On Aug 31, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 31 Aug 2011, at 15:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > Ok, so how do we know that human awareness is not both a machine and a > > non-machine, and therefore not completely Turing emulable? > > On the contrary, we know that if we have a Turing emulable body, then > our first person being are not Turing emulable. > Even the Universal Dovetailer cannot emulate one soul. By the first > person indeterminacy (but not only that) the soul emerges from the > whole block structure of the UD-work (which I denote often by UD*). > The notion of soul refers to truth which is not even definable. I'm confused. I thought that the whole point of comp is to say that our first person being can be emulated digitally. > >>>>>> The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory > >>>>>> relying on > >>>>>> something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it? > > >>>>> Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness. > > >>>> If you mean by this, 1-awareness, > > >>> No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all > >>> types > >>> of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the > >>> same. > > >> Most plausibly. > > >>>> comp explains its existence and its > >>>> non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing > >>>> emulable > >>>> beings in our physical neighborhood. > > >>> Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1- > >>> awareness > >>> beings living in? Or are they metaphysical? > > >> They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view. > >> And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals) > > > What makes them seem local to a spatiotemporal axis in a way that > > seems simple in the 1p? How does an unboundedly complex phenomena 'go > > to the store for some beer'? > > Look at what is beer in a first approximation. You need stars planet, > life, .. up to he human story including perhaps soccer, adverstizing, > prohibition of cannabis, and incredibly complex phenomenon related to > other complex phenomenon. That's the 3-p externality, but why and how is there a 1-p simplicity on top of that? We do we experience a beer and not stars, planets, life, human civilization, etc.? What is served by it seeming simple if it isn't? > It seems simple to you because a large part of that story is already > encapsulate by the complexity of your cells and brains, the deepness > of the thirst sensation, etc. The 1-person find that simple, because > it looks at the process from its end. Why and how would complexity encapsulate itself? > > But back to this "(sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view". That's a yes > > to the question of whether they are metaphysical, right? > > No, it means it is arithmetical. Like "17 is prime". > And the 1-person is theological, if you want. Like "17 is prime" and > 17 is prime. The second "17 is prime" refers implicitly to truth, > which is arguably metaphysical or theological. To me the arithmetic truth is a human cognitive experience with a large set of 3-p demonstrable consequences. Primeness is conceptual. You could just name an imaginary number i17 that = whatever quantity 17 is divisible by other than one, or just alter your state of consciousness until 17 seems even. > >>>> This is enough precise to be > >>>> tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum > >>>> weirdness, > >>>> like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self- > >>>> duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to > >>>> experience > >>>> non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in > >>>> the third person picture. > > >>> I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person > >>> picture. Third person is by definition computable. > > >> Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis > >> as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The > >> third person truth is bigger than the computable. > > > I don't know enough about it to say whether I agree yet, so I'll take > > your word for it, but would you agree that Third person truth is by > > definition more computable than first person? > > I'm afraid it is not. > A famous theorem (following works by Post, Skolem, Kleene, Mostowski) > makes it possible to classify the arithmetical insolubilities by the > alternation of the quantifiers in front of a decidable predicate. > Hereafter P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is a decidable predicate containing > only the symbols *, +, s, 0, together with variables x, y, z, ..., and > the usual propositional logical symbol (&, V, ~, "(", ")"°, but NO > quantifiers. > > P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_0, or Pi_0, or Delta_0. They are > recursive, decidable, completely computable. > ExP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_1 = semi-decidable (decidable when > true) = partial computable = Turing emulable > AxP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_1 = semi-refutable (decidable when > false) = already non computable, non Turing emulable > ExAyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_2 (much more non computable) > AxEyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_2 (even much more non computable) > ExAyEzP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_3 > etc. What's Ex, Ay, Ax, Ey, Ez stand for? > Arithmetical truth can be seen as the union of all Sigma_i (or of all > Pi_i). Computability stops at sigma_1. > > Now the 1-person is orthogonal to that hierarchy. It does not even > compare. If this hierarchy is all 3-p, does that mean that 1-p is neither more nor less computable than 3-p? > >>> Some of those > >>> computations are influenced by 1p motives though. > > >> OK. But the motive might be an abstract being or engram (programmed > >> by > >> nature, evolution, that is deep computational histories). > >> No need to introduce anything non Turing emulable in the picture > >> here. > > > Doesn't that just push first cause back a step? What motives influence > > the abstract being, nature, or deep computational histories? > > The nice thing, which is disliked a little bit some mystics, is that > the motive emerges from the number relations. Can numbers 'exist' without relations with each other? I would say no. Can they relate without motive? If not, then that makes motive primitive, does it not? Which is what my hypothesis is. Motive and sense are sort of the precursors of 1-p and 3-p symmetry but within 1- p. Our main divergence here is that you see arithmetic truth as primitive and I see it as a secondary category of sense. Truth is a kind of sense. Arithmetic deals in a kind of truth. There are many other kinds of truths and senses which are equally primitive though. > > >>> Once those motives > >>> are expressed externally, they are computable. > > >> But with comp, you just cannot express them externally, just > >> illustrate them and hope others grasp. They are not computable, > >> because the experience is consciousness filtered by infinities of > >> 'brains'. > > > Illustrating them isn't an external expression? It sounds like you're > > saying that nothing is computable now? > > Only the sigma_1 relations are computable. So yes, very few things are > computable or emulable. The hypothesis that we are Turing emulable is > very strong. You're saying that we are sigma_1? What's an example of something that is sigma_1 other than us, and what's an example of sigma_2 and 3? > But there are also very strong evidence in its favors, if > only the fact that we don't meet public sharable third person non > computable process. (And this is a sort of miracle that we have to > justify in the comp theory). miracle? > > > > >> Comp shows a problem. What problem shows your theory? > > > You mean what problem does my theory solve? Or what's an example of a > > problem which arises from not using my model? It's the mind/body > > problem. The role of awareness in the cosmos. The nature of our > > relation to the microcosm and macrocosm. What energy, time, space, and > > matter really are. The origins of the universe. > > No. I was asking to the problem arising in your theory. A theory is > interesting if, by solving or putting light on a problem, it leads to > new problems. The problem that my theory leads to is how to get minds which are pegged to either the extreme of Occidental materialism or Oriental idealism to break their philosophical addiction. It seems almost impossible since both extremes are self-reinforcing. You cannot reason that the universe arises from the relation between essential subjectivity and existential objectivity with a mind that denies it's own subjective authority or the reality of the world outside of faith. > Comp solves conceptually the problem of the origin of consciousness, > and of the appearance of matter. But it shows the price: we have to > isolate some mathematical measure on the sigma_1 sentences and their > proofs (computations). Doesn't it just move it to the origin of comp? Which is metaphysical or theological, yes? > >>> You can't always > >>> reverse engineer the 1-p motives from the 3-p though. > > >> You are right, that is why, with comp, most 1-p notion are not 3- > >> definable. Still, comp allows to study the case of the ideally > >> correct > >> machine, and have metatheories shedding light on that non > >> communicability. > > > Sounds good to me. I think there is tremendous value in studying ideal > > principles, although I would not limit them to arithmetic minimalism. > > There's a whole universe of ideally correct non-machine intelligence > > out there (in here) that needs metatheories too. > > With comp too (like with the Sigma_i and Pi_i complete sets: they are > universal, but not effective except for sigma_1). > There is no evidence that human are more than sigma_1 complete. A Pi_1 > complete set/machine can solve the halting machine problem. But we > can't. > Note that AUDA is still valid for most "gods" (non-machines). So those > "Gods" lives in similar "physical universe" than us. I'll reread that if I can figure out more of what you mean by sigma_1. > > > > >>>>> Feeling as > >>>>> qualitatively distinct from detection. > > >>>> Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a > >>>> person, > > >>> Yes! A person, or another animal. Not a virus or a silicon chip or a > >>> computer made of chips. > > >> This is racism. > > > A silicon chip is not a member of a race. > > But it can be the clothe of one. How could it be if comp makes no distinction between milk bottles and semiconductors? Isn't your view that it's the same arithmetic race no matter how it's dressed? > > > It does nothing at all that > > could be considered an expression of feeling. > > Even today, that is not clearly true. But if it is, it is not true in > general (with comp). So you say. > > > It might have feeling, > > but whatever it has, we have something more, at least in our own eyes. > > Racism is to look at another human being with prejudice, not to look > > at an inanimate object and fail to give it the benefit of the doubt as > > a human being. > > But a human with an artificial brain will not be inanimate. It depends how literally you mean 'inanimate'. A car or a marionette is still an inanimate object to me in that it's motives are not self- generated and therefore it's motion is not self-directed. I think that is the case with any machine - it is dependent upon external motives for defining it's process. Even a fine automobile or supercomputer is still not in the same category as a mouse as far as having feeling. A barely conscious mouse has more feeling that a contemporary supercomputer the size of a mountain. Why would that be the case if there were no significant qualitative difference? >Your > theory makes it a zombie, but that is what does not really make sense > with the comp hyp (and without: you need special magic which just > makes the MB problem insoluble). No, it doesn't make it anything except what it is. We make it a zombie by our pseudognostic projection. > > I understand that you see no reason in principle why a chip should be > > different from anything else as far as being able to host a universal > > machine, and that's true, but I'm not talking about universal > > machines, I'm talking about universal non-machines, which I think are > > made of sense (awareness,etc), and which would indeed vary from > > substance to substance in a qualitative way which could not be > > quantitatively emulated. > > But that is like introducing magic. Each time humans use magic to > justify the fact that "they are more", it leads to bad behavior > against others (human, or animals, ...). Why is it like introducing magic? I'm not saying humans feel more than animals, but whatever feeling that we share with animals seems awfully likely to be missing in things that are not alive. Even if there is no objective 3-p justification, it's still an extremely important distinction in our 1-p experience, so I see no reason to invoke some kind of ambi-biotic political correctness. > >> It is a confusion of what is a person and its body. No doubt billions > >> years of engramming, make them hard to separate technologically, but > >> nothing prevent to survive with digital brain, or even to live in > >> virtual environment in principle, at some level, some day. > >> And in this picture we can formulate precise (sub) problem of the > >> hard > >> mind body problem. > > > Survive where? > > On earth for those who want to elongate the samsara. > In arithmetical truth with the usual shortcuts (death, salvia, > meditations, etc.) On Earth where? In human bodies? Silicon computers? > >>>> which involves some (not big) amount of self-reference ability. > > >>> You don't have to be able to refer to yourself to feel something. > > >> You don't have to refer to yourself explicitly, but *feeling* still > >> involves implicit self-references, I think. > > > I don't agree. The self-references are a cognitive-cortical level > > afterthought. > > No doubt that the cortex has been specialized for high level self- > references, but I think elementary, but important self-reference > appears in many parts of the brain, and in cells already. I agree that self-reference is likely 1p ubiquitous, but every cell or part of the brain that has self-reference may also have perceptions or qualia which are not tied to that. Our pain doesn't require our self- reference, quite the opposite, it seems to often pull us toward solipsistic self-absorption. > > > > >>> Pain > >>> is primitive. > > >> It is very simple at the base and very deep, but, hmm.... I don't > >> know, perhaps 1-primitive (with some of the "1"-views described by > >> the > >> arithmetical or self-referential hypostases). > > >> Not 3-primitive, with mechanism. > > > Not human pain, but there is not necessarily any mechanism if pain > > originates in cells (and how could it really not?) > > I personally tend to believe that pain, and thus consciousness, arise > already with bacteria. Sure, bacteria pain seems like a plausible ancestor for human pain. > No magic here: it is due to an already highly > complex self-reference emulated by the interaction between its genome, > its metabolical cycles and the concentration of molecules in their > neighborhood. Those are UMs, and deserves some respect. Self- > consciousness comes with the LUMs. The LUMs develop easily a notion of > time, of other person, of death-what-is-that-?, etc. It makes sense that pain arises when the 1-p sensorimotive quality is robust enough to include the possibility of the organism being able to do something to avoid or stop the pain, otherwise it seems superfluous (like it would be in a mineral). I don't think that it's automatic though. I don't think that you can train a mineral to pretend that it cares desperately if it stays alive. > > >>>>> Not to disqualify machines > >>>>> implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk > >>>>> bottles, > >>>>> whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those > >>>>> substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want > >>>>> to > >>>>> assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like > >>>>> dominoes. We know about synesthesia and agnosia, and I am positing > >>>>> HADD or prognosia to describe how the assumption of qualia > >>>>> equivalence > >>>>> is invalid. > > >>>>> If we make a machine out of living cells, then we run into the > >>>>> problem > >>>>> of living cells not being easily persuaded to do our bidding. To > >>>>> physically enact the design of universal machine, you need a > >>>>> relatively inanimate substance, which is the very thing that you > >>>>> cannot use to make a living organism with access to qualia in the > >>>>> biological range. > > >>>> But we can emulate a brain with milk bottles, > > >>> I don't think that we can. It's just a sculpture of a brain. It's > >>> like > >>> emulating a person with a video image. > > >> You are wrong on this. We can. In principle. We cannot afford wasting > >> our time doing it. But the point is that the person will be a zombie, > >> where it is just badly connected to our reality. > > > The program will (asymptotically) approach p-zombie because it's just > > a sculpture of a brain. > > This is a bit ridiculous, to be franc. You are saying that comp with > an infinitely low level is still wrong. Right, the painting of a buffalo never jumps out of the wall as a real buffalo no matter how great of a painting it is. > You can, if you wish, but this means that a "person", in your theory > can diagonalize against the whole (semi or partial) computable reality. > By reading your post, and your conversation with Stathis, you will > eventually convince me that comp is true! (and that is wrong, in the > comp theory!). You don't think that comp is true? > Comp entails the consistency of non-comp (like a LUM can prove that > its own consistency would implies its the unprovability of its own > consistency). Consistency is not a lot (for example 'the provability > of the 0=1' is consistent in Peano Arithmetic!). > > Nevertheless, to refute comp directly, by providing a non-comp theory, > including the proof that its object are not Turing emulable, need not > just an infinite level, but a very awkward non computable > diagonalization against all partial computable functions. > > In directly, you can refute comp by showing the existence of some > primitive matter, also. Or by showing a discrepancy between machines' > intelligible matter and nature, but this would probably refute only > the Theaetetus' knowledge theory. I'm not sure what that all means, but my feeling is that you're saying on the one hand that some things are non-comp but on the other hand those things still are defined entirely by comp. I don't get it. To me non-comp means apples to oranges. They don't grow on orange trees or in an orange grove. > > >>>> so you agree that there > >>>> is zombie in your theory. > > >>> I don't think it would never get that far. A zombie implies that the > >>> behavior is identical to a typical person, and I don't think that's > >>> possible to emulate through mathematics alone. It's always going > >>> to be > >>> a stiff. > > >> The arithmetical reality does emulate the computation, where they are > >> solidly defined (with Church thesis). > >> Now the experience of the machine themselves will not be of the type > >> of Turing emulable object. > > > But the computation is blind to any feeling that is driving the > > person's motives through the brain being emulated. > > You are right. A computation, like a computing machine is blind as the > person's motive. > If you want, the person's motive is a limiting concept, and as such it > leaves on the limit of UD*. It drives the behavior of the machine > nonetheless, as far as the machine mirrors itself in the limiting self > correct sense. I don't think that a predictive model which does not have access to the sense and motive of what it emulates will inevitably diverge from it (unless it has real time access to the genuine original - like a live TV broadcast). > > > > >>>> Above you say that awareness is not Turing > >>>> emulable, but my question was: do you know what in the brain is not > >>>> Turing emulable? > > >>> The awareness of the brain is not emulable in a non-brain. > > >> Which evidence have you for saying that the brain is aware? > > > I'm saying that we are the awareness of our brain (as opposed to us > > being the awareness of our foot our a basketball in our closet). MRI > > and TMS technologies have convincingly shown that the activity of the > > brain correlates with subjective awareness and can be manipulated in > > ways that it cannot be through the foot or the basketball. > > That looks like authoritative argument, but I am OK with this. > In fact my brain, if ever it existed in some sense, might be > conscious, but then such consciousness might be unrelated to mine. > Strictly speaking we cannot know, and that is why theology attracts so > much 'fancy theories', and people can become hot with them. We can't be certain, but we can be reasonable. > > > > > In addition, the brain may host many kinds of awareness other than our > > own conscious experience. Why wouldn't it? > > I have no doubt about that. We are already many ourselves, and can > relinquish the one self emulation the night so that we can look at > ourselves in some first person plural ways. Dissociative molecules can > help to study such altered state of consciousness, form variate first > person perspectives. Agreed. > > > >> We have evidence that the brain supports awareness and self-awareness > >> of a person, sometimes persons, not that it is aware itself. > > > Right, but if we are that awareness then our knowledge of the brain as > > an object *is* the brain discovering it's own objective topology. > > In metaphorical way, like saying that when we look at far away > galaxies, the universe is discovering itself. I think it's literally doing that. > But the brain might be a construct of the brain, leading to artificial > separation between subject and object. > > With comp it is suggested that, like the heart is a pump, like blood > is an oxygen transporter and deliverer, the brain is a computer, not > in the metaphorical sense, but in the mathematical sense. It can > imitate all machines, it *is*, in a sense, *all* machines, relatively > to the data. Right. That's why I'm careful to talk about neurology as a meta- biological phenomena. The nervous system is like a transparent animal within an animal. It feels what the body feels, and the body feels the world as well as itself. We feel the body's world through the body, as well as projecting our interior sense and motive outward into the world through the body. It's not a simulation though. Sense is presentation, not representation. Blue doesn't stand for anything, it is a non-Turing complete phenomenon. > > > Our > > awareness is the 1p (heads) side of the coin of the brain (tails), > > That is a metaphore. It does not fits to well with comp. With comp, to > extend your metaphore, you need to take a dice, or a polygonal with > much more sides. Then variate 1-p notions are some sides, and variate > 3-p are some antipode sides, and reality is in that superdice. But > that's very metaphoric. I like that. I'm not sure if it minimizes the 1-p 3-p duality though. Being antipodal facets on dice could be confused with a casual consequence of position rather than being a inseparable poles of an involuted continuum. > > so > > I wouldn't expect the tails side of a coin to have it's own heads side > > as distinct from the heads side of the coin. Our awareness isn't only > > the brain (or regions of it), but what we are aware of runs through > > the brain. > > That does not make sense. Only intellectually, using an (hypothetical) > theory, can I interpret some thought as a run in my brain. > Brain typically have no sensitive cells. Think of the brain as sense-translucent, hosting a grand concordance of sensorimotive experience. It's optimized to carry the sense of the body and the world that scales to the body's life/environment. > > > > >>> It's not a > >>> matter of what can't be emulated, it's that all emulation is itself > >>> subjective. It's a modeling technique. A model of a brain is never > >>> going to be much like a brain unless it is built out of something > >>> that > >>> is a lot like a brain. > > >> What makes you so sure that nature is experimenting modelling all the > >> time? > > > It might model on the inside, but it experiments without modeling on > > the outside. Each instance of something we sense in 3-p is a genuine > > phenomenon. There aren't any disembodied theories wandering around > > Earth. > > I know what you want. But I don't take Earth as a primitive object > either. Primitive or not, what Earth is constructed of is not models or theories, but enactments (of theory sequences + entropic consequences). > > > > >> If the modelling of the brain fails at all substitution level, it > >> means you will get zombie at some level. > > > The thing itself is not a zombie, it's just what it is. > > If it is not a zombie, then he thinks like you and me. Not at all. There isn't even a he or a thing there. Like a puppet isn't a zombie, and it's not even a puppet, it's bundle of dyed felt and stuffing which serves as a prop for HADD/pseudognosia. > > > It's our > > failure to fool ourselves into thinking it's genuine > > So it is a zombie after all ... ? It's not anything but what it is. If it's made of bologna, then it's a piece of bologna we almost mistook for a person. If it's a computer, then it's warm circuits that we almost believed was intelligent. If it's CGI, it's colored pixels that we almost imagine is a talking dragon. > > which projects > > zombiehood (let's call it pseudognosia from now on?) on the model. > > I don't understand. I'm saying that zombies are in the eye of the beholder. > > > > >>>> You cannot answer by some 1-notion, because comp > >>>> explains why they exist, and why they are not Turing emulable, > >>>> (albeit > >>>> manifestable by Turing emulation with some probability with respect > >>>> to > >>>> you). > > >>> Comp is generalizing 1-awareness. Human awareness cannot be located > >>> that way. It's not a matter of running human software on a universal > >>> machine, because the essence of 1-p is non-universality. > > >> Yeah ... A typical 1-move, to abandon universality for ... control. > > > That is the essence of 1p. The motive of sensorimotive. Actually two > > distinguishable aspects: the sensory experience represents the > > abandonment universality for locality (being something means > > collapsing the superposition of universality into a specific > > phenomenological range of experiences and relations), while the > > projection of the sense of that entity's 1p private involution of it's > > self-created universe is, of course, the intent to assert the self > > through control (even if that means intentionally seeking to be > > controlled). > > >>> The hardware > >>> is what makes the software possible. > > >> Locally. Globally it is the other way round. > > > Sort of. Globally, the hardware is just the software's rear end. They > > are the same thing but appear opposite to the software. > > All that is quite like comp. I'm ok with that. I'm just not sure that comp's version of 'appear opposite' is as strong as I want. They should be as opposite as possible, just short of being completely unrelatable to each other. > > > > >>>> To negate comp, you have to show something, different than > >>>> matter and consciousness, which necessitates an actual infinite > >>>> amount > >>>> of bits. > > >>> It's the whole premise underlying comp that is circular reasoning. > >>> If > >>> you assume that matter and consciousness are both bits, > > >> I don't do that. I just assume there is a level of description of the > >> brain which makes it digitally emulable. And neither consciousness or > >> matter become bits in that picture. > > > What is the digital emulation made of if not bits? > > It is made of elementary arithmetical (or digital) relations. A lot of > them. Isn't a bit an example of an elementary digital arithmetic relation? > Classical information is made of bits, but computations are dynamical > process. Stopping or not stopping, in which case they are infinite. hm. I don't know enough about the implications of stopping a computation to say. > > > What would any > > consciousness arising from that emulation be made of? > > Why would ever need consciousness to be made of something. > Consciousness is of a type related to 17. Except it is more subtle: it > is the state of a UMs when it knows something, or believe what happens > to be something true. What keeps those beliefs and truths bound locally to a UM? > > > >>> then you frame > >>> the argument as a quantitative information theory. Sense is what > >>> makes > >>> information meaningful. Sense is the phenomena of being informed and > >>> informing. It's the I, me, and you experiential aspects of the > >>> cosmos. > >>> Comp is limited to the 'it' aspects of the cosmos, > > >> No. It get the it (Bp) and the 1-me (Bp & p), and 7 other variants > >> which offer an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. It is very > >> rich. You can't dismiss computer science, when UMs look deep inside, > >> they see some non trivial things. > > > I accept that UMs and computer science can deliver non trivial > > insights, but I don't think that we are going to find ourselves in > > there, except by contrast. > > Too late. I already find myself in there. haha. well, yeah. you will be the first UM immortal. > That is not argument, of course. > How can you be so sure. > You have some intuition, but your ruin them by opposing them to your > reductionist conception of numbers. I think you mistake my conception of numbers as reductionist because you don't accept qualitative phenomena as primitive. > > We may find a negative image of the self > > that could be the only way of truly seeing the positive. > > >>> and insists that I, > >>> me, and you can be emulated by 'it'. > > >> You meant "can't" I guess. > > > No, I'm saying that comp is insisting that digitalness (it) can > > emulate I, me, and you. > > >>> That's one way of looking at it, > >>> but it's biased against 1-p from the start. > > >> Not at all. It is explicitely taken into account at the start of comp > >> by a question. And then recovered later by Theaetetus+machine self- > >> reference. Comp, the weak version I study, is biased explicitly in > >> favor of the 1-p at the start. > > >>> It's great for designing > >>> AGI, but it does nothing to explain the origin of red or the meaning > >>> of a conversation like this. > > >> I think it does, but you can only understand by yourself, and this by > >> being able to at least assume comp for the sake of the reasoning. > > > I think I can assume comp for the sake of reasoning, but it still > > doesn't explain specific qualia and signifying meaning for me. > > That is in AUDA. Can you accept Theatetus theory of knowledge. Put in > another equivalent (but that is not trivial) way, do you accept that > we cannot know if we are awake (not dreaming) ? If we can have the concept of being awake or dreaming, then we have a way of knowing that the two states are different when we are awake, but that distinction is not as clear in the dream state. Otherwise our dream lives and our waking lives would be considered equivalent in every way. We cannot know if we are awake with certainty, but even if we are dreaming we know that being awake is different from dreaming, and different in specific non-trivial ways (which are related to significance and cumulative entanglement). > > Comp share with the Theaetetus theory that we can know that we are > dreaming, but never that we are not dreaming. > > > It may > > plot where they come into play on a map, but it has no opinion on the > > redness of red. > > That is true. It leaves the opinion to the UMs and LUMs themselves. Where do they get their opinions from? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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