Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
>  >  >> wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > John M wrote:
>  >  > Stathis and Brent:
>  >  >
>  >  > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
>  >  > Would it not make sense to write instead of
>  >  > "we are" (thing-wise) -
>  >  > the term less static, rather process-wise:
>  >  > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
>  >  >
>  >  > John M
>  >
>  > That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being
>  > static, may leave out something essential to consciousness.  But
>  > this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process
>  > rates are encoded statically as state values.  I think
> however this
>  > misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that
> when it is
>  > run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.
>  >
>  >
>  > As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from
>  > within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been
> able
>  > to come up with a method for distinguishing between block
> universe time
>  > and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise
> to the
>  > effect (or illusion) of linear time.
> 
> I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE,
> PDE, and stochastic.  But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is
> doing in running a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of
> variable values and functions that computer the rate-of-change of
> those variables - not just the values.  When it runs, the
> integration routine uses the functions to generate new values.  I'm
> not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to
> an abstract computation in Platonia.  It take the states to
> correspond to OMs.  But the states are not standing in isolation
> with no relation.  They are related by the integrator.  The
> integrator may be thought of as simulator of time.  If it is part of
> an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther,
> point to the next OM.  If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone
> are not sufficient to construct consciousness.  At least that's what
> I think part of the time ;-) 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure I understand. Are you referring to the fact that a real 
> computer does not instantaneously jump from one state to the other, but 
> goes through a process, i.e. a finite current flows when a "1" turns 
> into a "0"? These transitional states are ignored as an irrelevant 
> hardware detail when considering abstract machines.

No.  I'm talking about a sort of program/data division - which I recognize is 
arbitrary in computer program - but I think may have an analogue in brains.  
When I write a simulation of a system of ODEs the time evolution of the ODEs 
define the states.  But in the simulation, what actually evolves them is 
passing them to another program that takes them and the current state as data 
and integrates; thus producing a sequence of states.  When you talk about 
isolated OMs, what we are conscious of, I think of them as the states.  They 
are what we write into memory; they form the "narrative" of the simulation.  
The integrator is like a simulation at a lower level, perhaps at the level of 
neurons.  We're not aware of it and in fact many different integration 
algorithms could be used with little difference in the outcome (as in the comp 
idea of replacing neurons with chips).  But the integrator, even conceived as 
an abstract 'machine' in Platonia, is performing a function, connecting 
one state to the next.  I'm not denying that you can simulate all this and that 
you can take a block universe view of the simulation.  I'm just saying that the 
block can't be made of just the conscious parts, the OMs, it needs to include 
the unconscious parts that connect the conscious parts.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> > John M wrote:
> >  > Stathis and Brent:
> >  >
> >  > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> >  > Would it not make sense to write instead of
> >  > "we are" (thing-wise) -
> >  > the term less static, rather process-wise:
> >  > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
> >  >
> >  > John M
> >
> > That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being
> > static, may leave out something essential to consciousness.  But
> > this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process
> > rates are encoded statically as state values.  I think however this
> > misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is
> > run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.
> >
> >
> > As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from
> > within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able
> > to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time
> > and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the
> > effect (or illusion) of linear time.
>
> I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and
> stochastic.  But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running
> a simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions
> that computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the
> values.  When it runs, the integration routine uses the functions to
> generate new values.  I'm not insisting on the computer hardware here - it
> applies equally to an abstract computation in Platonia.  It take the states
> to correspond to OMs.  But the states are not standing in isolation with no
> relation.  They are related by the integrator.  The integrator may be
> thought of as simulator of time.  If it is part of an OM then and OM
> includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, point to the next OM.  If
> it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not sufficient to construct
> consciousness.  At least that's what I think part of the time ;-)


I'm not sure I understand. Are you referring to the fact that a real
computer does not instantaneously jump from one state to the other, but goes
through a process, i.e. a finite current flows when a "1" turns into a "0"?
These transitional states are ignored as an irrelevant hardware detail when
considering abstract machines.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/22/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> John M wrote:
>  > Stathis and Brent:
>  >
>  > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
>  > Would it not make sense to write instead of
>  > "we are" (thing-wise) -
>  > the term less static, rather process-wise:
>  > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
>  >
>  > John M
> 
> That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being
> static, may leave out something essential to consciousness.  But
> this conflicts with the idea of simulations in which all process
> rates are encoded statically as state values.  I think however this
> misses the point that a simulation must be *run* and that when it is
> run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.
> 
>  
> As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from 
> within the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able 
> to come up with a method for distinguishing between block universe time 
> and linear time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the 
> effect (or illusion) of linear time.

I'm well aware of that - I've written a lot of simulations, ODE, PDE, and 
stochastic.  But ISTM that if I look at what a computer is doing in running a 
simulation, its state is defined by a lot of variable values and functions that 
computer the rate-of-change of those variables - not just the values.  When it 
runs, the integration routine uses the functions to generate new values.  I'm 
not insisting on the computer hardware here - it applies equally to an abstract 
computation in Platonia.  It take the states to correspond to OMs.  But the 
states are not standing in isolation with no relation.  They are related by the 
integrator.  The integrator may be thought of as simulator of time.  If it is 
part of an OM then and OM includes rates and an arrow of time that, togther, 
point to the next OM.  If it is not part of the OM, then OMs alone are not 
sufficient to construct consciousness.  At least that's what I think part of 
the time ;-)

Brent Meeker

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/22/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> John M wrote:
> > Stathis and Brent:
> >
> > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> > Would it not make sense to write instead of
> > "we are" (thing-wise) -
> > the term less static, rather process-wise:
> > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
> >
> > John M
>
> That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being static, may
> leave out something essential to consciousness.  But this conflicts with the
> idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as
> state values.  I think however this misses the point that a simulation must
> be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the "rate", i.e.
> the clock.


As Quentin said, the computer clock rate cannot be determined from within
the simulation. Also, as far as I am aware no-one has been able to come up
with a method for distinguishing between block universe time and linear
time, as in a block universe static slices give rise to the effect (or
illusion) of linear time.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Believing ...

[John Mikes]

Thanks, Bruno,

The 'truth' was missing from my post.

there was a technical mistake: from my sentence as mailed:

> Being a "he" you pointed to (rejcted though as 'atheist') I really do
> not ' believe. What I
> find "logically not so repugnant -

one word disappeared in the mailing process. Originally I wrote:

> Being a "he" you pointed to (rejcted though as 'atheist') I really do
> not ' believe in T R U T H  (that was in RED). - then came a new par:
. What I  find "logically not so repugnant - etc. etc.

Maybe the red insert was not well accepted by the computer-god.
*
The reductionist dichotomy is semantic: I called 'science' (the reductionst)

the conventional historic 'gathering of information as humanity could'
and identified it earlier as a "model-view" of a boundaries-enclosed topical

cut out from the totality. Reductionist science (sic) observes events WITHIN

the topical boundaries and draws conclusions applied many times BEYOND
 them.(what I find false).
Academic - tenure - even Nobel type conventional science is rfeductionistic
in this sense.. I agree: "SCIENCE" should be as you identified it.

John

On 3/21/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Le 21-mars-07, à 15:48, John M a écrit :
>
> > BRUNO:
> >
> > I have never met an atheist who does not believe in primitive matter.
> > Well, today even theist believe in primitive matter, with few
> > exception.
> > Now, if an atheist does not believe in primitive matter, he certainly
> > believe in something, all right. And if he does fundamental research,
> > he certainly believe in something fundamental, and then if he is a
> > lobian machine, then it can be shown that that fundamental thing has
> > to be unnameable and god-like, even if it is "just" a pagan notion of
> > god.
> >
> > Bruno
> > -
> > I cannot offer myself as the example you missed so far, because - as I
> > explained - I do not consider myself conform to MY definition of an
> > atheist.
> > Theists do beluieve in primitive matter, created by their God. The
> > previous Pope even undersigned to the Big Bang (some version).
> > *
> > Being a "he" you pointed to (rejcted though as 'atheist') I really do
> > not ' believe. What I
> > find "logically not so repugnant - as either the reductionist science
> > fables" nor the religious hearsay - is a 'story' and I call itmy
> > "NARRATIVE" to just speak about an origination of our world and
> > uncountable others in a less nausiating way.
> > And yes, you may call my 'plenitude' a 'god', outside (not above) OUR
> > mother-nature AND unidentified to the limit of minimum information.
> > Not sitting as an old man oncloud.
> >
> > John M
> >
>
> OK then, except that I think that you confuse "science" and "scientism
> or fake science". I just don't see how "science" can be reductionist.
> Science is "opening the eyes and doubting what we see".
> When a scientist thinks he knows the truth (or acts like he/she was
> thinking that) then he looses his scientific attitude.  Be it in
> biology, astronomy, theology or even in astrology, or whatever. In
> science, like in conscience, public lack of doubt is akin to madness.
> This is provable (indeed it is a form of Godel second incompleteness
> theorem) for machines or lobian entities.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
>

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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Wednesday 21 March 2007 17:46:32 Brent Meeker wrote:
> John M wrote:
> > Stathis and Brent:
> >
> > ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> > Would it not make sense to write instead of
> > "we are" (thing-wise) -
> > the term less static, rather process-wise:
> > "We do"  (in whatever action)?
> >
> > John M
>
> That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being static, may
> leave out something essential to consciousness.  But this conflicts with
> the idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically
> as state values.  I think however this misses the point that a simulation
> must be *run* and that when it is run the computer provides the "rate",
> i.e. the clock.
>
> Brent Meeker
>

But the internal states of a computation are not tied to an "external" clock. 
The "external" clock rate is irrelevant (from the inside).

Quentin Anciaux

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Re: Believing ...

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 20-mars-07, à 13:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/20/07, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 01-mars-07, à 00:35, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>  > Brent Meeker quoted:
>  > "Atheism is a belief system the way "Off" is a TV channel."
>  >   --- George Carlin
> 
> 
> 
> Carlin makes the typical confusion between atheism and agnosticism.
> 
> An atheist has indeed a rich belief system:
> 1) he believes that God does not exist (unlike an agnostic who
> does not
> believe that God exists: that makes a huge difference)
> 2) he generally believes in a material or Aristotelian Universe
> (despite its contradiction with comp, or with QM, or with some
> physically reproducible facts, and despite any proof or argument
> beyond
> the Aristotelian Matter reification.)
> 
> 
> 
> 1) Do you believe we should also be agnostic about Santa Claus and
> the Tooth Fairy? If so, should the balance of belief in these
> entities (i.e. belief for/against) be similar to that in the case of
> God? I ask in all seriousness as you are a logician and there *is* a
> huge difference, logically if not practically, between atheism and
> agnosticism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course (cf Brent's comment) we are on the verge of a purely 
> vocabulary discussion. If you define God by a big white male sitting on 
> a cloud, there is a case of comparing "God" and "Santa Klaus". If you 
> define "god" by "ultimate meaning or ultimate theory of everything 
> including persons and feeling, quanta and qualia, ...", or even more 
> generally by "god" = "truth" about "us", then it is different. Now most 
> religions accept or even define God by its transcendance and 
> unnameability, 

A god defined solely by that would not be accepted by any of the major 
religions, except perhaps Bhuddism which doesn't include gods.  The Abrahamic 
religions add that God is a person, is beneficient, is demanding, and answers 
prayers.  These are defining characteristics of theism.  Which is why I was 
careful to specify a theist God.  The etymology of "atheist" implies that it is 
this religion of theism that is not believed.

>making "truth" an elementary lobian machine/entity's God, 
> and this is enough for coming back to serious theology. 

Serious theology for Bruno seems to be that of Paul Tillich: God is whatever 
you consider fundamental.  To me that seems like an attempt at theological 
jujitsu to convert atheists by redefining words.

>The gap between 
> truth about a machine and provability by that machine already 
> illustrates the necessity of distinguishing the scientific and religious 
> discourse of machines. Pure theology can be (re)defined by "truth minus 
> science". Then, lobian theology is controlled by the G/G* mathematical 
> gap, and their intensional (modal) variants.
> Talking or acting or doing anything in the name of God leads to 
> inconsistency and most probably suffering. 

What difference does "in the name of make"?  That seems to attribute magic 
power to phrases.

>In the scientific (= 
> doubting) discourse, we can use use the term "God" like we can use the 
> term "first person", but we cannot talk *in* those names.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 2) I don't know that atheists are much more likely to believe in a
> material universe than other people.
> 
> 
> I have never met an atheist who does not believe in primitive matter. 
> Well, today even theist believe in primitive matter, with few exception.
> Now, if an atheist does not believe in primitive matter, he certainly 
> believe in something, all right. And if he does fundamental research, he 
> certainly believe in something fundamental, and then if he is a lobian 
> machine, then it can be shown that that fundamental thing has to be 
> unnameable and god-like, even if it is "just" a pagan notion of god.

I can appreciate that the fundamental thing (if there is one) must be unameable 
and god-like (omnipresent)...but not God-like (person, answer prayers, 
beneficient) and not God.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Janus [was Evidence for the simulation argument ]

[Mark Peaty]

John, with your rich linguistic experience you surely recognise
that English [plain or otherwise] is very much a hybrid language
- and surely many who are forced to learn it as a second or
third language would call it 'b*stard' even. And the way that we
native speakers of English use words from other languages is
never very consistent, Imp*rialistically exploitative is the
stronger tradition. So please don't expect great depth of
empathy with Latin or whatever.

The point about 'Janus' - who I first heard about through
reading the books of Arthur Koestler - is that 'he'?  no 'It'!
embodies or symbolises some interesting aspects of the
part-whole nature of things in the real world. And it was Arthur
Koestler who really majored on the pervasive manifestation and
influence of part-whole dichotomy-as-integration in nature.

My rave about Janus and the quora is an attempt to digest all
the strange and seemingly incompatible theories and descriptions
trotted out on this and other discussion groups. The Janus
incorporates a basic paradoxical feature of the 'real' world:
togetherness and separation. The two faces of Janus ARE one
entity or feature, like the two sides of a door. Each face must
connect with others, and it seems self evident that such a place
of connection requires at least three different Jani to be
linked together, because just two would not be distinguishable.

Part of the reason I go on about this is that I am not satisfied
with conceptions of 'arithmetic' being ultimate in nature and
somehow immune from entropy. My take on things is that
'existence' per se is ultimately irreducible but we can never
get to the bottom of it. Indeed, 'getting to the bottom' of the
_Great It_ may be impossible in principle if process physics is
the truest description we can find. If basic space time is an
eternal process of collapse and simplification in the direction
of smallwards, there may be no true smallest thing. Our
discovery of the Planck length, etc, and the fact that we live
in a world of the characteristic dimensions it appears to have,
may be 'just' artefacts or consequences of being the size we
are. What I mean  is there may be no limits to the range of
scales [orders of magnitude] that are possible.

One good feature of the 'Janus' concept is that it incorporates
existence, connection at potentially vast distance, the
potential for 'direction' [because the two faces of Janus are
looking opposite ways], the potential for tension and its
resolution through simplification [and therefore gravity as
drift towards small size], and so forth. Furthermore it does not
rule out the possibility that the connections embodied as the
Janus connection, are of an indeterminate, fractal nature. This
might be reflected in the node or quorum actually being made of
[or having] fractional connectivity.

I see it as possible that 'numbers' are in fact words, and the
'integers' or 'whole numbers' that we commonly speak of and
utilise are actually convenient fabrications humans have created
in order to impose order on the world. It is conceivable that
everything real is actually a process that can only ever be
represented properly with 'quasi-numbers' that only ever
exhibit/take fractional values.


Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





John Mikes wrote:
> Mark, makes sense - but... *: I hate when people create a new
> vocabulary to be learned for appropriate use. I made MY
> vocabulary and the rest of the world should learn it. Adolf
> H*tler. * Then again I like your 'plain English' of Latin
> words, grammar and mythology. * We like to mix features of
> reductionist (conventional) "science" with more advanced
> ideas, it is an excellent way to secure endless discussions.
> Like e.g. the "SU".. I rather spread my 'I dunno' into the
> vagueness of my narratives, suggest what we might find (out?)
> in the future and scratch those assumptions that *in my
> views* serve only the purpose to make model-theories better
> believable (calculable?). * If I got it right, your 'ianus'
> is sometimes called relation and the quorum may be referred
> to as (network) nodes or hubs in some other vocabulary.
> (quorum, btw. looks to me as a plural genitive of the pronoun
> qui quae quod in masculine or neutral (quarum being the 
> feminine), also used pars pro toto for the existing total
> construct mostly in human assemblages. Accordingly my Latin
> disallows to form a simple plural of it, since it is not a
> noun within the neutral o-based conjugation. (Yet, you may
> say: 'quorums'). (I learned this 74-75 years ago, so please
> do correct me if someone has more recent and unmatching
> memories).
> 
> You start well with " * so-called Dark matter may simply be
> vortex knots that neither generate nor receive gliders..."
> but continue within the subatomic 'particle' lingo,( of which
> Enrico Fermi quipped: If I knew that much Greek, I could be a
> botanic. )
> 
> Best regards
> 
> John M
> 
> On

Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[Brent Meeker]

John M wrote:
> Stathis and Brent:
>  
> ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments.
> Would it not make sense to write instead of
> "we are" (thing-wise) -
> the term less static, rather process-wise:
> "We do"  (in whatever action)?
>  
> John M

That's part of what I'm struggling with.  ISTM that OMs, being static, may 
leave out something essential to consciousness.  But this conflicts with the 
idea of simulations in which all process rates are encoded statically as state 
values.  I think however this misses the point that a simulation must be *run* 
and that when it is run the computer provides the "rate", i.e. the clock.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the 
>> numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an 
>> inherent relation like being relatively prime?
> 
> 
> It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number 
> of a proof of f, etc.

I didn't think godel numbering was unique?  If I just cite a number, like 
12345678987654321, is it either the godel number of a proof or not?

Brent

> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> > 
> 
> 


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Re: Believing ...

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 21-mars-07, à 15:48, John M a écrit :

> BRUNO:
>  
> I have never met an atheist who does not believe in primitive matter. 
> Well, today even theist believe in primitive matter, with few 
> exception.
> Now, if an atheist does not believe in primitive matter, he certainly 
> believe in something, all right. And if he does fundamental research, 
> he certainly believe in something fundamental, and then if he is a 
> lobian machine, then it can be shown that that fundamental thing has 
> to be unnameable and god-like, even if it is "just" a pagan notion of 
> god.
>
> Bruno
> -
> I cannot offer myself as the example you missed so far, because - as I 
> explained - I do not consider myself conform to MY definition of an 
> atheist.
> Theists do beluieve in primitive matter, created by their God. The 
> previous Pope even undersigned to the Big Bang (some version).
> *
> Being a "he" you pointed to (rejcted though as 'atheist') I really do 
> not ' believe. What I
> find "logically not so repugnant - as either the reductionist science 
> fables" nor the religious hearsay - is a 'story' and I call it my 
>  "NARRATIVE"  to just speak about an origination of our world and 
> uncountable others in a less nausiating way.
> And yes, you may call my 'plenitude' a 'god', outside (not above) OUR 
> mother-nature AND unidentified to the limit of minimum information. 
> Not sitting as an old man on cloud.
>  
> John M
>

OK then, except that I think that you confuse "science" and "scientism 
or fake science". I just don't see how "science" can be reductionist. 
Science is "opening the eyes and doubting what we see".
When a scientist thinks he knows the truth (or acts like he/she was 
thinking that) then he looses his scientific attitude.  Be it in 
biology, astronomy, theology or even in astrology, or whatever. In 
science, like in conscience, public lack of doubt is akin to madness. 
This is provable (indeed it is a form of Godel second incompleteness 
theorem) for machines or lobian entities.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: String theory and Cellular Automata

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

Thanks.

On 3/20/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> You could be interested by a paper introducing String theory as a
> syntactical logical structure by the "other Schmidhuber" (Juergen's
> brother Christof):
>
>
> Here:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0011065
>
>   What are strings made of? The possibility is discussed that strings
> are purely mathematical objects, made of logical axioms. More
> precisely, proofs in simple logical calculi are represented by graphs
> that can be interpreted as the Feynman diagrams of certain large-N
> field theories. Each vertex represents an axiom. Strings arise, because
> these large-N theories are dual to string theories. These ``logical
> quantum field theories'' map theorems into the space of functions of
> two parameters: N and the coupling constant. Undecidable theorems might
> be related to nonperturbative field theory effects.
>
>
>
> This is infinitely better than Wolfram pure classical CA approach which
> has no rules for distinguishing 1 and 3 person notion, and so miss the
> idea of internal emerging physical laws.
>
>
>
>
> Le 14-mars-07, à 10:23, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit :
>
> > I'm thinking there's some kind of similarity between string theory and
> > depicting the world as a big CA. In String theory we have some
> > vibrating strings which have some kind of influence on each other and
> > can for different matters and fields. CA can play such role of
> > changing patterns and of course the influence is evident. Different
> > rules in CA might correspond to various basic shapes of vibration in
> > strings...
> > I don't know much about S.T. but the idea of such mapping seems very
> > interesting.
> >
> > --
> > Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.
> >
> >
> >  >
> >
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
>


-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,
Sharif University of Technology,
Tehran.

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Re: Believing ...

[John M]

BRUNO:

I have never met an atheist who does not believe in primitive matter. Well, 
today even theist believe in primitive matter, with few exception.
Now, if an atheist does not believe in primitive matter, he certainly believe 
in something, all right. And if he does fundamental research, he certainly 
believe in something fundamental, and then if he is a lobian machine, then it 
can be shown that that fundamental thing has to be unnameable and god-like, 
even if it is "just" a pagan notion of god.

Bruno
-
I cannot offer myself as the example you missed so far, because - as I 
explained - I do not consider myself conform to MY definition of an atheist. 
Theists do beluieve in primitive matter, created by their God. The previous 
Pope even undersigned to the Big Bang (some version). 
*
Being a "he" you pointed to (rejcted though as 'atheist') I really do not ' 
believe. What I 
find "logically not so repugnant - as either the reductionist science fables" 
nor the religious hearsay - is a 'story' and I call it my  "NARRATIVE"  to just 
speak about an origination of our world and uncountable others in a less 
nausiating way. 
And yes, you may call my 'plenitude' a 'god', outside (not above) OUR 
mother-nature AND unidentified to the limit of minimum information. Not sitting 
as an old man on cloud.

John M






: Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2007 7:25 AM
  Subject: Re: Believing ...



  Le 20-mars-07, à 13:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :




On 3/20/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


  Le 01-mars-07, à 00:35, Brent Meeker a écrit :

  > Brent Meeker quoted:
  > "Atheism is a belief system the way "Off" is a TV channel."
  >   --- George Carlin



  Carlin makes the typical confusion between atheism and agnosticism.

  An atheist has indeed a rich belief system:
  1) he believes that God does not exist (unlike an agnostic who does not
  believe that God exists: that makes a huge difference)
  2) he generally believes in a material or Aristotelian Universe
  (despite its contradiction with comp, or with QM, or with some
  physically reproducible facts, and despite any proof or argument beyond
  the Aristotelian Matter reification.)




1) Do you believe we should also be agnostic about Santa Claus and the 
Tooth Fairy? If so, should the balance of belief in these entities (i.e. belief 
for/against) be similar to that in the case of God? I ask in all seriousness as 
you are a logician and there *is* a huge difference, logically if not 
practically, between atheism and agnosticism.




  Of course (cf Brent's comment) we are on the verge of a purely vocabulary 
discussion. If you define God by a big white male sitting on a cloud, there is 
a case of comparing "God" and "Santa Klaus". If you define "god" by "ultimate 
meaning or ultimate theory of everything including persons and feeling, quanta 
and qualia, ...", or even more generally by "god" = "truth" about "us", then it 
is different. Now most religions accept or even define God by its transcendance 
and unnameability, making "truth" an elementary lobian machine/entity's God, 
and this is enough for coming back to serious theology. The gap between truth 
about a machine and provability by that machine already illustrates the 
necessity of distinguishing the scientific and religious discourse of machines. 
Pure theology can be (re)defined by "truth minus science". Then, lobian 
theology is controlled by the G/G* mathematical gap, and their intensional 
(modal) variants.
  Talking or acting or doing anything in the name of God leads to inconsistency 
and most probably suffering. In the scientific (= doubting) discourse, we can 
use use the term "God" like we can use the term "first person", but we cannot 
talk *in* those names.





2) I don't know that atheists are much more likely to believe in a material 
universe than other people.


  I have never met an atheist who does not believe in primitive matter. Well, 
today even theist believe in primitive matter, with few exception.
  Now, if an atheist does not believe in primitive matter, he certainly believe 
in something, all right. And if he does fundamental research, he certainly 
believe in something fundamental, and then if he is a lobian machine, then it 
can be shown that that fundamental thing has to be unnameable and god-like, 
even if it is "just" a pagan notion of god.

  Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?

[John M]

Stathis and Brent:

ineresting and hard-to-object sentiments. 
Would it not make sense to write instead of 
"we are" (thing-wise) - 
the term less static, rather process-wise:
"We do"  (in whatever action)?

John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2007 3:23 PM
  Subject: Re: Statistical Measure, does it matter?



  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  > 
  > 
  > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  > > wrote:
  > 
  > 
  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  >  >
  >  >
  >  > On 3/19/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  > 
  >  >  >> wrote:
  >  >
  >  >
  >  >  >If there are OMs which don't
  >  >  > remember being you then they are not going to be part of your
  >  > stream of
  >  >  > consciousness.
  >  >
  >  > There's the rub.  Almost all my OMs *do not* include consciously
  >  > remembering being me (or anyone). And if you suppose there is an
  >  > *unconscious* memory component of an OM then there's a
  > problem with
  >  > what it means to have an unconscious part of consciousness.
  >  >
  >  >
  >  > Well, how do you maintain a sense of being you in normal life?
  > 
  > Certainly not consciously.
  > 
  >  >If you
  >  > are absent-mindedly staring at a tree you at least have a sense
  > that you
  >  > have been staring at the tree, rather than drowning in the ocean a
  >  > moment ago.
  > 
  > I have that sense transiently - and its isolated and unconnected to
  > the OM in which I was staring at the tree, except through the
  > content it shares, i.e. my staring at a tree - the one as perception
  > and the other as memory of a perception.
  > 
  >  >You are also aware that you haven't grown 10cm taller or
  >  > suddenly changed sex - that is, you would immediately be aware of
  > these
  >  > things had they happened, even though you are not actively thinking
  >  > about them or their absence.
  > 
  > 
  >  >So a bland sameness from moment to moment
  >  > constitutes a sense of memory and continuity of identity,
  > 
  > What's a "sense of memory"?  Is it conscious?  I'm not conscious of
  > one.  I'd say it's the default model we use when we think, "Am I the
  > same person I was a few minutes ago?  Don't feel and
  > different.  Must be." 
  > 
  > 
  > It seems you are using "consciousness" in a more specific sense than I 
  > am. I am just referring to the process of having any experience - of not 
  > being unconscious.
  > 
  >  >since an OM
  >  > that deviated substantially from this would either not be
  > considered as
  >  > a successor OM or immediately alert you that something strange had
  >  > happened.
  > 
  > But as you argued earlier OMs don't communicate.  They are not
  > related except by their conscious content.  So an OM never has
  > knowledge of another OM against which to measure its deviation.  One
  > might experience an OM whose content was, "I'm a different person
  > than I was ten minutes ago because I now notice a discontinuity in
  > my memory." but I'm not sure even that would break my feeling of
  > being me. 
  > 
  > 
  > No, there are obviously multiple factors involved, from memory to 
  > continuity of perception and perhaps even a primary sense of identity 
  > separate from these other cues. But if at any moment these factors have 
  > zero conscious activity, they could in theory be eliminated, although 
  > they might need to be brought into play again in an instant.
  > 
  > My point is that, at least as I experience it, consciousness, the
  > inner narrative we tell ourselves, is far too weak, to lacking in
  > content, to create a chain of experience.  Memory cannot do it
  > because one is rarely, consciously remembering anything.  What
  > creates the chain is something unconscious - something not observed
  > and so not part of an OM. 
  > 
  > 
  > Unconscious factors affecting our sense of continuity of identity must 
  > do it through affecting conscious factors. 

  That would follow if we were always conscious of our sense of continuity of 
identity, but I don't think we are.  I may think of it from time-to-time, but 
generally I don't have any "sense of identity" to be affected.  That's the 
problem I see with OMs.  They are usually conceived as what people not on this 
list call "thoughts", the sort of thing expressible in simple sentence.  They 
don't come with a subordinate clause, "and this thought is by Brent Meeker."

  >Suppose some unconscious 
  > factor X were partly responsible for placing my last second of 
  > consciousness in sequence. That means

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the 
> numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an 
> inherent relation like being relatively prime?


It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number 
of a proof of f, etc.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Believing ...

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 20-mars-07, à 17:07, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 01-mars-07, à 00:35, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> Brent Meeker quoted:
>>> "Atheism is a belief system the way "Off" is a TV channel."
>>> --- George Carlin
>>
>>
>>
>> Carlin makes the typical confusion between atheism and agnosticism.
>>
>> An atheist has indeed a rich belief system:
>> 1) he believes that God does not exist (unlike an agnostic who does 
>> not
>> believe that God exists: that makes a huge difference)
>
> I disagree.  Those are definitions consistent is usage, but so are
>
> atheist: one who doesn't believe that God (meaning the god of theism) 
> exists.
>
> agnostic: one who believes it is impossible have any knowledge as to 
> whether God exists.
>
> Those are also common usages and align more closely with the etymology 
> of the words.


Even searching in most web dictionaries I don't find such definitions, 
except in parentheses with remark like "some also use the term in such 
or such way".


>
>
>> 2) he generally believes in a material or Aristotelian Universe
>> (despite its contradiction with comp,
>
> What contradiction is that?


It is the epistemological contradiction which follows the UDA 
reasoning. It is not an ontic contradiction because science can never 
refute anything ontological. But it is a logical contradiction between 
comp, materialism and even very weak form of Occam razor, like the 
contradiction in believing in both thermodynamic and invisible horses 
pulling cars.



>
>> or with QM, or with some
>> physically reproducible facts, and despite any proof or argument 
>> beyond
>> the Aristotelian Matter reification.)
>
> To say one shouldn't reifying matter seems like saying one shouldn't 
> anthropomorphize people.  Things made of matter, tables and chairs, 
> exist paradigmatically.  That there may be some deeper, more 
> fundamental explanation of tables and chairs hardly makes them go 
> away.

Of course. I was talking about primitive or reifed matter, not about 
gluons or elephants.


Must go for now,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Believing ...

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 20-mars-07, à 13:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

>
>
> On 3/20/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> Le 01-mars-07, à 00:35, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>> > Brent Meeker quoted:
>> > "Atheism is a belief system the way "Off" is a TV channel."
>> >   --- George Carlin
>>
>>
>>
>>  Carlin makes the typical confusion between atheism and agnosticism.
>>
>> An atheist has indeed a rich belief system:
>> 1) he believes that God does not exist (unlike an agnostic who does 
>> not
>> believe that God exists: that makes a huge difference)
>> 2) he generally believes in a material or Aristotelian Universe
>> (despite its contradiction with comp, or with QM, or with some
>> physically reproducible facts, and despite any proof or argument 
>> beyond
>> the Aristotelian Matter reification.)


> 1) Do you believe we should also be agnostic about Santa Claus and the 
> Tooth Fairy? If so, should the balance of belief in these entities 
> (i.e. belief for/against) be similar to that in the case of God? I ask 
> in all seriousness as you are a logician and there *is* a huge 
> difference, logically if not practically, between atheism and 
> agnosticism.



Of course (cf Brent's comment) we are on the verge of a purely 
vocabulary discussion. If you define God by a big white male sitting on 
a cloud, there is a case of comparing "God" and "Santa Klaus". If you 
define "god" by "ultimate meaning or ultimate theory of everything 
including persons and feeling, quanta and qualia, ...", or even more 
generally by "god" = "truth" about "us", then it is different. Now most 
religions accept or even define God by its transcendance and 
unnameability, making "truth" an elementary lobian machine/entity's 
God, and this is enough for coming back to serious theology. The gap 
between truth about a machine and provability by that machine already 
illustrates the necessity of distinguishing the scientific and 
religious discourse of machines. Pure theology can be (re)defined by 
"truth minus science". Then, lobian theology is controlled by the G/G* 
mathematical gap, and their intensional (modal) variants.
Talking or acting or doing anything in the name of God leads to 
inconsistency and most probably suffering. In the scientific (= 
doubting) discourse, we can use use the term "God" like we can use the 
term "first person", but we cannot talk *in* those names.



>
> 2) I don't know that atheists are much more likely to believe in a 
> material universe than other people.

I have never met an atheist who does not believe in primitive matter. 
Well, today even theist believe in primitive matter, with few 
exception.
Now, if an atheist does not believe in primitive matter, he certainly 
believe in something, all right. And if he does fundamental research, 
he certainly believe in something fundamental, and then if he is a 
lobian machine, then it can be shown that that fundamental thing has to 
be unnameable and god-like, even if it is "just" a pagan notion of god.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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