On 31 Aug 2011, at 15:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Aug 31, 2:53 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 30 Aug 2011, at 19:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming
universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on its
level universal bearer.

Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine?

This is meaningless.

If there is no such thing as a non-machine, then how can the term
machine have any meaning?

There are a ton of non-machines. Recursion theory is the study of
degree of non-machineness.

What is meaningless is to ask to a machine to emulate a non-machine,
which by definition is not emulable by a machine.

Ok, so how do we know that human awareness is not both a machine and a
non-machine, and therefore not completely Turing emulable?

On the contrary, we know that if we have a Turing emulable body, then our first person being are not Turing emulable. Even the Universal Dovetailer cannot emulate one soul. By the first person indeterminacy (but not only that) the soul emerges from the whole block structure of the UD-work (which I denote often by UD*). The notion of soul refers to truth which is not even definable.

The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory
relying on
something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it?

Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness.

If you mean by this, 1-awareness,

No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all types
of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the

Most plausibly.

comp explains its existence and its
non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing
beings in our physical neighborhood.

Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1- awareness
beings living in? Or are they metaphysical?

They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view.
And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals)

What makes them seem local to a spatiotemporal axis in a way that
seems simple in the 1p? How does an unboundedly complex phenomena 'go
to the store for some beer'?

Look at what is beer in a first approximation. You need stars planet, life, .. up to he human story including perhaps soccer, adverstizing, prohibition of cannabis, and incredibly complex phenomenon related to other complex phenomenon.

It seems simple to you because a large part of that story is already encapsulate by the complexity of your cells and brains, the deepness of the thirst sensation, etc. The 1-person find that simple, because it looks at the process from its end.

But back to this "(sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view". That's a yes
to the question of whether they are metaphysical, right?

No, it means it is arithmetical. Like "17 is prime".
And the 1-person is theological, if you want. Like "17 is prime" and 17 is prime. The second "17 is prime" refers implicitly to truth, which is arguably metaphysical or theological.

This is enough precise to be
tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum weirdness,
like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self-
duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to experience
non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in
the third person picture.

I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person
picture. Third person is by definition computable.

Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis
as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The
third person truth is bigger than the computable.

I don't know enough about it to say whether I agree yet, so I'll take
your word for it, but would you agree that Third person truth is by
definition more computable than first person?

I'm afraid it is not.
A famous theorem (following works by Post, Skolem, Kleene, Mostowski) makes it possible to classify the arithmetical insolubilities by the alternation of the quantifiers in front of a decidable predicate. Hereafter P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is a decidable predicate containing only the symbols *, +, s, 0, together with variables x, y, z, ..., and the usual propositional logical symbol (&, V, ~, "(", ")"°, but NO quantifiers.

P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_0, or Pi_0, or Delta_0. They are recursive, decidable, completely computable. ExP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_1 = semi-decidable (decidable when true) = partial computable = Turing emulable AxP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_1 = semi-refutable (decidable when false) = already non computable, non Turing emulable
ExAyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_2 (much more non computable)
AxEyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_2 (even much more non computable)
ExAyEzP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_3
Arithmetical truth can be seen as the union of all Sigma_i (or of all Pi_i). Computability stops at sigma_1.

Now the 1-person is orthogonal to that hierarchy. It does not even compare.

Some of those
computations are influenced by 1p motives though.

OK. But the motive might be an abstract being or engram (programmed by
nature, evolution, that is deep computational histories).
No need to introduce anything non Turing emulable in the picture here.

Doesn't that just push first cause back a step? What motives influence
the abstract being, nature, or deep computational histories?

The nice thing, which is disliked a little bit some mystics, is that the motive emerges from the number relations.

Once those motives
are expressed externally, they are computable.

But with comp, you just cannot express them externally, just
illustrate them and hope others grasp. They are not computable,
because the experience is consciousness filtered by infinities of

Illustrating them isn't an external expression? It sounds like you're
saying that nothing is computable now?

Only the sigma_1 relations are computable. So yes, very few things are computable or emulable. The hypothesis that we are Turing emulable is very strong. But there are also very strong evidence in its favors, if only the fact that we don't meet public sharable third person non computable process. (And this is a sort of miracle that we have to justify in the comp theory).

Comp shows a problem. What problem shows your theory?

You mean what problem does my theory solve? Or what's an example of a
problem which arises from not using my model? It's the mind/body
problem. The role of awareness in the cosmos. The nature of our
relation to the microcosm and macrocosm. What energy, time, space, and
matter really are. The origins of the universe.

No. I was asking to the problem arising in your theory. A theory is interesting if, by solving or putting light on a problem, it leads to new problems. Comp solves conceptually the problem of the origin of consciousness, and of the appearance of matter. But it shows the price: we have to isolate some mathematical measure on the sigma_1 sentences and their proofs (computations).

You can't always
reverse engineer the 1-p motives from the 3-p though.

You are right, that is why, with comp, most 1-p notion are not 3-
definable. Still, comp allows to study the case of the ideally correct
machine, and have metatheories shedding light on that non

Sounds good to me. I think there is tremendous value in studying ideal
principles, although I would not limit them to arithmetic minimalism.
There's a whole universe of ideally correct non-machine intelligence
out there (in here) that needs metatheories too.

With comp too (like with the Sigma_i and Pi_i complete sets: they are universal, but not effective except for sigma_1). There is no evidence that human are more than sigma_1 complete. A Pi_1 complete set/machine can solve the halting machine problem. But we can't. Note that AUDA is still valid for most "gods" (non-machines). So those "Gods" lives in similar "physical universe" than us.

Feeling as
qualitatively distinct from detection.

Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a person,

Yes! A person, or another animal. Not a virus or a silicon chip or a
computer made of chips.

This is racism.

A silicon chip is not a member of a race.

But it can be the clothe of one.

It does nothing at all that
could be considered an expression of feeling.

Even today, that is not clearly true. But if it is, it is not true in general (with comp).

It might have feeling,
but whatever it has, we have something more, at least in our own eyes.
Racism is to look at another human being with prejudice, not to look
at an inanimate object and fail to give it the benefit of the doubt as
a human being.

But a human with an artificial brain will not be inanimate. Your theory makes it a zombie, but that is what does not really make sense with the comp hyp (and without: you need special magic which just makes the MB problem insoluble).

I understand that you see no reason in principle why a chip should be
different from anything else as far as being able to host a universal
machine, and that's true, but I'm not talking about universal
machines, I'm talking about universal non-machines, which I think are
made of sense (awareness,etc), and which would indeed vary from
substance to substance in a qualitative way which could not be
quantitatively emulated.

But that is like introducing magic. Each time humans use magic to justify the fact that "they are more", it leads to bad behavior against others (human, or animals, ...).

It is a confusion of what is a person and its body. No doubt billions
years of engramming, make them hard to separate technologically, but
nothing prevent to survive with digital brain, or even to live in
virtual environment in principle, at some level, some day.
And in this picture we can formulate precise (sub) problem of the hard
mind body problem.

Survive where?

On earth for those who want to elongate the samsara.
In arithmetical truth with the usual shortcuts (death, salvia, meditations, etc.)

which involves some (not big) amount of self-reference ability.

You don't have to be able to refer to yourself to feel something.

You don't have to refer to yourself explicitly, but *feeling* still
involves implicit self-references, I think.

I don't agree. The self-references are a cognitive-cortical level

No doubt that the cortex has been specialized for high level self- references, but I think elementary, but important self-reference appears in many parts of the brain, and in cells already.

is primitive.

It is very simple at the base and very deep, but, hmm.... I don't
know, perhaps 1-primitive (with some of the "1"-views described by the
arithmetical or self-referential hypostases).

Not 3-primitive, with mechanism.

Not human pain, but there is not necessarily any mechanism if pain
originates in cells (and how could it really not?)

I personally tend to believe that pain, and thus consciousness, arise already with bacteria. No magic here: it is due to an already highly complex self-reference emulated by the interaction between its genome, its metabolical cycles and the concentration of molecules in their neighborhood. Those are UMs, and deserves some respect. Self- consciousness comes with the LUMs. The LUMs develop easily a notion of time, of other person, of death-what-is-that-?, etc.

Not to disqualify machines
implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk bottles,
whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those
substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want to
assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like
dominoes. We know about synesthesia and agnosia, and I am positing
HADD or prognosia to describe how the assumption of qualia
is invalid.

If we make a machine out of living cells, then we run into the
of living cells not being easily persuaded to do our bidding. To
physically enact the design of universal machine, you need a
relatively inanimate substance, which is the very thing that you
cannot use to make a living organism with access to qualia in the
biological range.

But we can emulate a brain with milk bottles,

I don't think that we can. It's just a sculpture of a brain. It's like
emulating a person with a video image.

You are wrong on this. We can. In principle. We cannot afford wasting
our time doing it. But the point is that the person will be a zombie,
where it is just badly connected to our reality.

The program will (asymptotically) approach p-zombie because it's just
a sculpture of a brain.

This is a bit ridiculous, to be franc. You are saying that comp with an infinitely low level is still wrong. You can, if you wish, but this means that a "person", in your theory can diagonalize against the whole (semi or partial) computable reality. By reading your post, and your conversation with Stathis, you will eventually convince me that comp is true! (and that is wrong, in the comp theory!). Comp entails the consistency of non-comp (like a LUM can prove that its own consistency would implies its the unprovability of its own consistency). Consistency is not a lot (for example 'the provability of the 0=1' is consistent in Peano Arithmetic!).

Nevertheless, to refute comp directly, by providing a non-comp theory, including the proof that its object are not Turing emulable, need not just an infinite level, but a very awkward non computable diagonalization against all partial computable functions.

In directly, you can refute comp by showing the existence of some primitive matter, also. Or by showing a discrepancy between machines' intelligible matter and nature, but this would probably refute only the Theaetetus' knowledge theory.

so you agree that there
is zombie in your theory.

I don't think it would never get that far. A zombie implies that the
behavior is identical to a typical person, and I don't think that's
possible to emulate through mathematics alone. It's always going to be
a stiff.

The arithmetical reality does emulate the computation, where they are
solidly defined (with Church thesis).
Now the experience of the machine themselves will not be of the type
of Turing emulable object.

But the computation is blind to any feeling that is driving the
person's motives through the brain being emulated.

You are right. A computation, like a computing machine is blind as the person's motive. If you want, the person's motive is a limiting concept, and as such it leaves on the limit of UD*. It drives the behavior of the machine nonetheless, as far as the machine mirrors itself in the limiting self correct sense.

Above you say that awareness is not Turing
emulable, but my question was: do you know what in the brain is not
Turing emulable?

The awareness of the brain is not emulable in a non-brain.

Which evidence have you for saying that the brain is aware?

I'm saying that we are the awareness of our brain (as opposed to us
being the awareness of our foot our a basketball in our closet). MRI
and TMS technologies have convincingly shown that the activity of the
brain correlates with subjective awareness and can be manipulated in
ways that it cannot be through the foot or the basketball.

That looks like authoritative argument, but I am OK with this.
In fact my brain, if ever it existed in some sense, might be conscious, but then such consciousness might be unrelated to mine. Strictly speaking we cannot know, and that is why theology attracts so much 'fancy theories', and people can become hot with them.

In addition, the brain may host many kinds of awareness other than our
own conscious experience. Why wouldn't it?

I have no doubt about that. We are already many ourselves, and can relinquish the one self emulation the night so that we can look at ourselves in some first person plural ways. Dissociative molecules can help to study such altered state of consciousness, form variate first person perspectives.

We have evidence that the brain supports awareness and self-awareness
of a person, sometimes persons, not that it is aware itself.

Right, but if we are that awareness then our knowledge of the brain as
an object *is* the brain discovering it's own objective topology.

In metaphorical way, like saying that when we look at far away galaxies, the universe is discovering itself. But the brain might be a construct of the brain, leading to artificial separation between subject and object.

With comp it is suggested that, like the heart is a pump, like blood is an oxygen transporter and deliverer, the brain is a computer, not in the metaphorical sense, but in the mathematical sense. It can imitate all machines, it *is*, in a sense, *all* machines, relatively to the data.

awareness is the 1p (heads) side of the coin of the brain (tails),

That is a metaphore. It does not fits to well with comp. With comp, to extend your metaphore, you need to take a dice, or a polygonal with much more sides. Then variate 1-p notions are some sides, and variate 3-p are some antipode sides, and reality is in that superdice. But that's very metaphoric.

I wouldn't expect the tails side of a coin to have it's own heads side
as distinct from the heads side of the coin. Our awareness isn't only
the brain (or regions of it), but what we are aware of runs through
the brain.

That does not make sense. Only intellectually, using an (hypothetical) theory, can I interpret some thought as a run in my brain.
Brain typically have no sensitive cells.

It's not a
matter of what can't be emulated, it's that all emulation is itself
subjective. It's a modeling technique. A model of a brain is never
going to be much like a brain unless it is built out of something that
is a lot like a brain.

What makes you so sure that nature is experimenting modelling all the

It might model on the inside, but it experiments without modeling on
the outside. Each instance of something we sense in 3-p is a genuine
phenomenon. There aren't any disembodied theories wandering around

I know what you want. But I don't take Earth as a primitive object either.

If the modelling of the brain fails at all substitution level, it
means you will get zombie at some level.

The thing itself is not a zombie, it's just what it is.

If it is not a zombie, then he thinks like you and me.

It's our
failure to fool ourselves into thinking it's genuine

So it is a zombie after all ... ?

which projects
zombiehood (let's call it pseudognosia from now on?) on the model.

I don't understand.

You cannot answer by some 1-notion, because comp
explains why they exist, and why they are not Turing emulable,
manifestable by Turing emulation with some probability with respect

Comp is generalizing 1-awareness. Human awareness cannot be located
that way. It's not a matter of running human software on a universal
machine, because the essence of 1-p is non-universality.

Yeah ... A typical 1-move, to abandon universality for ... control.

That is the essence of 1p. The motive of sensorimotive. Actually two
distinguishable aspects: the sensory experience represents the
abandonment universality for locality (being something means
collapsing the superposition of universality into a specific
phenomenological range of experiences and relations), while the
projection of the sense of that entity's 1p private involution of it's
self-created universe is, of course, the intent to assert the self
through control (even if that means intentionally seeking to be

The hardware
is what makes the software possible.

Locally. Globally it is the other way round.

Sort of. Globally, the hardware is just the software's rear end. They
are the same thing but appear opposite to the software.

All that is quite like comp.

To negate comp, you have to show something, different than
matter and consciousness, which necessitates an actual infinite
of bits.

It's the whole premise underlying comp that is circular reasoning. If
you assume that matter and consciousness are both bits,

I don't do that. I just assume there is a level of description of the
brain which makes it digitally emulable. And neither consciousness or
matter become bits in that picture.

What is the digital emulation made of if not bits?

It is made of elementary arithmetical (or digital) relations. A lot of them. Classical information is made of bits, but computations are dynamical process. Stopping or not stopping, in which case they are infinite.

What would any
consciousness arising from that emulation be made of?

Why would ever need consciousness to be made of something. Consciousness is of a type related to 17. Except it is more subtle: it is the state of a UMs when it knows something, or believe what happens to be something true.

then you frame
the argument as a quantitative information theory. Sense is what makes
information meaningful. Sense is the phenomena of being informed and
informing. It's the I, me, and you experiential aspects of the cosmos.
Comp is limited to the 'it' aspects of the cosmos,

No. It get the it (Bp) and the 1-me (Bp & p), and 7 other variants
which offer an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. It is very
rich. You can't dismiss computer science, when UMs look deep inside,
they see some non trivial things.

I accept that UMs and computer science can deliver non trivial
insights, but I don't think that we are going to find ourselves in
there, except by contrast.

Too late. I already find myself in there.
That is not argument, of course.
How can you be so sure.
You have some intuition, but your ruin them by opposing them to your reductionist conception of numbers.

We may find a negative image of the self
that could be the only way of truly seeing the positive.

and insists that I,
me, and you can be emulated by 'it'.

You meant "can't" I guess.

No, I'm saying that comp is insisting that digitalness (it) can
emulate I, me, and you.

That's one way of looking at it,
but it's biased against 1-p from the start.

Not at all. It is explicitely taken into account at the start of comp
by a question. And then recovered later by Theaetetus+machine self-
reference. Comp, the weak version I study, is biased explicitly in
favor of the 1-p at the start.

It's great for designing
AGI, but it does nothing to explain the origin of red or the meaning
of a conversation like this.

I think it does, but you can only understand by yourself, and this by
being able to at least assume comp for the sake of the reasoning.

I think I can assume comp for the sake of reasoning, but it still
doesn't explain specific qualia and signifying meaning for me.

That is in AUDA. Can you accept Theatetus theory of knowledge. Put in another equivalent (but that is not trivial) way, do you accept that we cannot know if we are awake (not dreaming) ?

Comp share with the Theaetetus theory that we can know that we are dreaming, but never that we are not dreaming.

It may
plot where they come into play on a map, but it has no opinion on the
redness of red.

That is true. It leaves the opinion to the UMs and LUMs themselves.



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