Re: The problem with physics

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 11:59:41 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/22/2019 9:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>> On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of 
>> Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" even 
>> mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a credible 
>> answer to that question
>>
>>
>> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.
>>
>
> Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 
> (arXiv:.3328)?  They prove a theorem that places limitations on the 
> viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave function: "Here 
> we show that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information 
> about an underlying physical state of the system, and in which systems 
> prepared independently have independent physical states, must make 
> predictions which contradict those of quantum theory."
>
>
> Which continues:
>
>  "The argument depends on few assumptions. One is that a
> system has a “real physical state” – not necessarily com-
> pletely described by quantum theory, but objective and
> independent of the observer. This assumption only needs
> to hold for systems that are isolated, and not entangled
> with other systems. Nonetheless, this assumption, or
> some part of it, would be denied by instrumentalist ap-
> proaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum state
> is merely a calculational tool for making predictions con-
> cerning macroscopic measurement outcomes."
>
> There is also this paper, which discusses some loopholes the the 
> assumptions of the PBR theorem:
>
> Implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph quantum no-go theorem
> Maximilian Schlosshauer, Arthur Fine
> (Submitted on 21 Mar 2012 (v1), last revised 27 Jun 2012 (this version, 
> v3))
> Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph introduce a new no-go theorem for 
> hidden-variables models of quantum theory. We make precise the class of 
> models targeted and construct equivalent models that evade the theorem. The 
> theorem requires assumptions for models of composite systems, which we 
> examine, determining "compactness" as the weakest assumption needed. On 
> that basis, we demonstrate results of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. 
> Given compactness and the relevant class of models, the theorem can be seen 
> as showing that some measurements on composite systems must have built-in 
> inefficiencies, complicating its testing.
> Comments:4 pages. v2: tweaked presentation, new title; v3: minuscule 
> edits to match published version
> Subjects:Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
> Journal reference:Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 260404 (2012)
> DOI:10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.260404
> Cite as:arXiv:1203.4779 [quant-ph]
>  (or arXiv:1203.4779v3 [quant-ph] for this version)
>
>
> Brent
>



*Epistemic interpretations of quantum theory have a measurement problem*

Quantum Physics and Logic 2019 - https://qpl2019.org/ 

https://qpl2019.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/QPL_2019_paper_2.pdf

*We have demonstrated that state update under measurement poses a serious 
challenge to ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory in the 
ontological models framework: all currently known ψ-epistemic models for 
full quantum theory in d ≥ 3 cannot faithfully represent*
*state update. This runs in direct contrast to the prevailing view that 
ψ-epistemic models provide a compelling explanation of state update.*




@philipthrift. 

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Re: The problem with physics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 11/22/2019 9:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:

Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of
Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a
"measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation
that can give a credible answer to that question


The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.


Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 
(arXiv:.3328)?  They prove a theorem that places limitations on 
the viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave 
function: "Here we show that any model in which a quantum state 
represents mere information about an underlying physical state of the 
system, and in which systems prepared independently have independent 
physical states, must make predictions which contradict those of 
quantum theory."


Which continues:

 "The argument depends on few assumptions. One is that a
system has a “real physical state” – not necessarily com-
pletely described by quantum theory, but objective and
independent of the observer. This assumption only needs
to hold for systems that are isolated, and not entangled
with other systems. Nonetheless, this assumption, or
some part of it, would be denied by instrumentalist ap-
proaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum state
is merely a calculational tool for making predictions con-
cerning macroscopic measurement outcomes."

There is also this paper, which discusses some loopholes the the 
assumptions of the PBR theorem:


Implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph quantum no-go theorem
Maximilian Schlosshauer, Arthur Fine
(Submitted on 21 Mar 2012 (v1), last revised 27 Jun 2012 (this version, v3))
Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph introduce a new no-go theorem for 
hidden-variables models of quantum theory. We make precise the class of 
models targeted and construct equivalent models that evade the theorem. 
The theorem requires assumptions for models of composite systems, which 
we examine, determining "compactness" as the weakest assumption needed. 
On that basis, we demonstrate results of the Bell-Kochen-Specker 
theorem. Given compactness and the relevant class of models, the theorem 
can be seen as showing that some measurements on composite systems must 
have built-in inefficiencies, complicating its testing.
Comments:    4 pages. v2: tweaked presentation, new title; v3: minuscule 
edits to match published version

Subjects:    Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
Journal reference:    Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 260404 (2012)
DOI:    10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.260404
Cite as:    arXiv:1203.4779 [quant-ph]
 (or arXiv:1203.4779v3 [quant-ph] for this version)


Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of
> Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" even
> mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a credible
> answer to that question
>
>
> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.
>

Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph
(arXiv:.3328)?  They prove a theorem that places limitations on the
viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave function: "Here
we show that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information
about an underlying physical state of the system, and in which systems
prepared independently have independent physical states, must make
predictions which contradict those of quantum theory."

Bruce

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Re: has evidence pointing to the exisrance of a new boson been found. See arvix link to paper

['Chris de Morsella' via Everything List]

Yes... it does seem analagous to the  muon moment which caused Rabi to utter 
that quip.
I am always fascinated by evidence that hints at something deeper and outside 
of the zone of competency of our current best theoretical frameworks and mental 
superstructures.
An endless re-confirmation of the Standard Model becomes just more of the same. 
Evidence that challenges our base-line assumptions is far more interesting, for 
it forces us to re-think that which we thought we knew.
-chris 
 
  On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 5:42 PM, Lawrence 
Crowell wrote:   I guess as I. Rabi said, 
"Who ordered that?" 
LC

On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 7:09:31 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote:

New evidence supporting the existence of the hypothetic X17 particle

A.J. Krasznahorkay, M. Csatlos, L. Csige, J. Gulyas, M. Koszta, B. Szihalmi, J. 
Timar, D.S. Firak, A. Nagy, N.J. Sas, A. Krasznahorkay(Submitted on 23 Oct 2019)
We observed electron-positron pairs from the electro-magnetically forbidden M0 
transition depopulating the 21.01 MeV 0− state in 4He. A peak was observed in 
their e+e− angular correlations at 115∘ with 7.2σ significance, and could be 
described by assuming the creation and subsequent decay of a light particle 
with mass of mXc2=16.84±0.16(stat)±0.20( syst) MeV and ΓX= 3.9×10−5 eV. 
According to the mass, it is likely the same X17 particle, which we recently 
suggested [Phys. Rev. Lett. 116, 052501 (2016)] for describing the anomaly 
observed in 8Be.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1910. 10459





The values for the hypothetical x17 boson that this team observed with the 
Helium (4) source aligns closely to those observed earlier with the Berylium 
(8) source.




Here is their summary:

 In summary, we have observed 
e+e− pairs from an electro-magnetically forbidden M0 transition depopulating 
the 21.01 MeV 0− state in 4He. The energy sum of the pairs corresponds to the 
energy of the transition. The measured e+e−angular correlation for the pairs 
shows a peak at 115∘, supporting the creation and decay of the X17 particle 
with mass of mXc2=16.84±0.16(stat)±0.20( syst)MeV. This mass agrees nicely with 
the value of mXc2=17.01 ±0.16 MeV we previously derived in the 8Be experiment 
kr16 ; kra17 ; kra1 9 . The partial width of the X17 particle decay is esimated 
to be: ΓX= 3.9×10−5 eV. We are expecting more, independent experimental results 
to come for the X17 particle in the coming years.


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Re: has evidence pointing to the exisrance of a new boson been found. See arvix link to paper

[Lawrence Crowell]

I guess as I. Rabi said, "Who ordered that?" 

LC

On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 7:09:31 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote:
>
> New evidence supporting the existence of the hypothetic X17 particle
> A.J. Krasznahorkay 
> 
> , M. Csatlos 
> , L. 
> Csige 
> , J. 
> Gulyas 
> , M. 
> Koszta 
> , B. 
> Szihalmi 
> , J. 
> Timar 
> , D.S. 
> Firak 
> , A. 
> Nagy 
> , N.J. Sas 
> , A. 
> Krasznahorkay 
> 
> (Submitted on 23 Oct 2019)
>
> We observed electron-positron pairs from the electro-magnetically 
> forbidden M0 transition depopulating the 21.01 MeV 0− state in 4He. A 
> peak was observed in their e+e− angular correlations at 115∘ with 7.2σ 
> significance, 
> and could be described by assuming the creation and subsequent decay of a 
> light particle with mass of mXc2=16.84±0.16(stat)±0.20(syst) MeV and ΓX= 
> 3.9×10−5 eV. According to the mass, it is likely the same X17 particle, 
> which we recently suggested [Phys. Rev. Lett. 116, 052501 (2016)] for 
> describing the anomaly observed in 8Be.
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.10459
>
>
> The values for the hypothetical x17 boson that this team observed with the 
> Helium (4) source aligns closely to those observed earlier with the 
> Berylium (8) source.
>
>
> Here is their summary:
>
>  In summary, we have observed 
>
> e+e− pairs from an electro-magnetically forbidden M0 transition 
> depopulating the 21.01 MeV 0− state in 4He. The energy sum of the pairs 
> corresponds to the energy of the transition. The measured e+e−angular 
> correlation for the pairs shows a peak at 115∘, supporting the creation 
> and decay of the X17 particle with mass of mXc2=16.84±0.16(stat)±0.20(syst
> )MeV. This mass agrees nicely with the value of mXc2=17.01 ±0.16 MeV we 
> previously derived in the 8Be experiment kr16  
> ; kra17  
> ; 
> kra19  . The 
> partial width of the X17 particle decay is esimated to be: ΓX= 3.9×10−5 eV. 
> We are expecting more, independent experimental results to come for the X17 
> particle in the coming years.

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Re: The problem with physics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 11/22/2019 1:33 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 3:02 PM 'Brent Meeker' via 
> wrote:


>>Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution
of Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a
"measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only
interpretation that can give a credible answer to that question

/> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer./

We now know thata measurementis possible without interacting with the 
thing being measured:


Interaction-free measurement 



So we could place such a device at one slit in the 2 slit exparament 
so we would know which slit the photons went throughand if we do there 
will be no interference pattern, but if we turn the device off the 
interference pattern willcome right back. If there is a credible 
epistemological explanation for this very strange behavior I have 
never heard it.


The person who knows the slit detector is on makes a different 
prediction of the screen pattern.


Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 1:14 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 7:18 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
 counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
 not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
 Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827).*

>>>
>>> >> The abstract says "*The view presented in this paper is that the
>>> minimal assumptions behind Bell's inequality are locality and
>>> counterfactual definiteness*", so if Bell can derive his Inequality
>>> from those assumptions but exparament proves that the Inequality is not
>>> true then one or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's
>>> entire point, he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions
>>> were true or not. It turned out they were not.
>>>
>>
>> *> But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness.*
>>
>
> That was your point?? You just said "*I can provide many references which
> claim that Bell did assume counterfactual definiteness*"!
>

You are trolling again. My comment was in answer to your comment that "Bell
did not assume counterfactual definiteness" was an obviously silly remark.
It was a remark that I made, and continue to make. There are many
references, like to the Baylock paper, which claim that  Bell did assume
this, so it is important to get the facts right -- Bell did not assume
counterfactual definiteness because he had no need to do so. And also,
because counterfactual definiteness is clearly false for quantum mechanics,
it would not be among the list of things he had to assume for his theorem.

> *All he *[Bell] *assumed was that any possible hidden variables were
>> local. So it is locality that is disproven by the experimental results.
>> Nothing about counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not
>> assume either of these things*.
>>
>
> You and Maudlin may believe that but it is certainly a minority viewpoint:
>
> *"The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
> assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
> to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
> intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
> within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*
>


That is false. Bell did assume locality, and also ruled out the idea of
retrocausality. But he had no need to assume counterfactual definiteness.
If you think he did, then it is up to you to show exactly where in his
proof use is made of such an assumption. I am quite sure that you cannot do
this; no-one has ever been able to do this because Bell did not make any
such assumption.

The other overwhelming case against the suggestion that this assumption is
necessary for Bell's theorem, and the associated implication that if you do
not make this assumption, a perfectly local account of the EPR correlations
is possible, is the fact that no one has ever been able to provide this
magical local account of the correlations. If you think it is possible,
produce it! After years of prompting, Bruno has been unable to produce any
such local account. And all the other authors who have made this claim have
likewise failed in their attempts to produce the required local account.
All these many failures tell very much in favour of Maudlin's and my point
that Bell did actually prove that any such local account of the
correlations was impossible.




> Counterfactual definiteness
> 
>
> >> Bell knew exactly what he was assuming, and Baylock's paper came out
>>> 10 years ago but it might just as well have fallen into a Black Hole for
>>> all the effect it had on the physics community. It wasn't exactly earth
>>> shattering.
>>>
>>
>> > *Yes, Baylock's paper has not received much attention -- basically
>> because it is obvious nonsense.*
>>
>
> Then why the hell did you reference it?! Why did you have me waste my time
> reading the abstract if you think it's "obvious nonsense"?
>

So that you could see for yourself that it was obvious nonsense. If all you
read was the abstract, then you might have failed to get that point. But
that is hardly my fault.

> *You are entitled to your own opinions. But you are not entitled to your
>> own facts. Physicists  do not use the term 'realism' to mean
>> 'counterfactual definiteness'.*
>>
>
> If by "realistic" physicists don't mean that an object can be in one and
> only one physical state both before and after an interaction, if they don't
> mean the ability to speak meaningfully of the results of a measurement that
> has not been performed, then what in the world do they mean by "realistic?
>

You show your ignorance of the relevant literature. Scientific realism is a
perfectly well-defined concept. And that is what most people mean by
realism -- there exists an objective extern

Re: The problem with physics

[John Clark]

On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 3:02 PM 'Brent Meeker' via <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of
>> Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" even
>> mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a credible
>> answer to that question
>
>

*> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.*


We now know that a measurement is possible without interacting with the
thing being measured:

Interaction-free measurement


So we could place such a device at one slit in the 2 slit exparament
so we would
know which slit the photons went through and if we do there will be no
interference pattern, but if we turn the device off the interference
pattern willcome right back. If there is a credible epistemological
explanation for this very strange behavior I have never heard it.

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of 
Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" 
even mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a 
credible answer to that question


The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 11/22/2019 12:22 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 12:06:04 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those
outcomes are ever observed.


It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The
point was that they can be judged right or wrong/*only*/ if
they are predictions of /*observations.*/ Otherwise they are
like your priest predicting that a donation to the church
will put you in heaven when you die.



Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic
practice that is outside the scientific
model/formulation/theory itself.


A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the
deflection of starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked
himself whether it will be/*useful */to think that his
observation matched Einstein's predict?  He should have
thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?

Brent



Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by
humans (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models
predict outcomes in galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models,
they may make predictions of outcomes in other universes where we
don't even live.


In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes. Which is
why it is a problem to interpret the Born rule.


*Nomologically possible? What does this mean? I looked it up but don't 
get it. AG

*


Unqualified "possible" is ambiguous.  Does it just mean "not 
self-contradictory" or does it mean "thinkable"  or "I can imagine it in 
detail".  "Nomological" means consistent with physics, i.e. not 
violating any physical "law".


Brent


How human observations relate to models (their predicted
outcomes) is a matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called
agreed-upon scientific practice. But this is not part of the models.


Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism).  But
observations are.  Otherwise it's just mathematics.  In QM they
are even called "observables".

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 11/22/2019 12:09 AM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
Well... maybe when you are a 50 years old scientist, you can say that, 
but this is not the spirit in which science is teached to children or 
popularized to laymen. The spirit of science popularization is that it 
gives us the truth, and we should obey or die. If scientists are such 
moral people, then why they don't tell to their students in the first 
class of their course that they will only present to them a model ? 
Instead, they jump right in: "Space is such-and-such, time is 
such-and-such.". I never heard any professor of mine telling us that 
they are only presenting us models.


I have.  Maybe my professor, Englebert Schucking, was more honest, or 
likely more philosophical.


Brent



On Thursday, 21 November 2019 19:23:27 UTC+2, Brent wrote:

The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to 
interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a 
mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal 
interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification
of  such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it
is expected to work.
    --—John von Neumann

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Re: The problem with physics

[John Clark]

On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 7:18 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*>>> I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
>>> counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
>>> not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
>>> Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827).*
>>>
>>
>> >> The abstract says "*The view presented in this paper is that the
>> minimal assumptions behind Bell's inequality are locality and
>> counterfactual definiteness*", so if Bell can derive his Inequality from
>> those assumptions but exparament proves that the Inequality is not true
>> then one or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's entire
>> point, he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions were true
>> or not. It turned out they were not.
>>
>
> *> But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness.*
>

That was your point?? You just said "*I can provide many references which
claim that Bell did assume counterfactual definiteness*"!


> > *All he *[Bell] *assumed was that any possible hidden variables were
> local. So it is locality that is disproven by the experimental results.
> Nothing about counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not
> assume either of these things*.
>

You and Maudlin may believe that but it is certainly a minority viewpoint:

*"The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*

Counterfactual definiteness


>> Bell knew exactly what he was assuming, and Baylock's paper came out 10
>> years ago but it might just as well have fallen into a Black Hole for all
>> the effect it had on the physics community. It wasn't exactly earth
>> shattering.
>>
>
> > *Yes, Baylock's paper has not received much attention -- basically
> because it is obvious nonsense.*
>

Then why the hell did you reference it?! Why did you have me waste my time
reading the abstract if you think it's "obvious nonsense"?


> > *You are entitled to your own opinions. But you are not entitled to
> your own facts. Physicists  do not use the term 'realism' to mean
> 'counterfactual definiteness'.*
>

If by "realistic" physicists don't mean that an object can be in one and
only one physical state both before and after an interaction, if they don't
mean the ability to speak meaningfully of the results of a measurement that
has not been performed, then what in the world do they mean by "realistic?


> * > As Maudlin points out, such abuse of Bell's argument has led to
> endless stupidity in these discussions.*
>

Maudlin says "*If I had my druthers, 'realist' and 'anti-realist' would be
banned from these foundational discussions*", and that strikes me as a
remarkably silly thing to say. Regardless of what ones philosophy may be
the FACT remains that a word is needed to express the idea that things can
be in one and only one physical state both before and after an interaction,
and a short easily spelled word like "realistic" seems to fit the bill
pretty well, although philosophers like lawyers generally prefer long Latin
phrases for simple ideas.

I also think it's very strange that Maudlin's book on quantum physics has
the very word "Philosophy" in its title and yet it spends virtually no time
on the measurement problem, perhaps the greatest philosophical mystery of
all in Quantum Mechanics. Why does the act of measurement seem to override
the evolution of Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a
"measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can
give a credible answer to that question. Maybe that's why Maudlin never
asked the question.

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 1:08:19 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 9:54 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> Also models (like Einstein Field Equations) make predictions of outcomes 
> that are at odds with observations 
>
>
> So at last you agree that we use theories to make predictions and we 
> compare them with observations.
>
>
> Sometimes. But nothing (except for some nagging critics in the science 
press) says we have to.

And sometimes we just use them to make science fiction stories.

cf. 
http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/11/can-we-tell-if-theres-wormhole-in-milky.html

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 1:06:04 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
>> observed.
>>
>>
>> It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
>> they can be judged right or wrong* only* if they are predictions of 
>> *observations.*  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
>> donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.
>>
>>
>> Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
>> outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.
>>
>>
>> A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
>> starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will be* 
>> useful *to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  He 
>> should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by humans 
> (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict outcomes in 
> galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may make predictions of 
> outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.
>
>
> In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes.  Which is why it 
> is a problem to interpret the Born rule.
>
>
> How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is a 
> matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon scientific 
> practice. But this is not part of the models.
>
>
> Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism).  But observations 
> are.  Otherwise it's just mathematics.  In QM they are even called 
> "observables".
>
> Brent
>



Throw away any book you have on quantum mechanics that uses the word 
"observables".

@philipthrift 

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Re: Branching on real-world decisions

[Philip Thrift]

Fundamentally, one can have a Many Worlds (a branching universe theory) if 
*reality 
is information*, which has been a trend among physicists for some time, 
e.g. Wheeler's "it from bit", now "it from qubit", but many others that 
talk about the universe being - at the fundamental level - information, or 
quantum information. (Related to the concept that reality is information 
is, perhaps more radically,  that reality is "mathematics".)

Under this view, 

*   Many Words might be a completely coherent "formulation" of reality*. 

But I think it is ultimately completely at odds with a *strictly material* 
(vs. informational) view of reality: the  "real" materialism of Galen 
Strawson (*the common concept of matter is wrong*) for example, or 
"radical" materialism of David Chalmers.

So the mathematics won't tell you one way (Many Worlds) or the other (One 
World), but metaphysics will.


@philipthrift


On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 1:36:05 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> I have been reading Sean Carroll's book "Something Deeply Hidden". It is 
> more reasonable than some of the commentary had led me to believe. The 
> issue at the moment is whether or not all things happen in the quantum 
> multiverse. I argued that just because I might turn left at some point, 
> it does not follow from Many-Worlds QM that in some other world I turn 
> right. 
>
> Carroll agrees with this, despite some reports to the contrary. On page 
> 214 he says "No, you do not cause the wave function to branch by making 
> a decision Branching is the result of a microscopic process 
> amplified to macroscopic scales: a system in a quantum superposition 
> becomes entangled with the environment, leading to decoherence. A 
> decision, on the other hand, is a purely macroscopic phenomenon. There 
> are no decisions being made by the electrons and atoms inside your 
> brain; they're just obeying the laws of physics." 
>
> So there is not a coy of me in some other branch that is typing a 
> completely different email at this moment. 
>
> Carroll also says sensible things about quantum suicide and other moral 
> issues. 
>
> I was, as Brent also reported, a little surprised by his argument that 
> it didn't really matter whether you thought of the splitting of the wave 
> function/universe on a decohered quantum event as spreading at light 
> speed, or as instantaneous throughout the entire universe. (pp. 
> 170-171). I think this reflects the fact that Carroll does not seem to 
> be as opposed to the idea of non-locality as are other advocates of many 
> worlds. However, he does seem to think that the fact that outcomes of 
> experiments are not unique in many-worlds does deflect the impact of 
> Bell's theorem in that theory. "That doesn't mean that Bell's theorem is 
> wrong in Many-Worlds; mathematical theorems are unambiguously right. It 
> just means that the theorem doesn't apply. Bell's result does not imply 
> that we have to include spooky action at a distance in Everettian 
> quantum mechanics, as it does  for boring old single-world theories. The 
> correlations don't come about because of any kind of influence being 
> transmitted faster than light, but because of branching of the wave 
> function into different worlds, in which correlated things happen." (p. 
> 105) 
>
> I think this is wrong, of course. The trouble with this argument is that 
> deflecting Bell's theorem does not automatically mean that your theory 
> is, in fact, local. And, as is usual for many-worlders, Carroll does not 
> go on the actually spell out how the magic of world branching actually 
> gives rise to the observed correlations. (He can't, of course, and that 
> is why the issue is glossed over.) Maudlin, on the other hand, is so 
> pissed off with people thinking that they can subvert Bell's theorem, 
> that he simply states baldly that the quantum mechanical wave function 
> is intrinsically non-local (Philosophy of Quantum Theory, 2019). 
>
> Bruce 
>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

[Alan Grayson]

On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 12:06:04 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
>> observed.
>>
>>
>> It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
>> they can be judged right or wrong* only* if they are predictions of 
>> *observations.*  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
>> donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.
>>
>>
>> Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
>> outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.
>>
>>
>> A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
>> starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will be* 
>> useful *to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  He 
>> should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by humans 
> (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict outcomes in 
> galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may make predictions of 
> outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.
>
>
> In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes.  Which is why it 
> is a problem to interpret the Born rule.
>

*Nomologically possible? What does this mean? I looked it up but don't get 
it. AG *

> How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is a 
> matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon scientific 
> practice. But this is not part of the models.
>
>
> Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism).  But observations 
> are.  Otherwise it's just mathematics.  In QM they are even called 
> "observables".
>
> Brent
>

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Re: The problem with physics

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Well... maybe when you are a 50 years old scientist, you can say that, but 
this is not the spirit in which science is teached to children or 
popularized to laymen. The spirit of science popularization is that it 
gives us the truth, and we should obey or die. If scientists are such moral 
people, then why they don't tell to their students in the first class of 
their course that they will only present to them a model ? Instead, they 
jump right in: "Space is such-and-such, time is such-and-such.". I never 
heard any professor of mine telling us that they are only presenting us 
models.

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 19:23:27 UTC+2, Brent wrote:
>
> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, 
> they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct 
> which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes 
> observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is 
> solely and precisely that it is  expected to work.
> --—John von Neumann
>

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