date:20170727

Re: Robust topological quantum computing

2017-07-27 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Without attempting to place works in your mouth, the achievement of 
hypercomputing such as seems possible with quantum computing, yielding 
processing up to 100 qbits per second, used to resolve the Protein Folding 
Problem, what, in your opinion, will the world then, look like? Fire took 
hundreds of thousands of years, to make a great impact, say, with doing thing 
like burning forests to make way for agriculture, and then metal making. I am 
guessing you would agree with a much faster impact then what I have described 
from archeology? We're looking at The Jetsons, K. Eric Drexler's 
Nanotechnology, Star Trek??

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Fri, Jul 28, 2017 12:14 am
Subject: Re: Robust topological quantum computing

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:

> Since it seems that there is no barrier in physics to halt the development 
of super-big computing, via quantum-bio-photonic computing, 

Can't yet be absolutely certain of that, but it's looking that way.

> what sort of change do you anticipate, with the advent of 100 Qbit 
computing? Better chatbots?  

Yes, chatbots will get better, much better, ASTRONOMICALLY better, in fact 
better than most chatbots that post on this list.  And a quantum computer 
should be able to solve the 3D Protein Folding problem, the discovery of that 
tool alone will cause changes to society of a magnitude similar to that 
of the discovery fire could be used as a tool. 

 John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 5:36 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 12:54 PM,  wrote:
>
> > 
>> I know that, barring disaster, tomorrow there will be a person with the
>> general attributes, memories, and so on of the person writing this sentence.
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>> > 
>> Because of the nature of human psychology, I consider that that person
>> will be "me",
>>
>
> Fine but always remember "me" is just a word but the person writing
> this sentence is more than a word.
>
>
>> > 
>> the same person as I am now, projected into the future,
>>
>
> It won't be exactly the same person, 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>  of tomorrow will have all of "your" memories but in addition will have
> other memories that "you" do not have. So treat all personal pronouns with
> suspicion.  
>
> > 
>> and so selfishly make provisions for him: make sure there is milk in the
>> fridge, lock the door so no-one breaks in, avoid spending all the money in
>> my bank account.
>>
>
> All those activities help insure that tomorrow there will be at least
> one individual
> (more would be fine)
> who 
> remembers being
> Stathis Papaioannou
> today.
>
>
>> > 
>> If I knew I was going to be duplicated so that tomorrow there would be
>> two versions of me in different cities, then I (the person writing this
>> now) would behave as if there were a 1/2 probability that I would end up in
>> one or other city.
>>
>
> You're free to act as you like. I wouldn't behave that way but there is
> no disputing matters of taste. B
> ut I thought we were talking about the nature of reality not the likes,
> dislikes, and superstitions of individuals. 
>
>

The objective facts (how many copies where) are not being disputed by
anyone in this prolonged discussion. I know that tomorrow morning someone
who looks like me, has my memories and so on will probably wake up in my
bed. As you point out above, he will differ from me  in a number if ways;
but even if he did not, why should I care about him? The answer is that is
how our brains have evolved to think, so this discussion *is* in fact about
our likes, dislikes and superstitions.

> 
>> If I knew I would be duplicated 1000 times in city A and once in city B,
>> I (the person writing this now) would behave as if I were 1000 times more
>> likely to end up in A than B, and make plans accordingly.
>>  
>> What would you (the person reading this now) do under these circumstances?
>>
>
> For me that would depend entirely on how up to date the copy is, 
>
> if the copy were made right now I wouldn't mind being blown up in a bomb
> right now. So how long is now? About a second, maybe 2, whatever is less
> time than would be needed to have a last thought because having a last
> thought is the thing I personally don't like about death. That's probably
> because I don't have thoughts I am thoughts, "I" is a specific sequence of
> thoughts.
>

So you agree you could survive if the original was destroyed and a copy
made, but the question is how to calculate the probability of ending up a
particular copy when multiple copies were made. You have stated repeatedly
that the question is nonsensical, but you haven't answered what you would
actually do in the example I gave: you will be copied to two cities, 1000
copies in A and 1 copy in B, and the original instantly destroyed. You have
the option prior to the duplication of arranging for (i) a reward for the
1000 copies that will be created in A, or (ii) the 1 copy that will be
created in B, or (iii) none of the copies - the reward being given to a
charity of your choice instead. Your answer to this question, I claim, will
be an indication of your beliefs about where you are likely to end up as a
result of the copying process.

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Re: Robust topological quantum computing

2017-07-27 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> 
> Since it seems that there is no barrier in physics to halt the development
> of super-big computing, via quantum-bio-photonic computing,

Can't yet be absolutely certain of that, but it's looking that way.

> 
> what sort of change do you anticipate, with the advent of 100 Qbit
> computing? Better chatbots?
>

Yes, chatbots will get better, much better, ASTRONOMICALLY

better, in fact
better 
than most chatbots that post on this list.  And a quantum computer should
be able to solve the 3D Protein Folding problem, the discovery of that tool
alone will cause

changes to society

of a

magnitude similar to that of the

discover
y
 fire could

be used as a tool.

 John K Clark

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Re: Robust topological quantum computing

2017-07-27 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Since it seems that there is no barrier in physics to halt the development of 
super-big computing, via quantum-bio-photonic computing, what sort of change do 
you anticipate, with the advent of 100 Qbit computing? Better chatbots?  

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Wed, Jul 26, 2017 1:07 pm
Subject: Re: Robust topological quantum computing

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 a spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:

> 
Now all we have to do is figure out what multiple Qbit computing can do for us? 
(He said sarcastically).

Well for a start large scale manipulations of Qbits could destroy Bitcoin and 
render nearly every encryption method currently used on the Internet obsolete, 
but that would be one of the more minor consequences of a Qbit world. Once a 
general purpose Quantum Computer larger than about 100 Qbits is built human 
civilization will never be the same again; assuming of corse it's physically 
possible to build such a machine, and it's looking increasingly likely that it 
is. Google says they hope to have a 49 Qbit computer late this year or early 
next. 

 John K Clark

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Jul 24, 2017 6:10 pm
Subject: Robust topological quantum computing

In the July 21 2017 issue of the journal Science Qing Lin He reports he was 
able to move Majorana quasiparticles in a nanowire, their existence has been 
shown before but this is the first time they could be moved around. Majorana 
quasiparticles (sometimes called Anyons) should obey non-Abelian statistics, 
which just means its non-commutative. But that is a big deal  because something 
like that would be ideal for use as the working material in a Quantum Computer 
because they would be far more resistant to quantum decoherence, the biggest 
enemy to practical quantum computing.

The amount of conductance a nanowire containing Anyons has comes in discrete 
jumps and is a function of the topological class (the number of times the 
spacetime worldlines of the Anyons cross over), and it's not easy to change the 
topological class of entangled Anyons,  and that makes them resistant to 
quantum decoherence. As a example you probably can't change the topological 
class of your shoelaces (nerd-speak for untie your shoelaces) with just any old 
random bump, a much more intricate maneuver would be necessary. Another way of 
looking at it is that each Anyon is really only half a particle so a single 
Qbit of information is stored in both,  so for a Qbit to be scrambled both 
Anyons would have to be hit at the same time, and they can be as far apart as 
you like. The next step is to get the Anyons to actually perform a calculation 
and so far none has even been able to add 1+1, however once that goal has been 
reached I think it would be possible to scale up to something far larger much 
more quickly than other approaches.

This certainly isn't the only approach to Quantum Computing, instead of Anyons 
companies like IBM, and Google and D-wave are using other things like ions and 
photons and superconducting junctions, and unlike Anyons they have already been 
able to perform a few simple calculations. Only Microsoft is betting entirely 
on the more radical topological approach, time will tell which method is better 
but it would be ironic if a company with a reputation for being plodding ends 
up being the most innovative of all. At the very least you've got to give them  
credit for taking the coolest path, and it might be the most lucrative too,

John K Clark  

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 4:45 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 6:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> >
>> I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times as
>> high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.
>
>
> If 2 things never differentiate then they are identical in every way
> and there is no way to tell if there is 1 thing or 2, so it would be silly
> to say there are 2 . And it would remain true if the thing in question
> is subjective experience. And it would be as true for 1000 as it is for 2.
>

There is the possibility of differentiation even if it doesn't occur. If
you know you have been duplicated into 1000 red cubicles and 1 blue
cubicle, identical on the inside, you would bet that if you opened the door
your cubicle would be red.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 12:54 PM,  wrote:

> 
> I know that, barring disaster, tomorrow there will be a person with the
> general attributes, memories, and so on of the person writing this sentence.
>

Yes.

> > 
> Because of the nature of human psychology, I consider that that person
> will be "me",
>

Fine but always remember "me" is just a word but the person writing this
sentence is more than a word.

> > 
> the same person as I am now, projected into the future,
>

It won't be exactly the same person, 
Stathis Papaioannou
 of tomorrow will have all of "your" memories but in addition will have
other memories that "you" do not have. So treat all personal pronouns with
suspicion.  

> 
> and so selfishly make provisions for him: make sure there is milk in the
> fridge, lock the door so no-one breaks in, avoid spending all the money in
> my bank account.
>

All those activities help insure that tomorrow there will be at least one
individual
(more would be fine)
who 
remembers being
Stathis Papaioannou
today.

> > 
> If I knew I was going to be duplicated so that tomorrow there would be two
> versions of me in different cities, then I (the person writing this now)
> would behave as if there were a 1/2 probability that I would end up in one
> or other city.
>

You're free to act as you like. I wouldn't behave that way but there is no
disputing matters of taste. B
ut I thought we were talking about the nature of reality not the likes,
dislikes, and superstitions of individuals. 

> > 
> If I knew I would be duplicated 1000 times in city A and once in city B, I
> (the person writing this now) would behave as if I were 1000 times more
> likely to end up in A than B, and make plans accordingly.
>  
> What would you (the person reading this now) do under these circumstances?
>

For me that would depend entirely on how up to date the copy is, 

if the copy were made right now I wouldn't mind being blown up in a bomb
right now. So how long is now? About a second, maybe 2, whatever is less
time than would be needed to have a last thought because having a last
thought is the thing I personally don't like about death. That's probably
because I don't have thoughts I am thoughts, "I" is a specific sequence of
thoughts.

 John K Clark

>

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 6:52 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> The probabilities are always about the first person experiences.



For gods sake! In a world that contains
 
first person experience
 
duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE*


first
 
person experience
, 
and no matter how often the phrase is repeated it remains just as stupid
 as it was the first time it was uttered.

 John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 6:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
> I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times as
> high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.

If 2 things never differentiate then they are identical in every way and
there is no way to tell if there is 1 thing or 2, so it would be silly to
say there are 2 . And it would remain true if the thing in question
is subjective experience. And it would be as true for 1000 as it is for 2.

  John K Clark

>>

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 12:08 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> > 
>> Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
>> behaviour,
>>
>
> 
> Absolutely true.
>  
> By the way, the short sentence quoted above contains just 12 words, but 3
> of them are personal pronouns. That's 25%. People just use them
> unconsciously without thinking about what they really mean, and that causes
> few problems in everyday life but fails utterly if personal pronoun
> duplicating machines are involved.
>
> > 
>> despite what you may say about pronouns.
>>
>
> Also true, and what John Clark says is that John Clark doesn't
>  give a damn about what happens to words like "me" or "I" or any other
> personal pronoun, however John Clark cares very much about what happens to
> the conscious being that is typing these words right now.
>
>
>> > 
>> If you go through a 1->1 duplication would you make provisions for the
>> copy?
>>
>
> Explain what the difference is between a future "you" and a future
> "copy" and John Clark will provide a answer to that question, in the future
> of course. 
>
> 
>

I know that, barring disaster, tomorrow there will be a person with the
general attributes, memories, and so on of the person writing this
sentence. Because of the nature of human psychology, I consider that that
person will be "me", the same person as I am now, projected into the
future, and so selfishly make provisions for him: make sure there is milk
in the fridge, lock the door so no-one breaks in, avoid spending all the
money in my bank account. If I knew I was going to be duplicated so that
tomorrow there would be two versions of me in different cities, then I (the
person writing this now) would behave as if there were a 1/2 probability
that I would end up in one or other city. If I knew I would be duplicated
1000 times in city A and once in city B, I (the person writing this now)
would behave as if I were 1000 times more likely to end up in A than B, and
make plans accordingly. What would you (the person reading this now) do
under these circumstances?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 8:52 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 27 Jul 2017, at 12:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> 
 >> 
 The bet was about who would be "you".
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist assumption,
>>> we know that all copies will be you.
>>>  
>>> The bet is not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on
>>> which first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no
>>> ambiguity) will live in the future
>>>
>>
>> 
>> No ambiguity?? If that
>> is 
>> what "you" means then that's ridiculous squared! The
>>  
>> "you"
>> 
>> here In Helsinki now on Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated
>> Universal Time will not exist tomorrow because tomorrow
>> nobody 
>> who answers by the name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki
>> ,
>> and even more important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05
>> Coordinated Universal Time will never come around again. If that's
>> really 
>> what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a people
>> duplicating machine.  But if "you" means somebody who remembers being
>>  Bruno Marchal on
>> 
>> Wednesday July 26 2017
>> at 
>> 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else it
>> could mean,  then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if duplicating machines
>> are involved "you" could be alive in several different places at exactly
>> the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>> Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure, but
>> you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where you will
>> feel to be.
>>
>> 3p/1p confusion.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever happen, you
>> will drink a cup of coffee
>>
>> It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for granted that
>> people on this list 
>> simply can not stop themselves from using personal pronouns. 
>>
>> > 
>>> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
>>>
>>
>> It's true I am confused. Tell me which *ONE* of those 1001 people has
>> *THE* 1p view and I will be less confused.
>>
>>
>>
>> The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From their
>> first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they all see the
>> symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON indeterminacy.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will be
>>> duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow, but you are
>>> told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will never
>>> differentiated.
>>>
>>
>> Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
>>
>>
>>
>> Exactly.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> > 
>>> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
>>>
>>
>> Agreed.
>>
>>
>>
>>> > 
>>> and the probability remains 1/2
>>>
>>
>> Huh? The probability of what?
>>
>>
>>
>> The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person
>> point of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies, confirm
>> this.
>>
>
> Here I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times
> as high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.
>
>
>
> Consider a computer, C, implemented with a boolean graph, so there are
> wires, + NAND, say.
>
> Imagine we double each wires and gates, in a ways such that they don't
> touch. That gives a new computer functionally equivalent with  C, having
> perhaps less thin wires than C. But that gives also a duplication of C,
> even if quite close together.
>
> If you are right, then, in the duplication experience, if in Moscow they
> use thick wires, and in Washington thin wires, the probabilty P(M) will be
> bigger than P(W). Yet, they are both digitally and functionally (at the
> right level) equivalent.
>

Two circuits tied together is electrically equivalent to one circuit with
thicker wires, but two equivalent look ent but separate circuits us not.
The difference is that in the two separate circuits a different input to
each would give a different output, but not in the connected circuits.

So I have some doubt that your answer is coherent with the mechanist
> hypothesis.
>
> The probabilities are always about the first person experiences. They do
> not need to be distinct, though, but there need to be distinguishable in
> principle, and it is hard to imagine protocol to capture this. It is about
> the point where I move to the math theory of self-reference.
>

In the multiverse there are many identical implementations of quotidian
first person experiences for each bizarre experience such as quantum
tunneling to the other side of the Earth. How would we explain the
probability of the bizarre experience

Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le 27 juil. 2017 16:14, "John Clark"  a écrit :

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> 
> Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
> behaviour,
>

Absolutely true.

By the way, the short sentence quoted above contains just 12 words, but 3
of them are personal pronouns. That's 25%. People just use them
unconsciously without thinking about what they really mean, and that causes
few problems in everyday life but fails utterly if personal pronoun
duplicating machines are involved.

> 
> despite what you may say about pronouns.
>

Also true, and what John Clark says is that John Clark doesn't
 give a damn about what happens to words like "me" or "I" or any other
personal pronoun, however John Clark cares very much about what happens to
the conscious being that is typing these words right now.

That's why the word 'I' is used for... It's an indexical... Waiting the
peepee.

> > 
> If you go through a 1->1 duplication would you make provisions for the
> copy?
>

Explain what the difference is between a future "you" and a future "copy"
and John Clark will provide a answer to that question, in the future of
course. 

 John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> 
> Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
> behaviour,
>

Absolutely true.

By the way, the short sentence quoted above contains just 12 words, but 3
of them are personal pronouns. That's 25%. People just use them
unconsciously without thinking about what they really mean, and that causes
few problems in everyday life but fails utterly if personal pronoun
duplicating machines are involved.

> 
> despite what you may say about pronouns.
>

Also true, and what John Clark says is that John Clark doesn't
 give a damn about what happens to words like "me" or "I" or any other
personal pronoun, however John Clark cares very much about what happens to
the conscious being that is typing these words right now.

> > 
> If you go through a 1->1 duplication would you make provisions for the
> copy?
>

Explain what the difference is between a future "you" and a future "copy"
and John Clark will provide a answer to that question, in the future of
course. 

 John K Clark

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Jul 2017, at 12:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> The bet was about who would be "you".

> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist  
assumption, we know that all copies will be you. The bet is  
not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on which  
first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no  
ambiguity) will live in the future

No ambiguity?? If that is what "you" means then that's  
ridiculous squared! The "you" here In Helsinki now on  
Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time will  
not exist tomorrow because tomorrow nobody who answers by the  
name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki, and even more  
important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 Coordinated  
Universal Time will never come around again. If that's really  
what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a  
people duplicating machine.  But if "you" means somebody who  
remembers being  Bruno Marchal on Wednesday July 26 2017 at  
17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else  
it could mean,  then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if  
duplicating machines are involved "you" could be alive in several  
different places at exactly the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no 
.

Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure,  
but you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where  
you will feel to be.

3p/1p confusion.

 > For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever  
happen, you will drink a cup of coffee

It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for  
granted that people on this list simply can not stop  
themselves from using personal pronouns. 

> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.

It's true I am confused. Tell me which ONE of those 1001 people  
has THE 1p view and I will be less confused.

The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From  
their first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they  
all see the symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON  
indeterminacy.

A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you  
will be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in  
Moscow, but you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally  
identical, and will never differentiated.

Then there are only 2 people not 1000.

Exactly.

> In that case, there is only two first person experiences

Agreed.

> and the probability remains 1/2

Huh? The probability of what?

The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person  
point of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies,  
confirm this.

Here I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000  
times as high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.

Consider a computer, C, implemented with a boolean graph, so there are  
wires, + NAND, say.

Imagine we double each wires and gates, in a ways such that they don't  
touch. That gives a new computer functionally equivalent with  C,  
having perhaps less thin wires than C. But that gives also a  
duplication of C, even if quite close together.

If you are right, then, in the duplication experience, if in Moscow  
they use thick wires, and in Washington thin wires, the probabilty  
P(M) will be bigger than P(W). Yet, they are both digitally and  
functionally (at the right level) equivalent.

So I have some doubt that your answer is coherent with the mechanist  
hypothesis.

The probabilities are always about the first person experiences. They  
do not need to be distinct, though, but there need to be  
distinguishable in principle, and it is hard to imagine protocol to  
capture this. It is about the point where I move to the math theory of  
self-reference.

Also, what is P(M) and P(W) in case you are told (in Helsinki) that  
they will build two identical reconstitutions in Moscow, evolving  
identically for a period of time, and then fuse them, to get one more  
solid computer?

Bruno

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> 
>>> >> 
>>> The bet was about who would be "you".
>>
>>
>> > 
>> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist assumption, we
>> know that all copies will be you.
>>  
>> The bet is not on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on
>> which first person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no
>> ambiguity) will live in the future
>>
>
> 
> No ambiguity?? If that
> is 
> what "you" means then that's ridiculous squared! The
>  
> "you"
> 
> here In Helsinki now on Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated
> Universal Time will not exist tomorrow because tomorrow
> nobody 
> who answers by the name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki
> ,
> and even more important because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05
> Coordinated Universal Time will never come around again. If that's
> really 
> what "you" means then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a people
> duplicating machine.  But if "you" means somebody who remembers being
>  Bruno Marchal on
> 
> Wednesday July 26 2017
> at 
> 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else it
> could mean,  then "you" will be alive tomorrow, and if duplicating machines
> are involved "you" could be alive in several different places at exactly
> the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no
> .
>
>
>
> Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure, but
> you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where you will
> feel to be.
>
> 3p/1p confusion.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever happen, you
> will drink a cup of coffee
>
> It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for granted that
> people on this list 
> simply can not stop themselves from using personal pronouns. 
>
> > 
>> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.
>>
>
> It's true I am confused. Tell me which *ONE* of those 1001 people has
> *THE* 1p view and I will be less confused.
>
>
>
> The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From their
> first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they all see the
> symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON indeterminacy.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will be
>> duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow, but you are
>> told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will never
>> differentiated.
>>
>
> Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
>
>
>
> Exactly.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> > 
>> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
>>
>
> Agreed.
>
>
>
>> > 
>> and the probability remains 1/2
>>
>
> Huh? The probability of what?
>
>
>
> The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person point
> of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies, confirm this.
>

Here I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times
as high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 3:50 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> The bet was about who would be "you".

> That is ridiculous. By definition of the Digital Mechanist  
assumption, we know that all copies will be you. The bet is not  
on who will be you, (as we know both will be), but on which first  
person experience, you, (here and now in Helsinki: no ambiguity)  
will live in the future

No ambiguity?? If that is what "you" means then that's  
ridiculous squared! The "you" here In Helsinki now on  
Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time will  
not exist tomorrow because tomorrow nobody who answers by the  
name Bruno Marchal will be in Helsinki, and even more important  
because Wednesday July 26 2017 17:20:05 Coordinated Universal Time  
will never come around again. If that's really what "you" means  
then "you" die every nanosecond with or without a people duplicating  
machine.  But if "you" means somebody who remembers being  Bruno  
Marchal on Wednesday July 26 2017 at 17:20:05 Coordinated  
Universal Time, and I can't imagine what else it could mean,  then  
"you" will be alive tomorrow, and if duplicating machines are  
involved "you" could be alive in several different places at exactly  
the same time. Odd yes paradoxical no.

Nobody said it is paradoxical. "you" can be it in two places, sure,  
but you cannot feel to be in two palces, and the question is where you  
will feel to be.

3p/1p confusion.

 > For the same reason you can bet in Helsinki that, whatever  
happen, you will drink a cup of coffee

It must be subconscious, it's so ingrained and so taken for  
granted that people on this list simply can not stop themselves  
from using personal pronouns. 

> It seems to me you were just confusing the 3p and 1p views.

It's true I am confused. Tell me which ONE of those 1001 people  
has THE 1p view and I will be less confused.

The question is on their future 1p view. They all have it. From their  
first person perspective, they all have "the" view, and they all see  
the symmetry broken, confirming the FIRST PERSON indeterminacy.

A more difficult question would appear if you are told that you will  
be duplicated in one copy in Washington, and 999 copies in Moscow,  
but you are told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical,  
and will never differentiated.

Then there are only 2 people not 1000.

Exactly.

> In that case, there is only two first person experiences

Agreed.

> and the probability remains 1/2

Huh? The probability of what?

The probability of ending living in Washington from the first person  
point of view. Both first person, despite here the 1000 bodies,  
confirm this.

Bruno

John K Clark

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