Not life.
> Just count into the simulations and reversals the constantly 
> (nonlinearly!) changing world not allowing any 'fixing' of 
> circumstances/processes. No static daydreams.
> *
> Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and 
> uncomputable to
> those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
> universe evolves deterministically. " - right on. I just wonder why all 
> those many worlds are 'emulated' after this one feeble universe we 
> pretend to observe. In my 'narrative' I allowed 'universes' of 
> unrestricted variety of course 'nobody' can ever continue in a totally 
> different 'universe' a life from here. With e.g. a different logic.
> *
> "Are you saying that a perfectly efficient computer could not be built 
> or that the physics of this universe are not computable? "
> You mean: with unrestricted, filled memory banks working on the 
> limitless variations nature CAN provide? A perfectly efficient computer 
> could then compute this universe as well. Maybe not these binary embryos 
> we are proudly using today. Indeed: you ask about the physics of this 
> universe, is it the reductionist science we are fed with in college? 
> That may be computed. Discounting the randomness and indeterminism shown 
> for members of this quantum universe of ours.
> 
> Sorry for the length and my unorthodoxy.
> 
> John M

You seem to have two themes: (1) The universe is more complex than current 
physics makes it out and may not be computable, and in comparison, (2) Our 
ability to comprehend things is quite limited.  But these two together imply 
that is quite possible that we live in a simulation.  If the simulation is 
being performed in a universe like ours, one with very complex physics, then 
the physics of that universe could provide a simulation that was beyond our 
ability to discern as a simulation - because of our limited comprehension.  The 
point is that the simulation doesn't have to simulate the whole complicated 
universe, only the part we can investigate and understand.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John Mikes]

This has been a long discussion between Jason and Mark. How do I get into it
is
by Mark's remark:
"I don't think I go anywhere as far as John M. in this but then maybe that
is just because I fear to let go of my sceptical reductionist walking stick.
"
--Stop half-way: when the guy received $10,000  in the bank in 100s and
counted
them 37,38,39, - then stopped and said: well. so far it was a match, let
me believe that the rest is also OK.
We are much earlier into the completion of what we know about our existence.

Then again you both wrote about simulations (even: emulations) horribile
dictu:
"The key point is that a wilful entity or conspiracy seeks to emulate all or
part of another wilful entity's world to the extent that the latter can't
tell the difference when the change is made."
Untold: "restricted to details known"  Nobody can simulate or look for
unknown details. Of course "the latter" can't tell whether 'simulated' if
looking only at the  portion that matches.  (I am not clear about "wilful
entity".)
The fallacy of the simulational business is more than that: you (get?)
simulate(d?) HERE and NOW and continue HERE under these conditions, while
THERE the simulacron lives under THOSE conditions and in no time flat
becomes different from you original. That the world of THERE is also
simulated? Just add: and lives exactly the life of THIS one? then the whole
thing is a hoax, a mirror image, no alternate.
*
Jason: " A reversible computation is one that has a 1 to 1 mapping between
input
and output. " Going up in the $100 bills to #45, the map may change. Don't
tell me please such "Brunoistic" examples like 1+1 = 2, go out into the
'life' of a universe (or of ourselves).
How can you reverse the infinite variations of a life-computation? You have
got to restrict it into a limited model and work on that. Like: reductionist
physics (QM?) .
It seems to me like a return to Carnot, disregarding Prigogine, who improved
the case to some (moderate) extent from the classical reversible even
isotherm thermodynmx,
from which I used to form the joke (as junior in college) that it shows how
processes would [theoretically] proceed, wouldn't they proceed as they do
proceed.
We can reverse a closed model content, all clearly known in it.  Not life.
Just count into the simulations and reversals the constantly (nonlinearly!)
changing world not allowing any 'fixing' of circumstances/processes. No
static daydreams.
*
Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and uncomputable to

those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
universe evolves deterministically. " - right on. I just wonder why all
those many worlds are 'emulated' after this one feeble universe we pretend
to observe. In my 'narrative' I allowed 'universes' of unrestricted variety
of course 'nobody' can ever continue in a totally different 'universe' a
life from here. With e.g. a different logic.
*
"Are you saying that a perfectly efficient computer could not be built or
that the physics of this universe are not computable? "
You mean: with unrestricted, filled memory banks working on the limitless
variations nature CAN provide? A perfectly efficient computer could then
compute this universe as well. Maybe not these binary embryos we are proudly
using today. Indeed: you ask about the physics of this universe, is it the
reductionist science we are fed with in college? That may be computed.
Discounting the randomness and indeterminism shown for members of this
quantum universe of ours.

Sorry for the length and my unorthodoxy.

John M




On 2/24/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  This is yet another delayed response; the story of my life really ...
>
> Jason: "By physically reversible I don't mean we as humans can undo
> anything
> that happens, rather physical interactions are time-invertible.  If you
> were shown a recording of any physical interaction on a small scale, an
> elastic collision of particles, the decay of a nucleus, burning of
> hydrogen, it would be impossible for you to tell if that recording were
> being played in reverse or not, since it is always possible for that
> interaction to occur as it does in either direction of time."
>
>  MP: This is only true for 'individual' reactions on the micro scale, but
> even then the 'truth' about the reversibility can only really be maintained
> by hiding the truth about the context. For example, it is logically possible
> for certain atomic nuclei to collide at just the right velocities and fusion
> will occur. In reality however the probability of what are normally fission
> products coming together to make a uranium nucleus is so close to zero you
> are never going to see it. [I don't know much about the physics but my
> casual believe is that heavy elements are created through various long and
> complex 'ratchet' accretion pathways in which nuclear isotopes of H or He
> enter heavier nuclei.] Like wise the burning of hydrogen; it seems simple
> enou

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mark Peaty wrote:
> This is yet another delayed response; the story of my life really ...
> 
> Jason: "By physically reversible I don't mean we as humans can undo 
> anything
> that happens, rather physical interactions are time-invertible.  If you
> were shown a recording of any physical interaction on a small scale, an
> elastic collision of particles, the decay of a nucleus, burning of
> hydrogen, it would be impossible for you to tell if that recording were
> being played in reverse or not, since it is always possible for that
> interaction to occur as it does in either direction of time."
> 
> MP: This is only true for 'individual' reactions on the micro scale, but 
> even then the 'truth' about the reversibility can only really be 
> maintained by hiding the truth about the context. For example, it is 
> logically possible for certain atomic nuclei to collide at just the 
> right velocities and fusion will occur. In reality however the 
> probability of what are normally fission products coming together to 
> make a uranium nucleus is so close to zero you are never going to see 
> it. [I don't know much about the physics but my casual believe is that 
> heavy elements are created through various long and complex 'ratchet' 
> accretion pathways in which nuclear isotopes of H or He enter heavier 
> nuclei.] Like wise the burning of hydrogen; it seems simple enough and 
> yes it is 'reversible', but does the reverse occur? Not where you and I 
> can see it.
> 
> Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and 
> uncomputable to
> those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
> universe evolves deterministically.  It is only the observers within
> the quantum mechanical universe that perceive the randomness and
> unpredictability, but this unpredictability doesn't exist at the higher
> level where the universe is being simulated (assuming many-worlds). "

This is mixing Everett's relative state interpretation with the idea that the 
world is a simulation.  These are not the same and maybe not even compatible.  
The world evolves deterministically in Hilbert space and the "many-worlds" are 
projections relative to us.  Whether this can be simulated, except in a quantum 
computer, is questionable because the Hilbert space is infinite dimensional.  
Is some fixed finite resolution sufficient for simulation?

> 
> MP: I don't think I can accept this. Maybe I sound arrogant in saying 
> this, but I think the idea of simulation is used a bit too loosely. I 
> know there are those lurking on the Mind & Brain list and JCS-online who 
> would say I am 'the pot calling the kettle black', because I am always 
> asserting what I call UMSITW [pronounced um-see-two for English 
> speakers] - updating the model of self in the world - is the basis of 
> consciousness. But they misunderstand me, because I do not say there is 
> anyone else doing simulation, merely that we experience being here 
> because the universe has evolved self sustaining regions within itself 
> which maintain their structure by means of dynamically modelling 
> themselves and their local region so as to avoid fatal dangers while 
> obtaining everything they need from their environments. My point here is 
> simply that the universe is its own best simulation and that any ideas 
> of something greater, such as a Matrix type operation, are science 
> fiction only. Why? Because for a feasible universe like the one we seem 
> to inhabit to be deterministic does not require that it is predictable 
> nor that it can be repeatable. Nobody knows to what extent quantum level 
> events are intrinsically random as opposed to being _pushed from 
> 'behind' or 'below'_ so to speak.
> 
> That is one thing. Another thing is that no entity or set of entities 
> could know if their 'simulation' attempt was doing what they wanted in 
> every detail because to attempt to find this out would interfere 
> irreversibly with the unfolding of the world. 

This assumes that the simulation must be quantum mechanical - but I think that 
would defeat the whole point of assuming a simulation.  If the world can be 
simulated classically, then it can be monitored without interference.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mark Peaty]

I think we have been through this before actually.

Can you point to any aspect of the world which can't be simulated no 
matter how powerful the computer?

MP: For us mortals, this universe is in many respects infinite. If 
'someone' IS running it within a 'computer' then they have to be running 
all of it. Why? Because humans can do science. This means that our 
little brains can come up with questions about everything and we do; in 
fact we can say that 'we' - collectively the whole human species - must 
have asked questions about everything we already have beliefs about. The 
formal and systematic way of checking out answers to practical questions 
of fact is through the assertion of an explanation which is able to make 
specific predictions because we assume causality, then someone sets up 
experimental situation to test the predictions. Now the experiment will 
either falsify the assertions of the explanation because the predictions 
were not correct, or the predictions will turn out to be correct in 
which case the assertions will gain strength as explanatory tools and 
become linked, in the minds of ever more people, with all the other 
assertions that didn't get falsified. The more this happens, the more 
the universe is constrained to comply with our explanations. 'So what?' 
you say.

Well, as curious people keep asking questions about their world, so more 
and more pervasive and detailed application of scientific theory occurs. 
Curious kids grow up to be curious adults, and some are always going to 
refuse to be fobbed off with the 'because it IS' response. And the ways 
of asking questions are potentially infinite because answers get 
re-input as new questions, which more or less guarantees non-linear 
results. So newer experiments get created which just by the by 
incorporate new juxtapositions of previously accepted results as part of 
the experimental set up. Over time this effectively demands that the 
accepted theories have to be 100% correct because any slight errors will 
be multiplied over time. Now I realise this is a rather informal way of 
asserting this but, as I said before, plain-English is what I want and 
yes I know this does seem to make things long winded. But the bottom 
line here is that, over time, scientific theories are constrained to be 
ever more exactly correct with less and less margin for error. In effect 
the human species will test just about all significant and practically 
useful theories to vanishingly small tolerances so whatever might be 
'simulating' the universe as seen from planet Earth has ever less margin 
for error. Simply put the 'universe in the bottle' has to be perfectly 
consistent and ontologically complete.

So the conspiratorial simulators must have 'computers' that are able to 
increase their representational power to infinite precision when needed. 
And can the conspirators predict before they start the simulation 
running just precisely what tests and outlandish ideas the humans will 
come up with? I think not.

I think this means that Stathis's 'no matter how powerful the computer?' 
is a bit of a cheat [nothing personal you understand; what I am saying 
is that I think the whole project of Mathematical universe and 'Comp' 
may be just a very sophisticated house of cards.] I believe that either 
all of our universe as seen on, at and from planet Earth is being 
simulated perfectly or none of it is being simulated at all.

 
Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
>
> On 2/24/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>
> Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and
> uncomputable to
> those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
> universe evolves deterministically.  It is only the observers within
> the quantum mechanical universe that perceive the randomness and
> unpredictability, but this unpredictability doesn't exist at the
> higher
> level where the universe is being simulated (assuming many-worlds). "
>
> MP: I don't think I can accept this. Maybe I sound arrogant in
> saying this, but I think the idea of simulation is used a bit too
> loosely. I know there are those lurking on the Mind & Brain list
> and JCS-online who would say I am 'the pot calling the kettle
> black', because I am always asserting what I call UMSITW
> [pronounced um-see-two for English speakers] - updating the model
> of self in the world - is the basis of consciousness. But they
> misunderstand me, because I do not say there is anyone else doing
> simulation, merely that we experience being here because the
> universe has evolved self sustaining regions within itself which
> maintain their structure by means of dynamically modelling
> themselves and their local region so as to avoid fatal dangers
> while obtaining everything they need from

Re: The Meaning of Life

[John M]

Thank you, guys, for 2 parts in this post I cherrish most.
(I was questioning the endless back-and-forth of these 'bickercussions', but 
from time to time there is a part that justifies the frustration of reading so 
much) 
*
I leave the part from Stathis' text which I want to copy to another list (with 
credit to Stathis and this list - if it is not prohibited, pls advise) between 
dotted lines. 
Also:
The remark of Brent opened up a little light in my head (aka activated some 
photons in the neurons?) about refreshing the 'pilot wave' of D. Bohm as 
coinciding with Robert Rosen's anticipatory principle. (Bohm's priority). 
*
Btw I find 'metaphysics' was a false historical mock-name to reject everything 
outside the primitive ancient model they called (then) "physics" (the science). 
Today's physics is many times 'meta', especially when carrying a "Q-name". I 
can relate to both of yours remarks. 
( Theists etc. just wanted to ride that horse in the past.  )
The wording that emerges in talks about metaphysics is a mixture of the ancient 
denigration and the up-to-date ideas. Is it still fruitful to argue about a 
past misnomer?

John M
 
PS. about 'cause' and 'positivists':
if we accept the random occurrences in the existence, we just waste any effort 
to identify ANY order (including math). I don't think the 'positivist' is a 
right (denigrating?)
word for the idea that everything is (deterministically) interconnected/ 
interinfluencing any occurrence to 'happen' - maybe not 'causing' just 
'directing/facilitating' - entailing in some sense.  JM
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Saturday, February 24, 2007 6:32 AM
  Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life


  I suppose it depends on what is covered by the term "metaphysics". Theists 
sometimes profess absolute certainty in the face of absolute lack of evidence, 
and are proud of it. I wouldn't lump this in together with the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics (I'm sure you wouldn't either, but I thought I'd make the 
point). 

  ...  (On /24/07,
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:)
>
> On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote: 
Skip
*
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually 
> don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science is
> ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a 
whole. 
>
> There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since, again,
> science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as 
> fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that science
> conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle 
> actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> metaphysics.
>
> [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that metaphysics, 
> as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of 
> Everything.]
>
> However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> things having a cause even in the context of Everything and Everyone,
> is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It 
assumes 
> that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as I've
> mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious circle. 
>
>-
> The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> can do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a
> best guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of 
> this process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> However, it's all tentative, and the scientific method itself is
> tentative: tomorrow pigs might sprout wings and fly, even though this 
> has never happened before. I would bet that pigs will still be
> land-bound tomorrow, because there is no reason to think otherwise, but
> I have to stop s

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Jesse Mazer]

Mark Peaty  wrote:
>
>This is yet another delayed response; the story of my life really ...
>
>Jason: "By physically reversible I don't mean we as humans can undo
>anything
>that happens, rather physical interactions are time-invertible.  If you
>were shown a recording of any physical interaction on a small scale, an
>elastic collision of particles, the decay of a nucleus, burning of
>hydrogen, it would be impossible for you to tell if that recording were
>being played in reverse or not, since it is always possible for that
>interaction to occur as it does in either direction of time."
>
>MP: This is only true for 'individual' reactions on the micro scale, but
>even then the 'truth' about the reversibility can only really be
>maintained by hiding the truth about the context. For example, it is
>logically possible for certain atomic nuclei to collide at just the
>right velocities and fusion will occur. In reality however the
>probability of what are normally fission products coming together to
>make a uranium nucleus is so close to zero you are never going to see
>it. [I don't know much about the physics but my casual believe is that
>heavy elements are created through various long and complex 'ratchet'
>accretion pathways in which nuclear isotopes of H or He enter heavier
>nuclei.] Like wise the burning of hydrogen; it seems simple enough and
>yes it is 'reversible', but does the reverse occur? Not where you and I
>can see it.

But according to modern physics, at maximum entropy the probability of any 
reaction should be identical to the probability of its time-inverted one 
(actually, there are a few weak nuclear reactions where you'd need to invert 
charge and parity as well--the laws of fundamental physics are 
CPT-symmetric, but not always T-symmetric). It's thought that the only 
reason some reactions are more likely to happen in the forward direction 
than the backward direction in the real world is because of the low-entropy 
initial boundary conditions of the universe; if we lived in a universe with 
low-entropy final boundary conditions on the big crunch and no constraints 
on the big bang, then the "arrow of time" would be reversed. And the reasons 
for the low-entropy big bang remain fairly mysterious, we may not understand 
it without a complete theory of quantum gravity or TOE (in the physics sense 
of unifying all four forces, not in the list's sense).

Jesse

_
Don’t miss your chance to WIN 10 hours of private jet travel from Microsoft® 
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Re: The Meaning of Life

[Stathis Papaioannou]

I suppose it depends on what is covered by the term "metaphysics". Theists
sometimes profess absolute certainty in the face of absolute lack of
evidence, and are proud of it. I wouldn't lump this in together with the
interpretation of quantum mechanics (I'm sure you wouldn't either, but I
thought I'd make the point).

On 2/24/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 2/24/07, *Tom Caylor* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Feb 23, 3:59 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >  > On 2/23/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >  >
> >  > > My point in quoting Kronecker was to simply to allude to the
> > fact that
> >  > > the foundations of mathematics are axiomatic in a similar way
> that
> >  > > ultimate meaning is ultimate.  We have a feeling that the
> > foundation
> >  > > of math is ultimately right, even though we can't prove it.  In
> my
> >  > > "logical reason" (reason #1 a few posts back), I am simply
> > arguing for
> >  > > realism (vs. positivism).  Your arguments that you are trying
> to
> >  > > enforce here would apply equally well (if valid) to realism in
> > general
> >  > > (not just God), and therefore put you in the positivist camp.
> >  >
> >  > > Tom
> >  >
> >  > Positivists don't like metaphysics, but even if you allow that
> > metaphysics
> >  > isn't all just nonsense, you have to maintain some sort of
> > standards. How do
> >  > you weed out those metaphysical beliefs which *are* just
> nonsense?
> >  >
> >  > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > I agree that positivists don't like metaphysics, and they actually
> > don't believe in it either.  The problem with this is that science
> is
> > ultimately based on (and is inescapably in the context of) some kind
> > of metaphysics, since it is in the context of the universe as a
> whole.
> >
> > There are some ways of sorting out metaphysics.  In fact these
> > criteria are mostly the same as how we sort out science (since,
> again,
> > science is based on metaphysics).  These are such things as
> > fundamentality, generality and beauty.  However, the fact that
> science
> > conventionally has been limited to the "material" (whatever that
> > means!) implies that the criteria of naturality (a viscious circle
> > actually!) and reproducibility (another vicious circle) that we have
> > in science cannot be applied to the universe as a whole or to
> > metaphysics.
> >
> > [Side note: But even more important is to recognize that
> metaphysics,
> > as well as science, is filtered for us: we are part of the universe
> > and we are limited.  So this filters out almost everything.  This
> > limits more than anything the amount of "sense" we can make out of
> > Everything.]
> >
> > However the criterion that you are trying to enforce, that of all
> > things having a cause even in the context of Everything and
> Everyone,
> > is a positivist criteria, treating metaphysics as science.  It
> assumes
> > that Everything has to be part of this closed system of cause and
> > effect.  There are plenty of criteria to sort out Everything (as
> I've
> > mentioned above) without getting into the positivist viscious
> circle.
> >
> >
> > The universe is not under any obligation to reveal itself to us. All we
> > can do is stumble around blindly gathering what data we can and make a
> > best guess as to what's going on. Science is just a systematisation of
> > this process, with guesses taking the form of models and theories.
> > However, it's all tentative, and the scientific method itself is
> > tentative: tomorrow pigs might sprout wings and fly, even though this
> > has never happened before. I would bet that pigs will still be
> > land-bound tomorrow, because there is no reason to think otherwise, but
> > I have to stop short of absolute certainty. A metaphysical position
> > would be that flying pigs are an absurdity or an anathema and therefore
> > pigs absolutely *cannot* fly. But it is arrogant as well as wrong to
> > create absolute certainty, absolute meaning, or absolute anything else
> > by fiat, just because that's what you fancy. If there are some things we
> > can't know with certainty or can't know at all, that may be unfortunate,
> > but it's the way the world is.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> You seem to take metaphysics to be an absolutist theory.  Maybe Tom does
> too.  But I think of metaphysics to be the interpretation we put on top of
> our mathematical theories, e.g. Bohm's pilot wave and Feynman's multiple
> particle paths are two different metaphysics we can use to explain what the
> formalism of quantum mechanics refers to.  But we're *less* certain about
> them t

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 2/24/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and uncomputable to
>
> those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
> universe evolves deterministically.  It is only the observers within
> the quantum mechanical universe that perceive the randomness and
> unpredictability, but this unpredictability doesn't exist at the higher
> level where the universe is being simulated (assuming many-worlds). "
>
> MP: I don't think I can accept this. Maybe I sound arrogant in saying
> this, but I think the idea of simulation is used a bit too loosely. I know
> there are those lurking on the Mind & Brain list and JCS-online who would
> say I am 'the pot calling the kettle black', because I am always asserting
> what I call UMSITW [pronounced um-see-two for English speakers] - updating
> the model of self in the world - is the basis of consciousness. But they
> misunderstand me, because I do not say there is anyone else doing
> simulation, merely that we experience being here because the universe has
> evolved self sustaining regions within itself which maintain their structure
> by means of dynamically modelling themselves and their local region so as to
> avoid fatal dangers while obtaining everything they need from their
> environments. My point here is simply that the universe is its own best
> simulation and that any ideas of something greater, such as a Matrix type
> operation, are science fiction only. Why? Because for a feasible universe
> like the one we seem to inhabit to be deterministic does not require that it
> is predictable nor that it can be repeatable. Nobody knows to what extent
> quantum level events are intrinsically random as opposed to being _pushed
> from 'behind' or 'below'_ so to speak.
>

Whether the world can be simulated and whether the world is being simulated
are two different questions. Can you point to any aspect of the world which
can't be simulated no matter how powerful the computer?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mark Peaty]

This is yet another delayed response; the story of my life really ...

Jason: "By physically reversible I don't mean we as humans can undo 
anything
that happens, rather physical interactions are time-invertible.  If you
were shown a recording of any physical interaction on a small scale, an
elastic collision of particles, the decay of a nucleus, burning of
hydrogen, it would be impossible for you to tell if that recording were
being played in reverse or not, since it is always possible for that
interaction to occur as it does in either direction of time."

MP: This is only true for 'individual' reactions on the micro scale, but 
even then the 'truth' about the reversibility can only really be 
maintained by hiding the truth about the context. For example, it is 
logically possible for certain atomic nuclei to collide at just the 
right velocities and fusion will occur. In reality however the 
probability of what are normally fission products coming together to 
make a uranium nucleus is so close to zero you are never going to see 
it. [I don't know much about the physics but my casual believe is that 
heavy elements are created through various long and complex 'ratchet' 
accretion pathways in which nuclear isotopes of H or He enter heavier 
nuclei.] Like wise the burning of hydrogen; it seems simple enough and 
yes it is 'reversible', but does the reverse occur? Not where you and I 
can see it.

Jason: "Quantum mechanics makes the universe seem random and 
uncomputable to
those inside it, but according to the many-worlds interpretation the
universe evolves deterministically.  It is only the observers within
the quantum mechanical universe that perceive the randomness and
unpredictability, but this unpredictability doesn't exist at the higher
level where the universe is being simulated (assuming many-worlds). "

MP: I don't think I can accept this. Maybe I sound arrogant in saying 
this, but I think the idea of simulation is used a bit too loosely. I 
know there are those lurking on the Mind & Brain list and JCS-online who 
would say I am 'the pot calling the kettle black', because I am always 
asserting what I call UMSITW [pronounced um-see-two for English 
speakers] - updating the model of self in the world - is the basis of 
consciousness. But they misunderstand me, because I do not say there is 
anyone else doing simulation, merely that we experience being here 
because the universe has evolved self sustaining regions within itself 
which maintain their structure by means of dynamically modelling 
themselves and their local region so as to avoid fatal dangers while 
obtaining everything they need from their environments. My point here is 
simply that the universe is its own best simulation and that any ideas 
of something greater, such as a Matrix type operation, are science 
fiction only. Why? Because for a feasible universe like the one we seem 
to inhabit to be deterministic does not require that it is predictable 
nor that it can be repeatable. Nobody knows to what extent quantum level 
events are intrinsically random as opposed to being _pushed from 
'behind' or 'below'_ so to speak.

That is one thing. Another thing is that no entity or set of entities 
could know if their 'simulation' attempt was doing what they wanted in 
every detail because to attempt to find this out would interfere 
irreversibly with the unfolding of the world. This latter objection can 
be sidelined by accepting that there are no entities with any such 
intention therefore it is irrelevant. For those who would be 'believers' 
in Sky God, as well sceptics, this puts divine intervention pretty much 
off limits.

OK, that leaves the concept of pseudo-emulation: another hidden 'level' 
of structure embodied in calculation. I guess this can be represented by 
either
1/ the movie '13th Floor' - which I think much better than 'Matrix' 1, 
2, and 3 in terms of its encapsulation of interesting philosophical 
questions - or
2/ Bruno's 'Yes Doctor' hypothesis.

These might seem to be very different but I don't think so. The key 
point is that a wilful entity or conspiracy seeks to emulate all or part 
of another wilful entity's world to the extent that the latter can't 
tell the difference when the change is made. Doubtless Bruno has a far 
more exacting definition and sets of caveats, but I insist on 
plain-English. As far as I can see, the assertion that this MUST be 
possible in principle because 'we' can imagine a mathematical 
implementation, just begs the question. I do not think there is anything 
shameful in 'reifying' physics, because if we exist and know that we do 
it has to be because we BELIEVE in ourselves and our world. Believing in 
something IS reifying it. When we understand that the basic mechanism 
underlying this process is the activation of a model of whatever it is, 
the whole question of mind and consciousness is demystified. This does 
not remove the wonder, or the challenges, of living in the amazing 
univer