Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 14, 5:44 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between emerging from truth and embodying logic. You tell me. Emerging from arithmetical truth just means true in arithmetic, or proved by some correct UMs, etc. It is standard terms for logicians, engineers, etc. And it makes perfect sense in that context, but the idea of something being true doesn't cause something to suddenly occur in the experience of people (or whoever lives through cells or atoms) in the universe. I can say that scoring a basket in basketball it worth two points, and that is true in basketball, but that truth does not literally cause a ball to do something to a basket. With comp, first person views are more complex, due to the first person dissemination in infinities of computations, which needs more subtle internal limit, but again comp has a tool which is computer science and math. I prefer to search a key under a lamp. If you are looking for a key that can only be seen when it glows in the dark, then the lamp is exactly what you can't use to search for it. I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I know it follows from comp. How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it has no way to describe in what way the experience differs. That's just free negative speculation. Blue is a quasi singularize deep experience involving collection of experiences, and having some non communicable quality, says the machine. I don't think blue need involve more than one experience and it need not be a deep experience. If you live for one second and see the sky, you have seen blue. The idea of blue being non communicable is not so simple though. Two people who know blue can communicate about it easily, just as mathematicians can communicate about arithmetic easily. The only difference is that arithmetic can be applied to other frames of reference outside of our direct experience but blue cannot. Instead blue can be applied figuratively within our own interiority. We can say we feel blue for sadness, red for anger, green for envy, yellow for cowardice, etc. These vary somewhat from culture to culture, but no culture as far as I know says they feel five for sadness, one for anger, four for envy, etc. Of course if you treat the machine as a zombie, there are few sense that you will ever listening to her. No zombie...puppet. It insults machines to call them zombies - or it would, if they weren't puppets. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic. What does it depend on? That's a mystery. The question is: do you believe in it. Does the theorem of Fermat story makes sense. Does the problem of the distribution of prime numbers make sense to you. All introspecting UMs is confronted to that mystery, and understand that IF they are correct machine, then that mystery is insoluble. That's why I say sense is primitive and not arithmetic. Arithmetic is only real because it makes sense, but sense is not limited to arithmetic. Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting to get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth. and never precedes or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily. What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel the wind? Nothing. What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious assumptions? Then it's an infinite regress of unconscious assumptions that neurons, molecules, atoms, and quantum has to make. Why an infinite regress? Because each assumption supervenes upon a more primitive layer of assumption. If the bottom layer can arbitrarily make initial assumptions, then why not any or all layers? Why is the brain taking orders from cells any better of an explanation than the brain taking orders from itself? It forces an infinitely efficacious microcosmic reality with a whole universe of arbitrary spectator illusions. My thinking is that there is no reason to presume that our relative size and complexity makes us any less grounded in absolute reality. We are direct participants in the universe as much as the brain is. That's about how I see the thing. All UMs are grounded in the absolute arithmetical reality. That's the other way of looking at it, but once you have arithmetic reality, there doesn't seem to be any point to embodied
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the interpretations. So you assume QM? I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. Why not? Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I know it follows from comp. No amount of whats and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) ? The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. This makes brain mysterious. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of the world. Sure, but those things are not as the same level. You are saying that we cannot life science, because we have to alive for doing that. This is incorrect. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic. Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting to get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth. and never precedes or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily. What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel the wind? Nothing. What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious assumptions? Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging question move. I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can. Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory. That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies. The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the person having that body. That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie, there is no confusion and it all
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the interpretations. So you assume QM? I assume the observations, but not the interpretations. For example: I assume that the double slit experiment produces a particular pattern of illumination under the given conditions, but I think that pattern is really interfering waves of sensitivity spread across the target, rather than a literal wave of photons in space. I assume that bubble and cloud chambers produce trails under the given conditions, but I don't assume that means that a physical particle has penetrated the chamber - it could be an event within the chamber that has an external cause. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. Why not? Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations. It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between emerging from truth and embodying logic. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I know it follows from comp. How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it has no way to describe in what way the experience differs. No amount of whats and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) ? What and how are questions that can be asked about literal machines. Who and why are questions that can be asked about figurative stories. They don't mix, but they are symmetrical aspects of the same underlying when where root sense. Actors (who and why) + Stage (what and how) = Show (when and where). The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. This makes brain mysterious. No more than the back side of a tapestry. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We are saying, in effect,
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. But how, precisely? I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual nesting. Are you assuming quantum mechanics? I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent qualia and having no qualia, also. A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by the puppet master. Which means that the puppet is not autonomous, like a human, or its behaviorally equivalent zombie. The difference between absent qualia and no qualia is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well. OK. It is consciousness with a lacking qualia. Philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, and all qualia. that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Not perfectly imitating, no. Sorry but it is the definition. That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a practical realism. But we reason about theory. That's what that whole business of substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants (even itself - since if it didn't
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 12, 6:54 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. But how, precisely? It doesn't translate as a how or what, it's a who and why. How do you make your signature your own? How do you stay the same person even thought your body changes? It doesn't work that way, it's a whole other sense which is symmetrical but anomalous to the what and how senses of 3p architecture. I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual nesting. Are you assuming quantum mechanics? I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the interpretations. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. Why not? I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. No amount of whats and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of the world. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis and never precedes or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily. What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel the wind? Nothing. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Bruno: Machine or human 1p = (1p(f(x)) - Subjectivity arises as a result of the 1p set of functional consequences of specific arithmetic truths, which (I think) are neither object, subject, or sense, but Platonic universal numbers. Is that close? I just say that IF we are machine, then some tiny part of arithmetical truth is ontologically enough, to derive matter and consciousness, and is necessary (up to recursive equivalence). Subjectivity comes from self-reference + Truth. Truth about a weaker LUM is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question) arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. Dennett thinks that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each other. Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and cannot doubt it. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity. Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. No, only seven or so nestings: Physical Chemical Biological Zoological Neurological Anthropological Individual Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Not perfectly imitating, no. That's what that whole business of substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be used to detect the puppet strings). The first consideration with this is that it would need to be extended to have a duration value because any puppet might not reveal it's strings in a short conversation. A TD00 program might decay to TD75 in an hour, and TD99 in two hours, so there could be a function plotted there. It may not be a simple arithmetic rise over time, participants may change their mind back and forth (and I think that they might) over time. There could be patterns in that too, where our expectations wax and wane with some kind of regularity for some people and not for others. It's not just time duration though, we would need to factor in the quantity and quality of data. How hard the questions are and how many of them. Answering long questions too fast would be a dead giveaway. A sparse conversation may have giveaways too - how they express impatience with long delays, whether they bring up parts of the conversation during the gaps, all kinds of subtle clues in the semantic character of what the program focuses on. There are so many variables that it may not even be useful to try to model it. The TD will undoubtedly be affected by how the participants have been prepared, whether they have experience with AI or have seen documentaries about it just before or whether they have been instead prepared with sentimental stories or crime dramas which sensitize them or desensitize them to certain attitudes and behavior. If the program speaks in LOL INTERWEBZ slang, or general informal terms vs precise scientific terms that would have an effect as well. Whether or not a true TD00 - universal human puppet could be possible in theory or practice is not what I'm speculating on. If I were to speculate, I would say that no, it is not possible. I don't think that even a real human could be TD00 to all other humans for all times and situations. That's because it's a continuum of 'seems like' rather than a condition which 'simply is' - it's indexical to subject and circumstance. All of this in no way means that the TD level implies actual simulation of subjectivity. TD is only a measure of imitation success. As I have said, the only way I can think of to come close to knowing whether a given imitation is a simulation is to walk your brain function over to the program, one hemisphere at a time, and then walk it back after a few hours or days. Short of that, we can either be generous with our projection and imagine that puppets, computers, and programs are potential human beings given the right degree of sophistication, or we can be more conservative and limit our scope so that we only give other humans, animals, or living organisms the benefit of the doubt. I think the more
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? Dennett thinks that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each other. Yes. Even in the physical sense. I am not sure if he really means that we know that, but then I am used to give a strong sense to knowing. Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and cannot doubt it. OK. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity. OK. If we doubt it, we have a subjective experience. If we don't doubt it, too. So we cannot doubt it. Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. No, only seven or so nestings: Physical Chemical Biological Zoological Neurological Anthropological Individual By UDA to have no comp you will have to continue such nesting in the Physical. I let you this as a non completely trivial exercise. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent qualia and having no qualia, also. that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Not perfectly imitating, no. Sorry but it is the definition. That's what that whole business of substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be used to detect the puppet strings). ? By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine. (That happens!)). By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The only difference is that they lack the 1p experience. The first consideration with this is that it would need to be extended to have a duration value because any puppet might not reveal it's strings in a short conversation. A TD00 program might decay to TD75 in an hour, and TD99 in two hours, so there could be a function plotted there. It may not be a simple arithmetic rise over time, participants may change their mind back and forth (and I think that they might) over time. There could be patterns in that too, where our expectations wax and wane with some kind of regularity for some people and not for others. It's not just time duration though, we would need to factor in the quantity and quality of data. How hard the questions are and how many of them. Answering long questions too fast would be a dead giveaway. A sparse conversation may have giveaways too - how they express impatience with long delays, whether they bring up parts of the conversation during the gaps, all kinds of subtle clues in the semantic character of what the program focuses on. There are so many variables that it may not even be useful to try to model it. The TD will undoubtedly be affected by how the participants have been prepared, whether they have experience with AI or have seen documentaries about it just before or whether they have been instead prepared with sentimental stories or crime dramas which sensitize them or desensitize them to certain attitudes and
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. This is a very different scaling than 3p, since there is a continuum of voluntary and involuntary incorporation. It's not a bunch of discrete gears or subroutines, it is a fugue of directly and indirectly experienced motives Dennett thinks that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each other. Yes. Even in the physical sense. I am not sure if he really means that we know that, but then I am used to give a strong sense to knowing. Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and cannot doubt it. OK. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity. OK. If we doubt it, we have a subjective experience. If we don't doubt it, too. So we cannot doubt it. Yes! Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. No, only seven or so nestings: Physical Chemical Biological Zoological Neurological Anthropological Individual By UDA to have no comp you will have to continue such nesting in the Physical. I let you this as a non completely trivial exercise. I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual nesting. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent qualia and having no qualia, also. A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by the puppet master. The difference between absent qualia and no qualia is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well. that is: the existence of
1p 3p comparison
Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is an illusion Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Bruno: Machine or human 1p = (1p(f(x)) - Subjectivity arises as a result of the 1p set of functional consequences of specific arithmetic truths, which (I think) are neither object, subject, or sense, but Platonic universal numbers. Is that close? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
