Re: The limit of all computations
On 26.05.2012 21:06 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 26 May 2012, at 16:48, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 26.05.2012 11:30 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 26 May 2012, at 08:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... In my view, it would be nicer to treat such a question historically. Your position based on your theorem, after all, is one of possible positions. What do you mean by my position? I don't think I defend a position. I do study the consequence of comp, if only to give a chance to a real non-comp theory. A position that the natural numbers are the foundation of the world. I don't defend that position. I show it to be a consequence of the comp hypothesis + occam razor. I do appreciate the clearness of your position. From this viewpoint, the language of mathematics allows us to remove ambiguities indeed. ... When we talk with each other and make proofs we use a human language. Hence to make sure that we can make universal proofs by means of a human language, it might be good to reach an agreement on what it is. This is an impossible task. That is why I use the semi-axiomatic method (in UDA), and math in AUDA. If you disagree with a method of reasoning, you have to explain why. In english, no problem. I also agree that human language in a way is a mess. Yet, somehow it seems to work and this puzzles my, how it could happen when even mathematicians failed to analyze it. ... I am not against non-comp, but I am against any gap-theory, where we introduce something in the ontology to make a problem unsolvable leading to don't ask policy. We are back to a human language. It seems that you mean that some constructions expressed by it do not make sense. It well might be but again we have to discuss the language then. I don't see why we have to discuss language, apart from the machines and their languages. It seems that there is a gap between the language of mathematics and a human language. It might be interesting to understand it. It might give us a hint on how the Universe is made. You see, we must use a human language to communicate, with the language of mathematics this would not work. I do not know why. As for comp, I have written once Simulation Hypothesis and Simulation Technology http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/09/simulation-hypothesis-and-simulation-technology.html that practically speaking it just does not work. I understand that you talk in principle but how could we know if comp in principle is true if we cannot check it in practice? The whole point is that we can check it, at least if you accept the classical theory of knowledge. Physics arise from number self-reference in a precise constrained way, and the logic of observable already give rise to quantum-like logic. If mechanism is false, we can know it. If it is true we can only bet on it, and the bet or not on some level of substitution. The facts (Everett QM) gives evidence that our first person plural is given by the electronic orbital, our stories does not depend on the precise position of electron in those orbitals. I personally find an extrapolation of a working model outside of its scope that has been researched pretty dangerous. I am just showing that computationalism (widespread) and materialism (widespread) are incompatible. I reason only, and I extrapolate less than Aristotelians. I am afraid that reason only is not enough to understand Nature. I am browsing now The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy. Let me give a quote that in an enjoyable way expresses my thought above. p. 19 In 1277 Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, issued a condemnation of several theses derived from Aristotelianism - that God could not allow any form of planetary motion other than circular, that He could not make a vacuum, and many more. The condemnation of 1277 helped inspire a form of theology known as voluntarism, which admitted no limitations on God’s power. It regarded natural law not as Forms inherent within nature but as divine commands imposed from outside nature. Voluntarism insisted that the structure of the universe - indeed, its very existence - is not rationally necessary but is contingent upon the free and transcendent will of God. One of the most important consequences of voluntarist theology for science is that it helped to inspire and justify an experimental methodology. For if God created freely rather than by logical necessity, then we cannot gain knowledge of it by logical deduction (which traces necessary connections). Instead, we have to go out and look, to observe and experiment. As Barbour puts it: 'The world is orderly and dependable because God is trustworthy and not capricious; but the details of the world must be found by observation rather than rational deduction because God is free and did not have to create any particular kind of universe.' Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: The limit of all computations
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 03:42:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: But a = Ba is a valid rule for all logic having a Kripke semantics. Why? Because it means that a is supposed to be valid (for example you have already prove it), so a, like any theorem, will be true in all worlds, so a will be in particular true in all worlds accessible from anywhere in the model, so Ba will be true in all worlds of the model, so Ba is also a theorem. I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will in MWI
On May 26, 1:42 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, May 26, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I nominate does not 'happen for a reason' Then what you nominate is as random as it is idiotic. Idiots do things for no reason, smart people do things for reasons. How does being an idiot allow you to to things for no reason? Does low intelligence make you exempt from determinism? the reason happens for my nomination. Read that again and explain to me what the hell it means. It means that If I nominate Bob for president, then the reason that Bob is in the presidential race now is because I nominated him. It's pretty straightforward. Read Bruno's answer. Free will is just will with degrees of freedom. So free will is a will that is free and a klogknee backstanator is a backstanator that is klogknee. Now you claim not to understand either words will or free? This sophistry appears to be malignant. What is wrong with that? I admit it's true, all circular definitions are true, but they are somewhat lacking in usefulness. How could you know whether it's circular or not when you claim not to understand either term? If you are trapped in a cage, you have will but not a lot of free will. Why is that so difficult to admit? I admit that if I'm trapped in a cage I can't do what my will wants me to do, and I admit that whatever it is my will wants me to do it does so for a reason or it does not. But you can't do what your will wants you to do anyways even outside of a cage. Doing or not doing what your will wants you to do is free will. When that power to decide is taken away by a cage, what has been lost? Freedom. Without free will, there could be no important distinction between being a slave and being free. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. You stand corrected. I suspect that I may have solved the hard problem of consciousness. I'll alert the press. They have been alerted already. I'm doing a radio show on Tuesday. I admit that some things happen for no reason, some things are random. So your opinions are random. That's not what I said. Why debate them? Again you're asking me the reasons I do things, you're demanding to know what caused me to do stuff, but this time you're asking the reason there is no reason and I have no reasonable answer except that's the way my brain is wired. Yes, your brain is wired to support free will. you are colorblind to free will, Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. How do you know what I know? Are you telepathic? you will have to take my word in all matters relating to free will. NO you are entirely wrong, I don't have to do any such thing. I choose not to take your word You can't choose whether to choose to take my word or not, you have no free will. You are a puppet of any force that happens to run across the algorithm that you are. on the merits of that silly free will noise; and of one thing you can be absolutely certain, I made that choice for a reason or I made that choice for no reason. Then it wasn't you who was making a choice. The reason made the choice and it made you believe you made it. You aren't allowed to say that you make choices. It doesn't matter what the reason is. If there really is a reason then it's deterministic if there is no reason then it's random. If you don't know what the reason is, then how can you claim that reason must be deterministic. Because the defining characteristic of reason is determinism, if you get a different output every time you feed in the identical input then it's not reason and it's not deterministic. It can also be just the opposite. If you ask Rain Man a question and he responds by reciting 'Who's on First' every time, that doesn't make it a reasonable answer, it makes it an autistic reflex. conditions don't give water much opportunity to express anything like free will. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. Speaking of autistic reflexes. In what possible way is that not free will? Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. The telepathic autistic wins again...in his mind. my free will determines what is deterministic. Then if this thing called free will determines that jumping off the 40'th floor will not deterministically cause you to turn into a greasy splat on the sidewalk far below then it would be safe to make such a jump. Good luck with that. Free will doesn't have to determine everything in the universe, just determining how my brain operates the voluntary muscles of my body is enough. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from
Re: was Relativity of Existence
On 27 May 2012, at 00:06, meekerdb wrote: On 5/26/2012 9:35 AM, John Mikes wrote: Brent wrote: 1. Presumably those true things would not be 'real'. Only provable things would be true of reality. Just to be clear, I didn't write 1. above. But I did write 2. below. Ah OK. Sorry. I have been wrong on that. 2. Does arithmetic have 'finite information content'? Is the axiom of succession just one or is it a schema of infinitely many axioms? Appreciable, even in layman's logic. In '#1' - I question provable since in my agnosticism an 'evidence' is partial only, leaving open lots of (so far?) unknown/ able aspects to be covered. In the infinity(?) of the world also the contrary of an evidence may be 'true'. As Bruno said, Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It is quite independent of true of reality. Which is why I'm highly suspicious of ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms and inferences. We don't give axioms and inference rule when teaching arithmetic in high school. We start from simple examples, like fingers, days of the week, candies in a bag, etc. Children understand anniversary before successor, and the finite/infinite distinction is as old as humanity. In fact it can be shown that the intuition of numbers, addition and multiplication included, is *needed* to even understand what axioms and inference can be, making arithmetic necessarily known before any formal machinery is posited. Bruno #2 is a technically precise formulation of what I tried to express in my post to Bruno. IFF!!! anything (i.e. everything) can be expressed by numerals, the information included into arithmetic IS infinite, I see no reason to suppose that. Everything ever expressed so far has been done with a finite part of arithmetic. Assuming every integer has a successor is just a convenience for modeling things; you don't have to worry about running out of counters. There is a book Ad Infinitum, The Ghost in Turing's Machine by Rotman that proposes what he calls non-euclidean arithmetic which does not assume the integers are infinite. I can't really recommend the book because most of it is written in the style of French deconstructionist philosophy, but the Appendix has some interesting ideas. however as it seems: in our (restricted) view of the world (Nature?) there seem to be NO numbers to begin with. In our human 'translation' we see 1,2, or 145, or a million OF SOMETHING - no the (integer?) numerals. Axioms? in my vocabulary: imagined things, necessary for certain theories we cannot substantiate otherwise. Axioms are just part of a logical, i.e. self-consistent, system. Mathematicians don't even care if they are true of reality. They may or may not refer to imagined things; they are just assumed true for some inferences. I could take I am typing on a keyboard as an axiom, which I also happen to think is true, or I could take I am a projection in a Hilbert space which might be true, but is much more dubious. In another logic than human, in another figment of a physical world different axioms would serve science. Logic is about the relations of propositions, statements in language. Humans already have invented different logics. 2+2=4? not necessarily in the (fictitious) octimality of the '[Zarathustran' aliens in the Cohen-Stewart books (still product of human minds). 2+2=11 Brent The world consists of 10 kinds of people. Those who think in binary and those who don't. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Relativity of Existence
On 27 May 2012, at 01:41, meekerdb wrote: On 5/26/2012 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 May 2012, at 17:56, meekerdb wrote: On 5/26/2012 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Mar 2012, at 06:18, meekerdb wrote (two month agao): On 3/1/2012 7:37 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Excerpt: Any system with finite information content that is consistent can be formalized into an axiomatic system, for example by using one axiom to assert the truth of each independent piece of information. Thus, assuming that our reality has finite information content, there must be an axiomatic system that is isomorphic to our reality, where every true thing about reality can be proved as a theorem from the axioms of that system Doesn't this thinking contradict Goedel's Incompleteness theorem for consistent systems because there are true things about consistent systems that cannot be derived from its axioms? Richard Presumably those true things would not be 'real'. Only provable things would be true of reality. Provable depends on the theory. If the theory is unsound, what it proves might well be false. And if you trust the theory, then you know that the theory is consistent is true, yet the theory itself cannot prove it, so reality is larger that what you can prove in that theory. So in any case truth is larger than the theory. Even when truth is restricted to arithmetical propositions. Notably because the statement the theory is consistent can be translated into an arithmetical proposition. Bruno Does arithmetic have 'finite information content'? Is the axiom of succession just one or is it a schema of infinitely many axioms? Arithmetical truth has infinite information content. That's what I thought. So the above Excerpt does not contradict Godel's incompleteness because it refers to systems with finite information content. Gödel's theorem applies also to many systems with infinite information content. Even arithmetical truth itself is undecided on many second order arithmetical propositions, and some occurs naturally like in the G* (first order) modal logic. Arithmetic has few information content, but arithmetic seen from inside as an infinite (and beyond!) information content. This should be the case for any proposed TOE. Peano Arithmetic has about 5K of information content, Which is just the information in the axioms (actually that number seems high to me). OK. (I said 5K to imply it is very little, but 5K is much too much indeed). Note that my computer already uses 4K for an empty document, but that kind of thing is very contingent. Bruno Brent even with the infinitely many induction axioms, for they are simple to generate. There are two succession axioms (0 ≠ s(x), and s(x) = s(y) .- x = y. Those are not scheme of axioms. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Max Velmans' Reflexive Monism
Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens-Evgenii Rudnyi I conjecture that the discrete nonphysical particles of compactified space, the so-called Calabi-Yau Manifolds of string theory, have perceptual projection due to the mapping of closed strings, something that Leibniz hypothesized for his monads centuries ago. http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard David On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 1:50 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 5/26/2012 11:57 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I have just finished reading Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans and below there are a couple of comments to the book. The book is similar to Jeffrey Gray's Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem in a sense that it takes phenomenal consciousness seriously. Let me give an example. Imagine that you watch yourself in the mirror. Your image that you observe in the mirror is an example of phenomenal consciousness. The difference with Jeffrey Gray is in the question where the image that you see in the mirror is located. If we take a conventional way of thinking, that is, 1) photons are reflected by the mirror 2) neurons in retina are excited 3) natural neural nets starts information processing then the answer should be that this image is in your brain. It seems to be logical as, after all, we know that there is nothing after the mirror. However, it immediately follows that not only your image in the mirror is in your brain but rather everything that your see is also in your brain. This is exactly what one finds in Gray's book The world is inside the head. Velmans takes a different position that he calls reflexive model of perception. According to him, what we consciously experience is located exactly where we experience it. In other words, the image that you see in the mirror is located after the mirror and not in your brain. A nice picture that explains Velmans' idea is at http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/**brain-and-world.htmlhttp://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/brain-and-world.html Velmans introduces perceptual projection but this remains as the Hard Problem in his book, how exactly perceptual projection happens. Velmans contrast his model with reductionism (physicalism) and dualism and interestingly enough he finds many common features between reductionism and dualism. For example, the image in the mirror will be in the brain according to both reductionism and dualism. This part could be interesting for Stephen. Hi Evgenii, I would be very interested if Velmans discussed how the model would consider multiple observers of the image in the mirror and how the images that are in the brains of the many are coordinated such that there is always a single consistent world of mirrors and brains and so forth. First I thought that perceptual projection could be interpreted similar to Craig's senses but it is not the case. Velmans' reflexive monism is based on a statement that first- and third-person views cannot be combined (this is what Bruno says). From a third-person view, one observes neural correlates of consciousness but not the first-person view. Now I understand such a position much better. Is this third-person view (3p) one that is not ever the actual first-person (1p) of some actual observer? I can only directly experience my own content of consciousness, so the content of someone else is always only known via some description. How is this idea considered, if at all? Anyway the the last chapter in the book is Self-consciousness in a reflexive universe. I am interested in communications between self-conscious entities in a reflexive universe. ;-) Does Velmans discuss any abstract models of reflexivity itself? Evgenii -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 03:42:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: But a = Ba is a valid rule for all logic having a Kripke semantics. Why? Because it means that a is supposed to be valid (for example you have already prove it), so a, like any theorem, will be true in all worlds, so a will be in particular true in all worlds accessible from anywhere in the model, so Ba will be true in all worlds of the model, so Ba is also a theorem. I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing? 1) You might be missing the soundness theorem, perhaps. I give an example with classical propositional logic. Suppose that you prove some formula, like (p q)-q, then automatically the formula is true in all propositional worlds (which are given by the valuation of the atomic propositions). Indeed you can verify that (p q)-q is true in the four type of possible worlds (those with p true and q true, p true and q false, p false and q true, and p false and q false). That is related to the idea that a valid proof does not depend on the world, or interpretations, or contexts, etc. So if you prove something it has to be true in all world, and that is why logicians favor theories having a semantics such that they can prove a soundness theorem. Of course they are even more happy when they have a theory with a completeness theorem, which provides the opposite: all proposition true in all interpretations (model, worlds, ...) can be proved in the theory. This is the case for all first order theory. So RA, PA, ZF are complete in that sense. M proves p iff p is true in all models (interpretation, worlds) of p. Of course they are incomplete in the incompleteness sense. Gödel proved the completeness theory PA, and actually of all first order theories (in his PhD thesis, 1930), and the incompleteness of PA (actually of PM, 1931). So completeness in completeness theorem and incompleteness theorem, is used in different sense: Keep in mind that the completeness theorem asserts that if M proves p, then p is true in all models of M. OK? 2) You might perhaps also be missing, or not taking into account consciously enough, Kripke semantics. In that case we have the same language as propositional calculus, + the unary connector or operator B. Unlike ~p, whose truth value depends only of the value of p, Bp value is not functionally dependent of the truth value of p. Now, a modal logic theory which has the formula K (for Kripke) B(p-q)- (Bp-Bp), and whose set of theorems is closed for the modus ponens rule (a, a-b) / b, but also the necessitation rule (p / Bp), can be given a so called Kripke semantics (due indeed to Kripke, around 1968, I think). [I write (p/BP) instead of p = Bp, to avoid confusion with -]. In that semantics, you have a referential (any set with a binary relation). The elements of the set are called world and designate by greek letters, and the relation is called accessibility relation, often designated by R, and if (alpha, beta) belongs to R, we write as usual alpha R beta. That referential becomes a model when, on each world, you give a valuation on the atomic sentences p, q, r, ... and you extend, as in propositional logic the value of the compound formula. All worlds obeys classical propositional logic, so to speak. If a is true in alpha, and if b is true in alpha, we will have (a b) is true in alpha. But this will not provide a valuation for Bp, as Bp does not truth- functionally depend on the value of p. Kripke defined the truth of Bp in the world alpha, by the truth of p in all the worlds accessible from alpha. Bp is true is everywhere I will find myself, p is true. It is natural with most known modalities (where Bp/Dp ([ ]/), with Dp = ~B~p, corresponds to Necessity/Possibility, Obligation/Permission, Everywhere/Somewhere, Always/Once, For-all/It-exists, etc.). If Bp means that p is true in all worlds accessible from the world I am in, Dp meaning ~B~p, will mean that it is false that ~p is true in all worlds accessible, and thus that there is a world where p is true. So, Dp is true in alpha if it exists a world beta with p true in beta and (alpha R beta). So here, like provability above, Bp is related to true in all (accessible) worlds. Then you have the completeness theorem for many modal logic. K4 proves A iff A is true in all models with R transitive (4 = Bp - BBp) KTproves A iff A is true in all models with R réflexive (T = Bp - p) KTB proves A iff A is true in all models with R réflexive and symmetrical and G proves A iff A is true in all finite models with R irreflexive and realist (realist means that all transitory world accesses to cul-de- sac, and a world is transitory if it is a not a cul-de-sac, and of course a cul-de-sac world is a world alpha such
Re: The limit of all computations
On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 03:42:15PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: But a = Ba is a valid rule for all logic having a Kripke semantics. Why? Because it means that a is supposed to be valid (for example you have already prove it), so a, like any theorem, will be true in all worlds, so a will be in particular true in all worlds accessible from anywhere in the model, so Ba will be true in all worlds of the model, so Ba is also a theorem. I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing? I realize my previous answer might be too long and miss your question. Apology if it is the case. Here is a shorter answer. The idea of proving, is that what is proved in true in all possible world. If not, a world would exist as a counter-example, invalidating the argument. You might want to prove something about your actual world, but this can only have the form of a conditional like if my world satisfy such a such propositions then it has to satisfy that or this proposition, and that conditional has better to be true in all worlds, for we never really know which world we are in, we can only make theories. Now, the modal Bp, and proof in math, can be study mathematically, and that is what I described in the preceding post, and constitutes a bit of the Arithmetical UDA. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On 27 May 2012, at 09:46, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 26.05.2012 21:06 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 26 May 2012, at 16:48, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 26.05.2012 11:30 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 26 May 2012, at 08:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... In my view, it would be nicer to treat such a question historically. Your position based on your theorem, after all, is one of possible positions. What do you mean by my position? I don't think I defend a position. I do study the consequence of comp, if only to give a chance to a real non-comp theory. A position that the natural numbers are the foundation of the world. I don't defend that position. I show it to be a consequence of the comp hypothesis + occam razor. I do appreciate the clearness of your position. From this viewpoint, the language of mathematics allows us to remove ambiguities indeed. Yes, and that is not an argument for the truth of comp, but it is an argument for the interest of comp. It like looking for your key under the lamp, because out the light you can't find them. But another reason, is that comp is more polite, with respect to the machine, and so if they can be conscious, there is less risk to hurt them, by betting on that. ... When we talk with each other and make proofs we use a human language. Hence to make sure that we can make universal proofs by means of a human language, it might be good to reach an agreement on what it is. This is an impossible task. That is why I use the semi-axiomatic method (in UDA), and math in AUDA. If you disagree with a method of reasoning, you have to explain why. In english, no problem. I also agree that human language in a way is a mess. Yet, somehow it seems to work and this puzzles my, how it could happen when even mathematicians failed to analyze it. No machine at all can develop of semantics for its living language. Language are living phenomenon, containing probably universal memes. It can be more clever than us. The brain is the most complex known object in the universe. And brains (and machine) are already limited in their self-study for logical reason. A clever machine is a machine which understands that she know nothing, really. But beliefs are possible and needed to survive. ... I am not against non-comp, but I am against any gap-theory, where we introduce something in the ontology to make a problem unsolvable leading to don't ask policy. We are back to a human language. It seems that you mean that some constructions expressed by it do not make sense. It well might be but again we have to discuss the language then. I don't see why we have to discuss language, apart from the machines and their languages. It seems that there is a gap between the language of mathematics and a human language. Don't confuse the formal languages, OBJECT of study of logicians, and the language of the mathematicians, and logicians, to prove things about what they are interested in. That language is human language. Formalism just means that we ask the opinion of some machine. We ask ZF about the continuum hypothesis, and she answered that she does not know (somehow). It might be interesting to understand it. It might give us a hint on how the Universe is made. What do you mean by Universe? I am a bit skeptical about Universe. You see, we must use a human language to communicate, with the language of mathematics this would not work. I do not know why. ? There is no language of mathematics. It is the human languages, with abbreviations. Don't confuse this with the formal languages of logicians and computer scientist. They are very easy to communicate with, as they are simpler (and sort of subset) of human language. In english you will say to the secretary could you print this document, but you can ask formally the machine, by print files of CONTROL- Command, or something. As for comp, I have written once Simulation Hypothesis and Simulation Technology http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2011/09/simulation-hypothesis-and-simulation-technology.html that practically speaking it just does not work. I understand that you talk in principle but how could we know if comp in principle is true if we cannot check it in practice? The whole point is that we can check it, at least if you accept the classical theory of knowledge. Physics arise from number self-reference in a precise constrained way, and the logic of observable already give rise to quantum-like logic. If mechanism is false, we can know it. If it is true we can only bet on it, and the bet or not on some level of substitution. The facts (Everett QM) gives evidence that our first person plural is given by the electronic orbital, our stories does not depend on the precise position of electron in those orbitals. I personally find an extrapolation of a working model outside of its scope that has been researched pretty dangerous. I am just
Re: Free will in MWI
On Sun, May 27, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Now you claim not to understand either words will or free? How could you know whether it's circular or not when you claim not to understand either term? When that power to decide is taken away by a cage, what has been lost? How do you know what I know? Are you telepathic? You believe that one of the many self-contradictory attributes that this thing called free will gives people is the ability to do things for no reason and you think that is wonderful, so it's surprising you should ask so many questions about what CAUSED me to write what I wrote. I'm doing a radio show on Tuesday. You arn't the first and won't be the last to peddle gibberish on the radio. You can't choose whether to choose to take my word or not, you have no free will. You are a puppet of any force that happens to run across the algorithm that you are. it wasn't you who was making a choice. The reason made the choice and it made you believe you made it. So now you have discovered a new thing you can talk about on your radio show: if Craig Weinberg finds that a particular fact about the universe is unpleasant to him then that fact can not be true. your brain is wired to support free will. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. Free will doesn't have to determine everything in the universe, just determining how my brain operates the voluntary muscles of my body is enough. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free will in MWI
On May 27, 1:44 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 27, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Now you claim not to understand either words will or free? How could you know whether it's circular or not when you claim not to understand either term? When that power to decide is taken away by a cage, what has been lost? How do you know what I know? Are you telepathic? You believe that one of the many self-contradictory attributes that this thing called free will gives people is the ability to do things for no reason Did I ever once say that free will means acting for no reason? I only say that reason is irrelevant and cannot explain the fact that there is a difference between freely exercising your will and being a impotent spectator held hostage in your own mind. and you think that is wonderful, so it's surprising you should ask so many questions about what CAUSED me to write what I wrote. I'm not asking what caused you to write, I'm asking why you caused that to be written. I'm doing a radio show on Tuesday. You arn't the first and won't be the last to peddle gibberish on the radio. I'm not selling anything so I can't really be peddling. You can't choose whether to choose to take my word or not, you have no free will. You are a puppet of any force that happens to run across the algorithm that you are. it wasn't you who was making a choice. The reason made the choice and it made you believe you made it. So now you have discovered a new thing you can talk about on your radio show: if Craig Weinberg finds that a particular fact about the universe is unpleasant to him then that fact can not be true. I could just talk about them as if they weren't facts and pretend I don't understand their meaning instead, like some other people. your brain is wired to support free will. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. See previous. Free will doesn't have to determine everything in the universe, just determining how my brain operates the voluntary muscles of my body is enough. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string free will means and neither do you. See previous. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: was Relativity of Existence
On 5/27/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As Bruno said, Provable is always relative to some axioms and rules of inference. It is quite independent of true of reality. Which is why I'm highly suspicious of ideas like deriving all of reality from arithmetic, which we know only from axioms and inferences. We don't give axioms and inference rule when teaching arithmetic in high school. We start from simple examples, like fingers, days of the week, candies in a bag, etc. Children understand anniversary before successor, and the finite/infinite distinction is as old as humanity. In fact it can be shown that the intuition of numbers, addition and multiplication included, is *needed* to even understand what axioms and inference can be, making arithmetic necessarily known before any formal machinery is posited. But only a small finite part of arithmetic. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Max Velmans' Reflexive Monism
On 5/27/2012 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the mind/consciousness of the observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull but ranging out to the farthest place where something is percieved. It seems to me that imply a mapping between a large hyper-volume (the out there) and the small volume of the brain that cannot be in a one-to-one form. The skull, the brain, and 'out there' are all just parts of the world model your brain constructs. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The limit of all computations
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 06:20:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 May 2012, at 12:15, Russell Standish wrote: I still don't follow. If I have proved a is true in some world, why should I infer that it is true in all worlds? What am I missing? I realize my previous answer might be too long and miss your question. Apology if it is the case. Here is a shorter answer. The idea of proving, is that what is proved in true in all possible world. If not, a world would exist as a counter-example, invalidating the argument. I certainly missed that. Is that given as an axiom? It seems like that would be written p - []p. When I say p is true in a world, I can only prove that p is true in that world. I am mute on the subject of whether p is true in any other world (unless I can use an axiom like the above). In what class of logics would such an axiom be taken to be true. (Of course it is true in classical logic, but there is only one world there). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Max Velmans' Reflexive Monism
On May 27, 5:45 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/27/2012 2:04 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: This does seem to imply an interesting situation where the mind/consciousness of the observer is in a sense no longer confined to being 'inside the skull but ranging out to the farthest place where something is percieved. It seems to me that imply a mapping between a large hyper-volume (the out there) and the small volume of the brain that cannot be in a one-to-one form. The skull, the brain, and 'out there' are all just parts of the world model your brain constructs. A model is a presentation which we use to refer to another presentation. To say that the brain constructs models relies on the possibility of a model which has no presentation to begin with. It means that our every experience, including your sitting in that chair reading these words, is made of 'representation-ness', which stands in for the Homunculus to perform this invisible and logically redundant alchemical transformation from perfectly useful neurological signals into some weird orgy of improbable identities. It doesn't hold up. It is a de-presentation of the world in order to justify our failure to locate consciousness inside the tissue of the brain. Consciousness isn't 'in' anything, and it's not produced by anything. It's a story which produces brains, bodies, planets, etc. They are parts of consciousness that are modeled as the world. They are representations made of condensed, externalized, temporally imploded presentations of sense. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
