Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Sophistry has a smell. Sometimes an argument smells of it, but it may be a lot harder to pin down where the specious logic is – especially when it’s all dressed up in a mathematical formalism that may be inaccessible to the non-mathematician/logician. However the problem with the arguments relating to consciousness in this paper is not so hard to pin down, and indeed Stephen King is on the right track with his objection. Eastmond argues that an infinite conscious lifetime is impossible because, in ‘finding oneself’ at a particular point in that lifetime, one would have to gain an infinite amount of knowledge, which is absurd. He concludes that such an infinite lifetime is in principle impossible. The flaw lies in the way the author glosses over the notion of “gaining information”. In examining the problem, he treats this “gaining of information” as if it occurred magically the moment one finds oneself at a certain point in a lifetime, but in fact such information has to be acquired by a concrete computation. For example, if I am to gain information about my current lifetime position, I need to examine a calendar and compare this to stored or acquired knowledge about my date of birth. In the case of an infinite lifetime, the size of the computation required is arbitrarily large (but finite) in the case of an infinite lifetime with a lower bound (a life time with a starting point), or simply uncomputable in the case of an infinite lifetime with no lower bound. This is the same as saying that one cannot calculate the age of a person who has always existed. The fact that such a person’s age is uncomputable does not however mean that such a person cannot exist. The favoured theory in modern cosmology suggests that the universe is spatially infinite. How then do we calculate the position of our planet in this universe? If astronomers had infinite access to the map of the universe, they could still never calculate our position, because the calculation would be infinite. Given that time is known to be interconvertible with space, it follows that the same logic would apply to locating an event on an infinite timeline. The situations are mathematically indistinguishable, yet this does not prove away the spatially infinite universe theory. In an infinite lifetime with no lower bound, we can never know our age, and the amount of information ‘gained’ when we find ourselves at a point of time in such a lifetime is a function of how much information we can process (concrete processing limitations) and the amount of information available to us about our position. Whichever is smaller forms the limit. There is also a flaw in the reasoning in relation to the proposed conscious computer which resets itself in order to generate repeated (and therefore infinite) conscious moments. We must remember that the information gain is made by the conscious entity and must form part of its conscious computation. Otherwise where is the supposed gain occurring? All we would have is an objective description of a perfectly mathematically conceivable situation – an infinite set of values for the set of conscious moments, or an infinitely long string to define a moment within that set. So the computer must gain the information. But it cannot do so if it continually resets. The invocation of thermodynamics does not help if the computer cannot access information about entropy. It can escape this problem with an endless incrementing loop, but then it needs an infinite memory to store this growing string. Its computational limitations inevitably force its incrementing register to 'clock over' (like Y2K) at some point, causing it to repeat itself. So unless we grant the possibility of an infinite mind/computer, an infinite lifetime necessarily entails the repeat of conscious experience (just as cosmologists grant that the spatially infinite universe with locally finite information must entail a Nietzschean infinite recurrence). Such a lifetime is perfectly imaginable. Indeed, theoretically an infinite lifetime with no repetition is possible with infinite computational resources. With these flaws the remaining argument regarding the impossibility of a deterministic and conscious computer need not even be addressed, since they are built on unsound foundations. On Aug 25, 8:12 am, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find this interesting). Any comments on its cogency? http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: bruno list
On 30 Aug 2011, at 19:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 30, 11:29 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Aug 2011, at 14:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 30, 4:06 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Aug 2011, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: Definitely, but the reasons that we have for causing those changes in the semiconductor material are not semiconductor logics. They use hardware logic to to get the hardware to do software logic, just as the mind uses the brain's hardware to remember, imagine, plan, or execute what the mind wants it to. What the mind wants is influenced by the brain, but the brain is also influenced directly by the mind. A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on its low level universal bearer. Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine? This is meaningless. If there is no such thing as a non-machine, then how can the term machine have any meaning? There are a ton of non-machines. Recursion theory is the study of degree of non-machineness. What is meaningless is to ask to a machine to emulate a non-machine, which by definition is not emulable by a machine. The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory relying on something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it? Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness. If you mean by this, 1-awareness, No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all types of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the same. Most plausibly. comp explains its existence and its non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing emulable beings in our physical neighborhood. Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1-awareness beings living in? Or are they metaphysical? They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals) This is enough precise to be tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum weirdness, like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self- duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to experience non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in the third person picture. I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person picture. Third person is by definition computable. Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The third person truth is bigger than the computable. Some of those computations are influenced by 1p motives though. OK. But the motive might be an abstract being or engram (programmed by nature, evolution, that is deep computational histories). No need to introduce anything non Turing emulable in the picture here. Once those motives are expressed externally, they are computable. But with comp, you just cannot express them externally, just illustrate them and hope others grasp. They are not computable, because the experience is consciousness filtered by infinities of 'brains'. Comp shows a problem. What problem shows your theory? You can't always reverse engineer the 1-p motives from the 3-p though. You are right, that is why, with comp, most 1-p notion are not 3- definable. Still, comp allows to study the case of the ideally correct machine, and have metatheories shedding light on that non communicability. Feeling as qualitatively distinct from detection. Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a person, Yes! A person, or another animal. Not a virus or a silicon chip or a computer made of chips. This is racism. It is a confusion of what is a person and its body. No doubt billions years of engramming, make them hard to separate technologically, but nothing prevent to survive with digital brain, or even to live in virtual environment in principle, at some level, some day. And in this picture we can formulate precise (sub) problem of the hard mind body problem. which involves some (not big) amount of self-reference ability. You don't have to be able to refer to yourself to feel something. You don't have to refer to yourself explicitly, but *feeling* still involves implicit self-references, I think. Pain is primitive. It is very simple at the base and very deep, but, hmm I don't know, perhaps 1-primitive (with some of the 1-views described by the arithmetical or self-referential hypostases). Not 3-primitive, with mechanism. Not to disqualify machines implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk bottles, whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want to assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like dominoes. We know about
Re: bruno list
On Aug 31, 2:53 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Aug 2011, at 19:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on its low level universal bearer. Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine? This is meaningless. If there is no such thing as a non-machine, then how can the term machine have any meaning? There are a ton of non-machines. Recursion theory is the study of degree of non-machineness. What is meaningless is to ask to a machine to emulate a non-machine, which by definition is not emulable by a machine. Ok, so how do we know that human awareness is not both a machine and a non-machine, and therefore not completely Turing emulable? The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory relying on something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it? Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness. If you mean by this, 1-awareness, No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all types of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the same. Most plausibly. comp explains its existence and its non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing emulable beings in our physical neighborhood. Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1-awareness beings living in? Or are they metaphysical? They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals) What makes them seem local to a spatiotemporal axis in a way that seems simple in the 1p? How does an unboundedly complex phenomena 'go to the store for some beer'? But back to this (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. That's a yes to the question of whether they are metaphysical, right? This is enough precise to be tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum weirdness, like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self- duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to experience non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in the third person picture. I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person picture. Third person is by definition computable. Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The third person truth is bigger than the computable. I don't know enough about it to say whether I agree yet, so I'll take your word for it, but would you agree that Third person truth is by definition more computable than first person? Some of those computations are influenced by 1p motives though. OK. But the motive might be an abstract being or engram (programmed by nature, evolution, that is deep computational histories). No need to introduce anything non Turing emulable in the picture here. Doesn't that just push first cause back a step? What motives influence the abstract being, nature, or deep computational histories? Once those motives are expressed externally, they are computable. But with comp, you just cannot express them externally, just illustrate them and hope others grasp. They are not computable, because the experience is consciousness filtered by infinities of 'brains'. Illustrating them isn't an external expression? It sounds like you're saying that nothing is computable now? Comp shows a problem. What problem shows your theory? You mean what problem does my theory solve? Or what's an example of a problem which arises from not using my model? It's the mind/body problem. The role of awareness in the cosmos. The nature of our relation to the microcosm and macrocosm. What energy, time, space, and matter really are. The origins of the universe. You can't always reverse engineer the 1-p motives from the 3-p though. You are right, that is why, with comp, most 1-p notion are not 3- definable. Still, comp allows to study the case of the ideally correct machine, and have metatheories shedding light on that non communicability. Sounds good to me. I think there is tremendous value in studying ideal principles, although I would not limit them to arithmetic minimalism. There's a whole universe of ideally correct non-machine intelligence out there (in here) that needs metatheories too. Feeling as qualitatively distinct from detection. Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a person, Yes! A person, or another animal. Not a virus or a silicon chip or a computer made of chips. This is racism. A silicon chip is not a member of a race. It does nothing at all that could be considered an expression of feeling. It might have feeling, but whatever it has, we have something more, at least in our own eyes. Racism is to look at another human being with prejudice, not to look at an inanimate object and fail to give it
10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers
http://scienceblogs.com/developingintelligence/2007/03/why_the_brain_is_not_like_a_co.php 10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers [ Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Neuroscience, Computational Modeling ] Posted on: March 27, 2007 12:38 PM, by Chris Chatham A good metaphor is something even the police should keep an eye on. - G.C. Lichtenberg Although the brain-computer metaphor has served cognitive psychology well, research in cognitive neuroscience has revealed many important differences between brains and computers. Appreciating these differences may be crucial to understanding the mechanisms of neural information processing, and ultimately for the creation of artificial intelligence. Below, I review the most important of these differences (and the consequences to cognitive psychology of failing to recognize them): similar ground is covered in this excellent (though lengthy) lecture. Difference # 1: Brains are analogue; computers are digital It's easy to think that neurons are essentially binary, given that they fire an action potential if they reach a certain threshold, and otherwise do not fire. This superficial similarity to digital 1's and 0's belies a wide variety of continuous and non-linear processes that directly influence neuronal processing. For example, one of the primary mechanisms of information transmission appears to be the rate at which neurons fire - an essentially continuous variable. Similarly, networks of neurons can fire in relative synchrony or in relative disarray; this coherence affects the strength of the signals received by downstream neurons. Finally, inside each and every neuron is a leaky integrator circuit, composed of a variety of ion channels and continuously fluctuating membrane potentials. Failure to recognize these important subtleties may have contributed to Minksy Papert's infamous mischaracterization of perceptrons, a neural network without an intermediate layer between input and output. In linear networks, any function computed by a 3-layer network can also be computed by a suitably rearranged 2-layer network. In other words, combinations of multiple linear functions can be modeled precisely by just a single linear function. Since their simple 2-layer networks could not solve many important problems, Minksy Papert reasoned that that larger networks also could not. In contrast, the computations performed by more realistic (i.e., nonlinear) networks are highly dependent on the number of layers - thus, perceptrons grossly underestimate the computational power of neural networks. Difference # 2: The brain uses content-addressable memory In computers, information in memory is accessed by polling its precise memory address. This is known as byte-addressable memory. In contrast, the brain uses content-addressable memory, such that information can be accessed in memory through spreading activation from closely related concepts. For example, thinking of the word fox may automatically spread activation to memories related to other clever animals, fox-hunting horseback riders, or attractive members of the opposite sex. The end result is that your brain has a kind of built-in Google, in which just a few cues (key words) are enough to cause a full memory to be retrieved. Of course, similar things can be done in computers, mostly by building massive indices of stored data, which then also need to be stored and searched through for the relevant information (incidentally, this is pretty much what Google does, with a few twists). Although this may seem like a rather minor difference between computers and brains, it has profound effects on neural computation. For example, a lasting debate in cognitive psychology concerned whether information is lost from memory because of simply decay or because of interference from other information. In retrospect, this debate is partially based on the false asssumption that these two possibilities are dissociable, as they can be in computers. Many are now realizing that this debate represents a false dichotomy. Difference # 3: The brain is a massively parallel machine; computers are modular and serial An unfortunate legacy of the brain-computer metaphor is the tendency for cognitive psychologists to seek out modularity in the brain. For example, the idea that computers require memory has lead some to seek for the memory area, when in fact these distinctions are far more messy. One consequence of this over-simplification is that we are only now learning that memory regions (such as the hippocampus) are also important for imagination, the representation of novel goals, spatial navigation, and other diverse functions. Similarly, one could imagine there being a language module in the brain, as there might be in computers with natural language processing programs. Cognitive psychologists even claimed to have found this module, based on patients with damage to a region of the brain known as Broca's area. More recent
Re: 10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers
On 31 Aug 2011, at 15:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://scienceblogs.com/developingintelligence/2007/03/why_the_brain_is_not_like_a_co.php 10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers [ Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Neuroscience, Computational Modeling ] Posted on: March 27, 2007 12:38 PM, by Chris Chatham A good metaphor is something even the police should keep an eye on. - G.C. Lichtenberg Although the brain-computer metaphor has served cognitive psychology well, research in cognitive neuroscience has revealed many important differences between brains and computers. Appreciating these differences may be crucial to understanding the mechanisms of neural information processing, and ultimately for the creation of artificial intelligence. Below, I review the most important of these differences (and the consequences to cognitive psychology of failing to recognize them): similar ground is covered in this excellent (though lengthy) lecture. Difference # 1: Brains are analogue; computers are digital It's easy to think that neurons are essentially binary, given that they fire an action potential if they reach a certain threshold, and otherwise do not fire. This superficial similarity to digital 1's and 0's belies a wide variety of continuous and non-linear processes that directly influence neuronal processing. For example, one of the primary mechanisms of information transmission appears to be the rate at which neurons fire - an essentially continuous variable. Similarly, networks of neurons can fire in relative synchrony or in relative disarray; this coherence affects the strength of the signals received by downstream neurons. Finally, inside each and every neuron is a leaky integrator circuit, composed of a variety of ion channels and continuously fluctuating membrane potentials. Failure to recognize these important subtleties may have contributed to Minksy Papert's infamous mischaracterization of perceptrons, a neural network without an intermediate layer between input and output. In linear networks, any function computed by a 3-layer network can also be computed by a suitably rearranged 2-layer network. In other words, combinations of multiple linear functions can be modeled precisely by just a single linear function. Since their simple 2-layer networks could not solve many important problems, Minksy Papert reasoned that that larger networks also could not. In contrast, the computations performed by more realistic (i.e., nonlinear) networks are highly dependent on the number of layers - thus, perceptrons grossly underestimate the computational power of neural networks. Difference # 2: The brain uses content-addressable memory In computers, information in memory is accessed by polling its precise memory address. This is known as byte-addressable memory. In contrast, the brain uses content-addressable memory, such that information can be accessed in memory through spreading activation from closely related concepts. For example, thinking of the word fox may automatically spread activation to memories related to other clever animals, fox-hunting horseback riders, or attractive members of the opposite sex. The end result is that your brain has a kind of built-in Google, in which just a few cues (key words) are enough to cause a full memory to be retrieved. Of course, similar things can be done in computers, mostly by building massive indices of stored data, which then also need to be stored and searched through for the relevant information (incidentally, this is pretty much what Google does, with a few twists). Although this may seem like a rather minor difference between computers and brains, it has profound effects on neural computation. For example, a lasting debate in cognitive psychology concerned whether information is lost from memory because of simply decay or because of interference from other information. In retrospect, this debate is partially based on the false asssumption that these two possibilities are dissociable, as they can be in computers. Many are now realizing that this debate represents a false dichotomy. Difference # 3: The brain is a massively parallel machine; computers are modular and serial An unfortunate legacy of the brain-computer metaphor is the tendency for cognitive psychologists to seek out modularity in the brain. For example, the idea that computers require memory has lead some to seek for the memory area, when in fact these distinctions are far more messy. One consequence of this over-simplification is that we are only now learning that memory regions (such as the hippocampus) are also important for imagination, the representation of novel goals, spatial navigation, and other diverse functions. Similarly, one could imagine there being a language module in the brain, as there might be in computers with natural language processing programs. Cognitive psychologists even claimed to have found this module, based on patients with damage to a region
Re: 10 Important Differences Between Brains and Computers
On Aug 31, 10:01 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Those are arguments against the comp metaphor, which compare the brain with man made universal machine, and which is very naïve. Not against the comp hypothesis which assert the existence of a level where we are Turing emulable. Yes, it's just about brain vs contemporary electronic semiconductor computer. I mainly wanted to post this in corroboration with my position on the viability of artificial neurons or the conception of the psyche as a product of electric switching through neurons. I wouldn't say that it supports comp hypothesis though either, whereas I would expect that it would support it if the data fit that interpretation. The point about relying on continuous sense connections of the body with it's outside world would seem to support my view that sense is fundamental and not solipsistic simulations or arithmetic representations. Other points made, like content addressable memory and self-organization seem to favor a signifying, 1p architecture rather than a 3-p a-signifying scripted organization. Every point he mentions seems to go along well with my position, but nothing compels me one way or the other in it about comp hypothesis. The #6 item about hardware and software being distinctly different in a typical PC but not in the brain supports my contention that our use of computers piggybacks our own human codes and experiences onto a completely unfeeling inorganic substrate which has no capacity to feel or learn to feel. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On 31 Aug 2011, at 15:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 31, 2:53 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Aug 2011, at 19:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on its low level universal bearer. Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine? This is meaningless. If there is no such thing as a non-machine, then how can the term machine have any meaning? There are a ton of non-machines. Recursion theory is the study of degree of non-machineness. What is meaningless is to ask to a machine to emulate a non-machine, which by definition is not emulable by a machine. Ok, so how do we know that human awareness is not both a machine and a non-machine, and therefore not completely Turing emulable? On the contrary, we know that if we have a Turing emulable body, then our first person being are not Turing emulable. Even the Universal Dovetailer cannot emulate one soul. By the first person indeterminacy (but not only that) the soul emerges from the whole block structure of the UD-work (which I denote often by UD*). The notion of soul refers to truth which is not even definable. The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory relying on something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it? Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness. If you mean by this, 1-awareness, No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all types of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the same. Most plausibly. comp explains its existence and its non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing emulable beings in our physical neighborhood. Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1- awareness beings living in? Or are they metaphysical? They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals) What makes them seem local to a spatiotemporal axis in a way that seems simple in the 1p? How does an unboundedly complex phenomena 'go to the store for some beer'? Look at what is beer in a first approximation. You need stars planet, life, .. up to he human story including perhaps soccer, adverstizing, prohibition of cannabis, and incredibly complex phenomenon related to other complex phenomenon. It seems simple to you because a large part of that story is already encapsulate by the complexity of your cells and brains, the deepness of the thirst sensation, etc. The 1-person find that simple, because it looks at the process from its end. But back to this (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. That's a yes to the question of whether they are metaphysical, right? No, it means it is arithmetical. Like 17 is prime. And the 1-person is theological, if you want. Like 17 is prime and 17 is prime. The second 17 is prime refers implicitly to truth, which is arguably metaphysical or theological. This is enough precise to be tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum weirdness, like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self- duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to experience non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in the third person picture. I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person picture. Third person is by definition computable. Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The third person truth is bigger than the computable. I don't know enough about it to say whether I agree yet, so I'll take your word for it, but would you agree that Third person truth is by definition more computable than first person? I'm afraid it is not. A famous theorem (following works by Post, Skolem, Kleene, Mostowski) makes it possible to classify the arithmetical insolubilities by the alternation of the quantifiers in front of a decidable predicate. Hereafter P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is a decidable predicate containing only the symbols *, +, s, 0, together with variables x, y, z, ..., and the usual propositional logical symbol (, V, ~, (, )°, but NO quantifiers. P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_0, or Pi_0, or Delta_0. They are recursive, decidable, completely computable. ExP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_1 = semi-decidable (decidable when true) = partial computable = Turing emulable AxP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_1 = semi-refutable (decidable when false) = already non computable, non Turing emulable ExAyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_2 (much more non computable) AxEyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_2 (even much more non computable) ExAyEzP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_3 etc. Arithmetical truth can be seen as the union of all Sigma_i (or of all Pi_i). Computability stops at sigma_1. Now the 1-person
Re: bruno list
On 31 Aug 2011, at 18:26, meekerdb wrote: On 8/31/2011 12:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't understand. I insist all the time that IF 3-we are machine (yes doctor) then neither matter nor consciousness are computable/ Turing emulable. The 1-p is not even representable, although it is meta-representable (by Bp p, for example). I think that is the confusing part. To say 'yes doctor' is to bet that we (our brain) can be replaced by a computer (in some general sense), Yes. but then you purport to show that 'we' are not computable. So even what a (physical) computer does is not computable. Well, to be an artificial brain, the physical computer has to do something computable. But the physical part (body) of the computer, when looked in details, has to result from a competition among infinities of universal machines. But that is just the comp many- worlds as seen through our angle/history/histories. This should be apparent in step seven, no? Just take the first person indeterminacy with UD* as domain. For your current computational state, there is an infinity of computational story going in that state, run by infinities of UMs. Your first person experience (including physical sensations) is given by a sort of Gaussian on those histories. Normality comes the high relative numbers of normal histories, perhaps by some (arithmetical) phase randomization. No doubt this is confusing. We start by assuming the brain is some material machine, and we conclude in making that machine a limiting idea in the universal mind looking at itself. But it is only logically confusing if you take some primitive matter for granted. It gives to physics a reason and a way to originate and evolve, and it justifies the existence of the non communicable part of truth (consciousness, notably). Ask for any precision if needed (but note that from tomorrow to 9 september I have a lot of exams, so be perhaps patient). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Aug 31, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Aug 2011, at 15:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: Ok, so how do we know that human awareness is not both a machine and a non-machine, and therefore not completely Turing emulable? On the contrary, we know that if we have a Turing emulable body, then our first person being are not Turing emulable. Even the Universal Dovetailer cannot emulate one soul. By the first person indeterminacy (but not only that) the soul emerges from the whole block structure of the UD-work (which I denote often by UD*). The notion of soul refers to truth which is not even definable. I'm confused. I thought that the whole point of comp is to say that our first person being can be emulated digitally. The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory relying on something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it? Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness. If you mean by this, 1-awareness, No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all types of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the same. Most plausibly. comp explains its existence and its non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing emulable beings in our physical neighborhood. Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1- awareness beings living in? Or are they metaphysical? They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals) What makes them seem local to a spatiotemporal axis in a way that seems simple in the 1p? How does an unboundedly complex phenomena 'go to the store for some beer'? Look at what is beer in a first approximation. You need stars planet, life, .. up to he human story including perhaps soccer, adverstizing, prohibition of cannabis, and incredibly complex phenomenon related to other complex phenomenon. That's the 3-p externality, but why and how is there a 1-p simplicity on top of that? We do we experience a beer and not stars, planets, life, human civilization, etc.? What is served by it seeming simple if it isn't? It seems simple to you because a large part of that story is already encapsulate by the complexity of your cells and brains, the deepness of the thirst sensation, etc. The 1-person find that simple, because it looks at the process from its end. Why and how would complexity encapsulate itself? But back to this (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. That's a yes to the question of whether they are metaphysical, right? No, it means it is arithmetical. Like 17 is prime. And the 1-person is theological, if you want. Like 17 is prime and 17 is prime. The second 17 is prime refers implicitly to truth, which is arguably metaphysical or theological. To me the arithmetic truth is a human cognitive experience with a large set of 3-p demonstrable consequences. Primeness is conceptual. You could just name an imaginary number i17 that = whatever quantity 17 is divisible by other than one, or just alter your state of consciousness until 17 seems even. This is enough precise to be tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum weirdness, like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self- duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to experience non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in the third person picture. I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person picture. Third person is by definition computable. Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The third person truth is bigger than the computable. I don't know enough about it to say whether I agree yet, so I'll take your word for it, but would you agree that Third person truth is by definition more computable than first person? I'm afraid it is not. A famous theorem (following works by Post, Skolem, Kleene, Mostowski) makes it possible to classify the arithmetical insolubilities by the alternation of the quantifiers in front of a decidable predicate. Hereafter P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is a decidable predicate containing only the symbols *, +, s, 0, together with variables x, y, z, ..., and the usual propositional logical symbol (, V, ~, (, )°, but NO quantifiers. P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_0, or Pi_0, or Delta_0. They are recursive, decidable, completely computable. ExP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_1 = semi-decidable (decidable when true) = partial computable = Turing emulable AxP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_1 = semi-refutable (decidable when false) = already non computable, non Turing emulable ExAyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_2 (much more non computable) AxEyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_2 (even much more non computable) ExAyEzP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_3 etc.
Re: bruno list
On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 2:52 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The subject feels he initiates and has control over the voluntary movement but not the involuntary movement. That's the difference between them. Ok, now you could understand what I'm talking about if you wanted to. All you have to do is realize that it is not possible for us to feel that there is a difference between them if there is not a difference between them. Doesn't mean that the difference is what we think it is - it could very well be only a feeling - but so what? What possible purpose could such a feeling have, and how could it possibly arise from particle mechanics? Where is the feeling located? Why is it there? Why don't we have the same feeling about our stomach digesting? We have different feelings about different things and this means there are different brain processes underlying them. Our neurology is not set up to control our digestion, but I suppose it is possible for a mutant to be born who has motor and sensory connections from the gut to the cortex. I don't see how you will help your case if you claim that there is some fundamental cellular difference between voluntary and involuntary actions, since in broad terms all the cells in the body follow the same basic plan. Both types of movement, however, are completely determined by the low level behaviour of the matter in the brain, You can say that if you want to, but it just means that the low level behavior of matter is magic, and that even though it's only a large molecule, it wants to drive a Bugatti. If a movement is *not* determined by the low level behaviour of matter in the brain that means that some part of the brain will do something magical. An ion channel will open not because the appropriate ligand has bound, but all by itself. which can in theory be modeled by a computer. No particle moves unless it is pushed by another particle or force, Force is metaphysical. It's just our way of understanding processes which are occurring outside of us rather than inside. My view is that it's all sense and that force is in the eye of the beholder. Even if you believe there is no basic physical reality, there are certain consistencies in the behaviour of objects in the apparent reality, and that is the subject of science. otherwise it's magic, like a table levitating. Tables do levitate if they aren't stuck to a large planet. What's magic is that we think it's a table and not a cloud of atoms flying around a volume of empty space. Tables only do what the forces on them make them do. Same with everything else in the universe, whether it's particles inside cells or inside stars. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 3:24 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: The subject feels he initiates and has control over the voluntary movement but not the involuntary movement. That's the difference between them. Both types of movement, however, are completely determined by the low level behaviour of the matter in the brain, which can in theory be modeled by a computer. No particle moves unless it is pushed by another particle or force, otherwise it's magic, like a table levitating. I would appreciate if you could be more specific about the mechanism on how movement of atoms leads for example to creation of a book about consciousness. Such a book is after all just a collection of atoms, this is true. For me however a self-assembly of such a book is just a magic. The atoms have to move in order to write the book. They have to move inside the brain of the author, then his hands have to move, the keys on the computer keyboard move, and so on. Also, things have to happen prior to the book being written. The universe arises, stars and planets form, life evolves, the author is born, photons from books he has read on consciousness impact on his retina which then leads to reactions in his visual cortex and language centre. It's all very complex, of course, but there is a causal chain of events. If you had the right physical theory and enough computing power you could start with the Big Bang, run a computer simulation and end up with the book. Quantum mechanics does not preclude such a simulation. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 11:33 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: A mechanistic world model can still accomodate human (and animal) feeling, imagination, creativity and compatibilist free will. How, specifically? There is no onus on us to answer that question in order to show that it can happen, since it is in fact what happens. It's like asking how heavier than air flight is possible: birds are heavier than air, birds fly, therefore heavier than air flight is possible. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
